15 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1952–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brown & Brown of Texas, Inc. v. Omni Metals, Inc.green2 sentences2011See Brown & Brown, 317 S.W.3d at 400 ; see also MRO Sw., Inc. v. Target Corp., No. 04-07-00078-CV, 2007 WL 4403912 , at *2 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Dec. 19, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.). 2011See Brown & Brown, 317 S.W.3d at 400 ; see also MRO Sw., Inc. v. Target Corp., No. 04-07-00078-CV, 2007 WL 4403912 , at *2 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Dec. 19, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.). | 3 | 3 |
In Re J.O.A.green2 sentences2011See In re K.L.L.H., No. 06-09-00067-CV, 2010 WL 87043 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. 12, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 339 (Tex. 2009)). 2007See In re K.L.L.H. , No. 06-09-00067-CV, 2010 WL 87043 , at *5 (Tex. App.Texarkana Jan. 12, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re J.O.A. , 283 S.W.3d 336, 339 (Tex. 2009)). | 2 | 2 |
McAfee, Inc. v. Agilysys, Inc.green1 sentence2016See McAfee, Inc. v. Agilysys, Inc., 316 S.W.3d 820, 828 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
McIntyre v. Wilsongreen1 sentence2016If the summary 36 See Argument Sections III, IV, V, and VI, supra. 37 McIntyre v. Wilson, 50 S.W.3d 674, 684-85 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied). -7- judgment grounds are broad enough to contemplate all causes of action later pled, then summary judgment may properly be rendered on the later claims even without an amended or supplemental motion.38 This Court adopted the exception in Smith v. Heard: Courts have granted summary judgments on causes of action not specifically addressed in a movant's motion if the movant has conclusively disproven an ultimate fact which is central to all causes | 1 | 1 |
Chamberlain v. Stategreen1 sentence2015It seems 4 Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Judwin Properties, Inc. v. Griggs & Harrisongreen1 sentence2002If the summary judgment grounds are broad enough to contemplate all causes of action later pled, then summary judgment may properly be rendered on the later claims even without an amended or supplemental motion. (3) See Judwin Props., Inc. v. Griggs & Harrison , 911 S.W.2d 498, 502 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); accord Farah v. Mafrige & Kormanik, P.C. , 927 S.W.2d 663, 671-72 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ); see also Elliott , 54 S.W.3d at 794 n.4 (distinguishing Judwin ) . | 1 | 1 |
Elliott v. Methodist Hospitalgreen1 sentence2002If the summary judgment grounds are broad enough to contemplate all causes of action later pled, then summary judgment may properly be rendered on the later claims even without an amended or supplemental motion. (3) See Judwin Props., Inc. v. Griggs & Harrison , 911 S.W.2d 498, 502 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); accord Farah v. Mafrige & Kormanik, P.C. , 927 S.W.2d 663, 671-72 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ); see also Elliott , 54 S.W.3d at 794 n.4 (distinguishing Judwin ) . | 1 | 1 |
Farah v. Mafrige & Kormanik, P.C.green1 sentence2002If the summary judgment grounds are broad enough to contemplate all causes of action later pled, then summary judgment may properly be rendered on the later claims even without an amended or supplemental motion. (3) See Judwin Props., Inc. v. Griggs & Harrison , 911 S.W.2d 498, 502 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); accord Farah v. Mafrige & Kormanik, P.C. , 927 S.W.2d 663, 671-72 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ); see also Elliott , 54 S.W.3d at 794 n.4 (distinguishing Judwin ) . | 1 | 1 |
