86 California opinions name it 3 courts 1953–2025 15 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wallace v. Katogreen2 sentences2022“A [title 42 United States Code] section 1983 cause of action is subject to the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury torts.” (Shalabi v. City of Fontana (2021) 11 Cal.5th 842, 847 , citing Wallace v. Kato (2007) 549 U.S. 384, 387 .) “California’s statute of limitations governing a personal injury claim is two years.” (Shalabi, at p. 847, citing Code Civ. 2021(Wallace v. Kato (2007) 549 U.S. 384, 387 (Wallace).) California’s statute of limitations governing a personal injury claim is two years. (§ 335.1 [“Within two years: An action . . . for the death of . . . an 4 SHALABI v. CITY OF FONTANA Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. | 4 | 5 |
Javor v. Taggartgreen2 sentences2019Proc., § 335.1.) 3 While state law sets the statute of limitations, "the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law." ( Wallace , at p. 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091 ; see also Javor v. Taggart (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 795 , 803, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 174 .) "Aspects of § 1983 which are not governed by reference to state law are governed by federal rules conforming in general to common-law tort principles. [Citations.] Under those principles, it is 'the standard rule that [accrual occurs] when the plaintiff has "a complete and present caus 2019Proc., § 335.1.) 3 While state law sets the statute of limitations, "the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law." ( Wallace , at p. 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091 ; see also Javor v. Taggart (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 795 , 803, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 174 .) "Aspects of § 1983 which are not governed by reference to state law are governed by federal rules conforming in general to common-law tort principles. [Citations.] Under those principles, it is 'the standard rule that [accrual occurs] when the plaintiff has "a complete and present caus | 2 | 2 |
Sidney v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2016For example, in Sidney v. Superior Court (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 710, 713-714 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 31 ] (Sidney), after the plaintiff sued Sidney for personal injuries and property damage and Sidney cross-complained against the plaintiff and his employer, the trial court denied Sidney’s later motion to amend his cross-complaint to allege a personal injury claim arising out of the same automobile accident, concluding the claim was time-barred because it was brought more than one year after the accident and its filing did not relate back to the filing of the complaint. 2016For example, in Sidney v. Superior Court (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 710, 713-714 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 31 ] (Sidney), after the plaintiff sued Sidney for personal injuries and property damage and Sidney cross-complained against the plaintiff and his employer, the trial court denied Sidney’s later motion to amend his cross-complaint to allege a personal injury claim arising out of the same automobile accident, concluding the claim was time-barred because it was brought more than one year after the accident and its filing did not relate back to the filing of the complaint. | 2 | 2 |
Ridley v. Younggreen2 sentences1964Certainly if such principle applies in cases where a new person, by virtue of statutory authority, may be sued on a personal injury claim (see Ridley v. Young, 64 Cal.App.2d 503, 509 [ 149 P.2d 76 ]), it should apply here where a new person, under statutory authority, may sue on a personal injury claim. 1964Certainly if such principle applies in cases where a new person, by virtue of statutory authority, may be sued on a personal injury claim (see Ridley v. Young, 64 Cal.App.2d 503, 509 [ 149 P.2d 76 ]), it should apply here where a new person, under statutory authority, may sue on a personal injury claim. | 2 | 2 |
Le Mere v. L. A. Unified Sch. Dist.green2 sentences2025(See Le Mere v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 237, 245-246 .)5 Claims for money or damages for injury for which the state is liable must be presented in accordance with the procedural requirements set forth in Government Code sections 900 through 915.4. 2024(See Willis, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1110, 1118 & fn. 9 [peace officer’s whistleblower retaliation claim, which sought economic damages and noneconomic damages for “mental pain and suffering and emotional distress,” invoked the six-month deadline for filing a government claim]; Colores v. Bd. of Trustees (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1293 , 1300–1302, 1312–1313, 1319–1320 [suit claiming constructive discharge in retaliation for whistleblowing subject to six-month deadline]; Baillargeon v. Dept. of Water & Power (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 670, 682 [§ 911.2’s shorter deadline applied to plaintiff”s caus | 1 | 2 |
