53 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Thiboutot v. Stategreen2 sentences2004There was no distinction between the type of relief sought by Well-man and the type of relief sought in Thiboutot v. State, 405 A.2d 230, 237 (Me.1979), in which we concluded that “sovereign immunity barred retroactive recovery of AFDC welfare underpayments ... at least when ... there is no allegation or evidence of bad faith, racial discrimination or other constitutionally impermissible purpose.” Wellman, 574 A.2d at 884 . [¶ 10] Sovereign immunity also bars plaintiffs from retroactively recovering “pass-through” welfare benefits that are withheld by the Department. 1995Nevertheless, I agree, in light of Thiboutot v. State, 405 A.2d 230, 236-37 (Me.1979), aff'd on other grounds, 448 U.S. 1 , 100 S.Ct. 2502 , 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980), and Drake v. Smith, 390 A.2d 541, 543, 546 (Me.1978), that we have relied in the past on federal Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity jurisprudence to develop our own doctrine of sovereign immunity. | 4 | 4 |
Drake v. Smithgreen2 sentences1998Similarly, the Maine Legislature may waive the State’s sovereign immunity only by enacting "a general law plainly conferring the State’s consent to be sued as to a class of cases,” or by dealing “specifically with a particular action sought to be brought against the State and giv[ing] its plainly stated consent that the State be sued in that action.” Drake v. Smith, 390 A.2d 541, 544 (Me. 1978). 1998The Court reasoned: "we perceive nothing in the overtime and minimum-wage requirements of the FLSA ... that is destructive of state sovereignty or violative of any constitutional provision." Id. at 554 , 105 S.Ct. 1005 . [4] Similarly, the Maine Legislature may waive the State's sovereign immunity only by enacting "a general law plainly conferring the State's consent to be sued as to a class of cases," or by dealing "specifically with a particular action sought to be brought against the State and giv[ing] its plainly stated consent that the State be sued in that action." Drake v. Smith, 390 A. | 3 | 8 |
Wellman v. Department of Human Servicesgreen2 sentences2013See Wellman v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 574 A.2d 879, 884 (Me. 1990) (holding that sovereign immunity barred retroactive recovery of any previously made payments). 2004There was no distinction between the type of relief sought by Well-man and the type of relief sought in Thiboutot v. State, 405 A.2d 230, 237 (Me.1979), in which we concluded that “sovereign immunity barred retroactive recovery of AFDC welfare underpayments ... at least when ... there is no allegation or evidence of bad faith, racial discrimination or other constitutionally impermissible purpose.” Wellman, 574 A.2d at 884 . [¶ 10] Sovereign immunity also bars plaintiffs from retroactively recovering “pass-through” welfare benefits that are withheld by the Department. | 3 | 5 |
Faucher v. City of Auburngreen2 sentences1990We have previously stated that the Act constitutes a limited relaxation of the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, see Faucher v. City of Auburn, 465 A.2d 1120, 1124 (Me.1983), and as a part of that statutory scheme, noncomplianee with the requirement that notice be filed within 180 days after the cause of action accrues will be excused only on a showing of good cause why notice could not reasonably have been filed within that time limit. 1985In Faucher v. City of Auburn, 465 A.2d 1120, 1124 (Me.1983), we recognized that the Maine Tort Claims Act is the statutory reformulation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. | 3 | 3 |
Davies v. City of Bathgreen2 sentences2022ANALYSIS A. Maine Tort Claims Act The Legislature enacted the MTCA, 14 M.R.S. §§ 8101-8118, to reestablish the sovereign immunity of governmental entities in Maine from tort claims seeking money damages, after the Law Court abrogated the common law immunity of these entities in Davies v. City ofBath, 364 A.2d 1269, 1273 (Me. 1976). 2012The Maine Tort Claims Act The Law Court abrogated the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity in Davis v. Bath, 364 A.2d 1269 (Me. 1976). | 2 | 7 |
Ginn v. Penobscot Companygreen2 sentences2005First, an award of interest is not an inherent part of any money judgment; any award of interest "is based solely on statutory law." Austin v. Austin, 2000 ME 61, ¶ 8 , 748 A.2d 996, 999 ; Ginn v. Penobscot Co., 342 A.2d 270, 276 (Me.1975). [¶ 37] Second, statutory exceptions to sovereign immunity are strictly construed with immunity as the rule and any exceptions narrowly interpreted. 2005First, an award of interest is not an inherent part of any money judgment; any award of interest “is based solely on statutory law.” Austin v. Austin, 2000 ME 61, ¶ 8 , 748 A.2d 996, 999 ; Ginn v. Penobscot Co., 342 A.2d 270, 276 (Me.1975). [¶ 37] Second, statutory exceptions to sovereign immunity are strictly construed with immunity as the rule and any exceptions narrowly interpreted. | 2 | 2 |