Gibbons v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences1992For more than a century, this court has recognized the rule prevailing nationwide that when a building is owned by a tax-exempt organization, "the renting of even a part of the building for profit, though the proceeds be devoted exclusively to charity, subjects such part, at least, to taxation." Morris v. Lone Star Chapter No. 6, 68 Tex. 698, 704 , 5 S.W. 519, 521 (1887) (citations omitted); see also Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404 , 6 S.Ct. 427 , 29 L.Ed. 680 (1886); Village of Oak Park v. Rosewell, 115 Ill. 1992For more than a century, this court has recognized the rule prevailing nationwide that when a building is owned by a tax-exempt organization, "the renting of even a part of the building for profit, though the proceeds be devoted exclusively to charity, subjects such part, at least, to taxation." Morris v. Lone Star Chapter No. 6, 68 Tex. 698, 704 , 5 S.W. 519, 521 (1887) (citations omitted); see also Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404 , 6 S.Ct. 427 , 29 L.Ed. 680 (1886); Village of Oak Park v. Rosewell, 115 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Village of Oak Park v. Rosewellgreen2 sentences1992For more than a century, this court has recognized the rule prevailing nationwide that when a building is owned by a tax-exempt organization, "the renting of even a part of the building for profit, though the proceeds be devoted exclusively to charity, subjects such part, at least, to taxation." Morris v. Lone Star Chapter No. 6, 68 Tex. 698, 704 , 5 S.W. 519, 521 (1887) (citations omitted); see also Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404 , 6 S.Ct. 427 , 29 L.Ed. 680 (1886); Village of Oak Park v. Rosewell, 115 Ill. 1992For more than a century, this court has recognized the rule prevailing nationwide that when a building is owned by a tax-exempt organization, “the renting of even a part of the building for profit, though the proceeds be devoted exclusively to charity, subjects such part, at least, to taxation.” Morris v. Lone Star Chapter No. 6, 68 Tex. 698, 704 , 5 S.W. 519, 521 (1887) (citations omitted); see also Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404 , 6 S.Ct. 427 , 29 L.Ed. 680 (1886); Village of Oak Park v. Rosewell, 115 Ill.App.3d 497 , 71 Ill.Dec. 293, 295-96 , 450 N.E.2d 981, 983-84 (1983); In | 1 | 1 |
Christian Home for the Aged, Inc. v. Tennessee Assessment Appeals Commissiongreen2 sentences1992App.3d 497 , 71 Ill.Dec. 293, 295-96 , 450 N.E.2d 981, 983-84 (1983); In re Open Door Baptist Church, 63 Pa.Cmwlth. 292 , 437 A.2d 1291, 1292 (1981); Christian Home for the Aged v. Tennessee Assessment *117 Appeals Comm'n, 790 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990). 1992For more than a century, this court has recognized the rule prevailing nationwide that when a building is owned by a tax-exempt organization, “the renting of even a part of the building for profit, though the proceeds be devoted exclusively to charity, subjects such part, at least, to taxation.” Morris v. Lone Star Chapter No. 6, 68 Tex. 698, 704 , 5 S.W. 519, 521 (1887) (citations omitted); see also Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404 , 6 S.Ct. 427 , 29 L.Ed. 680 (1886); Village of Oak Park v. Rosewell, 115 Ill.App.3d 497 , 71 Ill.Dec. 293, 295-96 , 450 N.E.2d 981, 983-84 (1983); In | 1 | 1 |
In re Appeal of the Open Door Baptist Churchgreen2 sentences1992For more than a century, this court has recognized the rule prevailing nationwide that when a building is owned by a tax-exempt organization, “the renting of even a part of the building for profit, though the proceeds be devoted exclusively to charity, subjects such part, at least, to taxation.” Morris v. Lone Star Chapter No. 6, 68 Tex. 698, 704 , 5 S.W. 519, 521 (1887) (citations omitted); see also Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404 , 6 S.Ct. 427 , 29 L.Ed. 680 (1886); Village of Oak Park v. Rosewell, 115 Ill.App.3d 497 , 71 Ill.Dec. 293, 295-96 , 450 N.E.2d 981, 983-84 (1983); In 1992For more than a century, this court has recognized the rule prevailing nationwide that when a building is owned by a tax-exempt organization, “the renting of even a part of the building for profit, though the proceeds be devoted exclusively to charity, subjects such part, at least, to taxation.” Morris v. Lone Star Chapter No. 6, 68 Tex. 698, 704 , 5 S.W. 519, 521 (1887) (citations omitted); see also Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404 , 6 S.Ct. 427 , 29 L.Ed. 680 (1886); Village of Oak Park v. Rosewell, 115 Ill.App.3d 497 , 71 Ill.Dec. 293, 295-96 , 450 N.E.2d 981, 983-84 (1983); In | 1 | 1 |
