sovereign immunity in Indiana

2015Then, in 1972, after years of increasing restrictions to the doctrine, our Supreme Court in Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55 , 283 N.E.2d 733 (1972), abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity for the State in almost all tort cases.

2015Then, in 1972, after years of increasing restrictions to the doctrine, our Supreme Court in Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55 , 283 N.E.2d 733 (1972), abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity for the State in almost all tort cases.

2015State v. Rendleman, 603 N.E.2d 1333, 1335 (Ind.1992) (quoting Peavler v. Monroe Cnty.

2015State v. Rendleman, 603 N.E.2d 1333, 1335 (Ind. 1992) (quoting Peavler v. Monroe Cnty.

2012See generally Peavler v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Monroe Co., 528 N.E.2d 40 (Ind.1988).

2004See generally Peavier v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Monroe County, 528 N.E.2d 40 (Ind.1988).

1999For a brief period following Campbell , courts correctly concluded the phrase “duty owed to a private individual” was nothing more than a synonym for “duty of reasonable care.” See, e.g., Miller v. Griesel, 261 Ind. 604 , 308 N.E.2d 701 (1974); Roberts v. State, 159 Ind.App. 456 , 307 N.E.2d 501 (1974).

1999For a brief period following Campbell , courts correctly concluded the phrase “duty owed to a private individual” was nothing more than a synonym for “duty of reasonable care.” See, e.g., Miller v. Griesel, 261 Ind. 604 , 308 N.E.2d 701 (1974); Roberts v. State, 159 Ind.App. 456 , 307 N.E.2d 501 (1974).

2006In 1972 our supreme court issued such an unequivocal statement and abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity in almost all tort cases. 7 Burns v. City of Terre Haute, 744 N.E.2d 1038, 1040 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied (citing Campbell v. State, 284 N.E.2d 733, 737 , 259 Ind. 55, 63 (Ind.1972)); see Benton v. City of Oakland City, 721 N.E.2d 224, 227 (Ind.1999) 8 The Campbell court explained that the legislature is primarily responsible for considering which instances of governmental conduct should be immunized from lia bility, and, in 1974, the General Assembly enacted ITTCA.

2000For example, the Indiana Supreme Court in Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55 , 284 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ind.1972) limited the defense in tort cases, holding that' it is “not available to any greater extent than is now available to municipal corporations and counties of this state.” The- Indiana Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its Campbell decision in Benton v. City of Oakland City, 721 N.E.2d 224, 230 (Ind.1999). 22 Sovereign immunity is a limited, yet viable doctrine.

2000Governmental/Proprietary Rule The first major step toward abrogation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity occurred in 1960, when the Indiana Supreme Court held that local governmental units were immune under the common law from tort liability in the performance of “government functions,” but they were not immune from tort liability under the common law with respect to “proprietary functions.” 5 See Flowers v. Board of Comm’rs of County of Vanderburgh, 240 Ind. 668, 671 , 168 N.E.2d 224, 225 (1960).

2000Governmental/Proprietary Rule The first major step toward abrogation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity occurred in 1960, when the Indiana Supreme Court held that local governmental units were immune under the common law from tort liability in the performance of “government functions,” but they were not immune from tort liability under the common law with respect to “proprietary functions.” 5 See Flowers v. Board of Comm’rs of County of Vanderburgh, 240 Ind. 668, 671 , 168 N.E.2d 224, 225 (1960).

1992Sovereign immunity has long been recognized in Indiana, see e.g., Perkins v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 549, 552 , 251 N.E.2d 30, 32 , and Pattison v. Shaw (1855), 6 Ind. 377, 378 , although the doctrine was rarely discussed in early cases.

1992Sovereign immunity has long been recognized in Indiana, see e.g., Perkins v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 549, 552 , 251 N.E.2d 30, 32 , and Pattison v. Shaw (1855), 6 Ind. 377, 378 , although the doctrine was rarely discussed in early cases.

2020Esserman, 84 N.E.3d at 1189 .

