personal injury claim in New York

2016Finally, despite the court’s pretrial ruling precluding defendants from questioning plaintiff about a personal injury claim she had filed in connection with a prior accident, defense counsel, over objection, asked plaintiff if she had been involved in any “legal action” related to her “neck and/or back condition.” Because evidence of prior accidents and lawsuits related thereto “may not [be used to] . . . demonstrate that the plaintiff is litigious and therefore unworthy of belief” (Molinari v Conforti & Eisele, 54 AD2d 1113, 1114 [1976]), it was error for the court to allow that questioning.

2016Finally, despite the court’s pretrial ruling precluding defendants from questioning plaintiff about a personal injury claim she had filed in connection with a prior accident, defense counsel, over objection, asked plaintiff if she had been involved in any “legal action” related to her “neck and/or back condition.” Because evidence of prior accidents and lawsuits related thereto “may not [be used to] . . . demonstrate that the plaintiff is litigious and therefore unworthy of belief” (Molinari v Conforti & Eisele, 54 AD2d 1113, 1114 [1976]), it was error for the court to allow that questioning.

2022In this case, where the cause of action arose in New York (where the accident occurred), no New Jersey Superior Court is available "in the county in which the cause of action arose." What the majority overlooks, however, is that venue is not a jurisdictional matter under New Jersey law; if a defendant objects to venue, its remedy is to move for a change of venue, not for dismissal, and the objection to venue is waived if it is not timely asserted (New Jersey Rules of Court R. 4:3-3[b]; see Ciaglia v Ciaglia , 106 NJL 479, 479, 148 A 761, 761 [NJ Ct E & A 1930] [improper venue "was not a ground

2022In this case, where the cause of action arose in New York (where the accident occurred), no New Jersey Superior Court is available "in the county in which the cause of action arose." What the majority overlooks, however, is that venue is not a jurisdictional matter under New Jersey law; if a defendant objects to venue, its remedy is to move for a change of venue, not for dismissal, and the objection to venue is waived if it is not timely asserted (New Jersey Rules of Court R. 4:3-3[b]; see Ciaglia v Ciaglia , 106 NJL 479, 479, 148 A 761, 761 [NJ Ct E & A 1930] [improper venue "was not a ground

2021However, the Court of Appeals addressed this argument in Heslin and rejected it, noting that "unlike a wrongful death claim that directly compensates a decedent's distributees for their own damages, a personal injury claim is designed to compensate the decedent for injuries suffered and is personal to the deceased - in other words, it is a claim assumed by the estate" ( 14 NY3d at 76 ).

2021However, the Court of Appeals addressed this argument in Heslin and rejected it, noting that "unlike a wrongful death claim that directly compensates a decedent's distributees for their own damages, a personal injury claim is designed to compensate the decedent for injuries suffered and is personal to the deceased - in other words, it is a claim assumed by the estate" ( 14 NY3d at 76 ).

2020This indemnification includes "the costs . . . incurred in defending [themselves]" against a personal injury claim, and "reasonable attorneys' fees" ( Espinal v City of New York , 107 AD3d 411, 412 [1st Dept 2013]).

2020This indemnification includes "the costs . . . incurred in defending [themselves]" against a personal injury claim, and "reasonable attorneys' fees" ( Espinal v City of New York , 107 AD3d 411, 412 [1st Dept 2013]).

2013Accordingly, the defendant waived any claim for equitable distribution she may have had to those funds (see Label v Label, 70 AD3d 898, 899-900 [2010]).

2013Accordingly, the defendant waived any claim for equitable distribution she may have had to those funds (see Label v Label, 70 AD3d 898, 899-900 [2010]).

