personal injury claim in Indiana

2014Estate of Wade v. U-Haul Intern., 745 N.E.2d 755, 764 (Ind. 2001).

2003Durham v. U-Haul Int'l., 745 N.E.2d 755, 764 (Ind.2001).

2013Its sole objective was to divide property acquired before the date of final separation. *371 Wife has strenuously argued that the instant matter is almost identical to a spousal agreement to divide “any proceeds” of a personal injury claim, addressed in Dusenberry v. Dusenberry, 625 N.E.2d 458, 463 (Ind.Ct.App.1993).

2012The decree there had provided that each party would receive 50% of any proceeds from a pending personal-injury claim. 625 N.E.2d at 460 .

2015Id. (citing Ohio Table Pad Co. of Ind. v. Hogan, 424 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind.Ct.App.1981); Mt.

1997See Id.

2004A cause of action for a personal injury claim accrues and the statute of limitation begins to run "when the plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of ordinary dili-genee, could have discovered that an injury had been sustained as a result of the tor-tious act of another." Wehling v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 586 N.E.2d 840, 843 (Ind.1992).

1992Bank (1992), Ind., 586 N.E.2d 840 , a cause of action for a personal injury claim accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knew, or in the exercise of ordinary diligence could have discovered, that an injury had been sustained as a result of the tortious act of another.

2026“In a typical personal injury claim, . . . the injury occurs at the time the [tortious or] negligent act is done, and the claimant is either aware of the injury or the cause of the injury.” Rieth-Riley Const. Co., Inc. v. Gibson, 923 N.E.2d 472, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). [12] Nothing in Gray’s complaint suggests his claim is any different from the typical personal injury claim: 7.

2020Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 177. [30] In Board of Commissioners of Cass County v. Nevitt, we held that while a loss of consortium claim is “derivative,” termination of the spouse’s personal injury claim does not necessarily terminate the loss of consortium claim. 448 N.E.2d 333, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).

2020Id. at 342 .

2015See id. .

2015Id. (citing Ohio Table Pad Co. of Ind. v. Hogan, 424 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind.Ct.App.1981); Mt.

2013The purpose of the ITCA is “to advise the city of the accident so that it may promptly investigate the surrounding circumstances.” Collier v. Prater, 544 N.E.2d 497, 498 (Ind.1989).

2011Estate of Tracy v. Bittles, 820 F.Supp. 396, 404 (N.D.Ind.1993) (declining to apply Indiana's survivorship statute and allowing estate to pursue decedent’s § 1983 claim for personal injuries where decedent died as a result of the alleged violations forming the basis of his § 1983 claim). 7 .

2011See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589-90, 594 , 98 S.Ct. 1991 , 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978) (holding that the survivability of a § 1983 claim instituted by a plaintiff prior to his death is to be determined based on the law of the forum state unless state law is inconsistent with federal policy, but specifically indicating that it was expressing no view regarding whether abatement of § 1983 claims based on state law would be allowed where the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights caused death); Ind.Code §§ 34-9-3-1, -4 (2011) (providing that personal injury claims do not survive death u

2011See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589-90, 594 , 98 S.Ct. 1991 , 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978) (holding that the survivability of a § 1983 claim instituted by a plaintiff prior to his death is to be determined based on the law of the forum state unless state law is inconsistent with federal policy, but specifically indicating that it was expressing no view regarding whether abatement of § 1983 claims based on state law would be allowed where the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights caused death); Ind.Code §§ 34-9-3-1, -4 (2011) (providing that personal injury claims do not survive death u

2008Co., 861 N.E.2d 719, 720 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), Transcontinental Insurance Company (“Transcontinental”) paid $3,740,000 as part of a settlement of a personal injury claim.

