sovereign immunity in Georgia

2024See Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 745 (1) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (“The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, adopted by this state in 1784, protected governments at all levels from unconsented-to legal actions.”) (footnote omitted); see also Peeples v. Byrd, 98 Ga. 688, 693-694 (4) ( 25 SE 677 ) (1896) (“It is hardly necessary to cite authority for the proposition that a sovereign State is not liable to suit at the instance of a citizen, unless permission to sue has been expressly granted.”).

2024See Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 745 (1) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (“The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, adopted by this state in 1784, protected governments at all levels from unconsented-to legal actions.”) (footnote omitted); see also Peeples v. Byrd, 98 Ga. 688, 693-694 (4) ( 25 SE 677 ) (1896) (“It is hardly necessary to cite authority for the proposition that a sovereign State is not liable to suit at the instance of a citizen, unless permission to sue has been expressly granted.”).

2024The doctrine of sovereign immunity has been “understood to 8 apply not only when the State was sued eo nomine,[3] but also in suits against its departments, agencies, and officers in their official capacities.” Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 413 (II) (A) (801 SE2d 867) (2017).

2024The doctrine of sovereign immunity has been “understood to 8 apply not only when the State was sued eo nomine,[3] but also in suits against its departments, agencies, and officers in their official capacities.” Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 413 (II) (A) (801 SE2d 867) (2017).

2025See CSX Transp., 277 Ga. at 250 (1) (no implied waiver of municipal’s sovereign immunity as any such waiver “is expressly reserved to the legislature”); see also Ga. Dept. of Natural Resources v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, 294 Ga. 593, 603 (2) ( 755 SE2d 184 ) (2014) (“The plain language of OCGA § 12–5–245 does not provide for a specific waiver of governmental immunity nor the extent of such a waiver, and therefore, no waiver can be implied or shown.”); Currid, 285 Ga. at 188 (“Because the Community Service Act does not contain language providing for an express waiver of a county’s sovere

2025See CSX Transp., 277 Ga. at 250 (1) (no implied waiver of municipal’s sovereign immunity as any such waiver “is expressly reserved to the legislature”); see also Ga. Dept. of Natural Resources v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, 294 Ga. 593, 603 (2) ( 755 SE2d 184 ) (2014) (“The plain language of OCGA § 12–5–245 does not provide for a specific waiver of governmental immunity nor the extent of such a waiver, and therefore, no waiver can be implied or shown.”); Currid, 285 Ga. at 188 (“Because the Community Service Act does not contain language providing for an express waiver of a county’s sovere

2023IX; accord Cameron v. Lang, 274 Ga. 122, 126 (3) ( 549 SE2d 341 ) (2001) (“The doctrine of sovereign immunity, also known as governmental immunity, protects all levels of governments from legal action unless 3 they have waived their immunity from suit.”) (emphasis supplied).

2023IX; accord Cameron v. Lang, 274 Ga. 122, 126 (3) ( 549 SE2d 341 ) (2001) (“The doctrine of sovereign immunity, also known as governmental immunity, protects all levels of governments from legal action unless 3 they have waived their immunity from suit.”) (emphasis supplied).

2025DPS answered and moved 4 Alred, 362 Ga. App. at 466 (punctuation omitted); see Ga. Dep’t of Lab. v. RTT Assocs., Inc., 299 Ga. 78, 81 (1) ( 786 SE2d 840 ) (2016) (“The burden of demonstrating a waiver of sovereign immunity rests upon the party asserting it.”). 5 Alred, 362 Ga. App. at 466 (punctuation omitted); see RTT Assocs., 299 Ga. at 81 (1) (“Whether sovereign immunity has been waived under the undisputed facts of this case is a question of law, and this Court’s review is de novo.”). 3 to dismiss, arguing the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred both of Blue 42’s claims.

2025DPS answered and moved 4 Alred, 362 Ga. App. at 466 (punctuation omitted); see Ga. Dep’t of Lab. v. RTT Assocs., Inc., 299 Ga. 78, 81 (1) ( 786 SE2d 840 ) (2016) (“The burden of demonstrating a waiver of sovereign immunity rests upon the party asserting it.”). 5 Alred, 362 Ga. App. at 466 (punctuation omitted); see RTT Assocs., 299 Ga. at 81 (1) (“Whether sovereign immunity has been waived under the undisputed facts of this case is a question of law, and this Court’s review is de novo.”). 3 to dismiss, arguing the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred both of Blue 42’s claims.

