personal injury claim in Connecticut

1976In a reply to a special defense filed by the defendant, the plaintiff admitted (1) that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest but is suing on behalf of her insurer, which, having reimbursed the plaintiff, is seeking recoupment by virtue of a subrogation agreement in its insurance policy covering the plaintiff, and (2) that such subrogation agreement, as it relates to claimed personal injuries, is an assignment of a personal injury claim. *180 The parties also stipulated that the sole remaining issue in this suit is whether the insurance carrier’s effort to recover money paid on the a

1976In a reply to a special defense filed by the defendant, the plaintiff admitted (1) that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest but is suing on behalf of her insurer, which, having reimbursed the plaintiff, is seeking recoupment by virtue of a subrogation agreement in its insurance policy covering the plaintiff, and (2) that such subrogation agreement, as it relates to claimed personal injuries, is an assignment of a personal injury claim. *180 The parties also stipulated that the sole remaining issue in this suit is whether the insurance carrier’s effort to recover money paid on the a

1995The "court recognized in Berlinski (p. 485) that the common-law prohibition against assignment of a personal injury claim would not apply once the claim had been reduced to judgment." Ciulewicz v. Doyle, 172 Conn. 177 , 374 A.2d 175 (1976) (noting that a judgment could be assigned at common law, regardless of statutory authority, even if judgment involved a personal injury claim).

1995The "court recognized in Berlinski (p. 485) that the common-law prohibition against assignment of a personal injury claim would not apply once the claim had been reduced to judgment." Ciulewicz v. Doyle, 172 Conn. 177 , 374 A.2d 175 (1976) (noting that a judgment could be assigned at common law, regardless of statutory authority, even if judgment involved a personal injury claim).

2022It argues that the plaintiff ‘‘seeks damages that will place him in the same position that he would have been in had the contract been performed, which such claims have previously been found not to set forth claims for liquidated damages satisfying the legal prerequisite for the imposition of prejudgment interest . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In support of its argument, the defendant relies on Foley v. Huntington Co., 42 Conn. App. 712, 742 , 682 A.2d 1026 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 931 , 683 A.2d 397 (1996), for the proposition that prejudgment interest under § 37-3a is not war

2022It argues that the plaintiff ‘‘seeks damages that will place him in the same position that he would have been in had the contract been performed, which such claims have previously been found not to set forth claims for liquidated damages satisfying the legal prerequisite for the imposition of prejudgment interest . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In support of its argument, the defendant relies on Foley v. Huntington Co., 42 Conn. App. 712, 742 , 682 A.2d 1026 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 931 , 683 A.2d 397 (1996), for the proposition that prejudgment interest under § 37-3a is not war

2022It argues that the plaintiff ‘‘seeks damages that will place him in the same position that he would have been in had the contract been performed, which such claims have previously been found not to set forth claims for liquidated damages satisfying the legal prerequisite for the imposition of prejudgment interest . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In support of its argument, the defendant relies on Foley v. Huntington Co., 42 Conn. App. 712, 742 , 682 A.2d 1026 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 931 , 683 A.2d 397 (1996), for the proposition that prejudgment interest under § 37-3a is not war

2022It argues that the plaintiff ‘‘seeks damages that will place him in the same position that he would have been in had the contract been performed, which such claims have previously been found not to set forth claims for liquidated damages satisfying the legal prerequisite for the imposition of prejudgment interest . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In support of its argument, the defendant relies on Foley v. Huntington Co., 42 Conn. App. 712, 742 , 682 A.2d 1026 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 931 , 683 A.2d 397 (1996), for the proposition that prejudgment interest under § 37-3a is not war

2017"Upon motion of the defendant, a summary judgment was rendered in its favor with respect to the plaintiff's personal injury claim on the negligence count on the ground that it was barred by [the applicable statute of limitations] ...." Id., at 292 , 365 A.2d 1180 . "[A]t trial, the court submitted only the third count of strict products liability to the jury but charged, without exception, that a verdict on this count would also determine the implied warranty count." Id., at 293 , 365 A.2d 1180 .

2017"Upon motion of the defendant, a summary judgment was rendered in its favor with respect to the plaintiff's personal injury claim on the negligence count on the ground that it was barred by [the applicable statute of limitations] ...." Id., at 292 , 365 A.2d 1180 . "[A]t trial, the court submitted only the third count of strict products liability to the jury but charged, without exception, that a verdict on this count would also determine the implied warranty count." Id., at 293 , 365 A.2d 1180 .

