43 Pennsylvania opinions name it 10 courts 1923–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Scattaregia v. Shin Shen Wugreen2 sentences2026Because the “consortium claim and the personal injury claim are closely interconnected; they represent the total, compensable damages – direct and indirect – suffered as a result of the principal plaintiff’s injury.” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). - 21 - J-A18006-25 LEHR AND ECORE’S APPELLATE ISSUES We will now consider the claims raised by Mr. Lehr and Ecore on appeal. 2014“The consortium claim and the personal injury claim are [thus] interconnected; together, they represent the total, compensable damages ... suffered as a result of the principal plaintiff’s injury.” Scattaregia v. Shin Shen Wu, 495 A.2d 552, 553 (Pa. Super. 1985). | 1 | 3 |
Maidman v. Stagggreen2 sentences2014However, it is also recognized that “a loss of consortium claim is separate and independent from the personal injury claim where the injured spouse has settled the case or for some reason the merits of the directly injured spouse’s claim have not been reached.” Id. 1986Recently, in the course of determining whether a spouse’s damages for loss of consortium should be reduced by the percentage of comparative negligence attributed to the injured spouse, this Court characterized a claim for loss of consortium as follows: “The consortium claim and the personal injury claim are closely interconnected; together, they represent the total, compensable damages — direct and indirect — suffered as a result of the principal plaintiff’s injury____ The consortium plaintiff ... has suffered no direct injury____ Her right to recover is derived, both in a literal and legal se | 1 | 2 |
Chada v. Chadagreen2 sentences2024This Court recently discussed the doctrine of collateral estoppel and its proper application, as follows: “The phrase ‘collateral estoppel,’ also known as ‘issue preclusion,’ simply means that when an issue of law, evidentiary fact, or ultimate fact has been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot be litigated again between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Chada v. Chada, 756 A.2d 39, 42 (Pa. Super. 2000) (doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes litigation of claims and issues that have previously been litigated). 2024This Court recently discussed the doctrine of collateral estoppel and its proper application, as follows: “The phrase ‘collateral estoppel,’ also known as ‘issue preclusion,’ simply means that when an issue of law, evidentiary fact, or ultimate fact has been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot be litigated again between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Chada v. Chada, 756 A.2d 39 , 42 (Pa. Super. 2000) (doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes litigation of claims and issues that have previously been litigated). | 1 | 1 |
Ingenito v. AC & S, INC.green2 sentences2024See also Ingenito v. AC&S, Inc., 633 A.2d 1172, 1176 (Pa. Super. 1993) (observing “no action for wrongful death can be maintained where the decedent, had he lived, could not himself have recovered for the injuries sustained.”). -7- J-A27033-23 BNI counters simply that the two-year statute of limitations on the personal injury claim underlying the present wrongful death action started to run by November 2007 at the latest and put Mr. Cooper out of time when he filed his personal injury action more than two years later, on December 1, 2009. 2024See also Ingenito v. AC&S, Inc., 633 A.2d 1172 , 1176 (Pa. Super. 1993) (observing “no action for wrongful death can be maintained where the decedent, had he lived, could not himself have recovered for the injuries sustained.”). -7- J-A27033-23 BNI counters simply that the two-year statute of limitations on the personal injury claim underlying the present wrongful death action started to run by November 2007 at the latest and put Mr. Cooper out of time when he filed his personal injury action more than two years later, on December 1, 2009. | 1 | 1 |
