Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
15 California opinions name it 2 courts 1887–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
M. P. Moller, Inc. v. Wilsongreen2 sentences1978P. Moller, Inc. v. Wilson (1936) 8 Cal.2d 31, 37 [ 63 P.2d 818 ], “This court has recognized the test of intention to make the article a permanent addition to the-realty as manifested by the physical facts, and has accepted the character of the annexation and the use for which the article is designed as subsidiary elements employed for the purpose of testing the intention ofpermanency. ” (Italics added.) When viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the trial court’s conclusion that the cranes in dispute were installed with the intention of permanency and therefore became a part of the rea 1978P. Moller, Inc. v. Wilson (1936) 8 Cal.2d 31, 37 [ 63 P.2d 818 ], “This court has recognized the test of intention to make the article a permanent addition to the-realty as manifested by the physical facts, and has accepted the character of the annexation and the use for which the article is designed as subsidiary elements employed for the purpose of testing the intention ofpermanency. ” (Italics added.) When viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the trial court’s conclusion that the cranes in dispute were installed with the intention of permanency and therefore became a part of the rea | 3 | 5 |
In Re Sheena K.green2 sentences2016(People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234-235 .) The court has recognized an exception to forfeiture in cases where the imposition of an 3 unconstitutional probation condition is "correctable without referring to factual findings in the record or remanding for further findings . . . ." (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 887 .) Since there are no factual findings, or even discussion of the challenged conditions in the record, we believe we are bound to follow In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th 875 , and find the challenge to the residence and employment approval has not been forfeited. 2016(People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234-235 .) The court has recognized an exception to forfeiture in cases where the imposition of an 3 unconstitutional probation condition is "correctable without referring to factual findings in the record or remanding for further findings . . . ." (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 887 .) Since there are no factual findings, or even discussion of the challenged conditions in the record, we believe we are bound to follow In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th 875 , and find the challenge to the residence and employment approval has not been forfeited. | 1 | 2 |
Grupp v. Margolisgreen2 sentences1962This court has recognized the test of intention to make the article a permanent addition to the realty as manifested by the physical facts, and has accepted the character of the annexation and the use for which the article is designed as subsidiary elements employed for the purpose of testing the intention of permanency.” See also Grupp v. Margolis, 153 Cal.App.2d 500, 503 [ 314 P.2d 820 ]. 1962This court has recognized the test of intention to make the article a permanent addition to the realty as manifested by the physical facts, and has accepted the character of the annexation and the use for which the article is designed as subsidiary elements employed for the purpose of testing the intention of permanency.” See also Grupp v. Margolis, 153 Cal.App.2d 500, 503 [ 314 P.2d 820 ]. | 1 | 1 |
City & County of San Francisco v. Boydgreen2 sentences1946Under the terms of the policy contracts, the insurers have undertaken to pay any judgment rendered in favor of either the plaintiff or the cross-complainant; they, therefore, have a pecuniary interest in effecting a balance between the litigants and so conducting the litigation that neither party recovers against the other. *799 This court has recognized the rule “that in litigation involving only private parties and rights, payment of all counsel fees by one party to the litigation may give that party ‘such control over both the preparation and argument of the cause, as to make the suit . . . 1946Under the terms of the policy contracts, the insurers have undertaken to pay any judgment rendered in favor of either the plaintiff or the cross-complainant; they, therefore, have a pecuniary interest in effecting a balance between the litigants and so conducting the litigation that neither party recovers against the other. *799 This court has recognized the rule “that in litigation involving only private parties and rights, payment of all counsel fees by one party to the litigation may give that party ‘such control over both the preparation and argument of the cause, as to make the suit . . . | 1 | 1 |