2012Although the governing statute provides that compensation for personal injury constitutes separate property {see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [1] [d] [2]), here, Supreme Court noted the complete lack of any evidence upon which the funds might have been allocated as between the husband’s personal injury claim and the wife’s consortium claim, and the substantial evidence supporting the legal presumption that the parties wished to treat the proceeds as joint assets of the marriage (see Cameron v Cameron, 22 AD3d 911, 912 [2005]; Garner v Garner, 307 AD2d 510, 512 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 51

2012Although the governing statute provides that compensation for personal injury constitutes separate property {see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [1] [d] [2]), here, Supreme Court noted the complete lack of any evidence upon which the funds might have been allocated as between the husband’s personal injury claim and the wife’s consortium claim, and the substantial evidence supporting the legal presumption that the parties wished to treat the proceeds as joint assets of the marriage (see Cameron v Cameron, 22 AD3d 911, 912 [2005]; Garner v Garner, 307 AD2d 510, 512 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 51

2012Although the governing statute provides that compensation for personal injury constitutes separate property {see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [1] [d] [2]), here, Supreme Court noted the complete lack of any evidence upon which the funds might have been allocated as between the husband’s personal injury claim and the wife’s consortium claim, and the substantial evidence supporting the legal presumption that the parties wished to treat the proceeds as joint assets of the marriage (see Cameron v Cameron, 22 AD3d 911, 912 [2005]; Garner v Garner, 307 AD2d 510, 512 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 51

2012Although the governing statute provides that compensation for personal injury constitutes separate property {see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [1] [d] [2]), here, Supreme Court noted the complete lack of any evidence upon which the funds might have been allocated as between the husband’s personal injury claim and the wife’s consortium claim, and the substantial evidence supporting the legal presumption that the parties wished to treat the proceeds as joint assets of the marriage (see Cameron v Cameron, 22 AD3d 911, 912 [2005]; Garner v Garner, 307 AD2d 510, 512 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 51

1989(See, e.g., Barni v Kutner, 45 Del 550, 76 A2d 801 ; Huffer v Kozitza, 361 NW2d 451, 454 [Minn], affd 375 NW2d 480 ; Ryter v Brennan, 291 So 2d 55 [Fla], cert denied 297 So 2d 836; Stapleton u Palmore, 250 Ga 259, 297 SE2d 270 ; Kotsiris v Ling, 451 SW2d 411 [Ky]; Whittlesey v Miller, 572 SW2d 665 , supra; Layne v Huffman, 42 Ohio St 2d 287, 327 NE2d 767 .) Courts in other jurisdictions, however, hold that the loss of consortium claim of one spouse must be joined with the personal injury claim of the other spouse.

1985Three jurisdictions have construed Millington (supra) as barring the deprived spouse’s action for loss of consortium only where the action by the impaired spouse was concluded by judgment or settlement prior to the effective date of a court decision recognizing a claim for loss of consortium by either spouse (see, Rodriguez v Bethelehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal 3d 382, 525 P2d 669, 686 [1974]; Diaz v Lilly & Co., 364 Mass 153, 302 NE2d 555, 564 [1973]; Swartz v United States Steel Corp., 293 Ala 439, 304 So 2d 881, 886 [1974]; see also, Huffer v Kozitza, 361 NW2d 451, 454 [Ct App, Minn 1985]).

2026Hosp., 28 Misc 3d 127[A] , 2010 NY Slip Op 51180[U] , *2, 2010 NY Misc LEXIS 2855 , *3 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists, Jul. 7, 2010]; see Badolato v Rosenberg, 67 AD3d 937, 938 [2d Dept 2009]).

2026Thus, for example, the relationship between a doctor performing a medical examination on behalf of an insurance company for the purpose of evaluating a personal injury claim, and the person whom he or she is examining, may fairly be called a “‘limited physician-patient relationship,’” which may only give rise to a medical malpractice cause of action where the physician performed the examination in a manner that directly caused physical harm to the examinee (Bazakos v Lewis, 12 NY3d 631, 635 [2009], citing Dyer v Trachtman, 470 Mich 45, 49-50 , 679 NW2d 311, 314-315 [2004]) or where the physici

