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14 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1879–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Alexander v. PSB Lending Corp.green1 sentence2016The complaints are merely ‘proposed’" class actions.” Alexander v. PSB Lending Corp., 800 N.E.2d 984, 991-92 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that standing may be determined on classwide basis), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Sims v. Stategreen1 sentence1996See, e.g., Daymude v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1263, 1268 (Ind.Ct.App.1989) (communications between defendant and family counselor held to be privileged where court required defendant to participate in counseling under threat of court action), trans. denied; Sims v. State, 601 N.E.2d 344, 346 (Ind.1992) (communications between defendant and therapist held to be privileged where defendant ordered to complete sexual abuse treatment program and where noncompliance could have resulted in contempt of court or probation violation). | 1 | 1 |
Daymude v. Stategreen1 sentence1996See, e.g., Daymude v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1263, 1268 (Ind.Ct.App.1989) (communications between defendant and family counselor held to be privileged where court required defendant to participate in counseling under threat of court action), trans. denied; Sims v. State, 601 N.E.2d 344, 346 (Ind.1992) (communications between defendant and therapist held to be privileged where defendant ordered to complete sexual abuse treatment program and where noncompliance could have resulted in contempt of court or probation violation). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Edgmangreen1 sentence1991See State v. Edgman (1983), Ind., 447 N.E.2d 1091 ; Johnson v. State (1982), Ind., 432 N.E.2d 1358 . | 1 | 1 |
Ryan v. Currangreen1 sentence1879See Ryan v. Curran, 64 Ind. 345 , and authorities there cited. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Metropolitan Life Insurance v. State
neutral
2 sentences1989In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. State (1924), 194 Ind. 657 , 144 N.E. 420 , we held that one who is entitled to a tax refund, to be fully compensated for the loss of the use of his money, is entitled to interest on the amount despite the lack of statutory authority granting a right to receive such interest. 1989In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. State (1924), 194 Ind. 657 , 144 N.E. 420 , we held that one who is entitled to a tax refund, to be fully compensated for the loss of the use of his money, is entitled to interest on the amount despite the lack of statutory authority granting a right to receive such interest. | 2 | 1989–1989 |
Robinson v. Moser
green
2 sentences1963In construing our Constitution this court has decided ‘that which is expressed makes that which is silent to cease.’ Robinson v. Moser (1931), 203 Ind. 66 , 179 N. E. 270 ; State v. Patterson (1914), 181 Ind. 660 , 105 N. E. 228 .” It seems illogical that this court would hold that the legislative branch of government cannot prescribe additional qualifications to a constitutional office such as Justice of the Peace, and yet do that very thing to a Prosecuting Attorney as the judicial branch of government. 1963In construing our Constitution this court has decided ‘that which is expressed makes that which is silent to cease.’ Robinson v. Moser (1931), 203 Ind. 66 , 179 N. E. 270 ; State v. Patterson (1914), 181 Ind. 660 , 105 N. E. 228 .” It seems illogical that this court would hold that the legislative branch of government cannot prescribe additional qualifications to a constitutional office such as Justice of the Peace, and yet do that very thing to a Prosecuting Attorney as the judicial branch of government. | 2 | 1963–1963 |
In Re Petition of Justice of the Peace Assoc. of Ind.
green
2 sentences1963In the case In re Petition of Justice of the Peace Assoc. of Ind. (1958), 237 Ind. 436, 440 , 147 N. E. 2d 16 , it was said by this Court: “This court has recognized the rule that where the Constitution prescribes qualifications for constitutional officers, the General Assembly cannot prescribe additional qualifications. 1963In the case In re Petition of Justice of the Peace Assoc. of Ind. (1958), 237 Ind. 436, 440 , 147 N. E. 2d 16 , it was said by this Court: “This court has recognized the rule that where the Constitution prescribes qualifications for constitutional officers, the General Assembly cannot prescribe additional qualifications. | 2 | 1963–1963 |
State v. Patterson
green
2 sentences1963In construing our Constitution this court has decided ‘that which is expressed makes that which is silent to cease.’ Robinson v. Moser (1931), 203 Ind. 66 , 179 N. E. 270 ; State v. Patterson (1914), 181 Ind. 660 , 105 N. E. 228 .” It seems illogical that this court would hold that the legislative branch of government cannot prescribe additional qualifications to a constitutional office such as Justice of the Peace, and yet do that very thing to a Prosecuting Attorney as the judicial branch of government. 1963In construing our Constitution this court has decided ‘that which is expressed makes that which is silent to cease.’ Robinson v. Moser (1931), 203 Ind. 66 , 179 N. E. 270 ; State v. Patterson (1914), 181 Ind. 660 , 105 N. E. 228 .” It seems illogical that this court would hold that the legislative branch of government cannot prescribe additional qualifications to a constitutional office such as Justice of the Peace, and yet do that very thing to a Prosecuting Attorney as the judicial branch of government. | 2 | 1963–1963 |
Johnson v. State
green