Byrne v. Byrnegreen2 sentences1946(United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 [ 63 S.Ct. 1075 , 87 L.Ed. 1413 ].) These decisions are in accordance with the fundamental principle that one may not be both the plaintiff and the defendant in an action (Stevens v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. 148, 150 [ 99 P. 512 ]; Byrne v. Byrne, 94 Cal. 576, 579 [ 29 P. 1115 , 30 P. 196 ]; see; 11B Cal.Jur. 322; 20 Cal.Jur. 485), and it is difficult to see why, in the litigation between Borad and O ’Morrow, the insurance companies would not come within that prohibition if they were allowed to defend each of their insureds against the claim of the other 1946(United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 [ 63 S.Ct. 1075 , 87 L.Ed. 1413 ].) These decisions are in accordance with the fundamental principle that one may not be both the plaintiff and the defendant in an action (Stevens v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. 148, 150 [ 99 P. 512 ]; Byrne v. Byrne, 94 Cal. 576, 579 [ 29 P. 1115 , 30 P. 196 ]; see; 11B Cal.Jur. 322; 20 Cal.Jur. 485), and it is difficult to see why, in the litigation between Borad and O ’Morrow, the insurance companies would not come within that prohibition if they were allowed to defend each of their insureds against the claim of the other | 1 | 1 |
Stevens v. Superior Court of Placergreen2 sentences1946(United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 [ 63 S.Ct. 1075 , 87 L.Ed. 1413 ].) These decisions are in accordance with the fundamental principle that one may not be both the plaintiff and the defendant in an action (Stevens v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. 148, 150 [ 99 P. 512 ]; Byrne v. Byrne, 94 Cal. 576, 579 [ 29 P. 1115 , 30 P. 196 ]; see; 11B Cal.Jur. 322; 20 Cal.Jur. 485), and it is difficult to see why, in the litigation between Borad and O ’Morrow, the insurance companies would not come within that prohibition if they were allowed to defend each of their insureds against the claim of the other 1946(United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 [ 63 S.Ct. 1075 , 87 L.Ed. 1413 ].) These decisions are in accordance with the fundamental principle that one may not be both the plaintiff and the defendant in an action (Stevens v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. 148, 150 [ 99 P. 512 ]; Byrne v. Byrne, 94 Cal. 576, 579 [ 29 P. 1115 , 30 P. 196 ]; see; 11B Cal.Jur. 322; 20 Cal.Jur. 485), and it is difficult to see why, in the litigation between Borad and O ’Morrow, the insurance companies would not come within that prohibition if they were allowed to defend each of their insureds against the claim of the other | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Los Angeles v. Klinker
green
2 sentences1957(City of Los Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198 [ 25 P.2d 826 , 90 A.L.R 148] ; Gosliner v. Briones, 187 Cal. 557 [ 204 P. 19 ] ; Oakland Bank of Savings v. California Pressed Brick Co., 183 Cal. 295 [ 191 P. 524 ]; Lavenson v. Standard Soap Co., 80 Cal. 245 [ 22 P. 184 , 13 Am.St.Rep. 147 ].) Thus whether an article is or was physically affixed to the buildings is only one of the criteria in determining whether there was an intention to make it a permanent accession to the real property. ’ ” (Southern Calif. 1957(City of Los Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198 [ 25 P.2d 826 , 90 A.L.R 148] ; Gosliner v. Briones, 187 Cal. 557 [ 204 P. 19 ] ; Oakland Bank of Savings v. California Pressed Brick Co., 183 Cal. 295 [ 191 P. 524 ]; Lavenson v. Standard Soap Co., 80 Cal. 245 [ 22 P. 184 , 13 Am.St.Rep. 147 ].) Thus whether an article is or was physically affixed to the buildings is only one of the criteria in determining whether there was an intention to make it a permanent accession to the real property. ’ ” (Southern Calif. | 3 | 1938–1957 |
People v. Welch
green
2 sentences2016(People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234-235 .) The court has recognized an exception to forfeiture in cases where the imposition of an 3 unconstitutional probation condition is "correctable without referring to factual findings in the record or remanding for further findings . . . ." (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 887 .) Since there are no factual findings, or even discussion of the challenged conditions in the record, we believe we are bound to follow In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th 875 , and find the challenge to the residence and employment approval has not been forfeited. 2014(People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 233-234 ; In re Abdirahman S. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 963, 970-971 .) However, the court has recognized an exception to the rule of forfeiture of challenges to probation conditions. | 2 | 2014–2016 |
Lavenson v. Standard Soap Co.
