sovereign immunity in Colorado

2025Section 42-4-108(4) provides that “[t]he provisions of th[at] section shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of such driver’s reckless disregard for the safety of others.” But the supreme court held in Fogg v. Macaluso, 892 P.2d 271, 277 (Colo. 1995), that the duty of care referenced in that section doesn’t apply to the sovereign immunity analysis under section 42-4-108(2) and (3).

2020In Fogg v. Macaluso, 892 P.2d 271, 277 (Colo. 1995), the supreme court held that the duty of care referenced in that section does not apply to the sovereign immunity 9 analysis under section 42-4-108(2) and (3).

1995I In 1971 we abrogated the doctrine of sovereign and governmental immunity as unjust and inequitable. § 24-10-102, 10A C.R.S. (1988) (“The General Assembly also recognizes that the supreme court has abrogated the doctrine of sovereign immunity....”); Bertrand v. Board of County Comm’rs, 872 P.2d 223, 226 (Colo.1994) (citing Evans v. Board of County Comm’rs, 174 Colo. 97 , 482 P.2d 968 (1971); Flournoy v. School Dist., 174 Colo. 110 , 482 P.2d 966 (1971); Proffitt v. State, 174 Colo. 113 , 482 P.2d 965 (1971)).

1995I In 1971 we abrogated the doctrine of sovereign and governmental immunity as unjust and inequitable. § 24-10-102, 10A C.R.S. (1988) (“The General Assembly also recognizes that the supreme court has abrogated the doctrine of sovereign immunity....”); Bertrand v. Board of County Comm’rs, 872 P.2d 223, 226 (Colo.1994) (citing Evans v. Board of County Comm’rs, 174 Colo. 97 , 482 P.2d 968 (1971); Flournoy v. School Dist., 174 Colo. 110 , 482 P.2d 966 (1971); Proffitt v. State, 174 Colo. 113 , 482 P.2d 965 (1971)).

2001See Trinity Broadcasting of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, supra. A. The individual defendants first assert that the sovereign immunity of the University, as an arm of the state, extends to them as state officials sued in their official capacity.

1994In Trinity Broadcasting of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916 (Colo.1993), announced after the trial court entered summary judgment in the present ease, our supreme court held that the proper procedure for determining a public entity’s sovereign immunity is C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), not C.R.C.P. 56.

2002See Bloomer v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, supra, 799 P.2d at 945 (the CGIA "makes no provision for waiving the sovereign immunity of counties for dangerous conditions present on county roads") (emphasis added).

2002This interpretation is supported by the statute's legislative history, which shows that the General Assembly intended to protect counties "from being financially overburdened by liability for dangerous conditions that exist on county roads and that the county is financially unable to remedy." Bloomer v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, supra, 799 P.2d at 948 .

2010Analysis The doctrine of sovereign immunity, which insulates states from liability for negli-genee, was abrogated in Colorado by Evans v. Board of County Commissioners, 174 Colo. 97, 104-06 , 482 P.2d 968, 972 (1971).

2010Analysis The doctrine of sovereign immunity, which insulates states from liability for negli-genee, was abrogated in Colorado by Evans v. Board of County Commissioners, 174 Colo. 97, 104-06 , 482 P.2d 968, 972 (1971).

2022Accordingly, this case does not raise a question as to whether Sheriff Elder can be held liable for the willful and wanton conduct of any of his employees, and the authorities on which Sheriff Elder relies are therefore inapposite. ¶35 In so determining, we acknowledge that in Gray v. University of Colorado Hospital Authority, 2012 COA 113, ¶ 27 , 284 P.3d 191 , 196–97, the division concluded that “the CGIA does not provide for the waiver of the sovereign immunity of public entities from suit based either on their own willful and wanton acts or omissions, or their employees’ willful and wanton

2012Our supreme court reached the same conclusion in Middleton v. Hartman, 45 P.3d 721, 728 (Colo.2002): According to the express language of seetion 24-10-110(1)(b)(I), the state is not liable for its employees' willful and wanton conduct.

2017Springer v. City & Cty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 798 (Colo. 2000).

2016Springer v. City & Cty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 798 (Colo. 2000).

1990See Board of County Commissioners v. Atler, 69 Colo. 290 , 194 P. 621 (1920).

1990See Board of County Commissioners v. Atler, 69 Colo. 290 , 194 P. 621 (1920).

2010Colorado has long recognized, even prior to its abrogation of the sovereign immunity doctrine, that where the state or one of its governmental entities enters into a contract, "it thereby waives immunity from suit." Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colo. Dep't of Agric., 136 Colo. 19, 22 , 314 P.2d 278, 280 (1957).

