15 Arkansas opinions name it 1 courts 1924–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arkansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Crain Industries, Inc. v. Cassgreen2 sentences2021This court has recognized an exception to the at-will doctrine “where there is an agreement that the employment is for a specified time, in which case firing may be only for cause, or where an employer’s employment manual contains an express provision stating that the employee will only be dismissed for cause and that provision is relied on by the employee.” Crain Indus., Inc. v. Cass, 305 Ark. 566, 571 , 810 S.W.2d 910, 913 (1991). 2021This court has recognized an exception to the at-will doctrine “where there is an agreement that the employment is for a specified time, in which case firing may be only for cause, or where an employer’s employment manual contains an express provision stating that the employee will only be dismissed for cause and that provision is relied on by the employee.” Crain Indus., Inc. v. Cass, 305 Ark. 566, 571 , 810 S.W.2d 910, 913 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Swanberg v. Tartgreen2 sentences1999Miller v. Witcher, 160 Ark. 479 , 254 S.W. 1063 (1923); see also Swanberg v. Tart, 300 Ark. 304 , 778 S.W.2d 931 (1989). 1999Miller v. Witcher, 160 Ark. 479 , 254 S.W. 1063 (1923); see also Swanberg v. Tart, 300 Ark. 304 , 778 S.W.2d 931 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mitchellred2 sentences1998See State of Arkansas Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Mitchell, 330 Ark. 338 , 954 S.W.2d 907 (1997); State v. Tedder, 326 Ark. 495 , 932 S.W.2d 755 (1996). 1998See State of Arkansas Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Mitchell, 330 Ark. 338 , 954 S.W.2d 907 (1997); State v. Tedder, 326 Ark. 495 , 932 S.W.2d 755 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Porter v. Stategreen2 sentences1996Larimore v. State, 317 Ark. 111, 121 , 877 S.W.2d 570, 574 (1994); see also Porter v. State, 308 Ark. 137 , 823 S.W.2d 846 (1992). 1996Larimore v. State, 317 Ark. 111, 121 , 877 S.W.2d 570, 574 (1994); see also Porter v. State, 308 Ark. 137 , 823 S.W.2d 846 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Larimore v. Stategreen2 sentences1996Larimore v. State, 317 Ark. 111, 121 , 877 S.W.2d 570, 574 (1994); see also Porter v. State, 308 Ark. 137 , 823 S.W.2d 846 (1992). 1996Larimore v. State, 317 Ark. 111, 121 , 877 S.W.2d 570, 574 (1994); see also Porter v. State, 308 Ark. 137 , 823 S.W.2d 846 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wright v. Keffer
green
2 sentences2001However, this court has recognized an exception to the mootness doctrine "for cases that are capable of repetition yet evading review, being cases in which the justiciable controversy will necessarily expire or terminate prior to adjudication" Cook v. State, 333 Ark. 22 , 968 S.W.2d 589 (1998) (citing Wright v. Keffer, 319 Ark. 201 , 890 S.W.2d 271 (1995)). 2001However, this court has recognized an exception to the mootness doctrine "for cases that are capable of repetition yet evading review, being cases in which the justiciable controversy will necessarily expire or terminate prior to adjudication" Cook v. State, 333 Ark. 22 , 968 S.W.2d 589 (1998) (citing Wright v. Keffer, 319 Ark. 201 , 890 S.W.2d 271 (1995)). | 2 | 1998–2001 |
Cook v. State
neutral
2 sentences2001However, this court has recognized an exception to the mootness doctrine "for cases that are capable of repetition yet evading review, being cases in which the justiciable controversy will necessarily expire or terminate prior to adjudication" Cook v. State, 333 Ark. 22 , 968 S.W.2d 589 (1998) (citing Wright v. Keffer, 319 Ark. 201 , 890 S.W.2d 271 (1995)). 2001However, this court has recognized an exception to the mootness doctrine "for cases that are capable of repetition yet evading review, being cases in which the justiciable controversy will necessarily expire or terminate prior to adjudication" Cook v. State, 333 Ark. 22 , 968 S.W.2d 589 (1998) (citing Wright v. Keffer, 319 Ark. 201 , 890 S.W.2d 271 (1995)). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Miller v. Witcher
green
2 sentences1999Miller v. Witcher, 160 Ark. 479 , 254 S.W. 1063 (1923); see also Swanberg v. Tart, 300 Ark. 304 , 778 S.W.2d 931 (1989). 1999Miller v. Witcher, 160 Ark. 479 , 254 S.W. 1063 (1923); see also Swanberg v. Tart, 300 Ark. 304 , 778 S.W.2d 931 (1989). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Bishop v. LINKWAY STORES, INC.