2005The EPA letter was not the equivalent of a conventional demand letter based on a personal injury claim.” Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 407 Mass. 689, 696 , 555 N.E.2d 576 (1990).

2005The EPA letter was not the equivalent of a conventional demand letter based on a personal injury claim.” Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 407 Mass. 689, 696 , 555 N.E.2d 576 (1990).

2005Co. v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, 517 Pa. 522, 525-26 , 539 A.2d 357 (1988) (The court concluded that legal malpractice action involves a pecuniary interest and, thus, was not barred under the rule precluding the assignment of a personal injury claim, and rejected the public policy argument that the attorney-client relationship must be protected: “We will not allow the concept of the attorney-client relationship to be used as a shield by an attorney to protect him or her from the consequences of legal malpractice.

2005Co. v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, 517 Pa. 522, 525-26 , 539 A.2d 357 (1988) (The court concluded that legal malpractice action involves a pecuniary interest and, thus, was not barred under the rule precluding the assignment of a personal injury claim, and rejected the public policy argument that the attorney-client relationship must be protected: “We will not allow the concept of the attorney-client relationship to be used as a shield by an attorney to protect him or her from the consequences of legal malpractice.

2005Where the attorney has caused harm to his or her client, there is no relationship that remains to be protected.”); Cerberus Partners, L.P. v. Gadsby & Hannah, 728 A.2d 1057, 1059-61 (R.I. 1999) (questioning policy concerns *276 generally and concluding that assignment not barred under specific facts of case, where commercial loan agreement was assigned and assignee brought malpractice action against attorney who represented original lender in commercial loan transaction; contrasting majority of cases barring assignment wherein legal malpractice claim is transferred to person without any other

2005Where the attorney has caused harm to his or her client, there is no relationship that remains to be protected.”); Cerberus Partners, L.P. v. Gadsby & Hannah, 728 A.2d 1057, 1059-61 (R.I. 1999) (questioning policy concerns *276 generally and concluding that assignment not barred under specific facts of case, where commercial loan agreement was assigned and assignee brought malpractice action against attorney who represented original lender in commercial loan transaction; contrasting majority of cases barring assignment wherein legal malpractice claim is transferred to person without any other

2003The court also found support for its denial of prejudgment interest in Paulus v. LaSala, 56 Conn. App. 139, 147 , 742 A.2d 379 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 928 , 746 A.2d 789 (2000), in which the court reiterated that “[i]t has long been recognized that there is no right to interest on a disputed demand unless a contact or a statute so provides.” Id.

2003The court also found support for its denial of prejudgment interest in Paulus v. LaSala, 56 Conn. App. 139, 147 , 742 A.2d 379 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 928 , 746 A.2d 789 (2000), in which the court reiterated that “[i]t has long been recognized that there is no right to interest on a disputed demand unless a contact or a statute so provides.” Id.

2003The court also found support for its denial of prejudgment interest in Paulus v. LaSala, 56 Conn. App. 139, 147 , 742 A.2d 379 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 928 , 746 A.2d 789 (2000), in which the court reiterated that “[i]t has long been recognized that there is no right to interest on a disputed demand unless a contact or a statute so provides.” Id.

2003“The allowance of prejudgment interest as an element of damages is an equitable determination and a matter lying within the discretion of the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Killion v. Davis, 69 Conn. App. 366, 375 , 793 A.2d 1237 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 931 , 799 A.2d 295 (2002).

2003“The allowance of prejudgment interest as an element of damages is an equitable determination and a matter lying within the discretion of the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Killion v. Davis, 69 Conn. App. 366, 375 , 793 A.2d 1237 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 931 , 799 A.2d 295 (2002).

2003The court also found support for its denial of prejudgment interest in Paulus v. LaSala, 56 Conn. App. 139, 147 , 742 A.2d 379 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 928 , 746 A.2d 789 (2000), in which the court reiterated that “[i]t has long been recognized that there is no right to interest on a disputed demand unless a contact or a statute so provides.” Id.

