has recognized exception in Illinois

2008See, e.g., People v. DeMorrow, 59 Ill.2d 352, 354 , 320 N.E.2d 1 (1974) ("whether or not any given search and seizure is unconstitutional, as violative of the fourth * * * amendment[ ], as a matter of substantive law, is to be decided by the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court. * * * The decision of what State courts may deem to be admissible in their systems according to their laws of evidence is an entirely separate question"); People v. Willis, 215 Ill.2d 517, 532 , 294 Ill.Dec. 581 , 831 N.E.2d 531 (2005) (exclusionary rule not applied where detention ran afoul of Gerstein, b

2008See, e.g., People v. DeMorrow, 59 Ill. 2d 352, 354 (1974) (“whether or not any given search and seizure is unconstitutional, as violative of the fourth *** amendment ], as a matter of substantive law, is to be decided by the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court. *** The decision of what State courts may deem to be admissible in their systems according to their laws of evidence is an entirely separate question”); People v. Willis, 215 Ill. 2d 517, 532 (2005) (exclusionary rule not applied where detention ran afoul of Gerstein, but confession voluntary); People v. Burnidge, 178 Ill.

2008See, e.g., People v. DeMorrow, 59 Ill.2d 352, 354 , 320 N.E.2d 1 (1974) ("whether or not any given search and seizure is unconstitutional, as violative of the fourth * * * amendment[ ], as a matter of substantive law, is to be decided by the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court. * * * The decision of what State courts may deem to be admissible in their systems according to their laws of evidence is an entirely separate question"); People v. Willis, 215 Ill.2d 517, 532 , 294 Ill.Dec. 581 , 831 N.E.2d 531 (2005) (exclusionary rule not applied where detention ran afoul of Gerstein, b

2008See, e.g., People v. DeMorrow, 59 Ill. 2d 352, 354 (1974) (“whether or not any given search and seizure is unconstitutional, as violative of the fourth *** amendment ], as a matter of substantive law, is to be decided by the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court. *** The decision of what State courts may deem to be admissible in their systems according to their laws of evidence is an entirely separate question”); People v. Willis, 215 Ill. 2d 517, 532 (2005) (exclusionary rule not applied where detention ran afoul of Gerstein, but confession voluntary); People v. Burnidge, 178 Ill.

2006Enis, 163 Ill. 2d at 386 ; Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d at 506 .

2006Enis, 163 Ill. 2d at 386 ; Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d at 506 .

2006Enis, 163 Ill. 2d at 386 ; Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d at 506 .

2006Enis, 163 Ill. 2d at 386 ; Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d at 506 .

1994This court has stated the following standard with respect to waiver: "Waiver of a constitutional right is valid only if it is clearly established that there was 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right ***.’ (Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 82 L.

1994This court has stated the following standard with respect to waiver: "Waiver of a constitutional right is valid only if it is clearly established that there was 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right ***.’ (Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 82 L.

1996Neade, 277 Ill.

1996Neade, 277 Ill.App.3d 1004 , 214 Ill.Dec. 764 , 662 N.E.2d 118 .

1996Halderman, 465 U.S. at 102 , 79 L.

1996Halderman, 465 U.S. at 102 , 79 L.

1994This court has stated the following standard with respect to waiver: "Waiver of a constitutional right is valid only if it is clearly established that there was `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right * * *.' ( Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 .) `Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.' ( Brady v. United States (1970), 397 U.S. 742, 748 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 756 , 90 S.Ct. 1463,

1994This court has stated the following standard with respect to waiver: "Waiver of a constitutional right is valid only if it is clearly established that there was `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right * * *.' ( Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 .) `Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.' ( Brady v. United States (1970), 397 U.S. 742, 748 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 756 , 90 S.Ct. 1463,

1994This court has stated the following standard with respect to waiver: "Waiver of a constitutional right is valid only if it is clearly established that there was `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right * * *.' ( Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 .) `Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.' ( Brady v. United States (1970), 397 U.S. 742, 748 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 756 , 90 S.Ct. 1463,

1994This court has stated the following standard with respect to waiver: "Waiver of a constitutional right is valid only if it is clearly established that there was `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right * * *.' ( Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 .) `Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.' ( Brady v. United States (1970), 397 U.S. 742, 748 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 756 , 90 S.Ct. 1463,

1990However, this court has recognized that requirement as late as our decision in People v. Ramsey (1986), 147 Ill.

1990However, this court has recognized that requirement as late as our decision in People v. Ramsey (1986), 147 Ill.

1989People v. Young (1978), 59 Ill.

