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22 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1960–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McGarvey v. Stategreen2 sentences2025See McGarvey v. State, 311 Md. 233, 234 , 533 A.2d 690, 690-91 (1987). 2025See McGarvey v. State, 311 Md. 233, 234 , 533 A.2d 690, 690-91 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Mairose v. Federal Express Corp.green1 sentence2020Corp., 86 S.W.3d 502, 513 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (Appellate court, upon reversing a trial court’s grant of a motion 67 for JNOV, may remand for a new trial or reinstate the verdict when there are “exceptional circumstances and when the interest of justice so requires.”). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Condor Management Group, Inc.green1 sentence2020Group, Inc., 587 A.2d 222 , 226 n.4 (D.C. 1991) (“This court has recognized an exception to the general rule of non-appealability of new trial orders before final judgment when the trial court has entered a conditional new trial order, in tandem with a judgment n.o.v.”); Mairose v. Federal Exp. | 1 | 1 |
Dubrowin v. Schrempgreen2 sentences2015This is not necessarily the end of the analysis because, as the Kobrine Court noted, the Court has recognized an exception to the rule enunciated in Brehm and other cases: In Dubrowin v. Schremp, 248 Md. 166, 171 [ 235 A.2d 722 ] (1967), we limited that requirement to rights of way created by deed and held that a right of way, otherwise sufficiently described, could validly be created by a memorandum that complied with the Statute of Frauds,[ 10 ] i.e., a writing signed by the party to be charged or that party’s authorized agent. 380 Md. at 636 , 846 A.2d 403 . 2015This is not necessarily the end of the analysis because, as the Kobrine Court noted, the Court has recognized an exception to the rule enunciated in Brehm and other cases: In Dubrowin v. Schremp, 248 Md. 166, 171 [ 235 A.2d 722 ] (1967), we limited that requirement to rights of way created by deed and held that a right of way, otherwise sufficiently described, could validly be created by a memorandum that complied with the Statute of Frauds,[ 10 ] i.e., a writing signed by the party to be charged or that party’s authorized agent. 380 Md. at 636 , 846 A.2d 403 . | 1 | 1 |
Elliott v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Elliott v. State, 417 Md. 413 , 10 A.3d 761 (2010) (fundamental fairness required disclosure of State’s confidential informant because it was necessary for the defense to prepare); Dillard v. State, 415 Md. 445 , 3 A.3d 403 (2010) (fundamental fairness violated when, after two jurors, during recess, had commended police officer/prosecution witness on his investigation, trial court did not conduct voir dire to determine if the two jurors could reach an impartial verdict); Mitchell v. State, 408 Md. 368 , 969 A.2d 989 (2009) (after defense, in closing argument, properly referred to the absen 2011See Elliott v. State, 417 Md. 413 , 10 A.3d 761 (2010) (fundamental fairness required disclosure of State’s confidential informant because it was necessary for the defense to prepare); Dillard v. State, 415 Md. 445 , 3 A.3d 403 (2010) (fundamental fairness violated when, after two jurors, during recess, had commended police officer/prosecution witness on his investigation, trial court did not conduct voir dire to determine if the two jurors could reach an impartial verdict); Mitchell v. State, 408 Md. 368 , 969 A.2d 989 (2009) (after defense, in closing argument, properly referred to the absen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bellgreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., Bell, 351 Md. at 727 , 720 A.2d at 320 (Citations omitted); Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77, 91 , 622 A.2d 727, 733 (1993) (Citations omitted); Gilliam v. State, 320 Md. 637, 652 , 579 A.2d 744, 751 (1990) (Citation omitted). 