sovereign immunity in Connecticut

2022The first exception . . . occurs when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statu- torily waives the state’s sovereign immunity; the second exception occurs when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and the third exception occurs when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer’s statutory authority.’’ (

2022Klewin Northeast, LLC v. Fleming ( 284 Conn. 250 ) and Gold v. Rowland ( 296 Conn. 186 ), which required claims for injunctive relief against the state to satisfy one of the exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, there was no categorical exception to sovereign immunity for applications for writs of mandamus; furthermore, the trial court improperly determined that the plaintiff’s requests for mandamus relief had to rise and fall together and, therefore, improperly dismissed the portion of the first count of the complaint seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the defendants to act on i

2019The first exception, as discussed in part I of this opinion, occurs ‘‘when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statu- torily waives the state’s sovereign immunity’’; the sec- ond exception occurs ‘‘when an action seeks declara- tory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights’’; and the third exception occurs ‘‘when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in

2019The first exception, as discussed in part I of this opinion, occurs ‘‘when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statu- torily waives the state’s sovereign immunity’’; the sec- ond exception occurs ‘‘when an action seeks declara- tory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights’’; and the third exception occurs ‘‘when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in

2016Because § 13a-144 is a "legislative exception to the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity," the statute should "be strictly construed in favor of the state." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stotler v. Dept. of Transportation, 313 Conn. 158 , 166, 96 A.3d 527 (2014) ; White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307 , 312-13, 567 A.2d 1195 (1990).

2016Because § 13a-144 is a "legislative exception to the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity," the statute should "be strictly construed in favor of the state." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stotler v. Dept. of Transportation, 313 Conn. 158 , 166, 96 A.3d 527 (2014) ; White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307 , 312-13, 567 A.2d 1195 (1990).

2025Where there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect which makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); see also Envirotest Systems Corp. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 293 Conn. 382, 388 , 978 A.2d 49 (2009) (‘‘a plaintiff seeking to circumvent the doctrine of sover- eign immunity must show that . . . the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waived the state’s sovereign immunity’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2025Where there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect which makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); see also Envirotest Systems Corp. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 293 Conn. 382, 388 , 978 A.2d 49 (2009) (‘‘a plaintiff seeking to circumvent the doctrine of sover- eign immunity must show that . . . the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waived the state’s sovereign immunity’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2022Therefore, because the plaintiff’s claim ultimately is an action for money damages, the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars his action.’’ (Citations omitted.)), cert. denied, 277 Conn. 912 , 894 A.2d 992 (2006); see also Daimler- Chrysler Corp. v. Law, 284 Conn. 701, 723 , 937 A.2d 675 (2007) (holding that request for order that defendant refund sales taxes to plaintiff ‘‘must be characterized as a claim for damages’’).

2022Therefore, because the plaintiff’s claim ultimately is an action for money damages, the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars his action.’’ (Citations omitted.)), cert. denied, 277 Conn. 912 , 894 A.2d 992 (2006); see also Daimler- Chrysler Corp. v. Law, 284 Conn. 701, 723 , 937 A.2d 675 (2007) (holding that request for order that defendant refund sales taxes to plaintiff ‘‘must be characterized as a claim for damages’’).

2022For example, with the exception of actions challeng- ing an unconstitutional statute or a state officer’s actions in excess of statutory authority; Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 624 , 376 A.2d 359 (1977); a court reviews action by state executive officials only pursuant to legis- lative authorization, which—because it implicates the state’s sovereign immunity from suit—is strictly con- strued.

2010On the other hand, where no substantial claim is made that the defendant officer is acting pursuant to an unconstitutional enactment or in excess of his statutory authority, the purpose of the sovereign immunity doctrine requires dismissal of the suit for want of jurisdiction.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 624 , 376 A.2d 359 (1977).

