22 Maryland opinions name it 3 courts 1986–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mummert v. Alizadehgreen2 sentences2016Id. at 212 , 77 A.3d at 1051-52 . 2016Id. at 212 , 77 A.3d at 1051-52 . | 1 | 3 |
Connors v. Oaksgreen2 sentences2005Petitioner had also maintained that Grimshaw is neither persuasive nor dispositive “because although [the Court of Appeals] in Scribner overruled Grimshaw on the issue of when a personal injury claim arises, it is not clear whether Grimshaw’s holding as to when the underlying personal injury arises — is still good law.” According to the Cook opinion, Owens-Illinois further pointed out that Grimshaw cited Oaks for the proposition that “loss of consortium is not a separate action from the predicate personal injury, even though [the Court of Appeals], in Oaks, did not disturb the Court of Special 2005Although aware that Grimshaw considered when a loss of consortium claim arose in the context of the cap statute and a *486 latent disease, holding that it arose at the same time as the predicate personal injury claim, the petitioner maintains that it is neither persuasive nor dispositive: “[bjecause this Court in Scribner overruled Grimshaw on the issue of when a personal injury claim arises, it is not clear whether Grimshaw’s holding as to when the underlying personal injury arises — is still good law.” (Petitioner’s Brief at 23) Moreover, the petitioner points out that Grimshaw cited Oaks fo | 1 | 2 |
Spangler v. McQuittygreen2 sentences2016Accord Spangler v. McQuitty, 449 Md. at 59-61 , 141 A.3d at 172-73 , 2016 WL 3685198 , at *13-14 (reasoning that “the purpose of the wrongful death statute and Maryland’s long-standing jurisprudence” generally align with jurisdictions that regard a wrongful death action as independent of, rather than derivative of, a decedent’s personal injury claim). 2016Accord Spangler v. McQuitty, 449 Md. at 59-61 , 141 A.3d at 172-73 , 2016 WL 3685198 , at *13-14 (reasoning that “the purpose of the wrongful death statute and Maryland’s long-standing jurisprudence” generally align with jurisdictions that regard a wrongful death action as independent of, rather than derivative of, a decedent’s personal injury claim). | 1 | 1 |
Taneia Galloway Vs. State Of Iowagreen1 sentence2013See Galloway v. State, 790 N.W.2d 252, 258 (Iowa 2010) (“Like a clear majority of other courts deciding such releases are unenforceable, we believe the strong policy in favor of protecting children must trump any competing interest of parents and tortfeasors in their freedom to contractually nullify a minor child’s personal injury claim before an injury occurs.”); see also Kirton v. Fields, 997 So.2d 349, 356 (Fla.2008) (“In holding that pre-injury releases executed by parents on behalf of minor children are unenforceable for participation in commercial activities, we are in agreement with the | 1 | 1 |
Kirton v. Fieldsgreen1 sentence2013See Galloway v. State, 790 N.W.2d 252, 258 (Iowa 2010) (“Like a clear majority of other courts deciding such releases are unenforceable, we believe the strong policy in favor of protecting children must trump any competing interest of parents and tortfeasors in their freedom to contractually nullify a minor child’s personal injury claim before an injury occurs.”); see also Kirton v. Fields, 997 So.2d 349, 356 (Fla.2008) (“In holding that pre-injury releases executed by parents on behalf of minor children are unenforceable for participation in commercial activities, we are in agreement with the | 1 | 1 |
Newell v. Runnelsgreen2 sentences2010See generally, Newell v. Runnels, 407 Md. 578 , 967 A.2d 729 (2009); Adler v. Am. 2010See generally, Newell v. Runnels, 407 Md. 578 , 967 A.2d 729 (2009); Adler v. Am. | 1 | 1 |
Green v. N.B.S., Inc.green2 sentences2009We recently held in Green v. N.B.S., Inc., 409 Md. 528, 541 , 976 A.2d 279, 286 (2009), that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages, CJP § 11-108, applies to a personal injury claim brought under the CPA. 2009We recently held in Green v. N.B.S., Inc., 409 Md. 528, 541 , 976 A.2d 279, 286 (2009), that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages, CJP § 11-108, applies to a personal injury claim brought under the CPA. | 1 | 1 |
Mills v. International Harvester Co.green2 sentences1998Mills v. International Harvester Co., 554 F.Supp. 611, 613 (D.Md. 1982). 1998Mills v. International Harvester Co., 554 F.Supp. 611, 613 (D.Md.1982). | 1 | 1 |