2006See, e.g., Bell, 351 Md. at 727 , 720 A.2d at 320 (Citations omitted); Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77, 91 , 622 A.2d 727, 733 (1993) (Citations omitted); Gilliam v. State, 320 Md. 637, 652 , 579 A.2d 744, 751 (1990) (Citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Thanos v. Stategreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., Bell, 351 Md. at 727 , 720 A.2d at 320 (Citations omitted); Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77, 91 , 622 A.2d 727, 733 (1993) (Citations omitted); Gilliam v. State, 320 Md. 637, 652 , 579 A.2d 744, 751 (1990) (Citation omitted). 2006See, e.g., Bell, 351 Md. at 727 , 720 A.2d at 320 (Citations omitted); Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77, 91 , 622 A.2d 727, 733 (1993) (Citations omitted); Gilliam v. State, 320 Md. 637, 652 , 579 A.2d 744, 751 (1990) (Citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Gilliam v. Stategreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., Bell, 351 Md. at 727 , 720 A.2d at 320 (Citations omitted); Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77, 91 , 622 A.2d 727, 733 (1993) (Citations omitted); Gilliam v. State, 320 Md. 637, 652 , 579 A.2d 744, 751 (1990) (Citation omitted). 2006See, e.g., Bell, 351 Md. at 727 , 720 A.2d at 320 (Citations omitted); Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77, 91 , 622 A.2d 727, 733 (1993) (Citations omitted); Gilliam v. State, 320 Md. 637, 652 , 579 A.2d 744, 751 (1990) (Citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Preston v. Poegreen2 sentences2004See Preston, supra, 116 Md. at 6 , 81 A. 178 (holding that a stockholder in a corporation did not have a sufficient interest in a suit to appoint receivers for the voluntary dissolution of the corporation to permit him to appeal an order dismissing the suit); In re Buckler Trusts, 144 Md. 424, 428 , 125 A. 177 (1924) (dismissing appeal by a tenant of property for which the appointment of successor trustees under deed of trust was sought and granted, because the tenant was not a party and had no interest in the subject matter of the suit); Karr, Hammond & Darnall v. Shirk, 142 Md. 118, 124 , 12 2004See Preston, supra, 116 Md. at 6 , 81 A. 178 (holding that a stockholder in a corporation did not have a sufficient interest in a suit to appoint receivers for the voluntary dissolution of the corporation to permit him to appeal an order dismissing the suit); In re Buckler Trusts, 144 Md. 424, 428 , 125 A. 177 (1924) (dismissing appeal by a tenant of property for which the appointment of successor trustees under deed of trust was sought and granted, because the tenant was not a party and had no interest in the subject matter of the suit); Karr, Hammond & Darnall v. Shirk, 142 Md. 118, 124 , 12 | 1 | 1 |
Rau v. Robertsongreen1 sentence2004See Preston, supra, 116 Md. at 6 , 81 A. 178 (holding that a stockholder in a corporation did not have a sufficient interest in a suit to appoint receivers for the voluntary dissolution of the corporation to permit him to appeal an order dismissing the suit); In re Buckler Trusts, 144 Md. 424, 428 , 125 A. 177 (1924) (dismissing appeal by a tenant of property for which the appointment of successor trustees under deed of trust was sought and granted, because the tenant was not a party and had no interest in the subject matter of the suit); Karr, Hammond & Darnall v. Shirk, 142 Md. 118, 124 , 12 | 1 | 1 |
Adler v. American Standard Corp.green2 sentences2002Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 40 , 432 A.2d 464, 469 (1981). 2002Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 40 , 432 A.2d 464, 469 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
Holiday Point Marina Partners v. Anne Arundel Countygreen2 sentences1998See Holiday Point, 349 Md. at 201 , 707 A.2d 829 ; Insurance Comm’r v. Equitable Life Assur. 1998See Holiday Point, 349 Md. at 201 , 707 A.2d 829 ; Insurance Comm’r v. Equitable Life Assur. | 1 | 1 |