Phillips v. Desert Hospital Districtgreen2 sentences2016Such a written notice claiming monetary damages thereby satisfies the purposes of the claims act - to facilitate investigation of disputes and their settlement without trial if appropriate [citation].” (Phillips, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 709 ; see Westcon Construction Corp. v. County of Sacramento (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 183, 202 .) A personal injury claim must be presented not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action. 1993Code, § 910.6.)” (Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice, supra, § 6.68, p. 726, italics added.) If VPD believed the 1982 letter from OSC claiming $1.8 million in losses constituted a new claim but was untimely, it was required to take action on it. (§ 910.8; Foster v. McFadden (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 943, 947-949 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 685 ].) Where, as here, a public entity fails to give notice of defects regarding the content or timeliness of the claim, it “. . . waives any defenses based on those insufficiencies.” (Phillips v. Desert Hospital Dist. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 699, 702 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 119 , 78 | 1 | 2 |
Children's Hospital Central California v. Blue Cross of Californiagreen2 sentences2015(See Children’s Hospital Central California v. Blue Cross of California (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1211 [ 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 ].) Yokohama objected to Cottles’s testimony, arguing to the trial court that only “tire defect theories” asserted by Daer’s expert were relevant to National Union’s indemnity claims, “because only those defect claims could have *1357 formed the basis for the parties’ evaluations of liability and settlement.” 5 However, this is not a claim of lack of relevance so much as an assertion that an indemnitee which settles the underlying plaintiff’s personal injury claim is 2015(See Children’s Hospital Central California v. Blue Cross of California (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1211 [ 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 ].) Yokohama objected to Cottles’s testimony, arguing to the trial court that only “tire defect theories” asserted by Daer’s expert were relevant to National Union’s indemnity claims, “because only those defect claims could have *1357 formed the basis for the parties’ evaluations of liability and settlement.” 5 However, this is not a claim of lack of relevance so much as an assertion that an indemnitee which settles the underlying plaintiff’s personal injury claim is | 1 | 2 |
Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.green2 sentences2012(Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 382, 406-407 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 765 , 525 P.2d 669 ] (Rodriguez); Evans v. Dayton Hudson Corp. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 49, 54-55 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 550 ] (Evans).) In many different contexts over a period of decades, California courts have held that a loss of consortium claim is an independent tort that does not rise or fall with the procedural fate of the injured party’s personal injury claim. 2012(Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 382, 406-407 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 765 , 525 P.2d 669 ] (Rodriguez); Evans v. Dayton Hudson Corp. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 49, 54-55 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 550 ] (Evans).) In many different contexts over a period of decades, California courts have held that a loss of consortium claim is an independent tort that does not rise or fall with the procedural fate of the injured party’s personal injury claim. | 1 | 2 |
Employers Mutual Liability Insurance v. Tutor-Saliba Corp.green2 sentences2004Co. v. Tutor-Saliba Corp. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 632, 638-639 [71 Cal. Rtpr. 2d 851, 951 P.2d 420 ] (Employers Mutual).) The “employer is subrogated to the personal injury claim of the employee against the third party. 2004Co. v. Tutor-Saliba Corp. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 632, 638-639 [71 Cal. Rtpr. 2d 851, 951 P.2d 420 ] (Employers Mutual).) The “employer is subrogated to the personal injury claim of the employee against the third party. | 1 | 2 |