Moody v. Commissioner, Department of Human Servicesgreen2 sentences2023Although the Eleventh Amendment is not directly applicable to state comis, the doctrine of sovereign immunity similarly protects the states from actions of state courts." Moody v. Comm 'r, Dep't ofHuman Servs., 661 A.2d 156 , 158 n.3 (Me. 1995). 2008"Although the Eleventh Amendment is not directly applicable to state courts, the doctrine of sovereign immunity similarly protects the states from actions [in] state courts." Moody v. Commissioner, Dept. of Human 6 Servs., 661 A.2d 156 , 158 n.3 (Me. 1995); Alden v. State, 1998 ME 200 , ']I']I 7-11, 715 A.2d 172, 174-75 , aff'd, 527 U.s. 706 (1999). | 1 | 4 |
Bell v. Town of Wellsgreen2 sentences2004These constitutional protections would lose considerable meaning if the doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibited the people from bringing quiet title actions to settle ownership disputes with the State. [¶ 10] As we have said in the past, invoking the doctrine of sovereign immunity in a quiet title action “is illogical because it assumes the merits — the existence of the State’s interest — in order to avoid litigating the merits ... [and] would represent a radical assault on the stability of title to real property within this State and the availability of legal remedies to defend it.” Bell, 5 1989In Bell I, 510 A.2d at 515-18, we vacated that dismissal, holding that plaintiff oceanfront owners, and not the State, presumptively hold fee title to the intertidal land by virtue of the Colonial Ordinance and that the State is not "a trustee of the public easement in the intertidal zone at Moody Beach." Id. at 517. | 1 | 2 |
Nelson v. Maine Turnpike Authoritygreen2 sentences1982Davies v. City of Bath, Me., 364 A.2d 1269 (1976) abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity, overruled Nelson v. Maine Turnpike Authority, 157 Me. 174 , 170 A.2d 687 (1961), and limited its retroactivity to the parties to the case. 1982Davies v. City of Bath, Me., 364 A.2d 1269 (1976) abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity, overruled Nelson v. Maine Turnpike Authority, 157 Me. 174 , 170 A.2d 687 (1961), and limited its retroactivity to the parties to the case. | 1 | 2 |
Leroy H. Johnson, Jr. v. Alex Rodriguez, Etc.green1 sentence2023See Johnson v. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104, 105 (1st Cir. 1991). | 1 | 1 |
Claire Dean Perry v. William T. Dean Jr.green2 sentences2022See Perry, 2017 ME 35, ¶ 24 , 156 A.3d 742 ; Hilderbrand v. Washington Cnty. 2022See Perry, 2017 ME 35, ¶ 24 , 156 A.3d 742 ; Hilderbrand v. Washington Cnty. | 1 | 1 |
Alden v. Mainegreen1 sentence2018While suits for retroactive damages may be maintained against individual governmental employees in certain instances, sovereign immunity still applies when the claims against the individual governmental employees are in effect suits against the State. 44 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756 ("Some suits against state officers are barred by the rule that sovereign immunity is not limited to suits which name the State as a party if the suits are, in fact, against the State."). | 1 | 1 |
Bouchard v. Frostgreen2 sentences2015See 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A. "The immunity of the sovereign from suit is one of the highest attributes inherent in the nature of sovereignty." Bouchard v. Frost, 2004 ME 9 , ~ 9, 840 A.2d 109 (quoting Drake v. SmUh, 390 A.2d 54L 543 (Me. 1978)). 2015See 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A. "The immunity of the sovereign from suit is one of the highest attributes inherent in the nature of sovereignty." Bouchard v. Frost, 2004 ME 9 , ~ 9, 840 A.2d 109 (quoting Drake v. SmUh, 390 A.2d 54L 543 (Me. 1978)). | 1 | 1 |
New Orleans Tanker Corp. v. Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences2009New Orleans Tanker Corp. v. Dep’t of Transp., 1999 ME 67, ¶ 5 , 728 A.2d 673, 675 (recognizing that “we start from the premise that immunity is the rule and exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed”). 2009New Orleans Tanker Corp. v. Dep’t of Transp., 1999 ME 67, ¶ 5 , 728 A.2d 673, 675 (recognizing that “we start from the premise that immunity is the rule and exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed”). | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Commissioner of the Department of Human Servicesgreen2 sentences2008See Anderson v. Commissioner ofthe Department ofHuman Services, 489 A.2d 1094, 1095, n. 1 (citing Thiboutot v. State, 405 A.2d 230,232-33 (Me. 1979). jurisdiction provided by statute in the context of SOB and C to "reverse or modify he decision if the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions are ...affected by bias ... " Such explicit statutory jurisdiction to enforce the consent agreement does not exist in its judicial review jurisdiction under SOc. 2008See Anderson v. Commissioner ofthe Department ofHuman Services, 489 A.2d 1094, 1095, n. 1 (citing Thiboutot v. State, 405 A.2d 230,232-33 (Me. 1979). jurisdiction provided by statute in the context of SOB and C to "reverse or modify he decision if the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions are ...affected by bias ... " Such explicit statutory jurisdiction to enforce the consent agreement does not exist in its judicial review jurisdiction under SOc. | 1 | 1 |
