sovereign immunity in Tennessee

2026This doctrine of sovereign immunity “has been a part of the common law of Tennessee for more than a century and [it] provides that suit may not be brought against a governmental entity unless that governmental entity has consented to be sued.” Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tenn.1997).

2026This doctrine of sovereign immunity “has been a part of the common law of Tennessee for more than a century and [it] provides that suit may not be brought against a governmental entity unless that governmental entity has consented to be sued.” Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tenn.1997).

2026A “waiver of sovereign immunity must be explicit, not implicit.” -4- Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 853 (Tenn. 2008). “[C]ourts will interpret a statute as waiving the State’s sovereign immunity only if the legislation waives sovereign immunity ‘in plain, clear and unmistakable’ terms.” Crouch v. Univ. of Tenn., No. E2023-00023-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 2319652 , at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 2024) (quoting Smith v. Tenn. Nat’l Guard, 551 S.W.3d 702, 709 (Tenn. 2018)).

2016In Colonial Pipeline Company v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d at 827 (Tenn. 2008), the Tennessee Supreme Court specifically addressed the interplay between the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the Declaratory Judgment Act in the context of subject matter jurisdiction.

2015Co., 519 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Tenn. 1975) (“This Court does not regard with favor the doctrine of sovereign immunity as applied to municipal or county governments.”).

2014Co., 519 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Tenn.1975) (“This Court does not regard with favor the doctrine of sovereign immunity as applied to municipal or county governments.”).

2026The doctrine of sovereign immunity extends to the State’s political subdivisions, see Lawson v. Hawkins County, 661 S.W.3d 54 , 59 (Tenn. 2023), and to its employees acting in their official capacities, see Greenhill v. Carpenter, 718 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). - 15 - However, the State’s sovereign immunity is not absolute, and it may be waived when the State has specifically consented to being sued.

2010Catalano for his lack of success in being placed on a payment plan, despite his claims that he wrote a letter to, and left voice mails for, Mr. Catalano. -5- “A suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is a ‘suit against the state.’” Newell v. Maitland, No. W2007-01704-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 2122331 , at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2008) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 1, 2008) (citing Whitaker v. Whirlpool Corp., 32 S.W.3d 222, 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Greenhill v. Carpenter, 718 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986)) (footnote omitted). “‘Historically, the doctrine of soverei

2018As the Tennessee Supreme Court explained in Lucius v. City of Memphis, 925 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1996): The doctrine of sovereign immunity, which has been a part of Tennessee law for more than a century, provides that suit may not be brought against a governmental entity except to the extent that the governmental entity has consented to be sued.

2018As the Tennessee Supreme Court explained in Lucius v. City of Memphis, 925 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1996): The doctrine of sovereign immunity, which has been a part of Tennessee law for more than a century, provides that suit may not be brought against a governmental entity except to the extent that the governmental entity has consented to be sued.

2018Cruse v. City of Columbia, 922 S.W.2d 492 (Tenn. 1996).

2018Cruse v. City of Columbia, 922 S.W.2d 492 (Tenn. 1996).

2021DISCUSSION Pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, “the State of Tennessee is immune from lawsuits ‘except as it consents to be sued.’” Smith v. Tenn. Nat’l Guard, 551 S.W.3d 702, 708 (Tenn. 2018) (quoting Stewart v. State, 33 S.W.3d 785, 790 (Tenn. 2000)).

2021DISCUSSION Pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, “the State of Tennessee is immune from lawsuits ‘except as it consents to be sued.’” Smith v. Tenn. Nat’l Guard, 551 S.W.3d 702, 708 (Tenn. 2018) (quoting Stewart v. State, 33 S.W.3d 785, 790 (Tenn. 2000)).

2026Therefore, “[w]e will not find a waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity unless there is a statute clearly and unmistakably disclosing an intent upon the part of the [General Assembly] to permit such litigation.” Davidson, 227 S.W.3d at 19 (quoting Scates v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Union City, 265 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1954)).

2019The Tennessee Supreme Court agreed, first noting the general rule that the court “will not find a waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity ‘unless there is a statute clearly and unmistakably disclosing an intent upon the part of the Legislature to permit such litigation.’” Id. at 19 (citing Scates v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Union City, 196 Tenn. 274 , 265 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tenn. 1954)).