Morris v. Lone Star Chapter No. 6green2 sentences1992For more than a century, this court has recognized the rule prevailing nationwide that when a building is owned by a tax-exempt organization, "the renting of even a part of the building for profit, though the proceeds be devoted exclusively to charity, subjects such part, at least, to taxation." Morris v. Lone Star Chapter No. 6, 68 Tex. 698, 704 , 5 S.W. 519, 521 (1887) (citations omitted); see also Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404 , 6 S.Ct. 427 , 29 L.Ed. 680 (1886); Village of Oak Park v. Rosewell, 115 Ill. 1992For more than a century, this court has recognized the rule prevailing nationwide that when a building is owned by a tax-exempt organization, "the renting of even a part of the building for profit, though the proceeds be devoted exclusively to charity, subjects such part, at least, to taxation." Morris v. Lone Star Chapter No. 6, 68 Tex. 698, 704 , 5 S.W. 519, 521 (1887) (citations omitted); see also Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404 , 6 S.Ct. 427 , 29 L.Ed. 680 (1886); Village of Oak Park v. Rosewell, 115 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Muncygreen2 sentences1952See Ex parte Muncy, 72 Tex. Cr. 1952See Ex parte Muncy, 72 Tex.Cr.R. 541 , 163 S.W. 29 , supra. We do not understand that the use of the word "truthfully" results in a conditional immunity. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Green v. United States
green
2 sentences2000The Court held in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191-92 , 78 S.Ct. 221, 225-26 , 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957), that a defendant had not waived his constitutional rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause by making a successful appeal of an improper conviction for second degree murder. 2000The Court held in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191-92 , 78 S.Ct. 221, 225-26 , 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957), that a defendant had not waived his constitutional rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause by making a successful appeal of an improper conviction for second degree murder. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Tennison
green
1 sentence1986State v. Tennison, supra; Lower Neches Valley Authority v. Murphy, supra. To hold otherwise would be to do the very thing Justice Reavley warned against in his concurring opinion in the Tennison case. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Lower Neches Valley Authority v. Murphy
green
1 sentence1986State v. Tennison, supra; Lower Neches Valley Authority v. Murphy, supra. To hold otherwise would be to do the very thing Justice Reavley warned against in his concurring opinion in the Tennison case. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Outlaw v. Noland
green
1 sentence1980Outlaw v. Noland, 506 S.W.2d 734 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] no writ history). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Ivy v. State
green
2 sentences1973The appellant cites Ivy v. State, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 371 , 277 S.W.2d 712 , which contains language in an opinion on motion for rehearing that this Court has recognized the doctrine of entrapment proof of which makes an entrapping person an accomplice witness because he has become a party to the crime. 1973The appellant cites Ivy v. State, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 371 , 277 S.W.2d 712 , which contains language in an opinion on motion for rehearing that this Court has recognized the doctrine of entrapment proof of which makes an entrapping person an accomplice witness because he has become a party to the crime. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counselman v. Hitchcock
green
2 sentences1952This court has recognized this rule announced by the Supreme Court in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 , 12 S.Ct. 195 , 35 L.Ed. 1110 . 1952This court has recognized this rule announced by the Supreme Court in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 , 12 S.Ct. 195 , 35 L.Ed. 1110 . | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.