Kraus v. Board of County Road Commissionersgreen2 sentences1993Johnsbury, 92 Vt. 423, 433-434 , 105 A. 34, 38 (1918) (statutory requirement of notice to municipality of a personal injury action did not apply to a suit by the “next of kin of the decedent”); Kraus v. Board of County Road Comm’rs for County of Kent, 236 F.Supp. 677, 679 (W.D.Mich.1964), appeal denied, 364 F.2d 919 (6th Cir.1966) (same). 1993Johnsbury, 92 Vt. 423, 433-434 , 105 A. 34, 38 (1918) (statutory requirement of notice to municipality of a personal injury action did not apply to a suit by the "next of kin of the decedent"); Kraus v. Board of County Road Comm'rs for County of Kent, 236 F. Supp. 677, 679 (W.D.Mich. 1964), appeal denied, 364 F.2d 919 (6th Cir.1966) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Bilbo v. Lewisgreen2 sentences1993See, e.g., Daley v. United Services, 312 Md. 550, 554 , 541 A.2d 632, 634 (1988) (solatium damages claimed in a wrongful death action are not “bodily injury damages”); Prouty v. Chicago, 250 Ill. 222, 227 , 95 N.E. 147, 149-150 (1911) (wrongful death act “does not, in its language or in substance, create a cause of action for a personal injury;” thus a statute requiring notice to the state of a personal injury claim does not require notice of a claim for damages suffered by third persons by reason of death.); Stormo v. Dell Rapids, 75 S.D. 582, 588 , 70 N.W.2d 831, 834 (1955) (same); Bilbo v. 1993See, e.g., Daley v. United Services, 312 Md. 550, 554 , 541 A.2d 632, 634 (1988) (solatium damages claimed in a wrongful death action are not "bodily injury damages"); Prouty v. Chicago, 250 Ill. 222, 227 , 95 N.E. 147, 149-150 (1911) (wrongful death act "does not, in its language or in substance, create a cause of action for a personal injury;" thus a statute requiring notice to the state of a personal injury claim does not require notice of a claim for damages suffered by third persons by reason of death.); Stormo v. Dell Rapids, 75 S.D. 582, 588 , 70 N.W.2d 831, 834 (1955) (same); Bilbo v. | 1 | 1 |
Stormo v. City of Dell Rapidsgreen2 sentences1993See, e.g., Daley v. United Services, 312 Md. 550, 554 , 541 A.2d 632, 634 (1988) (solatium damages claimed in a wrongful death action are not “bodily injury damages”); Prouty v. Chicago, 250 Ill. 222, 227 , 95 N.E. 147, 149-150 (1911) (wrongful death act “does not, in its language or in substance, create a cause of action for a personal injury;” thus a statute requiring notice to the state of a personal injury claim does not require notice of a claim for damages suffered by third persons by reason of death.); Stormo v. Dell Rapids, 75 S.D. 582, 588 , 70 N.W.2d 831, 834 (1955) (same); Bilbo v. 1993See, e.g., Daley v. United Services, 312 Md. 550, 554 , 541 A.2d 632, 634 (1988) (solatium damages claimed in a wrongful death action are not “bodily injury damages”); Prouty v. Chicago, 250 Ill. 222, 227 , 95 N.E. 147, 149-150 (1911) (wrongful death act “does not, in its language or in substance, create a cause of action for a personal injury;” thus a statute requiring notice to the state of a personal injury claim does not require notice of a claim for damages suffered by third persons by reason of death.); Stormo v. Dell Rapids, 75 S.D. 582, 588 , 70 N.W.2d 831, 834 (1955) (same); Bilbo v. | 1 | 1 |
Daley v. United Services Automobile Ass'ngreen2 sentences1993See, e.g., Daley v. United Services, 312 Md. 550, 554 , 541 A.2d 632, 634 (1988) (solatium damages claimed in a wrongful death action are not “bodily injury damages”); Prouty v. Chicago, 250 Ill. 222, 227 , 95 N.E. 147, 149-150 (1911) (wrongful death act “does not, in its language or in substance, create a cause of action for a personal injury;” thus a statute requiring notice to the state of a personal injury claim does not require notice of a claim for damages suffered by third persons by reason of death.); Stormo v. Dell Rapids, 75 S.D. 582, 588 , 70 N.W.2d 831, 834 (1955) (same); Bilbo v. 1993See, e.g., Daley v. United Services, 312 Md. 550, 554 , 541 A.2d 632, 634 (1988) (solatium damages claimed in a wrongful death action are not “bodily injury damages”); Prouty v. Chicago, 250 Ill. 222, 227 , 95 N.E. 147, 149-150 (1911) (wrongful death act “does not, in its language or in substance, create a cause of action for a personal injury;” thus a statute requiring notice to the state of a personal injury claim does not require notice of a claim for damages suffered by third persons by reason of death.); Stormo v. Dell Rapids, 75 S.D. 582, 588 , 70 N.W.2d 831, 834 (1955) (same); Bilbo v. | 1 | 1 |