2017After the war was concluded, Georgia adopted the common law of England as our own, 9 see Tift v. Griffin, 5 Ga. 185, 189 (1848), and with it, we adopted the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 10 See Crowder, 228 Ga. at 439 (3).

2017After the war was concluded, Georgia adopted the common law of England as our own, 9 see Tift v. Griffin, 5 Ga. 185, 189 (1848), and with it, we adopted the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 10 See Crowder, 228 Ga. at 439 (3).

2025See City of Atlanta v. Mitcham, 296 Ga. 576, 577 (1) (769 2 We sometimes refer to the sovereign immunity of municipalities as “municipal immunity” or “governmental immunity.” See Gatto, 312 Ga. at 164 n.1. 8 SE2d 320) (2015); see also Atlantic Specialty Ins.

2021See City of Atlanta v. Mitcham, 296 Ga. 576, 582 (2) ( 769 SE2d 320 ) (2015) (reiterating that whether an act performed by a governmental employee is ministerial or discretionary is not a consideration in the analysis of whether the governmental entity’s sovereign immunity has been waived, because “sovereign immunity applies equally to, i.e., bars claims arising from, both ministerial and discretionary acts”); Seay v. Cleveland, 270 Ga. 64, 65 (1) ( 508 SE2d 159 ) (1998) (espousing that the county’s sovereign immunity applied equally to ministerial and discretionary acts). 2.

2026IX; CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 277 Ga. 248, 249 (2003) (“[O]nly the legislature has the authority to enact a law that specifically waives a municipality’s sovereign immunity.”).

2026IX; CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 277 Ga. 248, 249 (2003) (“[O]nly the legislature has the authority to enact a law that specifically waives a municipality’s sovereign immunity.”).

2019"The doctrine of sovereign immunity, also known as governmental immunity, protects all levels of governments from legal action unless they have waived their immunity from suit." Watts v. City of Dillard , 294 Ga.App. 861 , 862 (1), 670 S.E.2d 442 (2008) (punctuation omitted).

2019"The doctrine of sovereign immunity, also known as governmental immunity, protects all levels of governments from legal action unless they have waived their immunity from suit." Watts v. City of Dillard , 294 Ga.App. 861 , 862 (1), 670 S.E.2d 442 (2008) (punctuation omitted).

2026Sovereign immunity is a threshold issue “and, if it does apply, a court lacks jurisdiction over the case and, concomitantly, lacks authority to decide the merits of a claim that is barred.” McConnell v. Dep’t of Labor, 302 Ga. 18, 19 ( 805 SE2d 79 ) (2017).

2026Sovereign immunity is a threshold issue “and, if it does apply, a court lacks jurisdiction over the case and, concomitantly, lacks authority to decide the merits of a claim that is barred.” McConnell v. Dep’t of Labor, 302 Ga. 18, 19 ( 805 SE2d 79 ) (2017).

2025“Nowhere in the statute has the Legislature specifically provided that sovereign immunity has been waived and the extent of such waiver, and, without specific statutory language providing for (1) a waiver of sovereign immunity and (2) the extent of such waiver, no waiver can be shown.” Currid v. DeKalb State Court Probation Dept., 285 Ga. 184, 187 ( 674 SE2d 894 ) (2009) (citation, punctuation omitted, emphasis in original); see also CSX Transp. v. City of Garden City, 277 Ga. 248, 249 (1) ( 588 SE2d 688 ) (2003) (“This Court has long recognized that sovereign immunity applies to all actions w

2025“Nowhere in the statute has the Legislature specifically provided that sovereign immunity has been waived and the extent of such waiver, and, without specific statutory language providing for (1) a waiver of sovereign immunity and (2) the extent of such waiver, no waiver can be shown.” Currid v. DeKalb State Court Probation Dept., 285 Ga. 184, 187 ( 674 SE2d 894 ) (2009) (citation, punctuation omitted, emphasis in original); see also CSX Transp. v. City of Garden City, 277 Ga. 248, 249 (1) ( 588 SE2d 688 ) (2003) (“This Court has long recognized that sovereign immunity applies to all actions w