1 sentence1991See State v. Edgman (1983), Ind., 447 N.E.2d 1091 ; Johnson v. State (1982), Ind., 432 N.E.2d 1358 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Loyd v. State
green
2 sentences1990This Court has recognized an exception to Crim.Rule 4(B) for court congestion where "any exigent circumstance ... warrant[s] a reasonable delay beyond the limitation of [Crim.R. 4], due deference being given to the defendant's speedy trial rights under the rule." Loyd v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 404, 409 , 398 N.E.2d 1260, 1265 , cert. denied, 449 U.S. 881 , 101 S.Ct. 281 , 66 L.Ed.2d 105 . 1990This Court has recognized an exception to Crim.Rule 4(B) for court congestion where "any exigent circumstance ... warrant[s] a reasonable delay beyond the limitation of [Crim.R. 4], due deference being given to the defendant's speedy trial rights under the rule." Loyd v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 404, 409 , 398 N.E.2d 1260, 1265 , cert. denied, 449 U.S. 881 , 101 S.Ct. 281 , 66 L.Ed.2d 105 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Holloway v. Florida
green
1 sentence1990This Court has recognized an exception to Crim.Rule 4(B) for court congestion where "any exigent circumstance ... warrant[s] a reasonable delay beyond the limitation of [Crim.R. 4], due deference being given to the defendant's speedy trial rights under the rule." Loyd v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 404, 409 , 398 N.E.2d 1260, 1265 , cert. denied, 449 U.S. 881 , 101 S.Ct. 281 , 66 L.Ed.2d 105 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Moore v. Illinois
green
1 sentence1990This Court has recognized an exception to Crim.Rule 4(B) for court congestion where "any exigent circumstance ... warrant[s] a reasonable delay beyond the limitation of [Crim.R. 4], due deference being given to the defendant's speedy trial rights under the rule." Loyd v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 404, 409 , 398 N.E.2d 1260, 1265 , cert. denied, 449 U.S. 881 , 101 S.Ct. 281 , 66 L.Ed.2d 105 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Sorrells v. Tennessee
green
1 sentence1990This Court has recognized an exception to Crim.Rule 4(B) for court congestion where "any exigent circumstance ... warrant[s] a reasonable delay beyond the limitation of [Crim.R. 4], due deference being given to the defendant's speedy trial rights under the rule." Loyd v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 404, 409 , 398 N.E.2d 1260, 1265 , cert. denied, 449 U.S. 881 , 101 S.Ct. 281 , 66 L.Ed.2d 105 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Malone v. State
green
2 sentences1987Malone, 441 N.E.2d 1339 . 1987Malone, 441 N.E.2d 1339 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Public Service Commission v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co.
green
2 sentences1956It is not the province of the court to substitute their judgment for that of the commission.” This court has recognized this doctrine repeatedly: Public Service Commission v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co. (1955), 235 Ind. 1 , 130 N. E. 2d 467 ; Pub. 1956It is not the province of the court to substitute their judgment for that of the commission.” This court has recognized this doctrine repeatedly: Public Service Commission v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co. (1955), 235 Ind. 1 , 130 N. E. 2d 467 ; Pub. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Yellow Manufacturing Acceptance Corp. v. Linsky
neutral
1 sentence1940Watts, Trustee v. Sweeney (1890), 127 Ind. 116 , 26 N. E. 680 ; Atlas Securities Company v. Grove (1922), 79 Ind. App. 144 , 137 N. E. 570 ; Grusin v. Stutz Motor Car Co., supra; Yellow Manufacturing *335 Acceptance Corp. v. Linshy (1934), 99 Ind. App. 691 , 190 N. E. 179 , 192 N. E. 715 . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Watts v. Sweeney
green
2 sentences1940Watts, Trustee v. Sweeney (1890), 127 Ind. 116 , 26 N. E. 680 ; Atlas Securities Company v. Grove (1922), 79 Ind. App. 144 , 137 N. E. 570 ; Grusin v. Stutz Motor Car Co., supra; Yellow Manufacturing *335 Acceptance Corp. v. Linshy (1934), 99 Ind. App. 691 , 190 N. E. 179 , 192 N. E. 715 . 1940Watts, Trustee v. Sweeney (1890), 127 Ind. 116 , 26 N. E. 680 ; Atlas Securities Company v. Grove (1922), 79 Ind. App. 144 , 137 N. E. 570 ; Grusin v. Stutz Motor Car Co., supra; Yellow Manufacturing *335 Acceptance Corp. v. Linshy (1934), 99 Ind. App. 691 , 190 N. E. 179 , 192 N. E. 715 . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Atlas Securities Co. v. Grove
neutral
2 sentences1940Watts, Trustee v. Sweeney (1890), 127 Ind. 116 , 26 N. E. 680 ; Atlas Securities Company v. Grove (1922), 79 Ind. App. 144 , 137 N. E. 570 ; Grusin v. Stutz Motor Car Co., supra; Yellow Manufacturing *335 Acceptance Corp. v. Linshy (1934), 99 Ind. App. 691 , 190 N. E. 179 , 192 N. E. 715 . 1940Watts, Trustee v. Sweeney (1890), 127 Ind. 116 , 26 N. E. 680 ; Atlas Securities Company v. Grove (1922), 79 Ind. App. 144 , 137 N. E. 570 ; Grusin v. Stutz Motor Car Co., supra; Yellow Manufacturing *335 Acceptance Corp. v. Linshy (1934), 99 Ind. App. 691 , 190 N. E. 179 , 192 N. E. 715 . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Davis v. Binford
neutral
1 sentence1923Davis v. Binford (1880), 70 Ind. 44 . | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Fesler v. Knight
neutral
1 sentence1884Rulo v. State, 19 Ind. 298 ; Vanderkarr v. State, 51 Ind. 91 . | 1 | 1884–1884 |
Vanderkarr v. State
neutral
1 sentence1884Rulo v. State, 19 Ind. 298 ; Vanderkarr v. State, 51 Ind. 91 . | 1 | 1884–1884 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.