Winston v. Maine Technical College Systemgreen2 sentences2008See 14 M.R.S. § 8111(1); see also Winston v. Maine Technical College Sys., 631 A.2d 70, 76 (Me. 1993); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (Generally, government officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity "shielding them from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with rights they are alleged to have violated"); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law"). 7 The System is even more clearly an alter eg 2008Id. | 1 | 1 |
| Anderson v. Creightongreen | 1 | 1 |
Malley v. Briggsgreen1 sentence2008See 14 M.R.S. § 8111(1); see also Winston v. Maine Technical College Sys., 631 A.2d 70, 76 (Me. 1993); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (Generally, government officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity "shielding them from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with rights they are alleged to have violated"); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law"). 7 The System is even more clearly an alter eg | 1 | 1 |
| Whalen v. Massachusetts Trial Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Colorado Springs v. Timberlane Associatesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Couturier v. Penobscot Indian Nationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Farley v. Department of Human Servicesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Clockedile v. State Department of Transportationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fowles v. Stearnsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| John S. Bottomly v. Passamaquoddy Tribegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moore v. City of Lewistongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jacoby v. Arkansas Department of Educationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ribitzki v. School Bd. of Highlands Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stretton v. City of Lewistongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Foss v. Maine Turnpike Authoritygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Richards v. Ellisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cushing v. Cohengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Knowlton v. Attorney General
green
2 sentences2018The Law Court has previously amalgamated claims against governmental employees into claims against the State for purposes of the application of the State's sovereign immunity without distinguishing between the sovereign immunity applicable to the employees versus the sovereign immunity applicable to the State itself. 27 Cf Knowlton, 2009 ME 79 , 1 1, 976 A.2d 973 (complaint against the Attorney General and the Superintendent of Insurance was treated as claim against the State for which the State had not waived its sovereign immunity). 2018The Law Court has previously amalgamated claims against governmental employees into claims against the State for purposes of the application of the State's sovereign immunity without distinguishing between the sovereign immunity applicable to the employees versus the sovereign immunity applicable to the State itself. 27 Cf Knowlton, 2009 ME 79 , 1 1, 976 A.2d 973 (complaint against the Attorney General and the Superintendent of Insurance was treated as claim against the State for which the State had not waived its sovereign immunity). | 4 | 2017–2021 |
Edelman v. Jordan
green
2 sentences1995Edelman, 415 U.S. at 677 , 94 S.Ct. at 1362-63 . 1995Edelman, 415 U.S. at 677 , 94 S.Ct. at 1362-63 . | 3 | 1979–1995 |
Austin v. Austin
green
2 sentences2005First, an award of interest is not an inherent part of any money judgment; any award of interest “is based solely on statutory law.” Austin v. Austin, 2000 ME 61, ¶ 8 , 748 A.2d 996, 999 ; Ginn v. Penobscot Co., 342 A.2d 270, 276 (Me.1975). [¶ 37] Second, statutory exceptions to sovereign immunity are strictly construed with immunity as the rule and any exceptions narrowly interpreted. 2005First, an award of interest is not an inherent part of any money judgment; any award of interest “is based solely on statutory law.” Austin v. Austin, 2000 ME 61, ¶ 8 , 748 A.2d 996, 999 ; Ginn v. Penobscot Co., 342 A.2d 270, 276 (Me.1975). [¶ 37] Second, statutory exceptions to sovereign immunity are strictly construed with immunity as the rule and any exceptions narrowly interpreted. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Green v. Mansour
green