2022Cf. Bordeaux, 352 Ga. App. at 403 (4) (“Although judges are immune from liability in civil actions seeking damages for acts performed in their judicial capacity, this immunity does not bar claims for declaratory or injunctive relief.” (punctuation omitted)). 30 See supra note 29. 31 Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 421 (II) (B) ( 801 SE2d 867 ) (2017); accord Price v. Dept. of Transp., 257 Ga. 535, 537 ( 361 SE2d 146 ) (1987). 32 Lathrop, 301 Ga. at 421 (II) (B). 15 in “their official capacities—since a suit against a county officer in his official capacity is a suit against the county itself—enj

2022Cf. Bordeaux, 352 Ga. App. at 403 (4) (“Although judges are immune from liability in civil actions seeking damages for acts performed in their judicial capacity, this immunity does not bar claims for declaratory or injunctive relief.” (punctuation omitted)). 30 See supra note 29. 31 Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 421 (II) (B) ( 801 SE2d 867 ) (2017); accord Price v. Dept. of Transp., 257 Ga. 535, 537 ( 361 SE2d 146 ) (1987). 32 Lathrop, 301 Ga. at 421 (II) (B). 15 in “their official capacities—since a suit against a county officer in his official capacity is a suit against the county itself—enj

2016The plain and unambiguous text of the 1991 constitutional amendment shows that only the General Assembly has the authority to waive the State’s sovereign immunity. [Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 748 (3) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994)] (subsection (e) of the amendment “confers upon the legislature the authority to waive sovereign immunity”); see also Woodard v. Laurens County, 265 Ga. 404 (1) ( 456 SE2d 581 ) (1995) (“A waiver of sovereign immunity is a mere privilege, not a right, and the extension of that privilege is solely a matter of legislative grace.”).

2016The plain and unambiguous text of the 1991 constitutional amendment shows that only the General Assembly has the authority to waive the State’s sovereign immunity. [Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 748 (3) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994)] (subsection (e) of the amendment “confers upon the legislature the authority to waive sovereign immunity”); see also Woodard v. Laurens County, 265 Ga. 404 (1) ( 456 SE2d 581 ) (1995) (“A waiver of sovereign immunity is a mere privilege, not a right, and the extension of that privilege is solely a matter of legislative grace.”).

2020See Price v. Dept. of Transp., 257 Ga. 535, 536-537 ( 361 SE2d 146 ) 4 OCGA § 33-24-51 establishes among other things that a county, municipal corporation, or other political subdivision of the state may secure and provide insurance and that the sovereign immunity of such local government entities for a loss arising out of claims for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle is waived under OCGA § 36-92-2 to the extent of the amount of insurance purchased. 14 (1987) (concluding that the state’s sovereign immunity under the 1983 Constitution extended to the acts of state Department of Transp

2020See Price v. Dept. of Transp., 257 Ga. 535, 536-537 ( 361 SE2d 146 ) 4 OCGA § 33-24-51 establishes among other things that a county, municipal corporation, or other political subdivision of the state may secure and provide insurance and that the sovereign immunity of such local government entities for a loss arising out of claims for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle is waived under OCGA § 36-92-2 to the extent of the amount of insurance purchased. 14 (1987) (concluding that the state’s sovereign immunity under the 1983 Constitution extended to the acts of state Department of Transp

2022Cf. Bordeaux, 352 Ga. App. at 403 (4) (“Although judges are immune from liability in civil actions seeking damages for acts performed in their judicial capacity, this immunity does not bar claims for declaratory or injunctive relief.” (punctuation omitted)). 30 See supra note 29. 31 Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 421 (II) (B) ( 801 SE2d 867 ) (2017); accord Price v. Dept. of Transp., 257 Ga. 535, 537 ( 361 SE2d 146 ) (1987). 32 Lathrop, 301 Ga. at 421 (II) (B). 15 in “their official capacities—since a suit against a county officer in his official capacity is a suit against the county itself—enj