In Re:Est. of Atkinson, J., Appeal of: Wells Fargogreen2 sentences2022Estate of Atkinson, 231 A.3d at 896-97 ; Provenzano, 121 A.3d at 1089 n.1, 1093; Gaffer Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Discover Reinsurance Co., 936 A.2d 1109 , 1110 n.2, 1111 & n.5 (Pa. Super. 2007). -5- J-A22036-22 Whether the Lease Agreement entered into between Plaintiff- Appellee, James Waters (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant Miller mandates the arbitration of disputes between the parties, and whether the personal injury claim[s] asserted in this matter are within the scope of that arbitration provision, and must, therefore, be arbitrated pursuant to that Lease Agreement? 2022Estate of Atkinson, 231 A.3d at 896-97; Provenzano, 121 A.3d at 1089 n.1, 1093; Gaffer Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Discover Reinsurance Co., 936 A.2d 1109 , 1110 n.2, 1111 & n.5 (Pa. Super. 2007). -5- J-A22036-22 Whether the Lease Agreement entered into between Plaintiff- Appellee, James Waters (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant Miller mandates the arbitration of disputes between the parties, and whether the personal injury claim[s] asserted in this matter are within the scope of that arbitration provision, and must, therefore, be arbitrated pursuant to that Lease Agreement? | 1 | 1 |
Meadows v. Goodmangreen1 sentence2020Any other action or proceeding to recover damages for injury to person or property which is founded on negligent, intentional, or otherwise tortious conduct[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(7); see also Meadows v. Goodman, 993 A.2d 912, 915 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“The statute of limitations for a personal injury claim is two years.”). -5- J-S22029-20 (c) When the words of a rule are not explicit, the intention of the Supreme Court may be ascertained by considering, among other matters (1) the occasion and necessity for the rule; (2) the circumstances under which it was promulgated; (3) the mischief to be r | 1 | 1 |
Goodman v. Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Co.green1 sentence2020See Goodman, 200 A. at 643 . | 1 | 1 |
Gates v. Gatesgreen1 sentence2015See Gates, supra at 105 . | 1 | 1 |
Barchfeld v. Nunley by Nunleygreen1 sentence2015In addition, “[a] loss of consortium claim is separate and independent from the personal injury claim where the injured spouse has settled the case or for some reason the merits of the directly injured spouse’s claim have not been reached[.]” Barchfeld v. Nunley by Nunley, 577 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 1990) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Berardi v. Johns-Manville Corp.green1 sentence2014Given this, “[t]he limitations period for a wife’s claim for loss of consortium [begins] to run on the same date that her husband’s personal injury claim began to run.” Berardi v. Johns-Manville Corp., 482 A.2d 1067, 1071 (Pa. Super. 1984). | 1 | 1 |
Gojmerac v. Naughtongreen1 sentence2008Id. at 1208 (internal citations omitted). ¶ 17 The two year statute of limitations for a personal injury claim expired in December 2006 (two years after the December 24, 2004 accident). | 1 | 1 |
Fancsali v. University Health Centergreen2 sentences2007See e.g., Fancsali v. University Health Center of Pittsburgh, 563 Pa. 439, 448-49 , 761 A.2d 1159, 1163-64 (2000) (stating that the Minority Tolling Statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5533(b), suspends the commencement of the two-year limitation period for a minor’s personal injury claim until the minor turns eighteen years old.) ¶ 9 In the case sub judice, Rule 1042.3(d) effectively suspended the time •within which Appellants were required to file their certificate of merit from the date Appellants filed their motion to extend until after the trial court ruled thereon. 2007See e.g., Fancsali v. University Health Center of Pittsburgh, 563 Pa. 439, 448-49 , 761 A.2d 1159, 1163-64 (2000) (stating that the Minority Tolling Statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5533(b), suspends the commencement of the two-year limitation period for a minor’s personal injury claim until the minor turns eighteen years old.) ¶ 9 In the case sub judice, Rule 1042.3(d) effectively suspended the time •within which Appellants were required to file their certificate of merit from the date Appellants filed their motion to extend until after the trial court ruled thereon. | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Reedgreen | 1 | 1 |
Stroback v. Camaionigreen2 sentences2004Stroback v. Camaioni, 449 Pa. Super. 395, 404 , 674 A.2d 257, 262 (1996). 2004Stroback v. Camaioni, 449 Pa. Super. 395, 404 , 674 A.2d 257, 262 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