Doering v. Stategreen2 sentences1989See Doering v. State, 313 Md. 384, 410 , 545 A.2d 1281 (1988), which acknowledged the rationale of the doctrine but observed that it was “not directly applicable to proceedings involving determination of sentence by a jury.” Some jurisdictions require such an instruction, and, in some, failure to give it is reversible error. 1989See Doering v. State, 313 Md. 384, 410 , 545 A.2d 1281 (1988), which acknowledged the rationale of the doctrine but observed that it was “not directly applicable to proceedings involving determination of sentence by a jury.” Some jurisdictions require such an instruction, and, in some, failure to give it is reversible error. | 1 | 1 |
Scull v. Montgomery Citizens Leaguegreen2 sentences1969Before proceeding to a discussion of these two theories we deem it helpful to contemplate the political philosophy behind “Some Rule.” One of the objectives of “Home Rule” was to assure to the political subdivisions of the State the power of self-government and freedom from interference, by the Legislature, in the exercise of that power. 4 “Article XI-A *312 grants to a ‘Home Rule’ political subdivision full power to enact local laws on the subjects covered by the Express Powers Act and denies the General Assembly power to enact public local laws on such subjects for the county.” Murray v. Dir 1969Before proceeding to a discussion of these two theories we deem it helpful to contemplate the political philosophy behind “Some Rule.” One of the objectives of “Home Rule” was to assure to the political subdivisions of the State the power of self-government and freedom from interference, by the Legislature, in the exercise of that power. 4 “Article XI-A *312 grants to a ‘Home Rule’ political subdivision full power to enact local laws on the subjects covered by the Express Powers Act and denies the General Assembly power to enact public local laws on such subjects for the county.” Murray v. Dir | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Vogel v. State
green
2 sentences2007We observed that “[i]t is abundantly clear that this Court has recognized the exception to the rule excluding evidence of prior crimes when (1) the prosecution is for sexual crimes, (2) the prior illicit sexual acts are similar to *416 that for which the accused is on trial, and (3) the same accused and victim are involved.” Id. at 465, 554 A.2d at 1234 . (emphasis added). 1993Vogel reaffirmed “that this Court has recognized the exception to the rule excluding evidence of prior crimes when (1) the prosecution is for sexual crimes, (2) the prior illicit sexual acts are similar to that for which the accused is on trial, and (3) the same accused and victim are involved.” Id. at 465 , 554 A.2d at 1234 . | 3 | 1993–2007 |
Sainato v. Potter
green
2 sentences1974This Court has recognized the rule on several occasions.” [citing cases.] 222 Md. at 267-68 . 1969This Court has recognized the rule on several occasions, [citing cases].” 222 Md. at 267-68 . | 2 | 1969–1974 |
Kobrine, L.L.C. v. Metzger
green
2 sentences2015This is not necessarily the end of the analysis because, as the Kobrine Court noted, the Court has recognized an exception to the rule enunciated in Brehm and other cases: In Dubrowin v. Schremp, 248 Md. 166, 171 [ 235 A.2d 722 ] (1967), we limited that requirement to rights of way created by deed and held that a right of way, otherwise sufficiently described, could validly be created by a memorandum that complied with the Statute of Frauds,[ 10 ] i.e., a writing signed by the party to be charged or that party’s authorized agent. 380 Md. at 636 , 846 A.2d 403 . 2015This is not necessarily the end of the analysis because, as the Kobrine Court noted, the Court has recognized an exception to the rule enunciated in Brehm and other cases: In Dubrowin v. Schremp, 248 Md. 166, 171 [ 235 A.2d 722 ] (1967), we limited that requirement to rights of way created by deed and held that a right of way, otherwise sufficiently described, could validly be created by a memorandum that complied with the Statute of Frauds,[ 10 ] i.e., a writing signed by the party to be charged or that party’s authorized agent. 380 Md. at 636 , 846 A.2d 403 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Rourke v. Amchem Products, Inc.