2020See Esserman, 84 N.E.3d at 1192 (observing that Indiana’s False Claims and Whistleblower Protection Act, while clearly stating that an employee may sue her employer, does not name the State (or one of its agencies or officials) as a permissible whistleblower defendant, noting that “[h]ad the legislature intended to subject the State to whistleblower liability, it could have expressed that intention any number of ways,” and concluding that the legislature did not “clearly evince” or “unequivocally express” its intention to waive State immunity for whistleblower claims). 4 [22] Even assuming the

2020Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-1536 | June 26, 2020 Page 11 of 17 [19] Sovereign immunity is not absolute, and it may be waived, generally, in two ways – by the plain language of the relevant federal statute, Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000), or through the State’s own action, either by consenting to be sued in a similar claim, or by the General Assembly abrogating the state’s sovereign immunity with regards to certain claims.

2020Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-1536 | June 26, 2020 Page 11 of 17 [19] Sovereign immunity is not absolute, and it may be waived, generally, in two ways – by the plain language of the relevant federal statute, Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000), or through the State’s own action, either by consenting to be sued in a similar claim, or by the General Assembly abrogating the state’s sovereign immunity with regards to certain claims.

2020See Esserman, 84 N.E.3d at 1192 (observing that Indiana’s False Claims and Whistleblower Protection Act, while clearly stating that an employee may sue her employer, does not name the State (or one of its agencies or officials) as a permissible whistleblower defendant, noting that “[h]ad the legislature intended to subject the State to whistleblower liability, it could have expressed that intention any number of ways,” and concluding that the legislature did not “clearly evince” or “unequivocally express” its intention to waive State immunity for whistleblower claims). 4 [22] Even assuming the

2020King, 868 F.3d at 594 (internal citations omitted) (footnote added). [23] Regarding the factors for issue preclusion, King had a full and fair opportunity in federal court to litigate the issue of whether the language of Title II of the ADA abrogated Indiana’s sovereign immunity with regard to King’s claims. 6 The Federal District Court agreed with King that the language of the ADA abrogated Indiana’s sovereign immunity and that MCC’s actions violated the ADA, and it ordered MCC to pay King over $10,000 in damages.

2017“A waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text[.]” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 , 116 S.Ct. 2092 , 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996) (citation omitted).

2017“A waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text[.]” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 , 116 S.Ct. 2092 , 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996) (citation omitted).

2017The Defendants argue Purdue and the individual Defendants acting in their official capacities have immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 3 “Under the Eleventh Amendment, a state may not be sued under federal law in either federal or state court without the state’s consent or Congress’ legitimate abrogation of the state’s sovereign immunity.” Gaff v. Indianar-Purdue Univ. of Fort Wayne, 45 N.E.3d 458, 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), relevant portion summarily aff'd and vacated in part on other grounds by 51 N.E.3d 1163 (Ind. 2016).

2015See, e.g., Montgomery v. Bd. of Trustees of Purdue Univ., 849 N.E.2d 1120, 1124 (Ind.2006).

2009See e.g., Karlson v. City of Oklahoma City, 711 P.2d 72 (Okla.1985); Winner v. Ratzlaff, 211 Kan. 59 , 505 P.2d 606 (1978); Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins.

2009Brown v. Alexander, 876 N.E.2d 376, 380 (Ind.Ct.App.2007).

2009Brown v. Alexander, 876 N.E.2d 376, 380 (Ind.Ct.App.2007).

2006In 1972 our supreme court issued such an unequivocal statement and abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity in almost all tort cases. 7 Burns v. City of Terre Haute, 744 N.E.2d 1038, 1040 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied (citing Campbell v. State, 284 N.E.2d 733, 737 , 259 Ind. 55, 63 (Ind.1972)); see Benton v. City of Oakland City, 721 N.E.2d 224, 227 (Ind.1999) 8 The Campbell court explained that the legislature is primarily responsible for considering which instances of governmental conduct should be immunized from lia bility, and, in 1974, the General Assembly enacted ITTCA.

2006Burns, 744 N.E.2d at 1040 .