personal injury claim in Kansas

2006In Bell v. Kansas City, Kansas, Housing Authority, 268 Kan. 208 , 922 P.2d 1233 (1999), the plaintiff filed a personal injury claim against the Kansas City, Kansas Housing Authority (Housing Authority).

2006In Bell v. Kansas City, Kansas, Housing Authority, 268 Kan. 208 , 922 P.2d 1233 (1999), the plaintiff filed a personal injury claim against the Kansas City, Kansas Housing Authority (Housing Authority).

2026In this respect, the legal fees plaintiffs incur to remove or quiet the malicious cloud on title is akin to the medical expenses plaintiffs incur in a personal-injury claim. "'When a pedestrian is struck by a car, he goes to a physician for treatment of his injuries, and the motorist, if liable in tort, must pay the pedestrian's medical fees.'" Brandt v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 813, 817 , 210 Cal. Rptr. 211 , 693 P.2d 796 (1985); see Shirley v. Smith, 261 Kan. 685, 693 , 933 P.2d 651 (1997) (economic damages include the cost of medical care, past and future).

2026In this respect, the legal fees plaintiffs incur to remove or quiet the malicious cloud on title is akin to the medical expenses plaintiffs incur in a personal-injury claim. "'When a pedestrian is struck by a car, he goes to a physician for treatment of his injuries, and the motorist, if liable in tort, must pay the pedestrian's medical fees.'" Brandt v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 813, 817 , 210 Cal. Rptr. 211 , 693 P.2d 796 (1985); see Shirley v. Smith, 261 Kan. 685, 693 , 933 P.2d 651 (1997) (economic damages include the cost of medical care, past and future).

2026If not bifurcated, there must be a clean demarcation between the two during the trial with appropriate jury instructions as to each. 56 Kan.

2025Chelf found that before June 1, 2007, when K.A.R. 44-16-104a replaced K.A.R. 44-16-104, "an inmate could present a personal injury claim to the prison or to the joint committee for purposes of exhausting administrative remedies, but now the inmate must present such a claim to the prison to properly exhaust." (Emphases added.) 46 Kan.

2015See Toumberlin v. Haas, 236 Kan. 138 , 689 P.2d 808 (1984) (driver and passenger together sued another driver and a county entity); Smith v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 222 Kan. 303 , 564 P.2d 514 (1977) *778 (passenger sued the railroad when she was injured after her car was struck by a train); Curtiss v. Fahle, 157 Kan. 226 , 139 P.2d 827 (1943) (passenger filed a personal injury claim after the vehicle in which he was riding collided with a truck).

2015See Toumberlin v. Haas, 236 Kan. 138 , 689 P.2d 808 (1984) (driver and passenger together sued another driver and a county entity); Smith v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 222 Kan. 303 , 564 P.2d 514 (1977) *778 (passenger sued the railroad when she was injured after her car was struck by a train); Curtiss v. Fahle, 157 Kan. 226 , 139 P.2d 827 (1943) (passenger filed a personal injury claim after the vehicle in which he was riding collided with a truck).

2015See Toumberlin v. Haas, 236 Kan. 138 , 689 P.2d 808 (1984) (driver and passenger together sued another driver and a county entity); Smith v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 222 Kan. 303 , 564 P.2d 514 (1977) *778 (passenger sued the railroad when she was injured after her car was struck by a train); Curtiss v. Fahle, 157 Kan. 226 , 139 P.2d 827 (1943) (passenger filed a personal injury claim after the vehicle in which he was riding collided with a truck).

2015See Toumberlin v. Haas, 236 Kan. 138 , 689 P.2d 808 (1984) (driver and passenger together sued another driver and a county entity); Smith v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 222 Kan. 303 , 564 P.2d 514 (1977) *778 (passenger sued the railroad when she was injured after her car was struck by a train); Curtiss v. Fahle, 157 Kan. 226 , 139 P.2d 827 (1943) (passenger filed a personal injury claim after the vehicle in which he was riding collided with a truck).

2010Earlier we discussed Davidson, 259 Kan. 659 , regarding when the statute of limitations period begins to run on a personal injury claim when the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable to the *605 injured party.

2009The Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding that “[t]he compulsory counterclaim rule does not require a defendant against whom a cross-claim for indemnity, contribution or apportionment of fault is asserted to set forth her claim for injuries against her cross-claiming co-defendant in a response.” 183 S.W.3d at 595 .

2004As a result, the Ellis court determined that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate Ellis’ claim. 81 Conn. App. at 113-15 .

2002On appeal, the Kinsella court recognized that derivative claims are dependent upon the right of the injured party to recover and are subject to the same defenses available to the underlying personal injury claim. 826 P.2d at 435 .

2002On appeal, the Kinsella court recognized that derivative claims are dependent upon the right of the injured party to recover and are subject to the same defenses available to the underlying personal injury claim. 826 P.2d at 435 .

1997Harris cites Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Products, Inc., 373 So. 2d 102 (La. 1979), as supporting a rule that when an attorney is prematurely discharged on a contingent fee contract without cause, the amount fixed in the contract should be the proper frame of reference for fixing compensation, not quantum meruit.

1991Plaintiff Parker was represented by the law firm of Michaud, Hutton and Bradshaw (Michaud), while defendant Volks wagenwerk was represented by the law firm of McDonald, Tinker, Skaer, Quinn & Herrington (McDonald). 245 Kan. at 581 .

1983In dismissing the tort claim, the trial court stated: “As was pointed out in the defendant’s brief, the Kansas Supreme Court in the case of Fisher v. Toler, 194 Kan. 701 , squarely upheld the doctrine of spousal tort immunity for intentional torts.

1972In Workman v. City of Emporia, 200 Kan. 112 , 434 P. 2d 846 , this court held that a timely filing of a written statement of a personal injury claim pursuant to K.

1972In Workman v. City of Emporia, 200 Kan. 112 , 434 P. 2d 846 , this court held that a timely filing of a written statement of a personal injury claim pursuant to K.