personal injury claim in Texas

2022In re Labatt Food Serv., 279 S.W.3d at 649 (holding “the arbitration provision in an agreement between a decedent and his employer requires the employee’s wrongful death beneficiaries to arbitrate their wrongful death claims against the employer even though they did not sign the agreement”); In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 135 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (recognizing that a “nonparty may be compelled to arbitrate if it deliberately seeks and obtains substantial benefits from the contract itself” in discussion of a personal injury claim where claimant demanded compliance with the

2021In re Labatt Food Serv., 279 S.W.3d at 649 (holding “the arbitration provision in an agreement between a decedent and his employer requires the employee’s wrongful death beneficiaries to arbitrate their wrongful death claims against the employer even though they did not sign the agreement”); In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 135 (Tex. 2005) (recognizing that a “nonparty may be compelled to arbitrate if it deliberately seeks and obtains substantial benefits from the contract itself” in discussion of a personal injury claim where claimant demanded compliance with the contract). –16– rej

2019In Godt we held that the patient’s legal malpractice claim constituted a personal injury claim under section 171.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 28 S.W.3d at 738–39.

2013See In re Godt, 28 S.W.3d 732, 738-39 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, orig. proceeding) (holding a legal malpractice suit arising from a lawyer’s handling of a personal-injury claim is a personal-injury claim for purposes of section 171.002); see also Bennett v. Leas, No. 13-06-469-CV, 2008 WL 2525403 , at *7 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi June 26, 2008, pet. abated) (holding legal malpractice claim arising from lawyer’s handling of grievance matters is a personal-injury claim for purposes of section 171.002).

2022In re Labatt Food Serv., 279 S.W.3d at 649 (holding “the arbitration provision in an agreement between a decedent and his employer requires the employee’s wrongful death beneficiaries to arbitrate their wrongful death claims against the employer even though they did not sign the agreement”); In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 135 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (recognizing that a “nonparty may be compelled to arbitrate if it deliberately seeks and obtains substantial benefits from the contract itself” in discussion of a personal injury claim where claimant demanded compliance with the

2021In re Labatt Food Serv., 279 S.W.3d at 649 (holding “the arbitration provision in an agreement between a decedent and his employer requires the employee’s wrongful death beneficiaries to arbitrate their wrongful death claims against the employer even though they did not sign the agreement”); In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 135 (Tex. 2005) (recognizing that a “nonparty may be compelled to arbitrate if it deliberately seeks and obtains substantial benefits from the contract itself” in discussion of a personal injury claim where claimant demanded compliance with the contract). –16– rej

2009However, at common law, a personal injury claim did not survive an injured party’s death, nor did a deceased’s heirs have a common law cause of action for their own losses. -3- 04-08-00007-CV Diaz, 941 S.W.2d at 100 ; Kramer v. Lewisville Mem’l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 403 (Tex. 1993).

1999See Bala v. Maxwell, 909 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tex.1995); Kramer v. Lewisville Memorial Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 403 (Tex.1993).

2003Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 343 (Tex.1998).

2003Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley , 968 S.W.2d 339, 343 (Tex. 1998).

2010Taylor, 180 S.W.3d at 630 .

2009The Taylor court examined the legislative history of the personal injury provision in the Texas Arbitration Act and found “no room for doubt in the legislature’s intent to restrict the meaning of the personal injury exception of the Texas Arbitration Act to physical personal injury.” Id. at 631 .

2009The court held that the “failure to specifically list personal injury as a covered claim preclude[d] indemnity for the personal injury claim.” Id. at 15 .

2009The court held that the “failure to specifically list personal injury as a covered claim preclude[d] indemnity for the personal injury claim.” Id. at 15.

2016Brown, 968 S.W.2d at 333 .

2014Here, M.R.’s claim is mature because claims for medical negligence in útero are established causes of action in Texas, Brown v. Shwarts, 968 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Tex.1998), and M.R.’s injury has allegedly come to fruition.

2011Thus, . . . , the [debtors'] omission of the personal injury claim from their mandatory bankruptcy filings is tantamount to a representation that no such claim existed. 374 F.3d at 335 (citation omitted, emphasis in original).

2011Thus, . . . , the [debtors’] omission of the personal injury claim from their mandatory bankruptcy filings is tantamount to a representation that no such claim existed. 374 F.3d at 335 (citation omitted, emphasis in original).

2012Co., 64 S.W.3d at 144 ; Howard, 980 S.W.2d at 719 ; see also J & J Timber Co. v. Broome, 932 So.2d 1, 6 (Miss. 2006) (where an underlying personal injury claim has been disposed of, a loss of consortium claim 10 cannot be maintained).

2012Co., 64 S.W.3d at 144 ; Howard, 980 S.W.2d at 719 ; see also J & J Timber Co. v. Broome, 932 So.2d 1, 6 (Miss.2006) (where an underlying personal injury claim has been disposed of, a loss of consortium claim cannot be maintained).

2008In re Godt , 28 S.W.3d 732, 738-39 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, orig. proceeding); contra Taylor v. Wilson , 180 S.W.3d 627, 631 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); Miller v. Brewer , 118 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, no pet.) (per curiam); In re Hartigan , 107 S.W.3d 684, 690 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding).

2008In re Godt, 28 S.W.3d 732, 738-39 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2000, orig. proceeding); contra Taylor v. Wilson, 180 S.W.3d 627, 631 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); Miller v. Brewer, 118 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2003, no pet.) (per curiam); In re Hartigan, 107 S.W.3d 684, 690 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding).