green
2 sentences1957(City of Los Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198 [ 25 P.2d 826 , 90 A.L.R 148] ; Gosliner v. Briones, 187 Cal. 557 [ 204 P. 19 ] ; Oakland Bank of Savings v. California Pressed Brick Co., 183 Cal. 295 [ 191 P. 524 ]; Lavenson v. Standard Soap Co., 80 Cal. 245 [ 22 P. 184 , 13 Am.St.Rep. 147 ].) Thus whether an article is or was physically affixed to the buildings is only one of the criteria in determining whether there was an intention to make it a permanent accession to the real property. ’ ” (Southern Calif. 1957(City of Los Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198 [ 25 P.2d 826 , 90 A.L.R 148] ; Gosliner v. Briones, 187 Cal. 557 [ 204 P. 19 ] ; Oakland Bank of Savings v. California Pressed Brick Co., 183 Cal. 295 [ 191 P. 524 ]; Lavenson v. Standard Soap Co., 80 Cal. 245 [ 22 P. 184 , 13 Am.St.Rep. 147 ].) Thus whether an article is or was physically affixed to the buildings is only one of the criteria in determining whether there was an intention to make it a permanent accession to the real property. ’ ” (Southern Calif. | 2 | 1936–1957 |
Gosliner v. Briones
green
2 sentences1957(City of Los Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198 [ 25 P.2d 826 , 90 A.L.R 148] ; Gosliner v. Briones, 187 Cal. 557 [ 204 P. 19 ] ; Oakland Bank of Savings v. California Pressed Brick Co., 183 Cal. 295 [ 191 P. 524 ]; Lavenson v. Standard Soap Co., 80 Cal. 245 [ 22 P. 184 , 13 Am.St.Rep. 147 ].) Thus whether an article is or was physically affixed to the buildings is only one of the criteria in determining whether there was an intention to make it a permanent accession to the real property. ’ ” (Southern Calif. 1957(City of Los Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198 [ 25 P.2d 826 , 90 A.L.R 148] ; Gosliner v. Briones, 187 Cal. 557 [ 204 P. 19 ] ; Oakland Bank of Savings v. California Pressed Brick Co., 183 Cal. 295 [ 191 P. 524 ]; Lavenson v. Standard Soap Co., 80 Cal. 245 [ 22 P. 184 , 13 Am.St.Rep. 147 ].) Thus whether an article is or was physically affixed to the buildings is only one of the criteria in determining whether there was an intention to make it a permanent accession to the real property. ’ ” (Southern Calif. | 2 | 1936–1957 |
People v. Abdirahman S.
green
1 sentence2014(People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 233-234 ; In re Abdirahman S. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 963, 970-971 .) However, the court has recognized an exception to the rule of forfeiture of challenges to probation conditions. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Mark N. v. Superior Court of L.A. Cty.
green
2 sentences2014This court has recognized an exception when “18 months had elapsed and no reunification plan had been developed for the parent . . . .” (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1778 ; cf. In re Daniel G. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1215-1216 ; In re Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1016 .) 3 Father acknowledges that to find a substantial probability of return within 18 months at a 12-month review hearing, “the court shall be required to find all of the following: [¶] (A) That the parent or legal guardian has consistently and regularly contacted and visited with the child. [¶] (B) That the 2014This court has recognized an exception when “18 months had elapsed and no reunification plan had been developed for the parent . . . .” (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1778 ; cf. In re Daniel G. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1215-1216 ; In re Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1016 .) 3 Father acknowledges that to find a substantial probability of return within 18 months at a 12-month review hearing, “the court shall be required to find all of the following: [¶] (A) That the parent or legal guardian has consistently and regularly contacted and visited with the child. [¶] (B) That the | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Daniel G.
green
1 sentence2014This court has recognized an exception when “18 months had elapsed and no reunification plan had been developed for the parent . . . .” (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1778 ; cf. In re Daniel G. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1215-1216 ; In re Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1016 .) 3 Father acknowledges that to find a substantial probability of return within 18 months at a 12-month review hearing, “the court shall be required to find all of the following: [¶] (A) That the parent or legal guardian has consistently and regularly contacted and visited with the child. [¶] (B) That the | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Dino E.
