personal injury claim in New Jersey

1996Joinder of such claims is permissive, not mandatory.” Id. at 500 , 242 A.2d 652 .

1996Joinder of such claims is permissive, not mandatory.” Id. at 500 , 242 A.2d 652 .

1991In Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 157 , 305 A. 2d 412 (1973), the Court determined that a personal injury claim was to be founded on strict liability rather than a breach of an implied warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code.

1991In Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 157 , 305 A. 2d 412 (1973), the Court determined that a personal injury claim was to be founded on strict liability rather than a breach of an implied warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code.

2025A-2201-24 2 Plaintiff instituted a personal injury claim that settled with the tortfeasor's policy limit of $25,000, after obtaining consent from defendant pursuant to Longworth v. Van Houten, 223 N.J.

2023Super 71, 76–77 (App. Div. 1977)).] The personal injury claim sounding in negligence is a common law claim, subject to the limitation period set out in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, which can be adjusted when necessary to preserve "individual justice" in the face of "the harsh approach of literally applying the statute of limitations." Galligan, 82 N.J. at 192 .

2023New Jersey courts have developed and adopted equitable tolling doctrines—such as laches, the discovery rule, and physical incapacity—in an "attempt to implement fully the underlying legislative purposes to avoid the A-1753-22 7 injustice which would result from a literal reading of the general statutory language." Id. at 191 .

2019The derivative claim can rise no higher than the personal injury claim of the other spouse. [Weir, 318 N.J.

2017Such reliance is misplaced, because in Walters, supra, we held that "whether a fitness center or health club can insulate itself through an exculpatory clause from the ordinary common law duty of care owed by all businesses to its invitees, was specifically not addressed or decided by the Court in Stelluti." 437 N.J.

2017Such reliance is misplaced, because in Walters, supra, we held that "whether a fitness center or health club can insulate itself through an exculpatory clause from the ordinary common law duty of care owed by all businesses to its invitees, was specifically not addressed or decided by the Court in Stelluti." 437 N.J.

2011He observed: “A wrongful death action may provide heirs with a remedy resulting from the loss of a life, but the claim still derives from the tortious conduct upon which a personal injury claim would have been based had the victim lived.” Id. at 576 , 997 A.2d 246 .

2011He observed: “A wrongful death action may provide heirs with a remedy resulting from the loss of a life, but the claim still derives from the tortious conduct upon which a personal injury claim would have been based had the victim lived.” Id. at 576 , 997 A.2d 246 .

2010Id. at 233, 734 A .2d 243 ; see also Vassiliu v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 178 N.J. 286, 294 , 839 A .2d 863 (2004); Giardina v. Bennett, 111 N.J. 412, 423-24 , 545 A .2d 139 (1988).

2010Id. at 233, 734 A .2d 243 ; see also Vassiliu v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 178 N.J. 286, 294 , 839 A .2d 863 (2004); Giardina v. Bennett, 111 N.J. 412, 423-24 , 545 A .2d 139 (1988).

2010Id. at 233, 734 A .2d 243 ; see also Vassiliu v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 178 N.J. 286, 294 , 839 A .2d 863 (2004); Giardina v. Bennett, 111 N.J. 412, 423-24 , 545 A .2d 139 (1988).

2009And, in Gershon, supra, 368 N.J.Super. at 247 , 845 A. 2d 720 , we held that an individual's execution of an exculpatory agreement in favor of a scuba diving instructor could not bar an heir's wrongful death action. [8] There are few decisions dealing with exculpatory agreements in the same or similar settings; these decisions have produced mixed results.

2009And, in Gershon, supra, 368 N.J.Super. at 247 , 845 A. 2d 720 , we held that an individual's execution of an exculpatory agreement in favor of a scuba diving instructor could not bar an heir's wrongful death action. [8] There are few decisions dealing with exculpatory agreements in the same or similar settings; these decisions have produced mixed results.

2007See Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323, 333 , 901 A. 2d 381 (2006); McCarthy v. Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 48 N.J. 539, 543 , 226 A. 2d 713 (1967).

2007See Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323, 333 , 901 A. 2d 381 (2006); McCarthy v. Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 48 N.J. 539, 543 , 226 A. 2d 713 (1967).

2003We decline to interfere with that goal and, in any event, are bound by the statute's plain meaning. [ Id. at 229, 812 A. 2d 363 .] However, in reversing the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice, the Konopka court held that, as a matter of law, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applicable "to bar dismissal of a personal injury claim as the result of plaintiff's failure to comply with *534 the certification requirements of AICRA when dismissal is sought only after the statute of limitations has run." Id. at 230-31, 232 , 812 A. 2d 363 .

2003We decline to interfere with that goal and, in any event, are bound by the statute's plain meaning. [ Id. at 229, 812 A. 2d 363 .] However, in reversing the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice, the Konopka court held that, as a matter of law, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applicable "to bar dismissal of a personal injury claim as the result of plaintiff's failure to comply with *534 the certification requirements of AICRA when dismissal is sought only after the statute of limitations has run." Id. at 230-31, 232 , 812 A. 2d 363 .

2001The necessary emphasis on an attorney’s negligent conduct is evident from Carney v. Finn, supra, 145 N.J.Super. at 236 , 367 A.2d 458 , in which the Appellate Division concluded that a legal-malpractice action was not “a personal injury claim but rather an assertion that an attorney engaged for a particular purpose was negligent in the handling of it, resulting in pecuniary loss to appellant.” The dispositive concept in Carney for purposes of concluding that “tortious injury to the rights of another” had occurred was not, however, the resultant pecuniary loss, but *426 rather that an attorney

2001The necessary emphasis on an attorney’s negligent conduct is evident from Carney v. Finn, supra, 145 N.J.Super. at 236 , 367 A.2d 458 , in which the Appellate Division concluded that a legal-malpractice action was not “a personal injury claim but rather an assertion that an attorney engaged for a particular purpose was negligent in the handling of it, resulting in pecuniary loss to appellant.” The dispositive concept in Carney for purposes of concluding that “tortious injury to the rights of another” had occurred was not, however, the resultant pecuniary loss, but *426 rather that an attorney