green
2 sentences2012Rourke, 384 Md. at 349 , 863 A.2d at 938 . 2012Rourke, 384 Md. at 349 , 863 A.2d at 938 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Jackson v. State
green
2 sentences2011The death must have occurred as a result or outcome of the attempt to commit the felony.’ ” Jackson v. State, 87 Md.App. 475, 488 , 590 A.2d 177 (1991) (quoting Wharton, Homicide § 126 at 184 (3d ed. 1907)). 2011The death must have occurred as a result or outcome of the attempt to commit the felony.’ ” Jackson v. State, 87 Md.App. 475, 488 , 590 A.2d 177 (1991) (quoting Wharton, Homicide § 126 at 184 (3d ed. 1907)). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Mitchell v. State
green
2 sentences2011See Elliott v. State, 417 Md. 413 , 10 A.3d 761 (2010) (fundamental fairness required disclosure of State’s confidential informant because it was necessary for the defense to prepare); Dillard v. State, 415 Md. 445 , 3 A.3d 403 (2010) (fundamental fairness violated when, after two jurors, during recess, had commended police officer/prosecution witness on his investigation, trial court did not conduct voir dire to determine if the two jurors could reach an impartial verdict); Mitchell v. State, 408 Md. 368 , 969 A.2d 989 (2009) (after defense, in closing argument, properly referred to the absen 2011See Elliott v. State, 417 Md. 413 , 10 A.3d 761 (2010) (fundamental fairness required disclosure of State’s confidential informant because it was necessary for the defense to prepare); Dillard v. State, 415 Md. 445 , 3 A.3d 403 (2010) (fundamental fairness violated when, after two jurors, during recess, had commended police officer/prosecution witness on his investigation, trial court did not conduct voir dire to determine if the two jurors could reach an impartial verdict); Mitchell v. State, 408 Md. 368 , 969 A.2d 989 (2009) (after defense, in closing argument, properly referred to the absen | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Dillard v. State
green
2 sentences2011See Elliott v. State, 417 Md. 413 , 10 A.3d 761 (2010) (fundamental fairness required disclosure of State’s confidential informant because it was necessary for the defense to prepare); Dillard v. State, 415 Md. 445 , 3 A.3d 403 (2010) (fundamental fairness violated when, after two jurors, during recess, had commended police officer/prosecution witness on his investigation, trial court did not conduct voir dire to determine if the two jurors could reach an impartial verdict); Mitchell v. State, 408 Md. 368 , 969 A.2d 989 (2009) (after defense, in closing argument, properly referred to the absen 2011See Elliott v. State, 417 Md. 413 , 10 A.3d 761 (2010) (fundamental fairness required disclosure of State’s confidential informant because it was necessary for the defense to prepare); Dillard v. State, 415 Md. 445 , 3 A.3d 403 (2010) (fundamental fairness violated when, after two jurors, during recess, had commended police officer/prosecution witness on his investigation, trial court did not conduct voir dire to determine if the two jurors could reach an impartial verdict); Mitchell v. State, 408 Md. 368 , 969 A.2d 989 (2009) (after defense, in closing argument, properly referred to the absen | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Kang v. State
green
2 sentences2006As the Court of Special Appeals noted in its opinion, Kang, 163 Md.App. at 36 , 877 A.2d at 181 , this Court has recognized the presumption that criminal defendants who are represented by counsel have been informed of their constitutional rights. 2006As the Court of Special Appeals noted in its opinion, Kang, 163 Md.App. at 36 , 877 A.2d at 181 , this Court has recognized the presumption that criminal defendants who are represented by counsel have been informed of their constitutional rights. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
In Re Buckler Trusts
green
2 sentences2004See Preston, supra, 116 Md. at 6 , 81 A. 178 (holding that a stockholder in a corporation did not have a sufficient interest in a suit to appoint receivers for the voluntary dissolution of the corporation to permit him to appeal an order dismissing the suit); In re Buckler Trusts, 144 Md. 424, 428 , 125 A. 177 (1924) (dismissing appeal by a tenant of property for which the appointment of successor trustees under deed of trust was sought and granted, because the tenant was not a party and had no interest in the subject matter of the suit); Karr, Hammond & Darnall v. Shirk, 142 Md. 118, 124 , 12 2004See Preston, supra, 116 Md. at 6 , 81 A. 178 (holding that a stockholder in a corporation did not have a sufficient interest in a suit to appoint receivers for the voluntary dissolution of the corporation to permit him to appeal an order dismissing the suit); In re Buckler Trusts, 144 Md. 424, 428 , 125 A. 177 (1924) (dismissing appeal by a tenant of property for which the appointment of successor trustees under deed of trust was sought and granted, because the tenant was not a party and had no interest in the subject matter of the suit); Karr, Hammond & Darnall v. Shirk, 142 Md. 118, 124 , 12 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Karr, Hammond & Darnall v. Shirk
green