green
1 sentence2014This court has recognized an exception when “18 months had elapsed and no reunification plan had been developed for the parent . . . .” (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1778 ; cf. In re Daniel G. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1215-1216 ; In re Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1016 .) 3 Father acknowledges that to find a substantial probability of return within 18 months at a 12-month review hearing, “the court shall be required to find all of the following: [¶] (A) That the parent or legal guardian has consistently and regularly contacted and visited with the child. [¶] (B) That the | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Pajaro Valley Bank v. County of Santa Cruz
green
2 sentences1964Plaintiff cites Pajaro Valley *112 Bank v. County of Santa Cruz, 207 Cal.App.2d 621 [ 24 Cal.Rptr. 639 ], in which the court held that safe deposit boxes placed in a vault in a national bank were personal property and not assessable. 1964Plaintiff cites Pajaro Valley *112 Bank v. County of Santa Cruz, 207 Cal.App.2d 621 [ 24 Cal.Rptr. 639 ], in which the court held that safe deposit boxes placed in a vault in a national bank were personal property and not assessable. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Daniger v. Hunter
green
2 sentences1962Daniger v. Hunter, 114 Cal.App.2d 796 [ 251 P.2d 353 ], an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien, involved sink units consisting of a gas stove, a sink and a refrigerator, the three fitting together as one unit. 1962Daniger v. Hunter, 114 Cal.App.2d 796 [ 251 P.2d 353 ], an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien, involved sink units consisting of a gas stove, a sink and a refrigerator, the three fitting together as one unit. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Oakland Bank of Savings v. California Pressed Brick Co.
green
2 sentences1957(City of Los Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198 [ 25 P.2d 826 , 90 A.L.R 148] ; Gosliner v. Briones, 187 Cal. 557 [ 204 P. 19 ] ; Oakland Bank of Savings v. California Pressed Brick Co., 183 Cal. 295 [ 191 P. 524 ]; Lavenson v. Standard Soap Co., 80 Cal. 245 [ 22 P. 184 , 13 Am.St.Rep. 147 ].) Thus whether an article is or was physically affixed to the buildings is only one of the criteria in determining whether there was an intention to make it a permanent accession to the real property. ’ ” (Southern Calif. 1957(City of Los Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198 [ 25 P.2d 826 , 90 A.L.R 148] ; Gosliner v. Briones, 187 Cal. 557 [ 204 P. 19 ] ; Oakland Bank of Savings v. California Pressed Brick Co., 183 Cal. 295 [ 191 P. 524 ]; Lavenson v. Standard Soap Co., 80 Cal. 245 [ 22 P. 184 , 13 Am.St.Rep. 147 ].) Thus whether an article is or was physically affixed to the buildings is only one of the criteria in determining whether there was an intention to make it a permanent accession to the real property. ’ ” (Southern Calif. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
James v. Myers
green
2 sentences1955Upon the authority of People v. Estorga, 206 Cal. 81 [ 273 P. 575 ], and People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. 470 [ 268 P. 909 , 270 P. 1117 ], this court has qualified the right and requires an "affirmative showing" of bias or prejudice. 1955Upon the authority of People v. Estorga, 206 Cal. 81 [ 273 P. 575 ], and People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. 470 [ 268 P. 909 . 270 P. 1117 ], this court has qualified the right and requires an ‘1 affirmative showing” of bias or prejudice. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
People v. Estorga
green
2 sentences1955Upon the authority of People v. Estorga, 206 Cal. 81 [ 273 P. 575 ], and People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. 470 [ 268 P. 909 , 270 P. 1117 ], this court has qualified the right and requires an "affirmative showing" of bias or prejudice. 1955Upon the authority of People v. Estorga, 206 Cal. 81 [ 273 P. 575 ], and People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. 470 [ 268 P. 909 , 270 P. 1117 ], this court has qualified the right and requires an "affirmative showing" of bias or prejudice. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
People v. Hickman
green
2 sentences1955Upon the authority of People v. Estorga, 206 Cal. 81 [ 273 P. 575 ], and People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. 470 [ 268 P. 909 , 270 P. 1117 ], this court has qualified the right and requires an "affirmative showing" of bias or prejudice. 1955Upon the authority of People v. Estorga, 206 Cal. 81 [ 273 P. 575 ], and People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. 470 [ 268 P. 909 , 270 P. 1117 ], this court has qualified the right and requires an "affirmative showing" of bias or prejudice. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
