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81 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1912–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Buerkett v. Illinois Power Companygreen2 sentences2018Buerkett v. Illinois Power Co. , 384 Ill. 2018Buerkett v. Illinois Power Co., 384 Ill. | 2 | 3 |
In re Estate of Coopergreen2 sentences2016Our supreme court stated that “as a debtor of [the hospital], the estate is obligated to pay for treatment rendered to [the minor] out of any available resources.” Estate of Cooper, 125 Ill. 2d at 369 . 2001In re Estate of Cooper , 125 Ill. 2d 363, 369 (West 1988). | 2 | 3 |
Foutch v. O'BRYANTgreen2 sentences2017To the contrary, absent an adequate record of the hearing, “it [is] presumed that the order entered by the trial court [is] in conformity with the law and had a sufficient factual basis.” Webster v. Hartman, 145 Ill. 2d 426 , 432 (2001), quoting Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 392 (1984); see also Mercantile Holdings, Inc. v. Feldman, 748 Ill. 2017To the contrary, absent an adequate record of the hearing, “ ‘it [is] presumed that the order entered by the trial court [is] in conformity with the law and had a sufficient factual basis.’ ” Webster v. Hartman, 195 Ill. 2d 426, 432 (2001) (quoting Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 392 (1984)); see also Mercantile Holdings, Inc. v. Feldman, 258 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Tri-G, Inc. v. Burke, Bosselman & Weavergreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Tri-G, 222 Ill. 2d at 240 (plaintiff alleged that, but for defendant’s malpractice in failing to prosecute plaintiffs complaint, it would have recovered damages in the underlying case); Eastman v. Messner, 188 Ill. 2d 404, 406 (1999) (plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to file the underlying personal injury claim within the applicable limitations period); Fox v. Berks, 334 Ill. 2008See, e.g., Tri-G, 222 Ill. 2d at 240 (plaintiff alleged that, but for defendant's malpractice in failing to prosecute plaintiff's complaint, it would have recovered damages in the underlying case); Eastman v. Messner, 188 Ill. 2d 404, 406 (1999) (plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to file the underlying personal injury claim within the applicable limitations period); Fox v. Berks, 334 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Eastman v. Messnergreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Tri-G, 222 Ill. 2d at 240 (plaintiff alleged that, but for defendant’s malpractice in failing to prosecute plaintiffs complaint, it would have recovered damages in the underlying case); Eastman v. Messner, 188 Ill. 2d 404, 406 (1999) (plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to file the underlying personal injury claim within the applicable limitations period); Fox v. Berks, 334 Ill. 2008See, e.g., Tri-G, 222 Ill. 2d at 240 (plaintiff alleged that, but for defendant's malpractice in failing to prosecute plaintiff's complaint, it would have recovered damages in the underlying case); Eastman v. Messner, 188 Ill. 2d 404, 406 (1999) (plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to file the underlying personal injury claim within the applicable limitations period); Fox v. Berks, 334 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Fox v. Berksgreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Tri-G, 222 Ill. 2d at 240 (plaintiff alleged that, but for defendant’s malpractice in failing to prosecute plaintiffs complaint, it would have recovered damages in the underlying case); Eastman v. Messner, 188 Ill. 2d 404, 406 (1999) (plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to file the underlying personal injury claim within the applicable limitations period); Fox v. Berks, 334 Ill. 2008See, e.g., Tri-G, 222 Ill. 2d at 240 (plaintiff alleged that, but for defendant's malpractice in failing to prosecute plaintiff's complaint, it would have recovered damages in the underlying case); Eastman v. Messner, 188 Ill. 2d 404, 406 (1999) (plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to file the underlying personal injury claim within the applicable limitations period); Fox v. Berks, 334 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Ignarski v. Norbutgreen2 sentences2008App. 3d 815, 816 (2002) (plaintiff alleged that, but for defendants’ negligent representation of her during her divorce case, she would have received a larger portion of the marital estate); Ignarski v. Norbut, 271 Ill. 2008App. 3d 815, 816 (2002) (plaintiff alleged that, but for defendants' negligent representation of her during her divorce case, she would have received a larger portion of the marital estate); Ignarski v. Norbut, 271 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Janiczek v. Dover Management Co.green2 sentences2003Not only would such a result clearly penalize an innocent party possessing a substantial personal injury claim, but it also would overlook the fact that the party did secure the services of a licensed attorney to represent him at trial." Janiczek , 134 Ill. 2003Not only would such a result clearly penalize an innocent party possessing a substantial personal injury claim, but it also would overlook the fact that the party did secure the services of a licensed attorney to represent him at trial.” Janiczek, 134 Ill. | 1 | 3 |
Mack-Evans v. Hilltop Healthcare Center, Inc.green1 sentence2019Mack-Evans v. Hilltop Healthcare Center, Inc., 700 S.E.2d 317, 326 (W. | 1 | 1 |
Webster v. Hartmangreen1 sentence2017To the contrary, absent an adequate record of the hearing, “ ‘it [is] presumed that the order entered by the trial court [is] in conformity with the law and had a sufficient factual basis.’ ” Webster v. Hartman, 195 Ill. 2d 426, 432 (2001) (quoting Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 392 (1984)); see also Mercantile Holdings, Inc. v. Feldman, 258 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Mercantile Holdings, Inc. v. Feldmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Varelis v. Northwestern Memorial Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Supreme Laundry Service, LLC v. Hartford Casualty Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Champaign County Nursing Home v. Petry Roofing, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| DeSeve v. Ladd Enterprises, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Ravenswood Hospital v. Maryland Casualty Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
White v. Johns-Manville Corp.