2 sentences2004See Preston, supra, 116 Md. at 6 , 81 A. 178 (holding that a stockholder in a corporation did not have a sufficient interest in a suit to appoint receivers for the voluntary dissolution of the corporation to permit him to appeal an order dismissing the suit); In re Buckler Trusts, 144 Md. 424, 428 , 125 A. 177 (1924) (dismissing appeal by a tenant of property for which the appointment of successor trustees under deed of trust was sought and granted, because the tenant was not a party and had no interest in the subject matter of the suit); Karr, Hammond & Darnall v. Shirk, 142 Md. 118, 124 , 12 2004See Preston, supra, 116 Md. at 6 , 81 A. 178 (holding that a stockholder in a corporation did not have a sufficient interest in a suit to appoint receivers for the voluntary dissolution of the corporation to permit him to appeal an order dismissing the suit); In re Buckler Trusts, 144 Md. 424, 428 , 125 A. 177 (1924) (dismissing appeal by a tenant of property for which the appointment of successor trustees under deed of trust was sought and granted, because the tenant was not a party and had no interest in the subject matter of the suit); Karr, Hammond & Darnall v. Shirk, 142 Md. 118, 124 , 12 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
American Colonization Society v. Latrobe
neutral
2 sentences2004See Preston, supra, 116 Md. at 6 , 81 A. 178 (holding that a stockholder in a corporation did not have a sufficient interest in a suit to appoint receivers for the voluntary dissolution of the corporation to permit him to appeal an order dismissing the suit); In re Buckler Trusts, 144 Md. 424, 428 , 125 A. 177 (1924) (dismissing appeal by a tenant of property for which the appointment of successor trustees under deed of trust was sought and granted, because the tenant was not a party and had no interest in the subject matter of the suit); Karr, Hammond & Darnall v. Shirk, 142 Md. 118, 124 , 12 2004See Preston, supra, 116 Md. at 6 , 81 A. 178 (holding that a stockholder in a corporation did not have a sufficient interest in a suit to appoint receivers for the voluntary dissolution of the corporation to permit him to appeal an order dismissing the suit); In re Buckler Trusts, 144 Md. 424, 428 , 125 A. 177 (1924) (dismissing appeal by a tenant of property for which the appointment of successor trustees under deed of trust was sought and granted, because the tenant was not a party and had no interest in the subject matter of the suit); Karr, Hammond & Darnall v. Shirk, 142 Md. 118, 124 , 12 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Shoemaker v. State
green
2 sentences1989This Court has recognized the doctrine with respect to the possibility of parole in proceedings involving the adjudication of guilt or innocence, see Shoemaker v. State, 228 Md. 462, 473 , 180 A.2d 682 (1962), but, as the Court of Special Appeals noted, has not spoken on the matter with respect to criminal responsibility. 1989This Court has recognized the doctrine with respect to the possibility of parole in proceedings involving the adjudication of guilt or innocence, see Shoemaker v. State, 228 Md. 462, 473 , 180 A.2d 682 (1962), but, as the Court of Special Appeals noted, has not spoken on the matter with respect to criminal responsibility. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vt.
green
2 sentences1987Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 438 , 100 S.Ct. at 1232 . 1987Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 438 , 100 S.Ct. at 1232 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Knight v. State
green
1 sentence1978In the pre-Gagnon case of Knight v. State, 7 Md. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Murray v. Director of Planning
green
2 sentences1969Before proceeding to a discussion of these two theories we deem it helpful to contemplate the political philosophy behind “Some Rule.” One of the objectives of “Home Rule” was to assure to the political subdivisions of the State the power of self-government and freedom from interference, by the Legislature, in the exercise of that power. 4 “Article XI-A *312 grants to a ‘Home Rule’ political subdivision full power to enact local laws on the subjects covered by the Express Powers Act and denies the General Assembly power to enact public local laws on such subjects for the county.” Murray v. Dir 1969Before proceeding to a discussion of these two theories we deem it helpful to contemplate the political philosophy behind “Some Rule.” One of the objectives of “Home Rule” was to assure to the political subdivisions of the State the power of self-government and freedom from interference, by the Legislature, in the exercise of that power. 4 “Article XI-A *312 grants to a ‘Home Rule’ political subdivision full power to enact local laws on the subjects covered by the Express Powers Act and denies the General Assembly power to enact public local laws on such subjects for the county.” Murray v. Dir | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Ringgold v. Bryan
neutral
1 sentence1967In Ringgold v. Bryan, 3 Md. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Gaver v. County Commissioners green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Dorsey v. Petrott green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Whitman v. Forney green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.