Board of Administration v. Glovergreen1 sentence2024Code, § 3860, subd. (b); accord, Glover, at p. 912 [“To the extent that the damages which the employee recovers from a third party simply duplicate the benefits which the employee has already received from the employer, the employee’s own recovery provides a fund from which the employer may draw”].) In Glover, the California Supreme Court construed the CalPERS provisions and the incorporated workers’ compensation subrogation provisions as authorizing CalPERS to pursue reimbursement directly against a settling employee.3 CalPERS had paid disability retirement benefits to a public employee after | 1 | 1 |
Baillargeon v. Dep't of Water & Power of L.A.green1 sentence2024(See Willis, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1110, 1118 & fn. 9 [peace officer’s whistleblower retaliation claim, which sought economic damages and noneconomic damages for “mental pain and suffering and emotional distress,” invoked the six-month deadline for filing a government claim]; Colores v. Bd. of Trustees (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1293 , 1300–1302, 1312–1313, 1319–1320 [suit claiming constructive discharge in retaliation for whistleblowing subject to six-month deadline]; Baillargeon v. Dept. of Water & Power (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 670, 682 [§ 911.2’s shorter deadline applied to plaintiff”s caus | 1 | 1 |
People v. Chismgreen1 sentence2024(Simon, at p. 1164.) This argument is unavailing because our task is to review the court’s ruling, not its reasoning (see People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1295, fn. 12 (Chism)) and because Simon’s discussion of the law regarding common carrier liability is still persuasive, even if not controlling. * * * In light of our conclusion that the undisputed evidence established that plaintiff was not entitled to instructions on the heightened duty of common carriers for reward, we have no occasion to reach the parties’ further arguments regarding whether the failure to give the jury those inst | 1 | 1 |
| The Regents of the University of California v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Munoz v. State of Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fielder v. City of Glendalegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Westcon Construction Corp. v. County of Sacramentogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kaiser Found. Hosp. v. Superior Court of L.A. Cty.green | 1 | 1 |
| Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gapusan v. Jaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Evans v. Dayton Hudson Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Brumley v. FDCC CALIFORNIA, INC.green | 1 | 1 |
| Lantis v. Condongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Christensen v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sime v. Maloufgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Eastlick v. City of Los Angelesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Addison v. State of Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Howe v. Pioneer Manufacturing Co.
green
2 sentences1979Co. (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 330 -339 [68 Cal.Rptr. *57 617]; Cotchett & Cartwright, Cal. Products Liability Actions, § 8.02.) Generally, a personal injury claim accrues and the period of limitations commences when the wrongful act takes place. 1975Co. (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 330 -339 [68 Cal.Rptr. 6Í7]; Cotchett & Cartwright, Cal. Products Liability Actions, § 8.02.) Generally, a personal injury claim accrues and the period of limitations commences when the wrongful act takes place. | 3 | 1975–1979 |
State v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2025(See id. at pp. 989- 990; City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730 , 737-738 (City of Stockton).) Among these, Government Code section 945.4 sets forth a claim presentation requirement and provides that “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented . . . until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board . . . .” Government Code section 911.2, subdivision (a), requires that a per 2022(J.J. v. County of San Diego (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1219 .) Subject to exceptions not relevant here, a plaintiff must present a claim for “money or damages” — which includes a personal injury claim arising from negligence — to the public entity no later than six months after the cause of action accrues. (§§ 905, 911.2, subd. (a); State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239 .) The purpose of this requirement is to allow the entity to investigate the claim and, if appropriate, settle it without litigation. | 2 | 2022–2025 |
Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.