green
2 sentences2015It logically applies as well in survival actions, which are merely continuations of the personal injury claim ***.” 2 Dan Dobbs, et al., The Law of Torts § 379, at 528-29 (2d ed. 2011) (citing White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 693 P.2d 687 (Wash. 1985)). ¶ 45 I agree with the above reasoning and would hold that because the discovery rule would apply to a personal injury action brought by an injured party who survives, it should likewise apply to a survival action brought on behalf of an injured party who did not survive. 2015It logically applies as well in survival actions, which are merely continuations of the personal injury claim ***.” 2 Dan Dobbs, et al., The Law of Torts § 379, at 528-29 (2d ed. 2011) (citing White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 693 P.2d 687 (Wash. 1985)). ¶ 45 I agree with the above reasoning and would hold that because the discovery rule would apply to a personal injury action brought by an injured party who survives, it should likewise apply to a survival action brought on behalf of an injured party who did not survive. | 4 | 2015–2015 |
Deering v. NATIONAL MAINTENANCE & REPAIR, INC.
green
2 sentences2021Id. ¶ 36 The court of appeals in that case noted “a suit or counterclaim by a shipowner against a seaman is a setoff against the seaman’s personal injury claim; the question is whether such a setoff is permissible.” Id. at 1043 . 2021Id. ¶ 36 The court of appeals in that case noted “a suit or counterclaim by a shipowner against a seaman is a setoff against the seaman’s personal injury claim; the question is whether such a setoff is permissible.” Id. at 1043 . | 3 | 2019–2021 |
In Re Johnson
green
2 sentences2016"The settlement included a term that all documents in the entire file were to be sealed." (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 1070 . 2016"The settlement included a term that all documents in the entire file were to be sealed." (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 1070 . | 3 | 2016–2016 |
Lee v. Colorado Department of Health
green
2 sentences1989The loss to that relationship resulting from an accident `is best distributed among those whose negligence caused it in proportion to the fault of each of them.'" ( Lee, 718 P.2d at 232 .) Third, the court held: "If a claim for loss of consortium were viewed as totally independent of the other spouse's personal injury claim, there would be no reason to preclude one spouse from suing another for loss of consortium or to prohibit the primary tortfeasor sued in a consortium claim from impleading the spouse who suffered the personal injuries. [Citations.] Placing one spouse in an adversarial relat 1989The loss to that relationship resulting from an accident `is best distributed among those whose negligence caused it in proportion to the fault of each of them.'" ( Lee, 718 P.2d at 232 .) Third, the court held: "If a claim for loss of consortium were viewed as totally independent of the other spouse's personal injury claim, there would be no reason to preclude one spouse from suing another for loss of consortium or to prohibit the primary tortfeasor sued in a consortium claim from impleading the spouse who suffered the personal injuries. [Citations.] Placing one spouse in an adversarial relat | 3 | 1989–1991 |
Waldron v. Brown
green
2 sentences2017The claim was therefore property of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 (a)(1), 1306(a)(1); Waldron, 536 F.3d at 1241 . 2017The claim was therefore property of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 (a)(1), 1306(a)(1) (2012); Waldron, 536 F.3d at 1241 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Seymour v. Collins