2021The doctrine of sovereign immunity ‘‘protects the state, not only from ultimate liability for alleged wrongs, but also from being required to litigate whether it is so liable.’’ Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 165 , 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled in part by Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 325 , 828 A.2d 549 (2003). ‘‘[T]he practical and logi- cal basis of the doctrine [of sovereign immunity] is today recognized to rest . . . on the hazard that the subjection of the state and federal governments to pri- vate litigation might constitute a serious interference with the performance of their function

2021The doctrine of sovereign immunity ‘‘protects the state, not only from ultimate liability for alleged wrongs, but also from being required to litigate whether it is so liable.’’ Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 165 , 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled in part by Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 325 , 828 A.2d 549 (2003). ‘‘[T]he practical and logi- cal basis of the doctrine [of sovereign immunity] is today recognized to rest . . . on the hazard that the subjection of the state and federal governments to pri- vate litigation might constitute a serious interference with the performance of their function

2022For example, with the exception of actions challeng- ing an unconstitutional statute or a state officer’s actions in excess of statutory authority; Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 624 , 376 A.2d 359 (1977); a court reviews action by state executive officials only pursuant to legis- lative authorization, which—because it implicates the state’s sovereign immunity from suit—is strictly con- strued.

2010On the other hand, where no substantial claim is made that the defendant officer is acting pursuant to an unconstitutional enactment or in excess of his statutory authority, the purpose of the sovereign immunity doctrine requires dismissal of the suit for want of jurisdiction.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 624 , 376 A.2d 359 (1977).

2009Thus, in the absence of a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, the plaintiff may not bring suit against the state for claims arising out of the lease without authorization from the claims commissioner to do so." [Citation omitted.]); see also Barde v. Board of Trustees, 207 Conn. 59, 66 , 539 A.2d 1000 (1988) (explaining that even constitutional claim relating to state contract cannot "supersede the state's sovereign immunity ... when the alternative procedure available through the claims commissioner, which might have provided the relief sought, has been ignored").

2009Thus, in the absence of a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, the plaintiff may not bring suit against the state for claims arising out of the lease without authorization from the claims commissioner to do so." [Citation omitted.]); see also Barde v. Board of Trustees, 207 Conn. 59, 66 , 539 A.2d 1000 (1988) (explaining that even constitutional claim relating to state contract cannot "supersede the state's sovereign immunity ... when the alternative procedure available through the claims commissioner, which might have provided the relief sought, has been ignored").

2000Because Blumenthal has been sued in his official capacity, the case is controlled by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. "[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." Amore v. Frankel , 228 Conn. 358 , 364 , 636 A.2d 786 (1994).

2000Because Blumenthal has been sued in his official capacity, the case is controlled by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. "[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." Amore v. Frankel , 228 Conn. 358 , 364 , 636 A.2d 786 (1994).

2014Our Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff seeking to overcome the presumption of sovereign immunity must show that ‘‘(1) the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statu- torily waived the state’s sovereign immunity . . . or (2) in an action for declaratory or injunctive relief, the state officer or officers against whom such relief is sought acted in excess of statutory authority, or pursu- ant to an unconstitutional statute.’’ (Citation omitted.) Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 314 ; see also Doe v. Heintz, 204 Conn. 17, 31 , 526 A.2d 1318 (1987) (‘‘[s]over-

2014Our Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff seeking to overcome the presumption of sovereign immunity must show that ‘‘(1) the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statu- torily waived the state’s sovereign immunity . . . or (2) in an action for declaratory or injunctive relief, the state officer or officers against whom such relief is sought acted in excess of statutory authority, or pursu- ant to an unconstitutional statute.’’ (Citation omitted.) Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 314 ; see also Doe v. Heintz, 204 Conn. 17, 31 , 526 A.2d 1318 (1987) (‘‘[s]over-

2010In support of his claim on cross appeal, the plaintiff cites this court’s statement in Bloom v. Gershon, 271 Conn. 96, 107 , 856 A.2d 335 (2004), that “the state cannot use sovereign immunity as a defense in an action for declaratory or injunctive relief.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) See also Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 328 , 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (“[t]he state is subject to suit without consent ... in a suit for injunctive relief when the action does not defeat the purpose of the doctrine of sovereign immunity by undue interference with governmental functions” [internal quotation