green
2 sentences2022(See Ortho Pharmaceutical, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at pp. 402–403.) That opinion must be expressed “to a reasonable medical probability,” which, again, means more likely than not (ibid.), because more likely than not is the threshold level of certainty necessary to prove a personal injury claim. 2015(Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. 8 (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 403 .) “The law is well settled that in personal injury action causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony. | 2 | 2015–2022 |
Shalabi v. City of Fontana
green
2 sentences2022“A section 1983 cause of action is subject to the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury torts. [Citation.] California’s statute of limitations governing a personal injury claim is two years. [Citation.] Federal law governs when a cause of action accrues and when the statute of limitations begins to run on a federal civil rights cause of action.” (Shalabi v. City of Fontana (2021) 11 Cal.5th 842, 847 .) “The general rule is that a civil rights claim accrues under federal law ‘when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.’ ” (Bo 2022“A [title 42 United States Code] section 1983 cause of action is subject to the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury torts.” (Shalabi v. City of Fontana (2021) 11 Cal.5th 842, 847 , citing Wallace v. Kato (2007) 549 U.S. 384, 387 .) “California’s statute of limitations governing a personal injury claim is two years.” (Shalabi, at p. 847, citing Code Civ. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Stallman v. Bell
green
2 sentences2018In several of the cases discussed ante , the parties offering settlement had different claims stemming from different types of injuries: Stallman involved claims by both the estate and the wife of a decedent, Fortman involved a personal injury claim by a toddler and an emotional distress claim by the toddler's mother, and Deocampo involved a personal injury claim by a husband and loss of consortium by his wife. ( Stallman, supra , 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 743 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 755 ; Fortman, supra , 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 249 , 259 Cal.Rptr. 311 ; Deocampo,supra , 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 766 , 125 Cal.R 2018In several of the cases discussed ante , the parties offering settlement had different claims stemming from different types of injuries: Stallman involved claims by both the estate and the wife of a decedent, Fortman involved a personal injury claim by a toddler and an emotional distress claim by the toddler's mother, and Deocampo involved a personal injury claim by a husband and loss of consortium by his wife. ( Stallman, supra , 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 743 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 755 ; Fortman, supra , 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 249 , 259 Cal.Rptr. 311 ; Deocampo,supra , 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 766 , 125 Cal.R | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Deocampo v. Ahn
green
2 sentences2018In several of the cases discussed ante , the parties offering settlement had different claims stemming from different types of injuries: Stallman involved claims by both the estate and the wife of a decedent, Fortman involved a personal injury claim by a toddler and an emotional distress claim by the toddler's mother, and Deocampo involved a personal injury claim by a husband and loss of consortium by his wife. ( Stallman, supra , 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 743 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 755 ; Fortman, supra , 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 249 , 259 Cal.Rptr. 311 ; Deocampo,supra , 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 766 , 125 Cal.R 2018In several of the cases discussed ante , the parties offering settlement had different claims stemming from different types of injuries: Stallman involved claims by both the estate and the wife of a decedent, Fortman involved a personal injury claim by a toddler and an emotional distress claim by the toddler's mother, and Deocampo involved a personal injury claim by a husband and loss of consortium by his wife. ( Stallman, supra , 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 743 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 755 ; Fortman, supra , 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 249 , 259 Cal.Rptr. 311 ; Deocampo,supra , 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 766 , 125 Cal.R | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Fortman v. Hemco, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018There, a toddler suffered severe injuries after she fell out of a moving car. ( Id . at p. 248, 259 Cal.Rptr. 311 .) The toddler filed a personal injury claim against the manufacturer of a custom part installed on the car; her mother, the driver of the car, sought emotional distress damages. 2018In several of the cases discussed ante , the parties offering settlement had different claims stemming from different types of injuries: Stallman involved claims by both the estate and the wife of a decedent, Fortman involved a personal injury claim by a toddler and an emotional distress claim by the toddler's mother, and Deocampo involved a personal injury claim by a husband and loss of consortium by his wife. ( Stallman, supra , 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 743 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 755 ; Fortman, supra , 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 249 , 259 Cal.Rptr. 311 ; Deocampo,supra , 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 766 , 125 Cal.R | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Trindade v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2016(Id. at pp. 713-714.) The appellate court (relying on Trindade, supra, 29 Cal.App.3d at p. 860 , and an earlier edition of Weil and Brown), granted the petition for writ of mandate, holding: “[A] cross-complaint need only be subject-matter related to the plaintiff’s complaint—i.e., arise out of the same occurrence (See §§426.10, 428.10)—to relate back to the date of filing the complaint for statute of limitation purposes. [Citation.]” (Sidney, at p. 714.) Sidney , like Trindade , involved a compulsory cross-complaint. 