green
2 sentences2015Id. ¶ 59 Moreover, as the dissenter noted, citing letters the Seymours’ personal injury counsel sent to defendants seeking to settle the case during the pendency of the bankruptcy case, “If the plaintiffs were trying to avoid creditors, they would have waited until after the discharge in bankruptcy to attempt to settle this suit.” Id. ¶ 61. ¶ 60 It is also clear from Myer’s affidavit that, had she been apprised of the personal injury claim, she, at least, would not have taken action with respect thereto. 2015Id. ¶ 59 Moreover, as the dissenter noted, citing letters the Seymours’ personal injury counsel sent to defendants seeking to settle the case during the pendency of the bankruptcy case, “If the plaintiffs were trying to avoid creditors, they would have waited until after the discharge in bankruptcy to attempt to settle this suit.” Id. ¶ 61. ¶ 60 It is also clear from Myer’s affidavit that, had she been apprised of the personal injury claim, she, at least, would not have taken action with respect thereto. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
K. Dale Wissman, Sheryll Wissman v. Pittsburgh National Bank
green
2 sentences2015It is, as we have suggested, and federal case law indicates (see Wissman, 942 F.2d at 871 ) difficult to discern how this asset might have been valued so as to benefit the Seymours’ creditors within the applicable period of Chapter 13 bankruptcy. ¶ 61 Further, the uncontroverted affidavits of the Seymours and their bankruptcy attorney confirm that Myer advised them that they had to report any lump sum funds received in excess of $2,000 during the pendency of the bankruptcy. 2015It is, as we have suggested, and federal case law indicates (see Wissman, 942 F.2d at 871 ), difficult to discern how this asset might have been valued so as to benefit the Seymours’ creditors within the applicable period of chapter 13 bankruptcy. ¶ 61 Further, the uncontroverted affidavits of the Seymours and their bankruptcy attorney confirm that Myer advised them that they had to report any lump sum funds received in excess of $2,000 during the pendency of the bankruptcy. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Roberts v. Sisters of Saint Francis Health Services, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014Id. ¶ 14 Under section 12-311 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, a minor may bring an action for personal injuries within two years after the minor turns 18, regardless of whether the cause of action accrued more than two years earlier. 735 ILCS 5/13-211 (West 2012). 2014Id. ¶ 14 Under section 12-311 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, a minor may bring an action for personal injuries within two years after the minor turns 18, regardless of whether the cause of action accrued more than two years earlier. 735 ILCS 5/13-211 (West 2012). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Continental Casualty Co. v. Brady
green
2 sentences2010Brady, 127 Idaho at 832 , 907 P.2d at 809 . 2010Brady, 127 Idaho at 832 , 907 P.2d at 809 . | 2 | 2010–2010 |
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Guccione
green
2 sentences2006Guccione, 171 Ill. 2006Guccione, 171 Ill. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Cernocky v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America
green
2 sentences2002Cernocky, 69 Ill. 2002Cernocky , 69 Ill. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Stephan Ex Rel. Home Insurance v. Yellow Cab Co.