2010In support of his claim on cross appeal, the plaintiff cites this court’s statement in Bloom v. Gershon, 271 Conn. 96, 107 , 856 A.2d 335 (2004), that “the state cannot use sovereign immunity as a defense in an action for declaratory or injunctive relief.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) See also Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 328 , 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (“[t]he state is subject to suit without consent ... in a suit for injunctive relief when the action does not defeat the purpose of the doctrine of sovereign immunity by undue interference with governmental functions” [internal quotation

1999"Sovereign immunity does not bar suits against state officials acting in excess of their statutory authority or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute." Id., 487-88 ; see also Savage v. Aronson , supra, 214 Conn. 264 ; Fetterman v. University of Connecticut , 192 Conn. 539 , 552-53 , 473 A.2d 1176 (1984); Sentner v. Board of Trustees , CT Page 11439 184 Conn. 339 , 343 , 439 A.2d 1033 (1981).

1999"Sovereign immunity does not bar suits against state officials acting in excess of their statutory authority or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute." Id., 487-88 ; see also Savage v. Aronson , supra, 214 Conn. 264 ; Fetterman v. University of Connecticut , 192 Conn. 539 , 552-53 , 473 A.2d 1176 (1984); Sentner v. Board of Trustees , CT Page 11439 184 Conn. 339 , 343 , 439 A.2d 1033 (1981).

2011Because we conclude that the plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and, therefore, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we need not analyze this issue further. 11 In its memorandum of decision, the trial court, citing Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 328 , 709 A.2d 1089 (1998), indicated that, even if the plaintiff succeeded in establishing that the defendants had acted illegally, the defendants would remain immune from suit unless the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff could be crafted so as to minimize interference with government fun

2011Because we conclude that the plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and, therefore, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we need not analyze this issue further. 11 In its memorandum of decision, the trial court, citing Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 328 , 709 A.2d 1089 (1998), indicated that, even if the plaintiff succeeded in establishing that the defendants had acted illegally, the defendants would remain immune from suit unless the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff could be crafted so as to minimize interference with government fun

1999Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 103 , 680 A.2d 1321 (1996), in which we held that the allegations contained in Peabody’s third party complaint were, on their face, insufficient to allege a waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity, because they failed to allege that Peabody itself had a disputed claim under its contract with the state as required by § 4-61.

1999Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 103 , 680 A.2d 1321 (1996), in which we held that the allegations contained in Peabody’s third party complaint were, on their face, insufficient to allege a waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity, because they failed to allege that Peabody itself had a disputed claim under its contract with the state as required by § 4-61.

2003Finally, our analysis, for almost one century, has been guided by the rule that the legislature may waive the state’s sovereign immunity “provided clear intention to that effect is disclosed by the use of express terms or by force of a necessary implication.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Works v. ECAP Construction Co., 250 Conn. 553, 558-59 , 737 A.2d 398 (1999); Lacasse v. Burns, 214 Conn. 464, 468 , 572 A.2d 357 (1990); Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542, 558 , 534 A.2d 888 (1987); Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 228 , 464 A.2d 45 (1983); Baker v. Ives, 162 Conn. 295,

2003Finally, our analysis, for almost one century, has been guided by the rule that the legislature may waive the state’s sovereign immunity “provided clear intention to that effect is disclosed by the use of express terms or by force of a necessary implication.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Works v. ECAP Construction Co., 250 Conn. 553, 558-59 , 737 A.2d 398 (1999); Lacasse v. Burns, 214 Conn. 464, 468 , 572 A.2d 357 (1990); Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542, 558 , 534 A.2d 888 (1987); Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 228 , 464 A.2d 45 (1983); Baker v. Ives, 162 Conn. 295,

2010This argument ignores the “strong policy reason” behind the doctrine of sovereign immunity — “to prevent the imposition of enormous fiscal burdens on states.” Fetterman v. University of Connecticut, 192 Conn. 539, 551-52 , 473 A.2d 1176 (1984).

