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52 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1961–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tevis v. Tevisgreen2 sentences1998See Brennan v. Orban, 145 N.J. 282, 290-91 , 678 A.2d 667 (1996) (requiring joinder of a personal injury claim in a divorce proceeding); Tevis v. Tevis, 79 N.J. 422, 434 , 400 A.2d 1189 (1979) (stating in dicta that the marital tort claim should have been joined with the dissolution proceeding); see also Brown v. Brown, 208 N.J.Super. 372, 379 , 506 A.2d 29 (App.Div.1986) (stating that “[h]ad the marital tort here occurred prior to the institution of the divorce action ... there would be no question of plaintiffs obligation to have raised it as a separate claim in her subsequently filed divorc 1998See Brennan v. Orban, 145 N.J. 282, 290-91 , 678 A.2d 667 (1996) (requiring joinder of a personal injury claim in a divorce proceeding); Tevis v. Tevis, 79 N.J. 422, 434 , 400 A.2d 1189 (1979) (stating in dicta that the marital tort claim should have been joined with the dissolution proceeding); see also Brown v. Brown, 208 N.J.Super. 372, 379 , 506 A.2d 29 (App.Div.1986) (stating that “[h]ad the marital tort here occurred prior to the institution of the divorce action ... there would be no question of plaintiffs obligation to have raised it as a separate claim in her subsequently filed divorc | 2 | 3 |
Tichenor v. Santillogreen2 sentences2014“The derivative claim can rise no higher than the personal injury claim of the other spouse.” Tichenor, supra, 218 N.J.Super. at 173 , 527 A.2d 78 (quoting Prosser & Keaton on Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 125 at 938)). 2014“The derivative claim can rise no higher than the personal injury claim of the other spouse.” Tichenor, supra, 218 N.J.Super. at 173 , 527 A.2d 78 (quoting Prosser & Keaton on Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 125 at 938)). | 1 | 3 |
HOJNOWSKI EX REL. HOJNOWSKI v. Vans Skate Parkgreen2 sentences2009In Hojnowski, supra, 187 N.J. at 338 , 901 A. 2d 381 , the Court held that a parent's execution of an exculpatory agreement could not bar the minor's personal injury claim. 2009In Hojnowski, supra, 187 N.J. at 338 , 901 A. 2d 381 , the Court held that a parent's execution of an exculpatory agreement could not bar the minor's personal injury claim. | 1 | 2 |
Anthony McCormick v. State of New Jerseygreen1 sentence2026Plaintiffs' complaint is not limited to a personal injury claim because they alleged defendants deviated from the accepted standard of care and were grossly negligent in their treatment and care of L.B., Jr. An AOM will only be required "when the underlying harmful conduct involves professional negligence, implicating the standards of care within that profession." McCormick v. State, 446 N.J. Super. 603, 613-14 (App. Div. 2016). | 1 | 1 |
Couri v. Gardnergreen1 sentence2026In determining whether a plaintiff is required to submit an AOM, courts must ask whether the allegations "require proof of a deviation from the professional standard of care applicable to [a] specific profession" when looking to "the nature of the legal inquiry" rather than "the label placed on the action." Couri v. Gardner, 173 N.J. 328, 340 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Sommers v. McKinneygreen1 sentence2025As with all elements of a legal malpractice action, "[t]he client bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of competent credible evidence that injuries were suffered as a proximate consequence of the attorney 's breach of duty." Sommers v. McKinney, 287 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Mullen v. Ippolito Corp.green1 sentence2025Generally, a personal injury claim "shall be commenced within two years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued." N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a). "[A] cause of action is deemed to accrue when facts exist which authorize one party to maintain an action against another." Mullen v. Ippolito Corp., 428 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Laidlow v. Hariton MacH. Co., Inc.green1 sentence2025Co., Inc., 170 N.J. 602, 606 (2002), involved an employee's personal injury claim against another employee and their employer due to intentionally wrongful conduct. | 1 | 1 |
Marini v. Borough of Wanaquegreen1 sentence2025Super. 85, 105 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Marini v. Wanaque, 37 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Petrocelli v. Daniel Woodhead Co.green1 sentence2020The following year, a Third Circuit panel followed Kozyra in a case that could not be “reasonably distinguish[ed]” from it, but expressed reluctance in doing so, noting that “[i]t does not seem efficient or particularly fair to require a person asserting a personal injury claim based on negligence or product s liability to piggyback the claim on top of a property damage subrogation suit by one insurance company against another simply because the insurance company managed to get to the courthouse first.” See Petrocelli v. Daniel Woodhead Co., 993 F.2d 27, 29-31 (3d Cir. 1993). 5 Bank Leumi appe | 1 | 1 |