green
2 sentences2000Stephan, 30 Ill. App. 3d at 998-99 , 333 N.E.2d at 225 . 2000Stephan, 30 Ill. App. 3d at 997 , 333 N.E.2d at 224 . | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Willis v. Reum
green
2 sentences1998The court found that “releases of personal injury claims may be set aside where there is a mutual mistake of fact and the circumstances, when finally known, present unconscionable results.” Willis , 64 Ill. 1998The court found that “releases of personal injury claims may be set aside where there is a mutual mistake of fact and the circumstances, when finally known, present unconscionable results.” Willis, 64 Ill. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Page v. Hibbard
green
2 sentences1992(Page v. Hibbard (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 41, 48 .) However, the action is independent in the sense that a loss of consortium award will neither be dismissed because the physically injured spouse settled and released the underlying personal injury claim (Brown, 104 Ill. 2d at 37 ), nor reduced by a worker’s compensation lien against the injured spouse’s settlement proceeds (Page, 119 Ill. 2d at 48 ). 1992(Page v. Hibbard (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 41, 48 .) However, the action is independent in the sense that a loss of consortium award will neither be dismissed because the physically injured spouse settled and released the underlying personal injury claim (Brown, 104 Ill. 2d at 37 ), nor reduced by a worker’s compensation lien against the injured spouse’s settlement proceeds (Page, 119 Ill. 2d at 48 ). | 2 | 1992–1992 |
Brown v. Metzger
green
2 sentences1992A loss of consortium action is not a derivative claim brought by a spouse as a representative of the injured spouse, but is an independent action. ( Page v. Hibbard (1987), 119 Ill.2d 41, 48 , 115 Ill.Dec. 544 , 518 N.E.2d 69 .) However, the action is independent in the sense that a loss of consortium award will neither be dismissed because the physically injured spouse settled and released the underlying personal injury claim ( Brown, 104 Ill.2d at 37 , 83 Ill.Dec. 344 , 470 N.E.2d 302 ), nor reduced by a worker's compensation lien against the injured spouse's settlement proceeds ( Page, 119 1992(Page v. Hibbard (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 41, 48 .) However, the action is independent in the sense that a loss of consortium award will neither be dismissed because the physically injured spouse settled and released the underlying personal injury claim (Brown, 104 Ill. 2d at 37 ), nor reduced by a worker’s compensation lien against the injured spouse’s settlement proceeds (Page, 119 Ill. 2d at 48 ). | 2 | 1992–1992 |
Thornberry v. Board of Education
neutral
2 sentences1991App. 3d at 353 ), the court held: “[I]n a complaint to enforce the compromise and settlement of a personal injury claim, facts must be alleged which show liability to the claimant, agreement to pay an amount, acceptance of the agreement in settlement of the claim and that the agreement was concluded by disposition of the cause through *** the claimant’s execution of or willingness to execute releases.” 8 Ill. 1976Nor is this case comparable to the factual issue involved in the compromise and settlement of a personal injury claim involved in Thornberry v. Board of Education (1st Dist. 1972), 8 Ill. | 2 | 1976–1991 |
Thomas v. Hollowell
green
2 sentences1969Thomas v. Hollowell, 20 Ill App2d 288 at p 291, 155 NE2d 827 . 1964Clancy v. Pacenti, 15 Ill App2d 171, 145 NE2d 802 ; Ruggles v. Selby, 25 Ill App2d 1, 165 NE2d 733 ; Thomas v. Hollowell, 20 Ill App2d 288, 155 NE2d 827 ; Hudson v. Thies, 35 Ill App 2d 189, 182 NE2d 760 ; Smith v. Broscheid, 46 Ill App 2d 117, 196 NE2d 380 . | 2 | 1964–1969 |
In re Marriage of Baecker
green
2 sentences2021We disagree. ¶ 57 In Baecker, 2012 IL App (3d) 110660, ¶ 5 , the husband beat the wife in the head with a wooden club and threw her down the stairs, after the wife confronted the husband about financial irregularities in their business. 2021Citing In re Marriage of Baecker, 2012 IL App (3d) 110660 , James argues a settlement of a personal injury claim created by one spouse harming the other should also be excluded from the marital estate, despite the settlement not being reduced to a judgment. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Walberg v. St. Francis Home, Inc.
green
1 sentence2019Section 893.16 states in relevant part: Person under disability. (1) If a person entitled to bring an action is, at the time the cause of action accrues . . . mentally ill, the action may be commenced within 2 years after the disability ceases, except that where the disability is due to mental illness, the period of limitation prescribed in this chapter may not be extended for more than 5 years. (2) Subsection (1) does not shorten a period of limitation otherwise prescribed.” Walberg, 2004 WI App 120, ¶¶ 7-8 . ¶ 25 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that, in a personal represe | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Seymour v. Collins
green
1 sentence2019Seymour, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 54 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Sompolski v. Miller green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Davis v. Chicago Housing Authority green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| In Re Marriage of Hubbs green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Richter v. Analex Corp. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Patsis v. Zion-Benton Township High School, No. 126 green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| McEvers v. Stout green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Whitaker v. Colbert green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Maynard v. Parker green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Marriage of Gallegos v. Gallegos green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| In Re Marriage of Burt green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. County of Cook green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Blagg v. Illinois F.W.D. Truck & Equipment Co. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Mist v. Westin Hotels, Inc. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Giardino v. Fierke green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Bartholomew v. Crockett green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Board of Education v. A, C and S, Inc. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Hux v. Raben green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Berry v. G. D. Searle & Co. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Allen v. Yancy green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Hays v. Country Mutual Insurance green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.