2010This argument ignores the “strong policy reason” behind the doctrine of sovereign immunity — “to prevent the imposition of enormous fiscal burdens on states.” Fetterman v. University of Connecticut, 192 Conn. 539, 551-52 , 473 A.2d 1176 (1984).

2007We agree that the provisions of § 7-163a do not contain language waiving the state’s sovereign immunity. “[T]he state’s sovereign right not to be sued without its consent is not to be diminished by statute, unless a clear intention to that effect on the part of the legislature is disclosed, by the use of express terms or by force of a necessary implication.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lacasse v. Burns, 214 Conn. 464, 468 , 572 A.2d 357 (1990).

2007We agree that the provisions of § 7-163a do not contain language waiving the state’s sovereign immunity. “[T]he state’s sovereign right not to be sued without its consent is not to be diminished by statute, unless a clear intention to that effect on the part of the legislature is disclosed, by the use of express terms or by force of a necessary implication.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lacasse v. Burns, 214 Conn. 464, 468 , 572 A.2d 357 (1990).

2007See id. (dismissing causes of action seeking money damages based on, inter alia, first and fourteenth amendments to United States constitution when permission to sue not received from claims commissioner); Krozser v. New Haven, 212 Conn. 415, 422 , 562 A.2d 1080 (1989) ( 42 U.S.C. § 1983 *724 “does not abrogate the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 , 110 S. Ct. 757 , 107 L.

2007See id. (dismissing causes of action seeking money damages based on, inter alia, first and fourteenth amendments to United States constitution when permission to sue not received from claims commissioner); Krozser v. New Haven, 212 Conn. 415, 422 , 562 A.2d 1080 (1989) ( 42 U.S.C. § 1983 *724 “does not abrogate the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 , 110 S. Ct. 757 , 107 L.

2019Specifically, he submits that when a statute ‘‘instructs an ‘aggrieved person’ what to file . . . and where to file,’’ our courts have held such language to be an implied waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity from suit.10 In support of this proposition, the plaintiff asks us to compare our Supreme Court’s holding in Martinez v. Dept. of Public Safety, 263 Conn. 74, 83 , 818 A.2d 758 (2003), with the legislature’s response to that case in its enactment of No. 03-97 of the 2003 Public Acts.

2019Specifically, he submits that when a statute ‘‘instructs an ‘aggrieved person’ what to file . . . and where to file,’’ our courts have held such language to be an implied waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity from suit.10 In support of this proposition, the plaintiff asks us to compare our Supreme Court’s holding in Martinez v. Dept. of Public Safety, 263 Conn. 74, 83 , 818 A.2d 758 (2003), with the legislature’s response to that case in its enactment of No. 03-97 of the 2003 Public Acts.

2018To determine whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies to a local school board, we look to whether the action would operate to control or interfere with the activities of the state ...." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Purzycki v. Fairfield , 244 Conn. 101 , 112, 708 A.2d 937 (1998), overruled on other grounds by Haynes v. Middletown , 314 Conn. 303 , 323, 101 A.3d 249 (2014) ; see also Cahill v. Board of Education , supra, at 101-102, 444 A.2d 907 (local school board not entitled to sovereign immunity from claim of breach of employment contract because such acti

2001To determine whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies to a local school board, we look to whether the "action would operate to control or interfere with the activities of the state. ..." Cahill v. Board of Education , 187 Conn. 94 , 102 , 444 A.2d 907 (1982).

2003But that is entirely different from the state’s sovereign immunity from suit . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Murphy v. Ives, 151 Conn. 259, 264 , 196 A.2d 596 (1963).

2003But that is entirely different from the state’s sovereign immunity from suit . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Murphy v. Ives, 151 Conn. 259, 264 , 196 A.2d 596 (1963).

2023The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiff’s action was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity pursuant to the four factor test set forth in Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 568 , 362 A.2d 871 (1975).

2023The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiff’s action was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity pursuant to the four factor test set forth in Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 568 , 362 A.2d 871 (1975).