personal injury claim in Kentucky

2015See Branham v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 437 S.W.3d 135, 136 (Ky. 2012) (attorney disbarred following conviction for failing to make the required disposition of funds to his clients and converting those funds to his own use); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Klapheke, 203 S.W.3d 135 (Ky. 2006) (holding disbarment was the appropriate sanction for attorney who failed to submit proceeds from the settlement of a personal injury claim to client, failed to pay medical bills from those proceeds, and failed to respond to disciplinary proceedings).

2015See Branham v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 487 S.W.3d 135, 136 (Ky.2012) (attorney disbarred following conviction for failing to make the required disposition of funds to his clients and converting those funds to his own use); Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Klapheke, 203 S.W.3d 135 (Ky.2006) (holding disbarment was the appropriate sanction for attorney who failed to submit proceeds from the settlement of a personal injury claim to client, failed to pay medical bills from those proceeds, and failed to respond to disciplinary proceedings).

1983Clay, Ky.Prac.3rd Ed. Civil Rule 15.03.” The opinion in Perkins cites an earlier case, Wimsatt v. Haydon Oil Co., Ky., 414 S.W.2d 908 (1967), in which we held that a claim that asserted a cause of action only for wrongful death of the wife and property damage to the husband’s automobile could be amended to present an additional claim for personal injuries to the husband from the same accident, even though the husband’s personal injury claim would have been otherwise barred by the statute of limitations.

1983Clay, Ky.Prac.3rd Ed. Civil Rule 15.03." The opinion in Perkins cites an earlier case, Wimsatt v. Haydon Oil Co., Ky., 414 S.W.2d 908 (1967), in which we held that a claim that asserted a cause of action only for wrongful death of the wife and property damage to the husband's automobile could be amended to present an additional claim for personal injuries to the husband from the same accident, even though the husband's personal injury claim would have been otherwise barred by the statute of limitations.

2023KRS 413.140(1)(a) in the present situation where the cause of action is both a motor vehicle accident and a personal injury claim.” 730 S.W.2d at 528 .

2022Toche’s claim is still a basic personal injury claim under common law.” Id. at 698 .

2022Toche’s claim is a basic personal injury claim under common law.” Id. (citation and footnote omitted).

2022Id. at 416 . -8- directly or indirectly, we agree with the trial court that a reasonable fee is no fee.” Id. at 417 .

2022Id. at 416 . -8- directly or indirectly, we agree with the trial court that a reasonable fee is no fee.” Id. at 417 .

2017In Son , Son negotiated a $100,000 settlement for a client in a personal injury claim. 398 S.W.3d at 433 .

2017As to our construction of the power to máke contracts “in relation to both real and personal property,” we explicitly recognized that “a personal injury claim is a chose-in-action, and therefore constitutes personal property.” Id. at 325-326 .

2017Id. at 325-26 citing Button v. Drake, 302 Ky. 517 , 195 S.W.2d 66, 69 (1946).

2014In Weakley v. Weakley, 731 S.W.2d 243 (Ky.1987), the issue involved the character of settlement proceeds from a personal injury claim based upon an automobile accident occurring during the marriage.

2012See, e.g., In re Labatt Food Service, L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640 (Tex.2009) (derivative); Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings Co., 115 Ohio St.3d 134 , 873 N.E.2d 1258 (2007) (independent).

2012See, e.g., In re Labatt Food Service, L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640 (Tex.2009) (derivative); Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings Co., 115 Ohio St.3d 134 , 873 N.E.2d 1258 (2007) (independent).

2012Labatt, 279 S.W.3d 640 ; Ballard v. Southwest Detroit Hospital, 119 Mich.App. 814 , 327 N.W.2d 370 (1982).

2012Labatt, 279 S.W.3d 640 ; Ballard v. Southwest Detroit Hospital, 119 Mich.App. 814 , 327 N.W.2d 370 (1982).

2003Kentucky Bar Association v. Howard, Ky., 899 S.W.2d 91 (1995).

1999Co. v. DeMarsh, supra , in which the owner of the insured vehicle, who was the named insured of the policy, was held entitled to a summary judgment with respect to a personal injury claim arising out of the negligent operation of the vehicle by another who was neither his agent nor his employee; and Preferred Risk Mut.

1999Co. v. DeMarsh, supra, in which the owner of the insured vehicle, who was the named insured of the policy, was held entitled to a summary judgment with respect to a personal injury claim arising out of the negligent operation of the vehicle by another who was neither his agent nor his employee; and Preferred Risk Mut.

1995Board, 161 Ky. 562 , 170 S.W. 1166 (1914) and Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533 , 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932) to Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, Ky., 808 S.W.2d 809 (1991).

1995Board, 161 Ky. 562 , 170 S.W. 1166 (1914) and Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533 , 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932) to Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, Ky., 808 S.W.2d 809 (1991).

1995Board, 161 Ky. 562 , 170 S.W. 1166 (1914) and Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533 , 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932) to Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, Ky., 808 S.W.2d 809 (1991).

1995Board, 161 Ky. 562 , 170 S.W. 1166 (1914) and Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533 , 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932) to Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, Ky., 808 S.W.2d 809 (1991).

1995Board, 161 Ky. 562 , 170 S.W. 1166 (1914) and Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533 , 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932) to Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, Ky., 808 S.W.2d 809 (1991).

1994See Atherton Condominium, Apartment-Owners Association Board of Directors v. Blume Development Company, 115 Wash.2d 506 , 799 P.2d 250 (1990).” KRS 446.070 elevates proof of violation of statutory standards to the status of negligence per se, by stating: “A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation.” The interrelationship between the statutory standard and KRS 446.070 is illustrated by Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Claywell, Ky., 736

1992A New York Supreme Court in Farm Family Mutual Insurance Company v. Nass, 126 Misc.2d 329 , 481 N.Y.S.2d 952 (1984), aff'd, 121 A.D.2d 498 , 503 N.Y.S.2d 820 (1986), held that the designation of a New York claims adjuster to settle a personal injury claim by a foreign insurer concerning an accident in New Jersey did not constitute “any other transaction of business” under Insurance Law sec. 59-a so as to warrant a New York court in exercising personal jurisdiction over the foreign insurer.

1992A New York Supreme Court in Farm Family Mutual Insurance Company v. Nass, 126 Misc.2d 329 , 481 N.Y.S.2d 952 (1984), aff'd, 121 A.D.2d 498 , 503 N.Y.S.2d 820 (1986), held that the designation of a New York claims adjuster to settle a personal injury claim by a foreign insurer concerning an accident in New Jersey did not constitute “any other transaction of business” under Insurance Law sec. 59-a so as to warrant a New York court in exercising personal jurisdiction over the foreign insurer.