Connecticut v. Doehrgreen1 sentence2019See Reardon, 947 F.2d at 1519 (stating the "[o]wnership of land, and the physical presence of hazardous substances on land, are matters that are subject to relatively simple resolution"); see also Doehr, 501 U.S. at 14 (contrasting the risk of error in a pre-judgment lien under Connecticut law against a defendant's property based on a personal injury claim, and "'ordinarily uncomplicated matters that lend themselves to documentary proof,'" such as "the existence of a debt or delinquent payments" (quoting Mitchell v. W.T. | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Auerbach Chevrolet Corp.green1 sentence2019See, e.g., Green v. Auerbach Chevrolet Corp., 127 N.J. 591, 598 (1992). 1 Thus, plaintiff had the right to bring a malpractice action against defendants for the injuries he allegedly sustained at the time of his birth until January 4, 2015, which was two years after he reached age eighteen on January 4, 2013. | 1 | 1 |
Sherwood Court v. Borough of South Rivergreen1 sentence2019Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 609 (1974))); Sherwood, 294 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Beauchamp v. Amediogreen2 sentences2019"Although the full extent of an injury or loss may not be known, N.J.S.A. 59:8-4, the [duty to provide a tort claims] notice is triggered by the occurrence of injury and must be filed in order for a complaint to be lodged against the public entity." Id. at 121 (emphasis added). 2019In Beauchamp, 164 N.J. at 119-21 , the Supreme Court analogously held that the date of accrual of a personal injury claim arising from an accident is the date when the accident occurred and when the initial harm was inflicted, even though the plaintiff's bodily injuries were eventually discovered A-3412-17T4 10 to be permanent. | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.green1 sentence2019Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 609 (1974))); Sherwood, 294 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Paul D. Reardon and John E. Reardon v. United States of America and the United States Environmental Protection Agencygreen1 sentence2019See Reardon, 947 F.2d at 1519 (stating the "[o]wnership of land, and the physical presence of hazardous substances on land, are matters that are subject to relatively simple resolution"); see also Doehr, 501 U.S. at 14 (contrasting the risk of error in a pre-judgment lien under Connecticut law against a defendant's property based on a personal injury claim, and "'ordinarily uncomplicated matters that lend themselves to documentary proof,'" such as "the existence of a debt or delinquent payments" (quoting Mitchell v. W.T. | 1 | 1 |
Vassiliu v. Daimler Chrysler Corp.green2 sentences2010Id. at 233, 734 A .2d 243 ; see also Vassiliu v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 178 N.J. 286, 294 , 839 A .2d 863 (2004); Giardina v. Bennett, 111 N.J. 412, 423-24 , 545 A .2d 139 (1988). 2010Id. at 233, 734 A .2d 243 ; see also Vassiliu v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 178 N.J. 286, 294 , 839 A .2d 863 (2004); Giardina v. Bennett, 111 N.J. 412, 423-24 , 545 A .2d 139 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Zukerman v. Piper Pools, Inc.green2 sentences2005See, e.g., Zukerman, supra, 232 N.J.Super. at 95-97 , 556 A.2d at 785-87 . [5] D The public policy that has led the majority to conclude that a pre-tort release may not validly bar a child's personal injury claim is the law's solicitude for the rights of children. 2005See, e.g., Zukerman, supra, 232 N.J.Super. at 95-97 , 556 A.2d at 785-87 . [5] D The public policy that has led the majority to conclude that a pre-tort release may not validly bar a child's personal injury claim is the law's solicitude for the rights of children. | 1 | 1 |
| Hurd v. Monsanto Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Silverman v. Lathropgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Krauth v. Israel Geller and Buckingham Homes, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Krauth v. Gellergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brennan v. Orbangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Deemer v. Silk City Textile MacH. Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Reldangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harmon v. Harmongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Worksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Burns v. Bethlehem Steel Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Biglioli v. Durotest Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. CHURCH
green
2 sentences1996Joinder of such claims is permissive, not mandatory." Id. at 500 , 242 A. 2d 652 . 1996Joinder of such claims is permissive, not mandatory." Id. at 500 , 242 A. 2d 652 . | 2 | 1992–1996 |
Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc.
red
2 sentences1991In Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 157 , 305 A. 2d 412 (1973), the Court determined that a personal injury claim was to be founded on strict liability rather than a breach of an implied warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code. 1991In Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 157 , 305 A. 2d 412 (1973), the Court determined that a personal injury claim was to be founded on strict liability rather than a breach of an implied warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code. | 2 | 1983–1991 |
Longworth v. Van Houten
green
1 sentence2025A-2201-24 2 Plaintiff instituted a personal injury claim that settled with the tortfeasor's policy limit of $25,000, after obtaining consent from defendant pursuant to Longworth v. Van Houten, 223 N.J. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Galligan v. Westfield Centre Service, Inc.