2008In re Godt , 28 S.W.3d 732, 738-39 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, orig. proceeding); contra Taylor v. Wilson , 180 S.W.3d 627, 631 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); Miller v. Brewer , 118 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, no pet.) (per curiam); In re Hartigan , 107 S.W.3d 684, 690 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding).

2008In re Godt, 28 S.W.3d 732, 738-39 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2000, orig. proceeding); contra Taylor v. Wilson, 180 S.W.3d 627, 631 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); Miller v. Brewer, 118 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2003, no pet.) (per curiam); In re Hartigan, 107 S.W.3d 684, 690 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding).

2007Specific Jurisdiction Analysis The Motts contend that Texas courts have specific jurisdiction over their claims against Double Eagle by virtue of Double Eagle’s direct marketing to them. “[W]hen a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the State is exercising ‘specific jurisdiction’ over the defendant.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 , 414 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 1868 , 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). “[T]he touchstone of jurisdictional due process has been ‘purposeful availment.’ ”

2007Specific Jurisdiction Analysis The Motts contend that Texas courts have specific jurisdiction over their claims against Double Eagle by virtue of Double Eagle's direct marketing to them. "[W]hen a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum, the State is exercising 'specific jurisdiction' over the defendant." Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall , 466 U.S. 408 , 414 n.8, 104 S.Ct. 1868 , 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). "[T]he touchstone of jurisdictional due process has been 'purposeful availment.'" M

2005See Tignor, 729 F.2d at 978 ; Douglas, 987 S.W.2d at 881-82 ; Carter, 21 S.W.3d at 444 . 22: Tex. R.

2005See Tignor, 729 F.2d at 978 ; Douglas, 987 S.W.2d at 881-82 ; Carter, 21 S.W.3d at 444 . 22.

2005For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that “the gravamen of legal-malpractice actions is injury to the rights of another, not personal injury.” McGrogan v. Till, 167 N.J. 414 , 771 A.2d 1187, 1192 (2001); see also Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal.3d 176 , 98 Cal.Rptr. 837, 840 , 491 P.2d 421 (1971) (noting that legal malpractice causes damage to “intangible property interests”); Higa v. Mirikitani, 55 Haw. 167 , 517 P.2d 1, 4 (1973) (commenting that “virtually all claims for legal malpractice [concern] a non-physical injury to an intangible interest of the pl

2005For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that “the gravamen of legal-malpractice actions is injury to the rights of another, not personal injury.” McGrogan v. Till, 167 N.J. 414 , 771 A.2d 1187, 1192 (2001); see also Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal.3d 176 , 98 Cal.Rptr. 837, 840 , 491 P.2d 421 (1971) (noting that legal malpractice causes damage to “intangible property interests”); Higa v. Mirikitani, 55 Haw. 167 , 517 P.2d 1, 4 (1973) (commenting that “virtually all claims for legal malpractice [concern] a non-physical injury to an intangible interest of the pl

2005The McGro-gan court relied on the analysis from an earlier case in which the court reasoned that “a legal-malpractice action was not ‘a personal injury claim but rather an assertion that an attorney engaged for a particular purpose was negligent in the handling of it, resulting in pecuniary loss to appellant.’ ” McGrogan, 771 A.2d at 1193 .

2005The McGrogan court relied on the analysis from an earlier case in which the court reasoned that "a legal-malpractice action was not `a personal injury claim but rather an assertion that an attorney engaged for a particular purpose was negligent in the handling of it, resulting in pecuniary loss to appellant.'" McGrogan, 771 A.2d at 1193 .

2005The other two cases relied upon by the Godt court cite Willis as authority for the proposition that a legal malpractice action is a claim for “personal injury.” See Sample v. Freeman, 873 S.W.2d 470, 476-77 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1994, writ denied) (holding an award for pre-judgment interest in a legal malpractice case is appropriate because a legal malpractice action is a personal injury claim); Estate of Degley v. Vega, 797 S.W.2d 299, 302-03 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ) (classifying a legal malpractice claim as a claim for personal injury for statute of limitations purposes).

2005The other two cases relied upon by the Godt court cite Willis as authority for the proposition that a legal malpractice action is a claim for "personal injury." See Sample v. Freeman, 873 S.W.2d 470, 476-77 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1994, writ denied) (holding an award for pre-judgment interest in a legal malpractice case is appropriate because a legal malpractice action is a personal injury claim); Estate of Degley v. Vega, 797 S.W.2d 299, 302-03 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ) (classifying a legal malpractice claim as a claim for personal injury for statute of limitations purposes).

2016Id. (citing In re Nexion Helath at Humble, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 67, 69 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)).

2015Id.

2004Bala , 909 S.W.2d at 893 .

1999See Bala v. Maxwell, 909 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tex.1995); Kramer v. Lewisville Memorial Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 403 (Tex.1993).

2005The other two cases relied upon by the Godt court cite Willis as authority for the proposition that a legal malpractice action is a claim for “personal injury.” See Sample v. Freeman, 873 S.W.2d 470, 476-77 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1994, writ denied) (holding an award for pre-judgment interest in a legal malpractice case is appropriate because a legal malpractice action is a personal injury claim); Estate of Degley v. Vega, 797 S.W.2d 299, 302-03 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ) (classifying a legal malpractice claim as a claim for personal injury for statute of limitations purposes).

2005The other two cases relied upon by the Godt court cite Willis as authority for the proposition that a legal malpractice action is a claim for "personal injury." See Sample v. Freeman, 873 S.W.2d 470, 476-77 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1994, writ denied) (holding an award for pre-judgment interest in a legal malpractice case is appropriate because a legal malpractice action is a personal injury claim); Estate of Degley v. Vega, 797 S.W.2d 299, 302-03 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ) (classifying a legal malpractice claim as a claim for personal injury for statute of limitations purposes).