sovereign immunity in Rhode Island

2009See Afzall v. Virginia , 639 S.E.2d 279 , 282 (Va. 2007) ("The doctrine of sovereign immunity serves a multitude of purposes *Page 11 including . . . providing for smooth operation of government, eliminating public inconvenience and danger that might spring from officials being fearful to act, assuring that citizens will be willing to take public jobs, and preventing citizens from improperly influencing the conduct of government affairs through the threat or use of vexatious litigation."); see also Catone v. Medberry , 555 A.2d 328 , 333 (R.I. 1989) ("The primary purpose of the public duty doc

2009See Afzall v. Virginia , 639 S.E.2d 279 , 282 (Va. 2007) ("The doctrine of sovereign immunity serves a multitude of purposes *Page 11 including . . . providing for smooth operation of government, eliminating public inconvenience and danger that might spring from officials being fearful to act, assuring that citizens will be willing to take public jobs, and preventing citizens from improperly influencing the conduct of government affairs through the threat or use of vexatious litigation."); see also Catone v. Medberry , 555 A.2d 328 , 333 (R.I. 1989) ("The primary purpose of the public duty doc

2011The doctrine of sovereign immunity "generally insulates municipalities from assessments of prejudgment *Page 24 interest unless waived `by express statutory language or by necessary implication there from.'" John Rocchio Corp. v. Town of Coventry , 919 A.2d 418 , 419 (R.I. 2007) (mem.) (quoting Reagan Const. Corp. v. Mayer , 712 A.2d 372 , 373 (R.I. 1998)).

2011The doctrine of sovereign immunity "generally insulates municipalities from assessments of prejudgment *Page 24 interest unless waived `by express statutory language or by necessary implication there from.'" John Rocchio Corp. v. Town of Coventry , 919 A.2d 418 , 419 (R.I. 2007) (mem.) (quoting Reagan Const. Corp. v. Mayer , 712 A.2d 372 , 373 (R.I. 1998)).

2009See Afzall v. Virginia , 639 S.E.2d 279 , 282 (Va. 2007) ("The doctrine of sovereign immunity serves a multitude of purposes *Page 11 including . . . providing for smooth operation of government, eliminating public inconvenience and danger that might spring from officials being fearful to act, assuring that citizens will be willing to take public jobs, and preventing citizens from improperly influencing the conduct of government affairs through the threat or use of vexatious litigation."); see also Catone v. Medberry , 555 A.2d 328 , 333 (R.I. 1989) ("The primary purpose of the public duty doc

2009See Afzall v. Virginia , 639 S.E.2d 279 , 282 (Va. 2007) ("The doctrine of sovereign immunity serves a multitude of purposes *Page 11 including . . . providing for smooth operation of government, eliminating public inconvenience and danger that might spring from officials being fearful to act, assuring that citizens will be willing to take public jobs, and preventing citizens from improperly influencing the conduct of government affairs through the threat or use of vexatious litigation."); see also Catone v. Medberry , 555 A.2d 328 , 333 (R.I. 1989) ("The primary purpose of the public duty doc

2011Id. at 1120-21.

2009See Capital Properties , 749 A.2d at 1081 ; see also Donnelly , 730 A.2d at 9 -10 ; Pellegrino , 788 A.2d at 1124 .

2009Mulvaney , 671 A.2d at 313 ("Because the Legislature has explicitly authorized only the award of damages, this court declines to expand the liability of the state and municipalities to include interest and costs."); see also L.A.

2009Regan Construction Corp. v. Mayer , 712 A.2d 372 , 373 (R.I. 1998) ("When a statute purporting to waive any aspect of the state's sovereign immunity is examined, the language of the statute must be closely parsed and strictly construed.") (citing Clark-Fitzpatrick v. Gill , 652 A.2d 440 , 452 (R.I. 1994)); see also Mulvaney v. Napolitano , 671 A.2d 312 (R.I. 1995) ("The Legislature did not intend to deprive the State of any sovereign power unless the intent to do so is clearly expressed or arises by necessary implication from the statutory language.") (quoting Andrade v. State , 448 A.2d 1293

2004Citing our opinion, Graff v. Motta, 695 A.2d 486 (R.I.1997), for the proposition that the “Legislature did not intend to deprive the State or town of any sovereign power ‘unless the intent to do so is clearly expressed or arises by necessary implication from the statutory language,’ ” id. at 489 (quoting In re Sherman, 565 A.2d 870, 872 (R.I.1989)), the motion justice ruled that “there is no indication that Rhode Island General Laws Section 5-65-3 provides a cause of action against the town or waives the town’s sovereign immunity.” Accordingly, she held that Torres’s cause of action against th

1992See In re Sherman, 565 A.2d 870 (R.I. 1989); Andrade v. State, 448 A.2d 1293 (R.I.1982).