2015Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, suit “may not be brought against a governmental entity unless that governmental entity has consented to be sued.” Doyle v. Frost, 49 S.W.3d 853, 857 (Tenn.2001) (citing Hawks, 960 S.W.2d at 14 ).

2015Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, suit “may not be brought against a governmental entity unless that governmental entity has consented to be sued.” Doyle v. Frost, 49 S.W.3d 853, 857 (Tenn.2001) (citing Hawks, 960 S.W.2d at 14 ).

2011The doctrine of sovereign immunity generally prohibits suits against the State unless the legislature has abrogated or waived immunity. “[A]ny abrogation of the immunity doctrine by the legislature must be set out in ‘plain, clear, and unmistakable terms.’” Wells, -4- 231 S.W.3d at 917 (quoting Northland Ins.

2010Catalano for his lack of success in being placed on a payment plan, despite his claims that he wrote a letter to, and left voice mails for, Mr. Catalano. -5- “A suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is a ‘suit against the state.’” Newell v. Maitland, No. W2007-01704-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 2122331 , at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2008) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 1, 2008) (citing Whitaker v. Whirlpool Corp., 32 S.W.3d 222, 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Greenhill v. Carpenter, 718 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986)) (footnote omitted). “‘Historically, the doctrine of soverei

2015This construction comports with notions of fundamental fairness and justice, and also with the Supreme Court’s often-repeated “established view that disfavors the doctrine of sovereign immunity as applied to local governments.” Lucius, 925 S.W.2d at 526; see also Jenkins v. Loudon Cnty., 736 S.W.2d 603, 605-06 (Tenn. 1987), 59 S.W.3d 73, 83 (Tenn. 2001), (stating that the Court “does not regard with favor the doctrine of sovereign immunity as applied to municipal or county governments”); Johnson v. Oman Constr.

2014Ctr., 59 S.W.3d 73, 83 (Tenn.2001), (stating that the Court “does not regard with favor the doctrine of sovereign immunity as applied to municipal or county governments”); Johnson v. Oman Constr.

2015This construction comports with notions of fundamental fairness and justice, and also with the Supreme Court’s often-repeated “established view that disfavors the doctrine of sovereign immunity as applied to local governments.” Lucius, 925 S.W.2d at 526; see also Jenkins v. Loudon Cnty., 736 S.W.2d 603, 605-06 (Tenn. 1987), 59 S.W.3d 73, 83 (Tenn. 2001), (stating that the Court “does not regard with favor the doctrine of sovereign immunity as applied to municipal or county governments”); Johnson v. Oman Constr.

2014This construction comports with notions of fundamental fairness and justice, and also with the Supreme Court’s often-repeated “established view that disfavors the doctrine of sovereign immunity as applied to local governments.” Lucius, 925 S.W.2d at 526; see also Jenkins v. Loudon Cnty., 736 S.W.2d 603, 605-06 (Tenn.1987), abrogated on other grounds by Limbaugh v. Coffee Med.

2007Kirby v. Macon County, 892 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tenn. 1994).

2002Kirby v. Macon County, 892 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tenn. 1994).

2015In feudal England the King was . at the very pinnacle- of the power structure and was answerable to no court since ‘the King can do no wrong,’ ” Cruse v. City of Columbia; 922 S.W.2d 492, 495 (Tenn.1996) (quoting Cooper v. Rutherford Cnty., 531 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tenn.1975) (Henry, J., dissenting)).

1981In Cooper v. Rutherford County, 531 S.W.2d 783 (Tenn.1975), the Supreme Court refused to abrogate the doctrine of sovereign immunity to allow recovery from a county for a defective bridge which was alleged to be a trap and a nuisance and said: The theory of nuisance has been urged in the Courts of Tennessee for many years, in an effort to circumvent the bar of governmental immunity.

2026A statute waiving the State’s sovereign immunity from suit must do so by a clear and unmistakable expression of the General Assembly’s “intent to permit claims against the State.” Smith, 551 S.W.3d at 709 (quoting Davidson v. Lewis Bros.