2003The court also found support for its denial of prejudgment interest in Paulus v. LaSala, 56 Conn. App. 139, 147 , 742 A.2d 379 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 928 , 746 A.2d 789 (2000), in which the court reiterated that “[i]t has long been recognized that there is no right to interest on a disputed demand unless a contact or a statute so provides.” Id.

2003“The allowance of prejudgment interest as an element of damages is an equitable determination and a matter lying within the discretion of the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Killion v. Davis, 69 Conn. App. 366, 375 , 793 A.2d 1237 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 931 , 799 A.2d 295 (2002).

2003“The allowance of prejudgment interest as an element of damages is an equitable determination and a matter lying within the discretion of the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Killion v. Davis, 69 Conn. App. 366, 375 , 793 A.2d 1237 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 931 , 799 A.2d 295 (2002).

1997We granted the defendants’ petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: “If an employee covered by workers’ compensation settles a personal injury claim against a third party, is the employer entitled to a credit against future compensation benefits equal to the amount of the settlement?” Libby v. Goodwin Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 239 Conn. 915 , 682 A.2d 1002 (1996).

1997We granted the defendants’ petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: “If an employee covered by workers’ compensation settles a personal injury claim against a third party, is the employer entitled to a credit against future compensation benefits equal to the amount of the settlement?” Libby v. Goodwin Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 239 Conn. 915 , 682 A.2d 1002 (1996).

1997The court finds no support for the plaintiff's position in Fabiano v. Fabiano, 10 Conn. Sup. 466 (1987) or in Tyc v. Tyc, 40 Conn. App. 562 (1996).

1997This court is not prepared to depart from Raccio v. Raccio, 41 Conn. Sup. 115 (1987), holding that a personal injury claim is a marital asset.

1997Id., citing, Ciulewicz v. Doyle, 172 Conn. 177 , 180 , 374 A.2d 175 (1976).

1996While acts of negligence can be the basis of a legitimate CUTPA claim, those negligent acts must still satisfy the criteria set forth in the "cigarette rule." A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc. , 216 Conn. 200 , 217 , 579 A.2d 69 (1990).

1996While acts of negligence can be the basis of a legitimate CUTPA claim, those negligent acts must still satisfy the criteria set forth in the "cigarette rule." A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc. , 216 Conn. 200 , 217 , 579 A.2d 69 (1990).

1996The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn. App. 200 (AC 14661), is granted, limited to the following issue: “If an employee covered by workers’ compensation settles a personal injury claim against a third party, is the employer entitled to a credit against future compensation benefits equal to the amount of the settlement?” Decided September 18, 1996 Robert C.

1995Linemaster argues that contamination of groundwater that invades another's property constitutes a "trespass or wrongful entry of that person's property." An older case, Platt Brothers Co. v. City of Waterbury, 80 Conn. 179 , 184 (1907) is not helpful to the plaintiff's position but Linemaster claims "modern" authority supports its view citing Burns v. Lehigh, Inc., 3 CSCR 722 (1988).

1995A Connecticut statute, § 22a-422 , states that "pollution of the waters of the state . . . is a public nuisance." Linemaster cites Filisko v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 176 Conn. 33 , 37 (1978) where polluted water from a town dump escaped into the plaintiff's pond and part of the evidence used to establish the existence of a nuisance were DEP and Water Resources Commission orders directed to the town to abate the pollution CT Page 8618 from the dump, also see Koystal v. Cass, 163 Conn. 92 , 100 (1972) and Dingwell v. Litchfield, 4 Conn. App. 621 , 625 (1985).

1995A Connecticut statute, § 22a-422 , states that "pollution of the waters of the state . . . is a public nuisance." Linemaster cites Filisko v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 176 Conn. 33 , 37 (1978) where polluted water from a town dump escaped into the plaintiff's pond and part of the evidence used to establish the existence of a nuisance were DEP and Water Resources Commission orders directed to the town to abate the pollution CT Page 8618 from the dump, also see Koystal v. Cass, 163 Conn. 92 , 100 (1972) and Dingwell v. Litchfield, 4 Conn. App. 621 , 625 (1985).

1995Reliance on the personal injury clause or endorsement would also have an added advantage for Linemaster since Titan Holdings, supra at page 270 also held the pollution exclusion clause does not affect coverage under the personal injury clause and Red Ball Leasing, Inc. v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., 915 F.2d 306 , 312 (CA7, 1990) held that there is no "occurrence" requirement under this clause.