2004Here the following facts are undisputed: (1) case law prior to Wilburn held that Ind. Trial Rule 3 required only the filing of a complaint to commence a civil action and to toll the statute of limitations, see, e.g., Taylor, 5T7 N.E.2d at 989; (2) in February 2000, we held in Wilburn that it was necessary to file a summons along with the complaint when commencing a civil action, see Wilburn, 728 N.E.2d at 968-969; (3) in April 2000, Lenn filed the Oxleys' complaint but did not tender a summons; and (4) the trial court dismissed the Oxleys' personal injury claim against Matillo for failure to f

2001Wine-Settergren v. Lamey, 716 N.E.2d 381, 390-91 (Ind.1999); Mayhue v. Sparkman, 653 N.E.2d 1384, 1386-87 (Ind.1995).

2001Wine-Settergren v. Lamey, 716 N.E.2d 381, 390-91 (Ind.1999); Mayhue v. Sparkman, 653 N.E.2d 1384, 1386-87 (Ind.1995).

2001In Becker v. Strater, as the driver approached an intersection *1114 with which he was familiar, he slowed down to observe and call his passenger's attention to some cattle in a field south of the road. 117 Ind.App. 504, 506 , 72 N.E.2d 580, 581 (1947) (addressing a personal injury claim brought under Indiana's Guest Statute), quoted in and cited with approval by Reynolds v. Langford, 241 Ind. 481 , 487-38, 172 N.E.2d 867, 870 (1961).

2001In Becker v. Strater, as the driver approached an intersection *1114 with which he was familiar, he slowed down to observe and call his passenger's attention to some cattle in a field south of the road. 117 Ind.App. 504, 506 , 72 N.E.2d 580, 581 (1947) (addressing a personal injury claim brought under Indiana's Guest Statute), quoted in and cited with approval by Reynolds v. Langford, 241 Ind. 481 , 487-38, 172 N.E.2d 867, 870 (1961).

2001See Long, 14 Ind. at 597 (noting that at common law, in addition to the parent's loss of services claim, an infant still had an action for personal injury); State v. Eaton, 659 N.E.2d 232, 237 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (noting that when a minor is injured by a wrongful act, the child has a personal injury claim and the parent has a claim for loss of services); see also 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 781 (1988) (declaring that historically, exemplary damages have only been available to the immediate person suffering the injury); J.D.

2001In Becker v. Strater, as the driver approached an intersection *1114 with which he was familiar, he slowed down to observe and call his passenger's attention to some cattle in a field south of the road. 117 Ind.App. 504, 506 , 72 N.E.2d 580, 581 (1947) (addressing a personal injury claim brought under Indiana's Guest Statute), quoted in and cited with approval by Reynolds v. Langford, 241 Ind. 481 , 487-38, 172 N.E.2d 867, 870 (1961).

2001Wine-Settergren v. Lamey, 716 N.E.2d 381, 390-91 (Ind.1999); Mayhue v. Sparkman, 653 N.E.2d 1384, 1386-87 (Ind.1995).

2001Cf. Wine-Settergren, 716 N.E.2d at 390-91 .

2001See Long, 14 Ind. at 597 (noting that at common law, in addition to the parent's loss of services claim, an infant still had an action for personal injury); State v. Eaton, 659 N.E.2d 232, 237 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (noting that when a minor is injured by a wrongful act, the child has a personal injury claim and the parent has a claim for loss of services); see also 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 781 (1988) (declaring that historically, exemplary damages have only been available to the immediate person suffering the injury); J.D.

1998See, e.g., Indiana State Highway Comm’n v. Curtis, 695 N.E.2d 143 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (reversed assessment of attorney’s fees against the State of Indiana and the Indiana State Highway Commission for the costs of bringing suit to enforce a settlement agreement), trans. pending; State v. Carter, 658 N.E.2d 618 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (reversed assessment of mediation costs and attorney’s fees against the State of Indiana for fading to mediate a personal injury claim in good faith); State v. Hicks, 465 N.E.2d 1146 (Ind.Ct.App.1984) (reversed award of attorney’s fees and costs against the State of Indian