1989App. 3d 456, 469 , 370 N.E.2d 1160, 1169 .) Moreover, this court has recognized that defense counsel’s request for a continuance is absolute if defense counsel did not learn of the defendant’s undisclosed statement until the jury had heard it.

1989App.3d 456, 469 , 370 N.E.2d 1160, 1169 .) Moreover, this court has recognized that defense counsel's request for a continuance is absolute if defense counsel did not learn of the defendant's undisclosed statement until the jury had heard it. ( People v. Weaver (1982), 92 Ill.2d 545, 559-60 , 442 N.E.2d 255 .) Under such circumstances, even a trial court's admonition to the jury to disregard the statement may not suffice to overcome potential prejudice to the defendant.

1989While it is true that misrepresentations of intention to perform future conduct, even if made without a present intention to perform, do not generally constitute fraud (see Steinberg, 69 Ill. 2d at 334 ; Roda v. Berko (1948), 401 Ill. 335, 340 ), this court has recognized an exception to this rule.

1989Under this exception, such promises are actionable if “the false promise or representation of future conduct is alleged to be the scheme employed to accomplish the fraud.” (Steinberg, 69 Ill. 2d at 334 ; see also Roda, 401 Ill. at 340 .) HPI argues, and the appellate court agreed ( 172 Ill.

1989App.3d 456, 469 , 370 N.E.2d 1160, 1169 .) Moreover, this court has recognized that defense counsel's request for a continuance is absolute if defense counsel did not learn of the defendant's undisclosed statement until the jury had heard it. ( People v. Weaver (1982), 92 Ill.2d 545, 559-60 , 442 N.E.2d 255 .) Under such circumstances, even a trial court's admonition to the jury to disregard the statement may not suffice to overcome potential prejudice to the defendant.

1989App.3d 456, 469 , 370 N.E.2d 1160, 1169 .) Moreover, this court has recognized that defense counsel's request for a continuance is absolute if defense counsel did not learn of the defendant's undisclosed statement until the jury had heard it. ( People v. Weaver (1982), 92 Ill.2d 545, 559-60 , 442 N.E.2d 255 .) Under such circumstances, even a trial court's admonition to the jury to disregard the statement may not suffice to overcome potential prejudice to the defendant.

1986(Mayr v. Chesman & Co. (1915), 195 Ill.

1986App. 2d 253 , 125 N.E.2d 535 .) Although it is true, as defendant contends, that equitable remedies are denied when there is an adequate remedy at law, this court has recognized an exception in cases in which an accounting is sought based on a breach of a fiduciary duty.

1985However, this court has recognized an exception to this doctrine “where multiple remedies exist before the same administrative agency and at least one has been exhausted ***.” ( 76 Ill. 2d 566, 573 ; see also Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Allphin (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 350, 358 ; Herman v. Village of Hillside (1958), 15 Ill. 2d 396, 407-08 .) Here, Fredman Brothers’ multiple remedies consisted of a hearing on its assessment before the Department and a new, separate proceeding consisting of its request for a rehearing before the Department.

1985However, this court has recognized an exception to this doctrine “where multiple remedies exist before the same administrative agency and at least one has been exhausted ***.” ( 76 Ill. 2d 566, 573 ; see also Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Allphin (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 350, 358 ; Herman v. Village of Hillside (1958), 15 Ill. 2d 396, 407-08 .) Here, Fredman Brothers’ multiple remedies consisted of a hearing on its assessment before the Department and a new, separate proceeding consisting of its request for a rehearing before the Department.

1979(Cobbins v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 285 , 290 N.E.2d 873 .) In construing insurance contracts, this court has recognized the rule that insurance contracts are construed in favor of the insured.

1979(Cobbins v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 285 , 290 N.E.2d 873 .) In construing insurance contracts, this court has recognized the rule that insurance contracts are construed in favor of the insured.

1979(People v. Puckett (1979), 70 Ill.

1979App. 3d 794 ; 377 N.E.2d 107 .) A panel of this court has recognized an exception where the public defender’s office is decentralized, and those cases arose in counties where assistant public defenders were appointed by the circuit court, rather than by one public defender.

1951(Kane v. Johnson, 397 Ill. 112 .) Where, however, a husband pays the purchase price for property conveyed to his wife, this court has recognized the rule that no presumption arises that he intended the beneficial interest to be in him, but instead the presumption is that he intended to make a gift to his wife.

1951(Mauricau v. Haugen, 387 Ill. 186 ; Nickoloff v. Nickeloff, 384 Ill. 377 .) A resulting trust which arises in favor of an ancestor at the time the property was purchased may be enforced by those who are beneficially interested in the estate, either as heirs-at-law or residuary devisees.