green
2 sentences2023New Jersey courts have developed and adopted equitable tolling doctrines—such as laches, the discovery rule, and physical incapacity—in an "attempt to implement fully the underlying legislative purposes to avoid the A-1753-22 7 injustice which would result from a literal reading of the general statutory language." Id. at 191 . 2023Super 71, 76–77 (App. Div. 1977)).] The personal injury claim sounding in negligence is a common law claim, subject to the limitation period set out in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, which can be adjusted when necessary to preserve "individual justice" in the face of "the harsh approach of literally applying the statute of limitations." Galligan, 82 N.J. at 192 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Weir v. Market Transition Facility
green
1 sentence2019The derivative claim can rise no higher than the personal injury claim of the other spouse. [Weir, 318 N.J. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
James F. Walters v. Ymca
green
2 sentences2017Such reliance is misplaced, because in Walters, supra, we held that "whether a fitness center or health club can insulate itself through an exculpatory clause from the ordinary common law duty of care owed by all businesses to its invitees, was specifically not addressed or decided by the Court in Stelluti." 437 N.J. 2017Such reliance is misplaced, because in Walters, supra, we held that "whether a fitness center or health club can insulate itself through an exculpatory clause from the ordinary common law duty of care owed by all businesses to its invitees, was specifically not addressed or decided by the Court in Stelluti." 437 N.J. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Aronberg v. Tolbert
neutral
2 sentences2011He observed: “A wrongful death action may provide heirs with a remedy resulting from the loss of a life, but the claim still derives from the tortious conduct upon which a personal injury claim would have been based had the victim lived.” Id. at 576 , 997 A.2d 246 . 2011He observed: “A wrongful death action may provide heirs with a remedy resulting from the loss of a life, but the claim still derives from the tortious conduct upon which a personal injury claim would have been based had the victim lived.” Id. at 576 , 997 A.2d 246 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Smith v. Whitaker
green
1 sentence2010Id. at 233, 734 A .2d 243 ; see also Vassiliu v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 178 N.J. 286, 294 , 839 A .2d 863 (2004); Giardina v. Bennett, 111 N.J. 412, 423-24 , 545 A .2d 139 (1988). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Giardina v. Bennett
green
2 sentences2010Id. at 233, 734 A .2d 243 ; see also Vassiliu v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 178 N.J. 286, 294 , 839 A .2d 863 (2004); Giardina v. Bennett, 111 N.J. 412, 423-24 , 545 A .2d 139 (1988). 2010Id. at 233, 734 A .2d 243 ; see also Vassiliu v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 178 N.J. 286, 294 , 839 A .2d 863 (2004); Giardina v. Bennett, 111 N.J. 412, 423-24 , 545 A .2d 139 (1988). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Gershon v. Regency Diving Center
green
2 sentences2009And, in Gershon, supra, 368 N.J.Super. at 247 , 845 A. 2d 720 , we held that an individual's execution of an exculpatory agreement in favor of a scuba diving instructor could not bar an heir's wrongful death action. [8] There are few decisions dealing with exculpatory agreements in the same or similar settings; these decisions have produced mixed results. 2009And, in Gershon, supra, 368 N.J.Super. at 247 , 845 A. 2d 720 , we held that an individual's execution of an exculpatory agreement in favor of a scuba diving instructor could not bar an heir's wrongful death action. [8] There are few decisions dealing with exculpatory agreements in the same or similar settings; these decisions have produced mixed results. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
McCarthy v. National Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc.
green
2 sentences2007See Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323, 333 , 901 A. 2d 381 (2006); McCarthy v. Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 48 N.J. 539, 543 , 226 A. 2d 713 (1967). 2007See Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323, 333 , 901 A. 2d 381 (2006); McCarthy v. Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 48 N.J. 539, 543 , 226 A. 2d 713 (1967). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Konopka v. Foster
green
2 sentences2003We decline to interfere with that goal and, in any event, are bound by the statute's plain meaning. [ Id. at 229, 812 A. 2d 363 .] However, in reversing the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice, the Konopka court held that, as a matter of law, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applicable "to bar dismissal of a personal injury claim as the result of plaintiff's failure to comply with *534 the certification requirements of AICRA when dismissal is sought only after the statute of limitations has run." Id. at 230-31, 232 , 812 A. 2d 363 . 2003We decline to interfere with that goal and, in any event, are bound by the statute's plain meaning. [ Id. at 229, 812 A. 2d 363 .] However, in reversing the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice, the Konopka court held that, as a matter of law, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applicable "to bar dismissal of a personal injury claim as the result of plaintiff's failure to comply with *534 the certification requirements of AICRA when dismissal is sought only after the statute of limitations has run." Id. at 230-31, 232 , 812 A. 2d 363 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Bixenman v. Christ Episcopal Church Parish House green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Monaghan v. Holy Trinity Church green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Carney v. Finn green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Neely v. Kossove green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Trentacost v. Brussel green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Williams v. Community Realty Management neutral | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Berzito v. Gambino green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Alfone v. Sarno red | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Dowler v. Boczkowski green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Williams v. Gorman green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Hauck v. Danclar green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| cluster 654203 green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Gantes v. Kason Corp. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Stebbins v. Robbins green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Peskin v. Peskin green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Peskin v. Peskin green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Maryland Casualty Co. v. New Jersey Manufacturers (Casualty) Insurance green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| MUELLER EX REL. MUELLER v. Parke Davis green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Montells v. Haynes green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Collins v. Uniroyal green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Realmuto v. Straub Motors, Inc. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Ayers v. Jackson Tp. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Lopez v. Swyer green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Lynch v. Rubacky green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Lieberman v. Employers Ins. of Wausau green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Libera v. Whittaker, Clark & Daniels, Inc. green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Hoppe v. Ranzini green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Mead Johnson & Co. v. Goodman green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.