2026A “waiver of sovereign immunity must be explicit, not implicit.” -4- Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 853 (Tenn. 2008). “[C]ourts will interpret a statute as waiving the State’s sovereign immunity only if the legislation waives sovereign immunity ‘in plain, clear and unmistakable’ terms.” Crouch v. Univ. of Tenn., No. E2023-00023-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 2319652 , at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 2024) (quoting Smith v. Tenn. Nat’l Guard, 551 S.W.3d 702, 709 (Tenn. 2018)).

2019Co. v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727, 731 (Tenn. 2000)).

2011Co. v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727, 731 (Tenn. 2000); accord Scates v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Union City, 265 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tenn. 1954).

2015Armstrong, No. M1999- 00713-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 134601 , at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2001) (citing Shell v. State, 893 S.W.2d 416, 420 (Tenn. 1995); Pool v. State, 987 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)).

2005Pool v. State, 987 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

2008“Historically, the doctrine of sovereign immunity has provided that a sovereign governmental entity cannot be sued in its own courts absent legislative consent.” Wells v. Tenn. Bd. of Regents, 231 S.W.3d 912, 916 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tenn. 1997); Williams v. State, 139 S.W.3d 308, 311 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)).

2008“Historically, the doctrine of sovereign immunity has provided that a sovereign governmental entity cannot be sued in its own courts absent legislative consent.” Wells v. Tenn. Bd. of Regents, 231 S.W.3d 912, 916 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tenn. 1997); Williams v. State, 139 S.W.3d 308, 311 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)).

2008Any statute purporting to waive the State’s sovereign immunity must be “so plain, clear and unmistakable as to leave no room for doubt of the intention of the legislature.” Quinton v. Board of Claims, 165 Tenn. at 214-15, 54 S.W.2d at 957; Hise v. State, 968 S.W.2d 852, 853 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

2003Any statute purporting to waive the State’s sovereign immunity must be “so plain, clear and unmistakable as to leave no doubt of the intention of the legislature.” Quinton v. Board of Claims, 165 Tenn. at 214-15 , 54 S.W.2d at 957 ; Hise v. State, 968 S.W.2d 852, 853 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

2026Therefore, “[w]e will not find a waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity unless there is a statute clearly and unmistakably disclosing an intent upon the part of the [General Assembly] to permit such litigation.” Davidson, 227 S.W.3d at 19 (quoting Scates v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Union City, 265 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1954)).

2019The Tennessee Supreme Court agreed, first noting the general rule that the court “will not find a waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity ‘unless there is a statute clearly and unmistakably disclosing an intent upon the part of the Legislature to permit such litigation.’” Id. at 19 (citing Scates v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Union City, 196 Tenn. 274 , 265 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tenn. 1954)).

2026See Sneed, 459 S.W.3d at 27 (concluding that because the THRA “provides broad remedies to prevailing parties” in civil actions and because the Code specifically identified governmental employers as permissible parties to such claims, the General Assembly’s “clear legislative intent” was to remove the State’s sovereign immunity in this context by “plac[ing] governmental employers in the same standing as private employers.”) (first citing Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4 - 21-102, -311; and then citing Eason v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 866 S.W.2d 952, 955 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)).

2019“The doctrine of sovereign immunity . . . provides that suit may not be brought against the government unless the government has consented to be sued[.]” Sneed v. City of Red Bank, Tennessee, 459 S.W.3d 17, 23 (Tenn. 2014) (citing Tenn. Const. art.

2012Brown v. State, 783 S.W.2d 567, 571 (Tenn.Ct.App.1989) (citing Austin v. City of Memphis, 684 S.W.2d 624, 637 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984)).

1999Austin v. City of Memphis, 684 S.W.2d 624, 637 (Tenn. App. 1984).

2007See, e.g., Lynn v. City of Jackson, 63 S.W.3d 332, 337 (Tenn.2001) (a litigant may not rely on Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-115, which “saves” for one year a case for filing in state court after a federal court has dismissed it for a lack of jurisdiction, to extend the state Government Tort Liability Act (GLTA)’s one-year statute of limitations, because the GLTA contains no waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity); Roettger v. Metro.