2026Thus, for example, the relationship between a doctor performing a medical examination on behalf of an insurance company for the purpose of evaluating a personal injury claim, and the person whom he or she is examining, may fairly be called a “‘limited physician-patient relationship,’” which may only give rise to a medical malpractice cause of action where the physician performed the examination in a manner that directly caused physical harm to the examinee (Bazakos v Lewis, 12 NY3d 631, 635 [2009], citing Dyer v Trachtman, 470 Mich 45, 49-50 , 679 NW2d 311, 314-315 [2004]) or where the physici

2026Thus, for example, the relationship between a doctor performing a medical examination on behalf of an insurance company for the purpose of evaluating a personal injury claim, and the person whom he or she is examining, may fairly be called a “‘limited physician-patient relationship,’” which may only give rise to a medical malpractice cause of action where the physician performed the examination in a manner that directly caused physical harm to the examinee (Bazakos v Lewis, 12 NY3d 631, 635 [2009], citing Dyer v Trachtman, 470 Mich 45, 49-50 , 679 NW2d 311, 314-315 [2004]) or where the physici

2025Under relevant principles of interpretation, the language of the settlement agreement demonstrates the parties' intent to preserve General Casualty's obligation to indemnify QPS Development with respect to the plaintiff's personal injury claim ( see generally Kefalas v Valiotis , 197 AD3d 698, 702 ).

2025Under relevant principles of interpretation, the language of the settlement agreement demonstrates the parties' intent to preserve General Casualty's obligation to indemnify QPS Development with respect to the plaintiff's personal injury claim ( see generally Kefalas v Valiotis , 197 AD3d 698, 702).

2025Co. , 172 AD3d 1336 , [*2]1338 [2d Dept 2019]; Gaglia v Nash , 8 AD3d 992, 993 [4th Dept 2004]).

2024Accordingly, the personal injury causes of action, which the decedent could have brought when he was alive, existed before the appointment and qualification of an administrator ( see Boffee , 171 AD at 394 ; see also George , 47 NY2d at 176 ).

2022"The new Statute of Limitations provide[d] that a personal injury claim arising out of the latent effects of exposure to any substance or combination of substances accrues on the earlier of the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or from the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence the injury should have been discovered" ( id. [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 214-c[2]). "[T]he revival statute provided a one-year window period to sue for persons who were or would have been barred by operation of the preexisting last exposure rule" ( Besser v Squibb & Sons

2022"The new Statute of Limitations provide[d] that a personal injury claim arising out of the latent effects of exposure to any substance or combination of substances accrues on the earlier of the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or from the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence the injury should have been discovered" ( id. [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 214-c[2]). "[T]he revival statute provided a one-year window period to sue for persons who were or would have been barred by operation of the preexisting last exposure rule" ( Besser v Squibb & Sons

2018The record presents an issue of fact as to whether defendant continuously represented plaintiff in connection with a personal injury claim based on the accident, such as to toll the statute of limitations during that time ( see Glamm v Allen , 57 NY2d 87, 94 [1982]; Waggoner v Caruso , 68 AD3d 1, 6-7 [1st Dept 2009]).

2018The complaint adequately alleged that the plaintiff was "left with the reasonable impression" that the defendants were, "in fact, actively addressing [his] legal needs" until that date ( Shumsky v Eisenstein , 96 NY2d at 169 ; see Lytell v Lorusso , 74 AD3d 905, 907 ).

2018Co. of N.Y. v Manoo , 140 AD3d 468, 470 [1st Dept 2016]; see Unitrin Advantage Ins.

2018However, where, as here, the personal injury claim is premised upon damages "caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance or combination of substances, in any form, upon or within the body or upon or within property," the three-year statute of limitations runs "from the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or from the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered by the plaintiff, whichever is earlier" (CPLR 214-c [2]; accord Caronia v Philip Morris USA, Inc. , 22 NY3d 439, 448 [2013]; Vasilatos v Dzamba , 148 AD3d 1275,