2 sentences1998The Court began its analysis with the general proposition that in order to abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity Congress must have “ ‘unequivocally expressed] its intent to abrogate the immunity,’ ” and must have done so “ ‘pursuant to a valid exercise of power.’ ” Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55 , 116 S.Ct. 1114 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 , 106 S.Ct. 423 , 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985)). 1998The Court began its analysis with the general proposition that in order to abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity Congress must have “ ‘unequivocally expressed] its intent to abrogate the immunity,’ ” and must have done so “ ‘pursuant to a valid exercise of power.’ ” Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55 , 116 S.Ct. 1114 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 , 106 S.Ct. 423 , 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985)). | 2 | 1995–1998 |
Maine v. Thiboutot
green
2 sentences1995Nevertheless, I agree, in light of Thiboutot v. State, 405 A.2d 230, 236-37 (Me.1979), aff'd on other grounds, 448 U.S. 1 , 100 S.Ct. 2502 , 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980), and Drake v. Smith, 390 A.2d 541, 543, 546 (Me.1978), that we have relied in the past on federal Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity jurisprudence to develop our own doctrine of sovereign immunity. 1995Nevertheless, I agree, in light of Thiboutot v. State, 405 A.2d 230, 236-37 (Me.1979), aff'd on other grounds, 448 U.S. 1 , 100 S.Ct. 2502 , 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980), and Drake v. Smith, 390 A.2d 541, 543, 546 (Me.1978), that we have relied in the past on federal Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity jurisprudence to develop our own doctrine of sovereign immunity. | 2 | 1988–1995 |
Quern v. Jordan
green
2 sentences1979Although the rationale of Edelman seemed to be placed in some doubt by the decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), holding municipalities to be “persons” subject to 1983 actions for both prospective and retroactive relief in federal courts, 7 a recent decision, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 , 99 S.Ct. 1139 , 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979), has reaffirmed Edel-man, interpreting it as holding that Congress did not intend to abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity when it enacted section 1 of Civil Rights Act of 1871, the precursor of sect 1979Although the rationale of Edelman seemed to be placed in some doubt by the decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), holding municipalities to be “persons” subject to 1983 actions for both prospective and retroactive relief in federal courts, 7 a recent decision, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 , 99 S.Ct. 1139 , 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979), has reaffirmed Edel-man, interpreting it as holding that Congress did not intend to abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity when it enacted section 1 of Civil Rights Act of 1871, the precursor of sect | 2 | 1979–1988 |
Sanford v. Town of Shapleigh
green
2 sentences2025Accordingly, our analysis starts from the premise that immunity is the rule and exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed.” (alteration, citation, and quotation marks omitted)); Sanford v. Town of Shapleigh, 2004 ME 73, ¶ 10 , 850 A.2d 325 (“Sovereign immunity is the rule, and liability for 8 governmental entities is the statutorily created narrowly construed exception.” (alterations and quotation marks omitted)). 2025Accordingly, our analysis starts from the premise that immunity is the rule and exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed.” (alteration, citation, and quotation marks omitted)); Sanford v. Town of Shapleigh, 2004 ME 73, ¶ 10 , 850 A.2d 325 (“Sovereign immunity is the rule, and liability for 8 governmental entities is the statutorily created narrowly construed exception.” (alterations and quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Norton v. C.P. Blouin, Inc.
green
1 sentence2022The Court is inclined to agree with this line of cases, because the availability of judicial review here appears to be integral to the constitutional framework, and not subject to a sovereign immunity defense. 21 intends for the provisions of a statute to apply retroactively, 16 the statute must be so applied “unless a specific provision of the state or federal constitution is demonstrated to prohibit such action by the Legislature.” Norton, 511 A.2d at 1061 n.5. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Brann v. State
green
1 sentence2018However, the Law Court originally refrained from deciding, where the State has consented to suit "by adoption of a comprehensive tort claims statute such as the [MTCA] (14 M.R.S .A. §§ 8101 et seq.), whether the assertion that a particular tort claim is not within the scope of such a statute is an assertion of lack ofjurisdiction, or is the assertion ofan affirmative defense." Brann v. State, 424 A.2d 699 , 702 n.3 (Me. 1981). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Lever v. Acadia Hospital Corp.