Prouty v. City of Chicagogreen2 sentences1993See, e.g., Daley v. United Services, 312 Md. 550, 554 , 541 A.2d 632, 634 (1988) (solatium damages claimed in a wrongful death action are not “bodily injury damages”); Prouty v. Chicago, 250 Ill. 222, 227 , 95 N.E. 147, 149-150 (1911) (wrongful death act “does not, in its language or in substance, create a cause of action for a personal injury;” thus a statute requiring notice to the state of a personal injury claim does not require notice of a claim for damages suffered by third persons by reason of death.); Stormo v. Dell Rapids, 75 S.D. 582, 588 , 70 N.W.2d 831, 834 (1955) (same); Bilbo v. 1993See, e.g., Daley v. United Services, 312 Md. 550, 554 , 541 A.2d 632, 634 (1988) (solatium damages claimed in a wrongful death action are not “bodily injury damages”); Prouty v. Chicago, 250 Ill. 222, 227 , 95 N.E. 147, 149-150 (1911) (wrongful death act “does not, in its language or in substance, create a cause of action for a personal injury;” thus a statute requiring notice to the state of a personal injury claim does not require notice of a claim for damages suffered by third persons by reason of death.); Stormo v. Dell Rapids, 75 S.D. 582, 588 , 70 N.W.2d 831, 834 (1955) (same); Bilbo v. | 1 | 1 |
Bigelow v. Town of St. Johnsburygreen2 sentences1993Johnsbury, 92 Vt. 423, 433-434 , 105 A. 34, 38 (1918) (statutory requirement of notice to municipality of a personal injury action did not apply to a suit by the “next of kin of the decedent”); Kraus v. Board of County Road Comm’rs for County of Kent, 236 F.Supp. 677, 679 (W.D.Mich.1964), appeal denied, 364 F.2d 919 (6th Cir.1966) (same). 1993Johnsbury, 92 Vt. 423, 433-434 , 105 A. 34, 38 (1918) (statutory requirement of notice to municipality of a personal injury action did not apply to a suit by the “next of kin of the decedent”); Kraus v. Board of County Road Comm’rs for County of Kent, 236 F.Supp. 677, 679 (W.D.Mich.1964), appeal denied, 364 F.2d 919 (6th Cir.1966) (same). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Oaks v. Connors
green
2 sentences2010In evaluating the application of the Cap to a non-injured spouse's loss of consortium claim for her injured spouse, we reasoned that not applying the statutory Cap equally to a personal injury claim and a loss of consortium claim would allow the injured spouse to receive one and a half times more in non-economic damages than was intended by the Cap. 339 Md. at 38 , 660 A.2d at 430 . 2010In evaluating the application of the Cap to a non-injured spouse's loss of consortium claim for her injured spouse, we reasoned that not applying the statutory Cap equally to a personal injury claim and a loss of consortium claim would allow the injured spouse to receive one and a half times more in non-economic damages than was intended by the Cap. 339 Md. at 38 , 660 A.2d at 430 . | 3 | 2002–2010 |
Linton v. Consumer Protection Division
green
2 sentences2022(Footnote omitted). 8 In Linton I, 467 Md. at 508 , 225 A.3d at 460 , we indicated that there are approximately 100 putative class members “who, between January 1, 2012 and July 6, 2016, transferred structured settlement payment rights obtained in settlement of a personal injury claim to Access.” 9 The complaint included the following seven counts: (1) negligence against Smith; (2) negligent misrepresentation against Smith; (3) negligent misrepresentation against Access; (4) fraud, misrepresentation, and deceit against Smith; (5) fraud, misrepresentation, and deceit against Access; (6) constru 2022(Footnote omitted). 8 In Linton I, 467 Md. at 508 , 225 A.3d at 460 , we indicated that there are approximately 100 putative class members “who, between January 1, 2012 and July 6, 2016, transferred structured settlement payment rights obtained in settlement of a personal injury claim to Access.” 9 The complaint included the following seven counts: (1) negligence against Smith; (2) negligent misrepresentation against Smith; (3) negligent misrepresentation against Access; (4) fraud, misrepresentation, and deceit against Smith; (5) fraud, misrepresentation, and deceit against Access; (6) constru | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Jackson v. Dackman Co.