2010Colorado has long recognized, even prior to its abrogation of the sovereign immunity doctrine, that where the state or one of its governmental entities enters into a contract, "it thereby waives immunity from suit." Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colo. Dep't of Agric., 136 Colo. 19, 22 , 314 P.2d 278, 280 (1957).

2016"Sovereign immunity," by contrast, "shall be a bar to any action." Id. (quoting § 24-10-108).

2016Id, The willful and wanton determination at issue in Brace, we concluded, involved a less "basic" of a "prerequisite for immunity." Id. 25 Importantly, Gallagher makes clear that although we cited section 24-10-118(2.5) in Brace as addressing "sovereign immunity," see Brace, 919 P.2d at 245 , we had no opportunity to actually apply the provision in Brace because it was not the law when the operative facts occurred.

2020The Finnie court went on to “clarify that the Trinity procedure . . . includes discovery, ruling without hearings, and affording parties the opportunity to request Trinity hearings.” Id. at 1260 . ¶9 When there is no evidentiary dispute, the court may rule on the C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion and decide the sovereign immunity 5 question without a hearing, based on the pleadings alone.

2018Id. at 1261 .

2020There, we held that claims brought pursuant to the Liability of Peace Officers Act, § 29-5-111, C.R.S. (2020), were not subject to the CGIA because “liability of a municipality’s police has traditionally existed despite the doctrine of sovereign immunity,” and thus “the legislature’s enactment of the [CGIA] was without effect on a peace officer’s vulnerability to liability.” Antonopoulos, 532 P.2d at 349 .

2020There, we held that claims brought pursuant to the Liability of Peace Officers Act, § 29-5-111, C.R.S. (2020), were not subject to the CGIA because “liability of a municipality’s police has traditionally existed despite the doctrine of sovereign immunity,” and thus “the legislature’s enactment of the [CGIA] was without effect on a peace officer’s vulnerability to liability.” Antonopoulos, 532 P.2d at 349 .

2009Indeed, a "waiver of the Federal Government's sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text ... and will not be implied." Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187, 192 , 116 S.Ct. 2092, 2096 , *750 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996).

2009Indeed, a "waiver of the Federal Government's sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text ... and will not be implied." Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187, 192 , 116 S.Ct. 2092, 2096 , *750 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996).

2016Based on this distinction, we determined that "the legislature did not intend an individual defendant's immunity from tort suits, although derived from *321 sovereign immunity, to have the same initially preclusive effect from suit." Id. at 246, We reasoned that the "willful and wanton" standard of section 24-10-118(2)(a) bolstered this conclusion because it "mandate[d] a fact based determination ... not susceptible to resolution at an early stage in the litigation process before significant discovery has been undertaken unless there are no dlsputed issues of fact." Id. 122 We substantially li

2014Gallagher, 54 P.3d at 394 (citing Brace, 919 P.2d at 245-46 ).

2012After applying those definitions, each division held that the vehicle in question was not a "motor vehicle." Therefore, the public entity's sovereign immunity was not waived. 125 In Bain v. Town of Avon, 820 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Colo.App.1991), the division concluded that a backhoe did not fall within the definition of "motor vehicle." The division noted that the evidence demonstrated that there was no place on the backhoe for transporting passengers, there was no cargo area, and the maximum speed at which the backhoe could be operated safely was fifteen miles per hour.

2012Id.

2026DeForrest v. City of Cherry Hills Vill. , 990 P.2d 1139, 1144 (Colo.App. 1999) (citing § 2-4-102, C.R.S. (2025)). ¶15 We strictly construe immunity provisions since they are in derogation of the common law, and we broadly construe waiver provisions.

2025“Sovereign immunity is waived by a public entity in an action for 4 injuries resulting from . . . [a] dangerous condition of a public . . . sidewalk which was designed and intended for public travel . . . .” § 24-10-106(1)(d)(I). ¶ 11 “[P]ublic entities are liable for dangerous conditions on sidewalks . . . .” City of Aspen v. Meserole, 803 P.2d 950, 955 (Colo. 1990).

2022Sovereign immunity is waived by a public entity in an action for injuries resulting from: .... (c) A dangerous condition of any public building.2 Section 24-10-103(1.3), C.R.S. 2021, contains a definition of “dangerous condition.” In Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo. 1998), the supreme court interpreted this definition to mean that immunity is waived under section 24-10-106(1)(c) if the injuries occurred as a result of (1) the physical condition of the public facility or the use thereof; (2) which constitutes an unreasonable risk to the health or safety of the public; 2 The University does