green
2 sentences2017Corp., 2004 ME 35, ¶ 2 , 845 A.2d 1178 . 3 Although I concur with the Court’s conclusion that Murphy Homes’s quantum meruit claims are barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see Court’s opinion ¶ 16, I do not agree with its assertion that “[a]bsent legislative authorization waiving sovereign immunity, an action to recover money from the State is barred by sovereign immunity.” Id. 2017Corp., 2004 ME 35, ¶ 2 , 845 A.2d 1178 . 3 Although I concur with the Court’s conclusion that Murphy Homes’s quantum meruit claims are barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see Court’s opinion ¶ 16, I do not agree with its assertion that “[a]bsent legislative authorization waiving sovereign immunity, an action to recover money from the State is barred by sovereign immunity.” Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Hanusek v. Southern Maine Medical Center
green
2 sentences2017Although I concur with the Court’s conclusion that Murphy Homes’s quantum meruit claims are barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see Court’s opinion ¶ 16, I do not agree with its assertion that “[a]bsent legislative authorization waiving sovereign immunity,- an action to recover money from the State is barred by sovereign immunity.” Id. 2017Although I concur with the Court’s conclusion that Murphy Homes’s quantum meruit claims are barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see Court’s opinion ¶ 16, I do not agree with its assertion that “[a]bsent legislative authorization waiving sovereign immunity,- an action to recover money from the State is barred by sovereign immunity.” Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Mastriano v. Blyer
green
2 sentences2017Murdock’s Negligence Claim [¶11] When a plaintiff alleges negligence, to survive a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, he “must establish a prima facie case for each element of the cause of action.” Mastriano v. Blyer, 2001 ME 134, ¶ 11 , 2 DPS cross-appeals purely for the purpose of preserving its arguments not reached by the Superior Court that Murdock’s UM claims against DPS were also barred pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the exclusivity and immunity provisions of Maine’s workers’ compensation statute. 6 779 A.2d 951 . 2017Murdock’s Negligence Claim [¶11] When a plaintiff alleges negligence, to survive a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, he “must establish a prima facie case for each element of the cause of action.” Mastriano v. Blyer, 2001 ME 134, ¶ 11 , 2 DPS cross-appeals purely for the purpose of preserving its arguments not reached by the Superior Court that Murdock’s UM claims against DPS were also barred pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the exclusivity and immunity provisions of Maine’s workers’ compensation statute. 6 779 A.2d 951 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Lewis Lubar, Trustee of the Clover Trust v. Frederick W. Connelly
green
2 sentences2017When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, courts are only required to consider "the portions of the record referred to, and the material facts set forth, in the parties' statement of material facts to determine whether there is no genuine dispute of material fact." Lubar v. Connel'Ly, 2014 ME 17 , ~ .'34, 86 A.3d. 642. 27 A. Whether DHHS Itself is Immune from Plaintiffs' Causes of Action This section evaluates DHHS's sovereign immunity defense as to the Plaintiffs' claims against it. 2017When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, courts are only required to consider "the portions of the record referred to, and the material facts set forth, in the parties' statement of material facts to determine whether there is no genuine dispute of material fact." Lubar v. Connel'Ly, 2014 ME 17 , ~ .'34, 86 A.3d. 642. 27 A. Whether DHHS Itself is Immune from Plaintiffs' Causes of Action This section evaluates DHHS's sovereign immunity defense as to the Plaintiffs' claims against it. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Alden v. State green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Maynard v. Commissioner of Corrections green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Graves v. S.E. Downey Registered Land Surveyor, P.A. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Tennessee v. Lane green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| United States v. Wheeler red | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Bunch v. Robinson green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| cluster 570406 green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Director, Maine Bureau of Labor Standards green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs. green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Kerr v. State neutral | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Bale v. Ryder green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Bartashevich v. City of Portland green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Bouchard v. City of Auburn green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Wilde v. Inhabitants of Town of Madison green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Inhabitants of Whiting v. Inhabitants of Lubec green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.