green
2 sentences2017Dackman held that the $17,000 available to a lead-poisoned child under the Act was a “totally inadequate” substitute for a personal injury claim and thus the immunity provided by the Act violated Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 422 Md. at 381 , which guarantees “[t]hat every man, for any injury done to him in his person or property, ought to have remedy by the course of the Law of the land.” At the same time, however, the Court determined that the “immunity provisions” of the Act “are severable from those remaining portions of the Act which can be given effect.” Id. at 383 . 2017Dackman held that the $17,000 available to a lead-poisoned child under the Act was a “totally inadequate” substitute for a personal injury claim and thus the immunity provided by the Act violated Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 422 Md. at 381 , which guarantees “[t]hat every man, for any injury done to him in his person or property, ought to have remedy by the course of the Law of the land.” At the same time, however, the Court determined that the “immunity provisions” of the Act “are severable from those remaining portions of the Act which can be given effect.” Id. at 383 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Spevack v. Klein
green
2 sentences2018Id. at 82-83 (quoting Spevack , 385 U.S. at 514 , 87 S.Ct. 625 ). 2018Id. at 82-83 (quoting Spevack , 385 U.S. at 514 , 87 S.Ct. 625 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Armstrong v. Tanaka
green
1 sentence2018Id. at 82-83 (quoting Spevack , 385 U.S. at 514 , 87 S.Ct. 625 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Stewart v. United Electric Light & Power Co.
green
2 sentences2016See Mummert, 435 Md. at 219-20 , 77 A.3d at 1056 ; Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 46 cmt. b; Stewart, 104 Md. 332 , 65 A. 49, 53 . 2016See Mummert, 435 Md. at 219-20 , 77 A.3d at 1056 ; Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 46 cmt. b; Stewart, 104 Md. 332 , 65 A. 49, 53 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Hawkins Ex Rel. Hawkins v. Peart
red
1 sentence2013See Galloway v. State, 790 N.W.2d 252, 258 (Iowa 2010) (“Like a clear majority of other courts deciding such releases are unenforceable, we believe the strong policy in favor of protecting children must trump any competing interest of parents and tortfeasors in their freedom to contractually nullify a minor child’s personal injury claim before an injury occurs.”); see also Kirton v. Fields, 997 So.2d 349, 356 (Fla.2008) (“In holding that pre-injury releases executed by parents on behalf of minor children are unenforceable for participation in commercial activities, we are in agreement with the | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Woodman v. Kera LLC
green
2 sentences2013See Galloway v. State, 790 N.W.2d 252, 258 (Iowa 2010) (“Like a clear majority of other courts deciding such releases are unenforceable, we believe the strong policy in favor of protecting children must trump any competing interest of parents and tortfeasors in their freedom to contractually nullify a minor child’s personal injury claim before an injury occurs.”); see also Kirton v. Fields, 997 So.2d 349, 356 (Fla.2008) (“In holding that pre-injury releases executed by parents on behalf of minor children are unenforceable for participation in commercial activities, we are in agreement with the 2013See Galloway v. State, 790 N.W.2d 252, 258 (Iowa 2010) (“Like a clear majority of other courts deciding such releases are unenforceable, we believe the strong policy in favor of protecting children must trump any competing interest of parents and tortfeasors in their freedom to contractually nullify a minor child’s personal injury claim before an injury occurs.”); see also Kirton v. Fields, 997 So.2d 349, 356 (Fla.2008) (“In holding that pre-injury releases executed by parents on behalf of minor children are unenforceable for participation in commercial activities, we are in agreement with the | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Doyle v. Bowdoin College
green
1 sentence2013See Galloway v. State, 790 N.W.2d 252, 258 (Iowa 2010) (“Like a clear majority of other courts deciding such releases are unenforceable, we believe the strong policy in favor of protecting children must trump any competing interest of parents and tortfeasors in their freedom to contractually nullify a minor child’s personal injury claim before an injury occurs.”); see also Kirton v. Fields, 997 So.2d 349, 356 (Fla.2008) (“In holding that pre-injury releases executed by parents on behalf of minor children are unenforceable for participation in commercial activities, we are in agreement with the | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd.