2007The Tennessee Supreme Court reached a very similar result in Lynn v. City of Jackson, 63 S.W.3d 332 (Tenn.2001), when it concluded that the doctrine of sovereign *101 immunity barred application of the saving statute to a claim brought against a governmental entity pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (the “GTLA”).

2007Article I, Section 17, of the Tennessee Constitution provides that “[s]uits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as the Legislature may by law direct.” This section has long been interpreted as embodying the doctrine of sovereign immunity, under which no suit may be maintained against the State “absent express authorization from the Legislature.” See Spencer v. Cardwell, 937 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996) (citing Coffman v. City of Pulaski 220 Tenn. 642 , 422 S.W.2d 429 (1967)).

2007Article I, Section 17, of the Tennessee Constitution provides that “[s]uits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as the Legislature may by law direct.” This section has long been interpreted as embodying the doctrine of sovereign immunity, under which no suit may be maintained against the State “absent express authorization from the Legislature.” See Spencer v. Cardwell, 937 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996) (citing Coffman v. City of Pulaski 220 Tenn. 642 , 422 S.W.2d 429 (1967)).

2026Thus, “[t]he Tennessee Claims Commission Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-301 et seq., waives the state’s sovereign immunity and provides claimants with a cause of action—and a deep pocket—that they would not otherwise be able to pursue.” Haley v. Univ. of Tennessee-Knoxville, 188 S.W.3d 518, 524 (Tenn. 2006).

2016Although the Act operates as a waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity and provides claimants with a “deep pocket” that they would not otherwise be able to pursue, it also “imposes a strict election of remedies requirement.” Haley v. Univ. of Tenn-Knoxville, 188 S.W.3d 518, 524 (Tenn.2006).

2026Lawson, 661 S.W.3d at 59 (citing Hughes v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 340 S.W.3d 352, 360-61 (Tenn. 2011)).

2021Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 340 S.W.3d 352, 360 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting Tenn. Const. art.

2008In Stockton v. Morris & Pierce, 172 Tenn. 197 , 110 S.W.2d 480 (1937), however, we *850 held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar suits against state officers to prevent them from enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional statute. 15 Stockton involved a suit in replevin instituted by tobacco dealers against the State Department of Finance to recover tobacco products that were seized pursuant to an unconstitutional statute.

2008In Stockton v. Morris & Pierce, 172 Tenn. 197 , 110 S.W.2d 480 (1937), however, we *850 held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar suits against state officers to prevent them from enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional statute. 15 Stockton involved a suit in replevin instituted by tobacco dealers against the State Department of Finance to recover tobacco products that were seized pursuant to an unconstitutional statute.

2013The original framers of our Constitution recognized that justice and good policy might require exceptions to this rule, Hembree v. State, No. 01A01-9306-BC-00279, 1995 WL 50066 , at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 1995), aff'd, 925 S.W.2d 513 (Tenn.1996).

2003Hembree v. State, 925 S.W.2d 513, 516 (Tenn. 1996); Beare Co. v. Olsen, 711 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tenn. 1986); Stokes v. University of Tennessee, 737 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

2010The doctrine of sovereign immunity ‘“has been a part of the common law of Tennessee for more than a century.’ ” Id. (quoting Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tenn.1997)).

2010The doctrine of sovereign immunity ‘“has been a part of the common law of Tennessee for more than a century.’ ” Id. (quoting Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tenn.1997)).

2003Any statute purporting to waive the State’s sovereign immunity must be “so plain, clear and unmistakable as to leave no doubt of the intention of the legislature.” Quinton v. Board of Claims, 165 Tenn. at 214-15 , 54 S.W.2d at 957 ; Hise v. State, 968 S.W.2d 852, 853 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

2003Any statute purporting to waive the State’s sovereign immunity must be “so plain, clear and unmistakable as to leave no doubt of the intention of the legislature.” Quinton v. Board of Claims, 165 Tenn. at 214-15 , 54 S.W.2d at 957 ; Hise v. State, 968 S.W.2d 852, 853 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).