United States v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1946(United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 [ 63 S.Ct. 1075 , 87 L.Ed. 1413 ].) These decisions are in accordance with the fundamental principle that one may not be both the plaintiff and the defendant in an action (Stevens v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. 148, 150 [ 99 P. 512 ]; Byrne v. Byrne, 94 Cal. 576, 579 [ 29 P. 1115 , 30 P. 196 ]; see; 11B Cal.Jur. 322; 20 Cal.Jur. 485), and it is difficult to see why, in the litigation between Borad and O ’Morrow, the insurance companies would not come within that prohibition if they were allowed to defend each of their insureds against the claim of the other 1946(United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 [ 63 S.Ct. 1075 , 87 L.Ed. 1413 ].) These decisions are in accordance with the fundamental principle that one may not be both the plaintiff and the defendant in an action (Stevens v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. 148, 150 [ 99 P. 512 ]; Byrne v. Byrne, 94 Cal. 576, 579 [ 29 P. 1115 , 30 P. 196 ]; see; 11B Cal.Jur. 322; 20 Cal.Jur. 485), and it is difficult to see why, in the litigation between Borad and O ’Morrow, the insurance companies would not come within that prohibition if they were allowed to defend each of their insureds against the claim of the other | 1 | 1946–1946 |
Tyler v. Mayre
neutral
1 sentence1946(United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 [ 63 S.Ct. 1075 , 87 L.Ed. 1413 ].) These decisions are in accordance with the fundamental principle that one may not be both the plaintiff and the defendant in an action (Stevens v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. 148, 150 [ 99 P. 512 ]; Byrne v. Byrne, 94 Cal. 576, 579 [ 29 P. 1115 , 30 P. 196 ]; see; 11B Cal.Jur. 322; 20 Cal.Jur. 485), and it is difficult to see why, in the litigation between Borad and O ’Morrow, the insurance companies would not come within that prohibition if they were allowed to defend each of their insureds against the claim of the other | 1 | 1946–1946 |
McNally v. Connolly
neutral
2 sentences1941The eases of McNally v. Connolly, 70 Cal. 3 [ 11 Pac 320 ], and1 Ban Francisco Breweries v. Schurtz, 104 Cal. 4 -20 [ 38 Pac. 92 ], upon which the respondent relies, are not in conflict with what we have previously said regarding the binding effect upon the parties to an agreement and upon third persons with notice thereof, that title to personal property subsequently placed on the land is reserved to a proposed purchaser of the realty. 1941The eases of McNally v. Connolly, 70 Cal. 3 [ 11 Pac 320 ], and1 Ban Francisco Breweries v. Schurtz, 104 Cal. 4 -20 [ 38 Pac. 92 ], upon which the respondent relies, are not in conflict with what we have previously said regarding the binding effect upon the parties to an agreement and upon third persons with notice thereof, that title to personal property subsequently placed on the land is reserved to a proposed purchaser of the realty. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
San Francisco Breweries v. Schurtz
green
1 sentence1941The eases of McNally v. Connolly, 70 Cal. 3 [ 11 Pac 320 ], and1 Ban Francisco Breweries v. Schurtz, 104 Cal. 4 -20 [ 38 Pac. 92 ], upon which the respondent relies, are not in conflict with what we have previously said regarding the binding effect upon the parties to an agreement and upon third persons with notice thereof, that title to personal property subsequently placed on the land is reserved to a proposed purchaser of the realty. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co. v. County of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence1921(Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 162 Cal. 164 , [9 A. L. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
People v. Smith
neutral
1 sentence1887Most of them are referred to in the first pages of the second volume of Russell on Crimes, 8th Am. ed., and in East’s Pleas of the Crown, under the head of “Larceny and Robbery.” A case precisely like the one at bar has not arisen in this state to our knowledge; but this court has recognized the rule as above stated in People v. Stone, 16 Cal. 370 ; People v. Jersey, 18 Cal. 338 ; People v. Smith, 23 Cal. 280 ; and in other cases. | 1 | 1887–1887 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.