| LeFevre v. Westberrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hahn v. Atlantic Richfield Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Linebaugh v. Lehrgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Teichgraeber v. Commissionergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gerdes v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| O'brien, Ann C. v. Eli Lilly & Company E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. The Upjohn Company, and Winthrop Company, Incgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nunamaker v. New Alexandria Bus Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Crouch v. Westgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vale Chemical Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Sanchez v. City of Philadelphiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Centofanti v. Penna. R. R.green | 1 | 1 |
| Henderson v. National Drug Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| TEACHER v. Kijurinagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works
green
2 sentences1983Each remedy should be effectuated by its particular statute of limitations and find dispositive what was stated in Gardner, supra, 413 Pa. at 419-20 , 197 A.2d at 614 : In this Commonwealth we have always recognized that a personal injury claim based upon a breach of warranty is a distinct claim from a personal injury claim based on negligence: Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1 , 176 A.2d 648 ; Loch et ux. v. Confair et ux, 361 Pa. 158, 162 , 63 A.2d 24 ; Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 561 , 28 A.2d 913 , 143 A.L.R. 1417 . 1983Each remedy should be effectuated by its particular statute of limitations and find dispositive what was stated in Gardner, supra, 413 Pa. at 419-20 , 197 A.2d at 614 : In this Commonwealth we have always recognized that a personal injury claim based upon a breach of warranty is a distinct claim from a personal injury claim based on negligence: Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1 , 176 A.2d 648 ; Loch et ux. v. Confair et ux, 361 Pa. 158, 162 , 63 A.2d 24 ; Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 561 , 28 A.2d 913 , 143 A.L.R. 1417 . | 3 | 1965–1983 |
Jones v. Boggs & Buhl, Inc.
green
2 sentences2025The disposition in Jones v. Boggs & Buhl, Inc., 49 A.2d 379 (Pa. 1946), barring the wife’s personal-injury claim no longer applies to sales of goods. 2025The disposition in Jones v. Boggs & Buhl, Inc., 49 A.2d 379 (Pa. 1946), barring the wife’s personal-injury claim no longer applies to sales of goods. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Spuck v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole
green
2 sentences2018In so holding, we emphasized that "the exculpatory language at issue cannot be said to violate public policy because it was an agreement between a private individual and entities, and because it did not address matters of interest to the public or the state." Hinkal , 133 A.3d at 742 . 2 Vinson attempts to distinguish Hinkal by highlighting that the injury in that case occurred during the course of athletic pursuits, whereas Vinson alleges she sustained injuries due to faulty maintenance. 2018In so holding, we emphasized that “the exculpatory language at issue cannot be said to violate public policy because it was an agreement between a private individual and entities, and because it did not address matters of interest to the public or the state.” Hinkal, 133 A.3d at 742 .2 Vinson attempts to distinguish Hinkal by highlighting that the injury in that case occurred during the course of athletic pursuits, whereas Vinson alleges she sustained injuries due to faulty maintenance. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co.
green
2 sentences1983Each remedy should be effectuated by its particular statute of limitations and find dispositive what was stated in Gardner, supra, 413 Pa. at 419-20 , 197 A.2d at 614 : In this Commonwealth we have always recognized that a personal injury claim based upon a breach of warranty is a distinct claim from a personal injury claim based on negligence: Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1 , 176 A.2d 648 ; Loch et ux. v. Confair et ux, 361 Pa. 158, 162 , 63 A.2d 24 ; Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 561 , 28 A.2d 913 , 143 A.L.R. 1417 . 1983Each remedy should be effectuated by its particular statute of limitations and find dispositive what was stated in Gardner, supra, 413 Pa. at 419-20 , 197 A.2d at 614 : In this Commonwealth we have always recognized that a personal injury claim based upon a breach of warranty is a distinct claim from a personal injury claim based on negligence: Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1 , 176 A.2d 648 ; Loch et ux. v. Confair et ux, 361 Pa. 158, 162 , 63 A.2d 24 ; Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 561 , 28 A.2d 913 , 143 A.L.R. 1417 . | 2 | 1964–1983 |
Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co.
