personal injury claim in Illinois

2015It logically applies as well in survival actions, which are merely continuations of the personal injury claim ***.” 2 Dan Dobbs, et al., The Law of Torts § 379, at 528-29 (2d ed. 2011) (citing White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 693 P.2d 687 (Wash. 1985)). ¶ 45 I agree with the above reasoning and would hold that because the discovery rule would apply to a personal injury action brought by an injured party who survives, it should likewise apply to a survival action brought on behalf of an injured party who did not survive.

2015It logically applies as well in survival actions, which are merely continuations of the personal injury claim ***.” 2 Dan Dobbs, et al., The Law of Torts § 379, at 528-29 (2d ed. 2011) (citing White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 693 P.2d 687 (Wash. 1985)). ¶ 45 I agree with the above reasoning and would hold that because the discovery rule would apply to a personal injury action brought by an injured party who survives, it should likewise apply to a survival action brought on behalf of an injured party who did not survive.

2021Id. ¶ 36 The court of appeals in that case noted “a suit or counterclaim by a shipowner against a seaman is a setoff against the seaman’s personal injury claim; the question is whether such a setoff is permissible.” Id. at 1043 .

2021Id. ¶ 36 The court of appeals in that case noted “a suit or counterclaim by a shipowner against a seaman is a setoff against the seaman’s personal injury claim; the question is whether such a setoff is permissible.” Id. at 1043 .

2016“The settlement included a term that all documents in the entire file were to be sealed.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 1070 .

2016"The settlement included a term that all documents in the entire file were to be sealed." (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 1070 .

1989The loss to that relationship resulting from an accident ‘is best distributed among those whose negligence caused it in proportion to the fault of each of them.’ ” (Lee, 718 P.2d at 232 .) Third, the court held: “If a claim for loss of consortium were viewed as totally independent of the other spouse’s personal injury claim, there would be no reason to preclude one spouse from suing another for loss of consortium or to prohibit the primary tortfeasor sued in a consortium claim from impleading the spouse who suffered the personal injuries. [Citations.] Placing one spouse in an adversarial relat

1989The loss to that relationship resulting from an accident ‘is best distributed among those whose negligence caused it in proportion to the fault of each of them.’ ” (Lee, 718 P.2d at 232 .) Third, the court held: “If a claim for loss of consortium were viewed as totally independent of the other spouse’s personal injury claim, there would be no reason to preclude one spouse from suing another for loss of consortium or to prohibit the primary tortfeasor sued in a consortium claim from impleading the spouse who suffered the personal injuries. [Citations.] Placing one spouse in an adversarial relat

2017The claim was therefore property of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 (a)(1), 1306(a)(1) (2012); Waldron, 536 F.3d at 1241 .

2017The claim was therefore property of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 (a)(1), 1306(a)(1); Waldron, 536 F.3d at 1241 .

2015It is, as we have suggested, and federal case law indicates (see Wissman, 942 F.2d at 871 ), difficult to discern how this asset might have been valued so as to benefit the Seymours’ creditors within the applicable period of chapter 13 bankruptcy. ¶ 61 Further, the uncontroverted affidavits of the Seymours and their bankruptcy attorney confirm that Myer advised them that they had to report any lump sum funds received in excess of $2,000 during the pendency of the bankruptcy.

2015It is, as we have suggested, and federal case law indicates (see Wissman, 942 F.2d at 871 ) difficult to discern how this asset might have been valued so as to benefit the Seymours’ creditors within the applicable period of Chapter 13 bankruptcy. ¶ 61 Further, the uncontroverted affidavits of the Seymours and their bankruptcy attorney confirm that Myer advised them that they had to report any lump sum funds received in excess of $2,000 during the pendency of the bankruptcy.

2015Id. ¶ 59 Moreover, as the dissenter noted, citing letters the Seymours’ personal injury counsel sent to defendants seeking to settle the case during the pendency of the bankruptcy case, “If the plaintiffs were trying to avoid creditors, they would have waited until after the discharge in bankruptcy to attempt to settle this suit.” Id. ¶ 61. ¶ 60 It is also clear from Myer’s affidavit that, had she been apprised of the personal injury claim, she, at least, would not have taken action with respect thereto.

2015Id. ¶ 59 Moreover, as the dissenter noted, citing letters the Seymours’ personal injury counsel sent to defendants seeking to settle the case during the pendency of the bankruptcy case, “If the plaintiffs were trying to avoid creditors, they would have waited until after the discharge in bankruptcy to attempt to settle this suit.” Id. ¶ 61. ¶ 60 It is also clear from Myer’s affidavit that, had she been apprised of the personal injury claim, she, at least, would not have taken action with respect thereto.

