13 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1912–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tilly v. Department of Labor & Industriesgreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Tilly v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 52 Wn.2d 148, 324 P.2d 432 (1958) (employee remains within the course of employment during a bathroom break). 2008See, e.g., Tilly v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 52 Wn.2d 148, 324 P.2d 432 (1958) (employee remains within the course of employment during a bathroom break). | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rader v. Stubblefield
green
2 sentences1933This court has recognized that rule expressly in Rader v. Stubblefield , 43 Wn. 334 , 86 P. 560 . 1933This court has recognized that rule expressly in Rader v. Stubblefield , 43 Wn. 334 , 86 P. 560 . | 2 | 1933–1933 |
Wilson v. City of Monroe
green
1 sentence2020Id.; Wilson v. City of 25 No. 53317-1-II Monroe, 88 Wn. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Morgan v. Department of Social Security
green
2 sentences1981Morgan v. Department of Social Security, 14 Wn.2d 156 , 127 P.2d 686 (1942). 1981Morgan v. Department of Social Security, 14 Wn.2d 156 , 127 P.2d 686 (1942). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Nafus v. Department of Labor & Industries
green
2 sentences1942It is not common law, equity, or admiralty law." This court has recognized the principle with respect to the industrial insurance act — that controversies arising under it are controlled by "`special statutory proceedings exercised in derogation of, or not according to, the course of the common law.'" (Italics ours.) Nafus v. Dept. of Labor and Industries , 142 Wn. 48 , 52 , 251 P. 877 . 1942It is not common law, equity, or admiralty law." This court has recognized the principle with respect to the industrial insurance act — that controversies arising under it are controlled by "`special statutory proceedings exercised in derogation of, or not according to, the course of the common law.'" (Italics ours.) Nafus v. Dept. of Labor and Industries , 142 Wn. 48 , 52 , 251 P. 877 . | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Pitcher v. Lone Pine-Surprise Consolidated Mining Co.
neutral
1 sentence1926It is true that this court has recognized the rule that a conditional delivery may be pleaded as a defense to an action on a promissory note, -and proven by a preponderance of the evidence (Ewell v. Turney, 39 Wash. 615 , 81 Pac. 1047 ), but the evidence of appellant, as admitted in the quotation heretofore made from his brief, in no wise establishes that the execution of the note by appellant was not to become effective until the North Midas Copper Company had signed the note. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Ewell v. Turney
neutral
1 sentence1926It is true that this court has recognized the rule that a conditional delivery may be pleaded as a defense to an action on a promissory note, -and proven by a preponderance of the evidence (Ewell v. Turney, 39 Wash. 615 , 81 Pac. 1047 ), but the evidence of appellant, as admitted in the quotation heretofore made from his brief, in no wise establishes that the execution of the note by appellant was not to become effective until the North Midas Copper Company had signed the note. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Bank of Montreal v. Guse
green
2 sentences1923It is not necessary that both an admission of the debt and a new promise to pay shall be made and signed by the party; but either is sufficient.” This court has recognized this doctrine in Bank of Montreal v. Guse, 51 Wash. 365 , 98 Pac. 1127 , by saying: “The acknowledgment must be so clear that a promise to pay must necessarily be implied.” But it is argued that the letters are insufficient because they fail to certainly identify the debt sued for. 1923It is not necessary that both an admission of the debt and a new promise to pay shall be made and signed by the party; but either is sufficient.” This court has recognized this doctrine in Bank of Montreal v. Guse, 51 Wash. 365 , 98 Pac. 1127 , by saying: “The acknowledgment must be so clear that a promise to pay must necessarily be implied.” But it is argued that the letters are insufficient because they fail to certainly identify the debt sued for. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Mason v. Yearwood
neutral
2 sentences1923To a certain extent, this court has recognized this doctrine in the following cases: Mason v. Yearwood, 58 Wash. 276 , 108 Pac. 608 , 30 L. 1923To a certain extent, this court has recognized this doctrine in the following cases: Mason v. Yearwood, 58 Wash. 276 , 108 Pac. 608 , 30 L. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Coleman v. Larson
neutral
2 sentences1919This court has recognized this rule in Coleman v. Larson, 49 Wash. 321 , 95 Pac. 262 , where Judge Fullerton, speaking for the court, said: “An agreement for a gift of land will not, of course, be enforced on proof alone of the promise to give. 1919This court has recognized this rule in Coleman v. Larson, 49 Wash. 321 , 95 Pac. 262 , where Judge Fullerton, speaking for the court, said: “An agreement for a gift of land will not, of course, be enforced on proof alone of the promise to give. | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Gaskill v. Northern Assurance Co.
green
1 sentence1918This court has recognized this doctrine in Gaskill v. Northern Assurance Co., 73 Wash. 668 , 132 Pac. 643 . | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Grosshoff v. City of Spokane
green
1 sentence1918This court has recognized this doctrine in Gaskill v. Northern Assurance Co., 73 Wash. 668 , 132 Pac. 643 . | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Nichols v. Oppermann
neutral
2 sentences1912Nichols v. Oppermann, 6 Wash. 618 , 34 Pac. 162 . 1912Nichols v. Oppermann, 6 Wash. 618 , 34 Pac. 162 . | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.