green
1 sentence2013See Galloway v. State, 790 N.W.2d 252, 258 (Iowa 2010) (“Like a clear majority of other courts deciding such releases are unenforceable, we believe the strong policy in favor of protecting children must trump any competing interest of parents and tortfeasors in their freedom to contractually nullify a minor child’s personal injury claim before an injury occurs.”); see also Kirton v. Fields, 997 So.2d 349, 356 (Fla.2008) (“In holding that pre-injury releases executed by parents on behalf of minor children are unenforceable for participation in commercial activities, we are in agreement with the | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Cook
green
2 sentences2006Although aware that Grimshaw considered when a loss of consortium claim arose in the context of the cap statute and a latent disease, holding that it arose at the same time as the predicate personal injury claim, the petitioner maintains that it is neither persuasive nor dispositive. 386 Md. at 484-86 , 872 A.2d 969 (emphasis supplied). 2006Although aware that Grimshaw considered when a loss of consortium claim arose in the context of the cap statute and a latent disease, holding that it arose at the same time as the predicate personal injury claim, the petitioner maintains that it is neither persuasive nor dispositive. 386 Md. at 484-86 , 872 A.2d 969 (emphasis supplied). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Deems v. Western Maryland Railway Co.
green
2 sentences2006In Deems v. Western Maryland Railway, 247 Md. 95, 108-09 , 231 A.2d 514 (1967), Judge Oppenheimer discussed the symbiotic relationship between the underlying personal injury claim and the derivative claim alleging damage to the marital relationship itself. 2006In Deems v. Western Maryland Railway, 247 Md. 95, 108-09 , 231 A.2d 514 (1967), Judge Oppenheimer discussed the symbiotic relationship between the underlying personal injury claim and the derivative claim alleging damage to the marital relationship itself. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Blake v. Blake
green
2 sentences2000Blake, 341 Md. at 348-49 , 670 A.2d 472 . 2000Blake, 341 Md. at 348-49 , 670 A.2d 472 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Frazier v. Waterman Steamship Corp.
green
2 sentences1995Similarly, in Frazier v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 206 Md. 434 , 112 A.2d 221 , a personal injury claim by a stevedore against the owner of a vessel claimed to be unseaworthy, the principal factual issue was whether the stevedore was caused to slip and fall through a hatch from one deck to another because there was grease on the upper deck. 1995Similarly, in Frazier v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 206 Md. 434 , 112 A.2d 221 , a personal injury claim by a stevedore against the owner of a vessel claimed to be unseaworthy, the principal factual issue was whether the stevedore was caused to slip and fall through a hatch from one deck to another because there was grease on the upper deck. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Kraus v. Board Of County Road Commissioners For The County Of Kent
green
2 sentences1993Johnsbury, 92 Vt. 423, 433-434 , 105 A. 34, 38 (1918) (statutory requirement of notice to municipality of a personal injury action did not apply to a suit by the “next of kin of the decedent”); Kraus v. Board of County Road Comm’rs for County of Kent, 236 F.Supp. 677, 679 (W.D.Mich.1964), appeal denied, 364 F.2d 919 (6th Cir.1966) (same). 1993Johnsbury, 92 Vt. 423, 433-434 , 105 A. 34, 38 (1918) (statutory requirement of notice to municipality of a personal injury action did not apply to a suit by the "next of kin of the decedent"); Kraus v. Board of County Road Comm'rs for County of Kent, 236 F. Supp. 677, 679 (W.D.Mich. 1964), appeal denied, 364 F.2d 919 (6th Cir.1966) (same). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Velasquez
green
2 sentences1986Comm’n v. Velasquez, 301 Md. 450 , 483 A.2d 354 (1984), Velasquez had received a check in the amount of $2,522.40 from GEICO on November 22, 1982, representing settlement of a client’s personal injury claim. 1986Comm’n v. Velasquez, 301 Md. 450 , 483 A.2d 354 (1984), Velasquez had received a check in the amount of $2,522.40 from GEICO on November 22, 1982, representing settlement of a client’s personal injury claim. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Summers v. Freishtat green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.