2014Id. ¶ 14 Under section 12-311 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, a minor may bring an action for personal injuries within two years after the minor turns 18, regardless of whether the cause of action accrued more than two years earlier. 735 ILCS 5/13-211 (West 2012).

2014Id. ¶ 14 Under section 12-311 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, a minor may bring an action for personal injuries within two years after the minor turns 18, regardless of whether the cause of action accrued more than two years earlier. 735 ILCS 5/13-211 (West 2012).

2010Brady, 127 Idaho at 832 , 907 P.2d at 809 .

2010Brady, 127 Idaho at 832 , 907 P.2d at 809 .

2006Guccione, 171 Ill.

2006Guccione, 171 Ill.

2002Cernocky, 69 Ill.

2002Cernocky , 69 Ill.

2000Stephan, 30 Ill.

2000Stephan, 30 Ill.

1998The court found that “releases of personal injury claims may be set aside where there is a mutual mistake of fact and the circumstances, when finally known, present unconscionable results.” Willis , 64 Ill.

1998The court found that “releases of personal injury claims may be set aside where there is a mutual mistake of fact and the circumstances, when finally known, present unconscionable results.” Willis, 64 Ill.

1992(Page v. Hibbard (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 41, 48 .) However, the action is independent in the sense that a loss of consortium award will neither be dismissed because the physically injured spouse settled and released the underlying personal injury claim (Brown, 104 Ill. 2d at 37 ), nor reduced by a worker’s compensation lien against the injured spouse’s settlement proceeds (Page, 119 Ill. 2d at 48 ).

1992(Page v. Hibbard (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 41, 48 .) However, the action is independent in the sense that a loss of consortium award will neither be dismissed because the physically injured spouse settled and released the underlying personal injury claim (Brown, 104 Ill. 2d at 37 ), nor reduced by a worker’s compensation lien against the injured spouse’s settlement proceeds (Page, 119 Ill. 2d at 48 ).

1992(Page v. Hibbard (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 41, 48 .) However, the action is independent in the sense that a loss of consortium award will neither be dismissed because the physically injured spouse settled and released the underlying personal injury claim (Brown, 104 Ill. 2d at 37 ), nor reduced by a worker’s compensation lien against the injured spouse’s settlement proceeds (Page, 119 Ill. 2d at 48 ).

1992A loss of consortium action is not a derivative claim brought by a spouse as a representative of the injured spouse, but is an independent action. ( Page v. Hibbard (1987), 119 Ill.2d 41, 48 , 115 Ill.Dec. 544 , 518 N.E.2d 69 .) However, the action is independent in the sense that a loss of consortium award will neither be dismissed because the physically injured spouse settled and released the underlying personal injury claim ( Brown, 104 Ill.2d at 37 , 83 Ill.Dec. 344 , 470 N.E.2d 302 ), nor reduced by a worker's compensation lien against the injured spouse's settlement proceeds ( Page, 119

1991App. 3d at 353 ), the court held: “[I]n a complaint to enforce the compromise and settlement of a personal injury claim, facts must be alleged which show liability to the claimant, agreement to pay an amount, acceptance of the agreement in settlement of the claim and that the agreement was concluded by disposition of the cause through *** the claimant’s execution of or willingness to execute releases.” 8 Ill.

1976Nor is this case comparable to the factual issue involved in the compromise and settlement of a personal injury claim involved in Thornberry v. Board of Education (1st Dist. 1972), 8 Ill.

1969Thomas v. Hollowell, 20 Ill App2d 288 at p 291, 155 NE2d 827 .

1964Clancy v. Pacenti, 15 Ill App2d 171, 145 NE2d 802 ; Ruggles v. Selby, 25 Ill App2d 1, 165 NE2d 733 ; Thomas v. Hollowell, 20 Ill App2d 288, 155 NE2d 827 ; Hudson v. Thies, 35 Ill App 2d 189, 182 NE2d 760 ; Smith v. Broscheid, 46 Ill App 2d 117, 196 NE2d 380 .

2021Citing In re Marriage of Baecker, 2012 IL App (3d) 110660 , James argues a settlement of a personal injury claim created by one spouse harming the other should also be excluded from the marital estate, despite the settlement not being reduced to a judgment.

2021We disagree. ¶ 57 In Baecker, 2012 IL App (3d) 110660, ¶ 5 , the husband beat the wife in the head with a wooden club and threw her down the stairs, after the wife confronted the husband about financial irregularities in their business.

2021See Johnson v. Fuller Family Holdings, LLC, 2017 IL App (1st) 162130, ¶ 29 ; Board of Managers of the 1120 Club Condominium Ass’n v. 1120 Club, LLC, 2016 IL App (1st) 143849, ¶ 42 .