green
2 sentences1983Each remedy should be effectuated by its particular statute of limitations and find dispositive what was stated in Gardner, supra, 413 Pa. at 419-20 , 197 A.2d at 614 : In this Commonwealth we have always recognized that a personal injury claim based upon a breach of warranty is a distinct claim from a personal injury claim based on negligence: Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1 , 176 A.2d 648 ; Loch et ux. v. Confair et ux, 361 Pa. 158, 162 , 63 A.2d 24 ; Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 561 , 28 A.2d 913 , 143 A.L.R. 1417 . 1983Each remedy should be effectuated by its particular statute of limitations and find dispositive what was stated in Gardner, supra, 413 Pa. at 419-20 , 197 A.2d at 614 : In this Commonwealth we have always recognized that a personal injury claim based upon a breach of warranty is a distinct claim from a personal injury claim based on negligence: Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1 , 176 A.2d 648 ; Loch et ux. v. Confair et ux, 361 Pa. 158, 162 , 63 A.2d 24 ; Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 561 , 28 A.2d 913 , 143 A.L.R. 1417 . | 2 | 1964–1983 |
Loch Et Ux. v. Confair Et Ux.
green
2 sentences1983Each remedy should be effectuated by its particular statute of limitations and find dispositive what was stated in Gardner, supra, 413 Pa. at 419-20 , 197 A.2d at 614 : In this Commonwealth we have always recognized that a personal injury claim based upon a breach of warranty is a distinct claim from a personal injury claim based on negligence: Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1 , 176 A.2d 648 ; Loch et ux. v. Confair et ux, 361 Pa. 158, 162 , 63 A.2d 24 ; Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 561 , 28 A.2d 913 , 143 A.L.R. 1417 . 1983Each remedy should be effectuated by its particular statute of limitations and find dispositive what was stated in Gardner, supra, 413 Pa. at 419-20 , 197 A.2d at 614 : In this Commonwealth we have always recognized that a personal injury claim based upon a breach of warranty is a distinct claim from a personal injury claim based on negligence: Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1 , 176 A.2d 648 ; Loch et ux. v. Confair et ux, 361 Pa. 158, 162 , 63 A.2d 24 ; Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 561 , 28 A.2d 913 , 143 A.L.R. 1417 . | 2 | 1964–1983 |
Buttermore v. Aliquippa Hospital
green
2 sentences2024We find the Supreme Court’s decision in Buttermore v. Aliquippa Hospital, 522 Pa. 325 , 561 A.2d 733 (1989) to be instructive. 2024We find the Supreme Court’s decision in Buttermore v. Aliquippa Hospital, 522 Pa. 325 , 561 A.2d 733 (1989) to be instructive. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Brown v. Pa. Department of Corrections
green
1 sentence2024Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Gaffer Insurance v. Discover Reinsurance Co.
green
2 sentences2022Estate of Atkinson, 231 A.3d at 896-97 ; Provenzano, 121 A.3d at 1089 n.1, 1093; Gaffer Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Discover Reinsurance Co., 936 A.2d 1109 , 1110 n.2, 1111 & n.5 (Pa. Super. 2007). -5- J-A22036-22 Whether the Lease Agreement entered into between Plaintiff- Appellee, James Waters (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant Miller mandates the arbitration of disputes between the parties, and whether the personal injury claim[s] asserted in this matter are within the scope of that arbitration provision, and must, therefore, be arbitrated pursuant to that Lease Agreement? 2022Estate of Atkinson, 231 A.3d at 896-97; Provenzano, 121 A.3d at 1089 n.1, 1093; Gaffer Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Discover Reinsurance Co., 936 A.2d 1109 , 1110 n.2, 1111 & n.5 (Pa. Super. 2007). -5- J-A22036-22 Whether the Lease Agreement entered into between Plaintiff- Appellee, James Waters (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant Miller mandates the arbitration of disputes between the parties, and whether the personal injury claim[s] asserted in this matter are within the scope of that arbitration provision, and must, therefore, be arbitrated pursuant to that Lease Agreement? | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Provenzano, D. v. Ohio Valley General Hosp.