2009Regan Construction Corp. v. Mayer , 712 A.2d 372 , 373 (R.I. 1998) ("When a statute purporting to waive any aspect of the state's sovereign immunity is examined, the language of the statute must be closely parsed and strictly construed.") (citing Clark-Fitzpatrick v. Gill , 652 A.2d 440 , 452 (R.I. 1994)); see also Mulvaney v. Napolitano , 671 A.2d 312 (R.I. 1995) ("The Legislature did not intend to deprive the State of any sovereign power unless the intent to do so is clearly expressed or arises by necessary implication from the statutory language.") (quoting Andrade v. State , 448 A.2d 1293

2009Regan Construction Corp. v. Mayer , 712 A.2d 372 , 373 (R.I. 1998) ("When a statute purporting to waive any aspect of the state's sovereign immunity is examined, the language of the statute must be closely parsed and strictly construed.") (citing Clark-Fitzpatrick v. Gill , 652 A.2d 440 , 452 (R.I. 1994)); see also Mulvaney v. Napolitano , 671 A.2d 312 (R.I. 1995) ("The Legislature did not intend to deprive the State of any sovereign power unless the intent to do so is clearly expressed or arises by necessary implication from the statutory language.") (quoting Andrade v. State , 448 A.2d 1293

1987In Ryan v. State Department of Transportation, 420 A.2d 841 (R.I.1980), this court established an exception to G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-31-1, as amended by P.L.1970, ch. 181, § 2, which abrogates the doctrine of sovereign immunity with respect to the state’s tortious conduct.

1985In Ryan we established an exception to G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-31-1, as enacted by P.L.1970, ch. 181, § 2, which abrogates the doctrine of sovereign immunity with respect to the tortious conduct of the state. 2 We held: “In suits brought against the state, plaintiffs must show a breach of some duty owed them in their individual capacities *978 and not merely a breach of some obligation owed the general public.” Id. 420 A.2d at 843 .

2009See Capital Properties, Inc. v. State , 749 A.2d 1069 , 1081 (R.I. 1999) (State waived sovereign immunity by asserting an affirmative claim under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, "the State has brought this action under the Act and, thus, has waived sovereign immunity.") Moreover, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has also ruled that a government entity's sovereign immunity protection can be waived based on fairness grounds.

2009See Capital Properties , 749 A.2d at 1081 ; see also Donnelly , 730 A.2d at 9 -10 ; Pellegrino , 788 A.2d at 1124 .

2009See 72 A.L.R. 2d 1379 , 1393-94 (1960, Supp. 2008); see also People v. Downs , 864 N.E.2d 320 , 323 (Ill.App.Ct. 2007) ("The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars only actions brought against the State, not actions brought by the State."); In Interest of *Page 7 R.M.H. , 843 S.W.2d 740 , 742 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992) ("Generally, when the State enters the court as a litigant, it places itself on the same basis as any other litigant. * * * Ordinarily, in the absence of a statute exempting a governmental unit from the payment of court costs, it is just as liable as any other litigant."); Barr

2009Id. at 353, 603 A.2d at 1158 (citation omitted). 12 The Canning Court emphasized that statutes waiving sovereign immunity must affirmatively express a right to a jury trial.

2009Donnelly v. Town of Lincoln , 730 A.2d 5 (R.I. 1999).

2009See Capital Properties , 749 A.2d at 1081 ; see also Donnelly , 730 A.2d at 9 -10 ; Pellegrino , 788 A.2d at 1124 .

2009See Afzall v. Virginia , 639 S.E.2d 279 , 282 (Va. 2007) ("The doctrine of sovereign immunity serves a multitude of purposes *Page 11 including . . . providing for smooth operation of government, eliminating public inconvenience and danger that might spring from officials being fearful to act, assuring that citizens will be willing to take public jobs, and preventing citizens from improperly influencing the conduct of government affairs through the threat or use of vexatious litigation."); see also Catone v. Medberry , 555 A.2d 328 , 333 (R.I. 1989) ("The primary purpose of the public duty doc

2009See Afzall v. Virginia , 639 S.E.2d 279 , 282 (Va. 2007) ("The doctrine of sovereign immunity serves a multitude of purposes *Page 11 including . . . providing for smooth operation of government, eliminating public inconvenience and danger that might spring from officials being fearful to act, assuring that citizens will be willing to take public jobs, and preventing citizens from improperly influencing the conduct of government affairs through the threat or use of vexatious litigation."); see also Catone v. Medberry , 555 A.2d 328 , 333 (R.I. 1989) ("The primary purpose of the public duty doc

2009See 72 A.L.R. 2d 1379 , 1393-94 (1960, Supp. 2008); see also People v. Downs , 864 N.E.2d 320 , 323 (Ill.App.Ct. 2007) ("The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars only actions brought against the State, not actions brought by the State."); In Interest of *Page 7 R.M.H. , 843 S.W.2d 740 , 742 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992) ("Generally, when the State enters the court as a litigant, it places itself on the same basis as any other litigant. * * * Ordinarily, in the absence of a statute exempting a governmental unit from the payment of court costs, it is just as liable as any other litigant."); Barr

2007As he correctly notes, G.L.1956 § 9-21-10(a) requires the inclusion of prejudgment interest “[i]n any civil action in which a verdict is rendered or a decision made for pecuniary damages * * *" Undeterred, however, by this Court’s broad statement in State of Rhode Island Department of Transportation v. Providence and Worcester Railroad Co., 674 A.2d 1239, 1244 (R.I.1996), that “§ 9-21-10 does not apply to judgments against the state[,]” Russell asserts that the sovereign immunity underpinning that particular holding collapsed for the purposes of his claim when the General Assembly enacted § 36