2022Cf. Bordeaux, 352 Ga. App. at 403 (4) (“Although judges are immune from liability in civil actions seeking damages for acts performed in their judicial capacity, this immunity does not bar claims for declaratory or injunctive relief.” (punctuation omitted)). 30 See supra note 29. 31 Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 421 (II) (B) ( 801 SE2d 867 ) (2017); accord Price v. Dept. of Transp., 257 Ga. 535, 537 ( 361 SE2d 146 ) (1987). 32 Lathrop, 301 Ga. at 421 (II) (B). 15 in “their official capacities—since a suit against a county officer in his official capacity is a suit against the county itself—enj

2021“Sovereign immunity bars any action for personal injury or wrongful death against a county arising from nuisance or inverse condemnation.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Rutherford, 287 Ga. App. at 369 (2).

2014“Sovereign immunity bars any action for personal injury or wrongful death against a county arising from nuisance or inverse condemnation.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Rutherford v. DeKalb County, 287 Ga. App. 366, 369 (2) ( 651 SE2d 771 ) (2007). (b) In considering property damage alleged to have been caused by a nuisance, mere negligence is insufficient to constitute a nuisance that rises to an inverse condemnation. ...

2021See City of Atlanta v. Mitcham, 296 Ga. 576, 582 (2) ( 769 SE2d 320 ) (2015) (reiterating that whether an act performed by a governmental employee is ministerial or discretionary is not a consideration in the analysis of whether the governmental entity’s sovereign immunity has been waived, because “sovereign immunity applies equally to, i.e., bars claims arising from, both ministerial and discretionary acts”); Seay v. Cleveland, 270 Ga. 64, 65 (1) ( 508 SE2d 159 ) (1998) (espousing that the county’s sovereign immunity applied equally to ministerial and discretionary acts). 2.

2021See City of Atlanta v. Mitcham, 296 Ga. 576, 582 (2) ( 769 SE2d 320 ) (2015) (reiterating that whether an act performed by a governmental employee is ministerial or discretionary is not a consideration in the analysis of whether the governmental entity’s sovereign immunity has been waived, because “sovereign immunity applies equally to, i.e., bars claims arising from, both ministerial and discretionary acts”); Seay v. Cleveland, 270 Ga. 64, 65 (1) ( 508 SE2d 159 ) (1998) (espousing that the county’s sovereign immunity applied equally to ministerial and discretionary acts). 2.

2023The doctrine of sovereign immunity, which extends to county-wide school districts, see Coffee County School Dist. v. Snipes, 216 Ga. App. 293, 294 ( 454 SE2d 149 ) (1995), “bars any suit against the [s]tate to which it has not given its consent, including suits against state departments, agencies, and officers in their official 4 capacities. . . .

2023The doctrine of sovereign immunity, which extends to county-wide school districts, see Coffee County School Dist. v. Snipes, 216 Ga. App. 293, 294 ( 454 SE2d 149 ) (1995), “bars any suit against the [s]tate to which it has not given its consent, including suits against state departments, agencies, and officers in their official 4 capacities. . . .

2023Sovereign immunity extends to “all state departments and agencies, regardless of insurance[,]” Miller, 266 Ga. at 588 (1); likewise, “sovereign immunity applies to state instrumentalities[.]” Kyle v. Georgia Lottery Corp., 290 Ga. 87, 88 (1) ( 718 SE2d 801 ) (2011).1 1 Nearly 80 years ago and prior to the incorporation of sovereign immunity into the Georgia Constitution, our Supreme Court, specifying that “exemption from taxation is the only question presented[,]” found a housing authority to be an “instrumentality of the State[.]” The case did not touch upon sovereign immunity.

2023Sovereign immunity extends to “all state departments and agencies, regardless of insurance[,]” Miller, 266 Ga. at 588 (1); likewise, “sovereign immunity applies to state instrumentalities[.]” Kyle v. Georgia Lottery Corp., 290 Ga. 87, 88 (1) ( 718 SE2d 801 ) (2011).1 1 Nearly 80 years ago and prior to the incorporation of sovereign immunity into the Georgia Constitution, our Supreme Court, specifying that “exemption from taxation is the only question presented[,]” found a housing authority to be an “instrumentality of the State[.]” The case did not touch upon sovereign immunity.