2016(Id. at pp. 713-714.) The appellate court (relying on Trindade, supra, 29 Cal.App.3d at p. 860 , and an earlier edition of Weil and Brown, supra), granted the petition for writ of mandate, holding: “[A] cross-complaint need only be subject-matter related to the plaintiff’s complaint—i.e., arise out of the same occurrence (See §§ 426.10, 428.10)—to relate back to the date of filing the complaint for statute of limitation purposes. [Citation.]” (Sidney, at p. 714.) Sidney, like Trindade, involved a compulsory cross- complaint. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Loehr v. Ventura County Community College District
green
2 sentences2015The claimant must present a claim to the board of the public entity within six months of the accrual of the cause of action. (§ 911.2, subd. (a).) A cause of action accrues for purposes of the Government Claims Act at the same time as a similar action against a nonpublic entity accrues for purposes of applying the relevant 3 statute of limitations. (§ 901; Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1078 .) Timely claim presentation is “‘“‘a condition precedent to plaintiff’s maintaining an action against defendant.’”’” (Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007 2015The claimant must present a claim to the board of the public entity within six months of the accrual of the cause of action. (§ 911.2, subd. (a).) A cause of action accrues for purposes of the Government Claims Act at the same time as a similar action against a nonpublic entity accrues for purposes of applying the relevant 3 statute of limitations. (§ 901; Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1078 .) Timely claim presentation is “‘“‘a condition precedent to plaintiff’s maintaining an action against defendant.’”’” (Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007 | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Shirk v. Vista Unified School District
red
2 sentences2015The claimant must present a claim to the board of the public entity within six months of the accrual of the cause of action. (§ 911.2, subd. (a).) A cause of action accrues for purposes of the Government Claims Act at the same time as a similar action against a nonpublic entity accrues for purposes of applying the relevant 3 statute of limitations. (§ 901; Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1078 .) Timely claim presentation is “‘“‘a condition precedent to plaintiff’s maintaining an action against defendant.’”’” (Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007 2015The claimant must present a claim to the board of the public entity within six months of the accrual of the cause of action. (§ 911.2, subd. (a).) A cause of action accrues for purposes of the Government Claims Act at the same time as a similar action against a nonpublic entity accrues for purposes of applying the relevant 3 statute of limitations. (§ 901; Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1078 .) Timely claim presentation is “‘“‘a condition precedent to plaintiff’s maintaining an action against defendant.’”’” (Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007 | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Cottle v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2014As it relates to this appeal the court granted nonsuit as to TSP’s night restriction claims against MTA and MTA’s night restriction claims against TSP and the State’s corresponding UCL claim. 6 In Cottle, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th 1367 , a trial court presiding over a complex toxic tort action entered a case management order requiring each plaintiff to submit a statement providing prima facie evidence of the nature of plaintiff’s injuries and the identity of each medical expert who would support the personal injury claim. 2014As it relates to this appeal the court granted nonsuit as to TSP’s night restriction claims against MTA and MTA’s night restriction claims against TSP and the State’s corresponding UCL claim. 6 In Cottle, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th 1367 , a trial court presiding over a complex toxic tort action entered a case management order requiring each plaintiff to submit a statement providing prima facie evidence of the nature of plaintiff’s injuries and the identity of each medical expert who would support the personal injury claim. | 2 | 2013–2014 |
Leonard v. John Crane, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014(See Leonard v. John Crane, Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1274 , 1279–1280 [“While joinder of a loss of consortium claim with the injured spouse’s personal injury claim is encouraged, it is not mandatory and a loss of consortium claim may be maintained independently.”].) Because Dane’s loss of consortium claim is separate and distinct from his Hardin’s, the time period for him to have brought his claim began accruing April 27, 2010. 2014Rather, it is comprised of [the spouse’s] own physical, psychological and emotional pain and anguish which results when [the injured spouse] is negligently injured to the extent that he [or she] is no longer capable of providing the love, affection, companionship, comfort or sexual relations concomitant with a normal married life. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] While joinder of a loss of consortium claim with the injured spouse’s personal injury claim is encouraged, it is not mandatory and a loss of consortium claim may be maintained independently.” (Leonard v. John Crane, Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4t | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Williams v. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority
green
2 sentences1986A nearly identical statutory analysis relying on “nullification by implication” was convincingly rejected in Williams v. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority (1968) 68 Cal.2d 599 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 297 , 440 P.2d 497 ], in which the Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the tolling provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 352 applied to a minor’s personal injury claim against a public entity. 1986A nearly identical statutory analysis relying on “nullification by implication” was convincingly rejected in Williams v. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority (1968) 68 Cal.2d 599 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 297 , 440 P.2d 497 ], in which the Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the tolling provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 352 applied to a minor’s personal injury claim against a public entity. | 2 | 1986–1986 |
Fracasse v. Brent
green
2 sentences1985In Fracasse v. Brent (1972) 6 Cal.3d 784 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 494 P.2d 9 ], the plaintiff was retained by the defendant to prosecute a personal injury claim. 1985In Fracasse v. Brent (1972) 6 Cal.3d 784 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 494 P.2d 9 ], the plaintiff was retained by the defendant to prosecute a personal injury claim. | 2 | 1985–1985 |
DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara
green
1 sentence2025(See id. at pp. 989- 990; City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730 , 737-738 (City of Stockton).) Among these, Government Code section 945.4 sets forth a claim presentation requirement and provides that “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented . . . until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board . . . .” Government Code section 911.2, subdivision (a), requires that a per | 1 | 2025–2025 |
City of Stockton v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2025(See id. at pp. 989- 990; City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730 , 737-738 (City of Stockton).) Among these, Government Code section 945.4 sets forth a claim presentation requirement and provides that “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented . . . until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board . . . .” Government Code section 911.2, subdivision (a), requires that a per | 1 | 2025–2025 |
J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist.
green
1 sentence2025(J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 648, 653 .) If a personal injury claim is presented more than six months after the action accrues, and the claim does not contain an application to present a late claim, the public entity may, within 45 days after the claim is presented, give written notice to the claimant that the claim was not filed timely and is being returned without further action. (§ 911.3, subd. (a).) The notice must state that the claimant’s only recourse is to apply to the public entity for leave to present the claim late or to petition the superior co | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Colores v. Board of Trustees of the California State University
green
1 sentence2024(See Willis, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1110, 1118 & fn. 9 [peace officer’s whistleblower retaliation claim, which sought economic damages and noneconomic damages for “mental pain and suffering and emotional distress,” invoked the six-month deadline for filing a government claim]; Colores v. Bd. of Trustees (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1293 , 1300–1302, 1312–1313, 1319–1320 [suit claiming constructive discharge in retaliation for whistleblowing subject to six-month deadline]; Baillargeon v. Dept. of Water & Power (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 670, 682 [§ 911.2’s shorter deadline applied to plaintiff”s caus | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Lewis v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Filmon.Com. Inc. v. Doubleverify Inc. green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Johnson v. Open Door Cmty. Health Ctrs. green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Charles Leonard Elliott v. City of Union City green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Kino Bonelli v. Grand Canyon University green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| J.J. v. County of San Diego green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Crow v. State of California green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| DeVore v. Department of the California Highway Patrol green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Shah v. Glendale Federal Bank green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| CALOROSO v. Hathaway green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Haley v. DOW LEWIS MOTORS, INC. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| City of Huntington Park v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Gilkyson v. Disney Enterprises CA2/7 green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Martinez v. Brownco Construction Co. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Kahn v. The Dewey Group green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. MV TRANSP. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Holmes v. General Dynamics Corp. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Atkins v. Strayhorn green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Farag v. Arvinmeritor, Inc. neutral | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Essex Ins. Co. v. Five Star Dye House, Inc. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.