green
2 sentences2022Estate of Atkinson, 231 A.3d at 896-97 ; Provenzano, 121 A.3d at 1089 n.1, 1093; Gaffer Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Discover Reinsurance Co., 936 A.2d 1109 , 1110 n.2, 1111 & n.5 (Pa. Super. 2007). -5- J-A22036-22 Whether the Lease Agreement entered into between Plaintiff- Appellee, James Waters (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant Miller mandates the arbitration of disputes between the parties, and whether the personal injury claim[s] asserted in this matter are within the scope of that arbitration provision, and must, therefore, be arbitrated pursuant to that Lease Agreement? 2022Estate of Atkinson, 231 A.3d at 896-97; Provenzano, 121 A.3d at 1089 n.1, 1093; Gaffer Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Discover Reinsurance Co., 936 A.2d 1109 , 1110 n.2, 1111 & n.5 (Pa. Super. 2007). -5- J-A22036-22 Whether the Lease Agreement entered into between Plaintiff- Appellee, James Waters (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant Miller mandates the arbitration of disputes between the parties, and whether the personal injury claim[s] asserted in this matter are within the scope of that arbitration provision, and must, therefore, be arbitrated pursuant to that Lease Agreement? | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Muhammad v. Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod & Gutnick
green
1 sentence2020In short, this is the type of “Monday-morning quarterback” claim that the Muhammad Court found was “based on speculative harm.” Muhammad, supra at 1352 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Campbell v. Walker
green
1 sentence2017Additionally, Sedgwick assents .that Campbell, supra is inapposite to this matter since this case involves a workers’, compensation matter, as opposed to a personal injury claim. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Zelenak v. Mikula
green
1 sentence2017In Zelenak v. Mikula, 911 A.2d 542 (Pa. Super. 2006), plaintiffs filed a personal injury claim against defendant, seeking damages in excess of $30,000.00. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Castings Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Klein
green
2 sentences2006In this case, defendants cite three general defenses in their proposed answer to the amended complaint: (1) the dog in question was not dangerous, had no known propensity for vicious behavior, and was a puppy, defendants’ petition to open, para. 23; (2) they did not violate the dog leash law, id. at para. 28; and (3) the Toolans have not provided medical bills with which to validate a personal injury claim, id. at para. 24. 2006In this case, defendants cite three general defenses in their proposed answer to the amended complaint: (1) the dog in question was not dangerous, had no known propensity for vicious behavior, and was a puppy, defendants’ petition to open, para. 23; (2) they did not violate the dog leash law, id. at para. 28; and (3) the Toolans have not provided medical bills with which to validate a personal injury claim, id. at para. 24. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Matthews v. Clarion Hospital
green
1 sentence2006Matthews, 742 A.2d at 1115 . ¶ 4 The statute of limitations for a personal injury claim is two years. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Hazleton Area School District v. Bosak
green
1 sentence2004Appel-lees’ position relies primarily upon the Commonwealth Court’s decision in Hazleton Area School District v. Bosak, 671 A.2d 277 (Pa.Commw.1996). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Callan v. Oxford Land Development, Inc.
green
1 sentence2004See Warwick Township Water and Sewer Authority v. Boucher & James, Inc., 851 A.2d 958, 958 (Pa.Super.2004) (“[G]iven the broad scope of the arbitration language which provides that arbitration is to be the preferred means to resolve all claims arising out of or.relating to the contract documents, it was improper for the trial court to rule that the arbitration provision does not apply to the negligence claim.”); Callan, supra (holding that tort claim that arose from real estate sales contract was subject to arbitration agreement). ¶ 23 Appellees counter that the dispute does not fall within th | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| McCauley v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Voland v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Cindy Keefe v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Scanlon v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Williams v. West Penn Power Co. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Neely v. Kossove green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| International Organization Masters, Mates & Pilots, Local No. 2 v. International Organization Masters, Mates & Pilots of America, Inc. green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Buttermore v. Aliquippa Hospital green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Walker v. City of Philadelphia green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Huffer v. Kozitza green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Oldani v. Lieberman green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Rosander v. Copco Steel & Engineering Co. green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Huffer v. Kozitza green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Whittlesey v. Miller green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Deese v. Parks green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Brown v. Metzger green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Archbishop v. KARLAK green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Brown v. Metzger green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Rothman v. Fillette green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| McLaughlin v. Monaghan green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Lipschutz v. Lipschutz green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Shearer v. Moore green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Commonwealth v. Bonaduce neutral | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.