2017Ga. Dept. of Human Resources v. Poss, 263 Ga. 347, 348 ( 434 SE2d 488 ) (1993), overruled on other grounds, Hedquist v. Merrill Lynch, 272 Ga. 209, 211 ( 528 SE2d 508 ) (2000).

2017Ga. Dept. of Human Resources v. Poss, 263 Ga. 347, 348 ( 434 SE2d 488 ) (1993), overruled on other grounds, Hedquist v. Merrill Lynch, 272 Ga. 209, 211 ( 528 SE2d 508 ) (2000).

2025Disabilities, 371 Ga. App. 762 , 762 ( 903 SE2d 146 ) (2024); see OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1) (“Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may, at the option of the pleader, be made by motion in writing: (1) Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter[.]”). 3 Alred, 362 Ga. App. at 466 (punctuation omitted); see Polo Golf and Country Club Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Cunard, 306 Ga. 788, 790 (1) (a) ( 8

2024Ten years later, the Georgia General Assembly 5 Alred, 362 Ga. App. at 466 (punctuation omitted); see Polo Golf and Country Club Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Cunard, 306 Ga. 788, 790 (1) (a) ( 833 SE2d 505 ) (2019) (“Sovereign immunity is a threshold determination that must be ruled upon prior to the case moving forward on the more substantive matters.”), overruled on other grounds by Cobb Cnty. v. Floam, ___ Ga. ___ (Case No. S24A0599; decided May 9, 2024). 6 Alred, 362 Ga. App. at 466 (punctuation omitted); see Ga. Dep’t of Lab. v. RTT Assocs., Inc., 299 Ga. 78, 81 (1) ( 786 SE2d 840 ) (2016) (

2019Sys. of Ga. v. Tyson , 261 Ga. 368 , 369 (1), 404 S.E.2d 557 (1991), finding that "even if a contract with a state agency is formed by the parties' conduct, if it is not a written contract the state's sovereign immunity is not waived" and that a breach of *535 contract action against the State cannot be based on multiple unsigned documents that do not establish the necessary terms of a contract.

2019Sys. of Ga. v. Tyson , 261 Ga. 368 , 369 (1), 404 S.E.2d 557 (1991), finding that "even if a contract with a state agency is formed by the parties' conduct, if it is not a written contract the state's sovereign immunity is not waived" and that a breach of *535 contract action against the State cannot be based on multiple unsigned documents that do not establish the necessary terms of a contract.

2024See Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 745 (1) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (“The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, adopted by this state in 1784, protected governments at all levels from unconsented-to legal actions.”) (footnote omitted); see also Peeples v. Byrd, 98 Ga. 688, 693-694 (4) ( 25 SE 677 ) (1896) (“It is hardly necessary to cite authority for the proposition that a sovereign State is not liable to suit at the instance of a citizen, unless permission to sue has been expressly granted.”).

2024See Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 745 (1) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (“The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, adopted by this state in 1784, protected governments at all levels from unconsented-to legal actions.”) (footnote omitted); see also Peeples v. Byrd, 98 Ga. 688, 693-694 (4) ( 25 SE 677 ) (1896) (“It is hardly necessary to cite authority for the proposition that a sovereign State is not liable to suit at the instance of a citizen, unless permission to sue has been expressly granted.”).

2024First, Donaldson—the only case from this Court the trial court cited— dealt with a sovereign immunity provision different from Paragraph V, which means the Court did not consider the meaning of “past, current, and prospective acts,” but instead decided whether a 1991 amendment to the Georgia Constitution that pertained to sovereign immunity, which was “silent on the issue of retroactive application,” would be applied prospectively only. 262 Ga. at 53 .

2024First, Donaldson—the only case from this Court the trial court cited— dealt with a sovereign immunity provision different from Paragraph V, which means the Court did not consider the meaning of “past, current, or prospective acts,” but instead decided whether a 1991 amendment to the Georgia Constitution that pertained to sovereign immunity, which was “silent on the issue of retroactive application,” would be applied prospectively only. 262 Ga. at 53.