green
2 sentences1999In the case of Bishop v. Linkway Stores, Inc., 280 Ark. 106 , 644 AS.W.2d 426 (1983), this Court stated: It is well-setded that when a constitutional amendment or a statute is plain an unambiguous, there is no room left for judicial construction, and neither the exigencies of a case, nor a resort to extrinsic facts will be permitted to alter the meaning of the language used in the statute. 1999In the case of Bishop v. Linkway Stores, Inc., *262 280 Ark. 106 , 655 S.W.2d 426 (1983), this Court stated: It is well-settled that when a constitutional amendment or a statute is plain an unambiguous, there is no room left for judicial construction, and neither the exigencies of a case, nor a resort to extrinsic facts will be permitted to alter the meaning of the language used in the statute. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
STATE DEPT. OF FIN. & ADMIN. v. Tedder
green
2 sentences1998See State of Arkansas Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Mitchell, 330 Ark. 338 , 954 S.W.2d 907 (1997); State v. Tedder, 326 Ark. 495 , 932 S.W.2d 755 (1996). 1998See State of Arkansas Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Mitchell, 330 Ark. 338 , 954 S.W.2d 907 (1997); State v. Tedder, 326 Ark. 495 , 932 S.W.2d 755 (1996). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Department of Human Services v. Crunkleton
green
2 sentences1998See State of Arkansas Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Mitchell, 330 Ark. 338 , 954 S.W.2d 907 (1997); State v. Tedder, 326 Ark. 495 , 932 S.W.2d 755 (1996). *233 Unlike the statutes at issue in Arkansas Department of Human Servs. v. State, 312 Ark. 481 , 850 S.W.2d 847 (1993), or Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Crunkleton, 303 Ark. 21 , 791 S.W.2d 704 (1990), the Juvenile Code expressly empowers the court to order cash assistance in FINS cases. 1998See State of Arkansas Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Mitchell, 330 Ark. 338 , 954 S.W.2d 907 (1997); State v. Tedder, 326 Ark. 495 , 932 S.W.2d 755 (1996). *233 Unlike the statutes at issue in Arkansas Department of Human Servs. v. State, 312 Ark. 481 , 850 S.W.2d 847 (1993), or Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Crunkleton, 303 Ark. 21 , 791 S.W.2d 704 (1990), the Juvenile Code expressly empowers the court to order cash assistance in FINS cases. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Arkansas Department of Human Services v. State
green
2 sentences1998See State of Arkansas Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Mitchell, 330 Ark. 338 , 954 S.W.2d 907 (1997); State v. Tedder, 326 Ark. 495 , 932 S.W.2d 755 (1996). *233 Unlike the statutes at issue in Arkansas Department of Human Servs. v. State, 312 Ark. 481 , 850 S.W.2d 847 (1993), or Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Crunkleton, 303 Ark. 21 , 791 S.W.2d 704 (1990), the Juvenile Code expressly empowers the court to order cash assistance in FINS cases. 1998See State of Arkansas Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Mitchell, 330 Ark. 338 , 954 S.W.2d 907 (1997); State v. Tedder, 326 Ark. 495 , 932 S.W.2d 755 (1996). *233 Unlike the statutes at issue in Arkansas Department of Human Servs. v. State, 312 Ark. 481 , 850 S.W.2d 847 (1993), or Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Crunkleton, 303 Ark. 21 , 791 S.W.2d 704 (1990), the Juvenile Code expressly empowers the court to order cash assistance in FINS cases. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Walder v. United States
green
2 sentences1996This court has recognized the principle that once a party has opened the door with inadmissible evidence, the opposing party can do likewise: Since Walder, ( Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 , 74 S.Ct. 354 , 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954)), we have recognized the propriety of "fighting fire with fire" when one of the parties opens the door with an untruthful statement, introduces inadmissible evidence, *96 or makes an improper closing argument. 1996This court has recognized the principle that once a party has opened the door with inadmissible evidence, the opposing party can do likewise: Since Walder, (Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)), we have recognized the propriety of “fighting fire with fire” when one of the parties opens the door with an untruthful statement, introduces inadmissible evidence, or makes an improper closing argument. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Skillern v. Baker
green
2 sentences1988In Skillern v. Baker, 82 Ark. 86 , 100 S.W. 764 (1907), we said: It may be said to be the general rule that where an unimpeached witness testifies distinctly and positively to a fact and is not contradicted, and there is no circumstance shown from which an inference against the fact testified to by the witness can be drawn, the fact may be taken as established, and a verdict directed based as on such evidence. 1988In Skillern v. Baker, 82 Ark. 86 , 100 S.W. 764 (1907), we said: It may be said to be the general rule that where an unimpeached witness testifies distinctly and positively to a fact and is not contradicted, and there is no circumstance shown from which an inference against the fact testified to by the witness can be drawn, the fact may be taken as established, and a verdict directed based as on such evidence. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Jackson v. Jones
green
1 sentence1971A quasi-contractual principle of unjust enrichment does not apply to an agreement deliberately entered into by the parties, however harsh the provisions of such contract may seem in the light of sdbsequent happenings.” This court has recognized this principle at least as far back as 1860, where in Jackson v. Jones, 22 Ark. 158 , we stated that the law never accommodates a party with an implied contract when he has made a specific one on the same subject matter. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Richardson v. Donaldson
neutral
2 sentences1961Richardson v. Donaldson, 220 Ark. 173 , 246 S. W. 2d 5511 . 1961Richardson v. Donaldson, 220 Ark. 173 , 246 S.W.2d 551 . | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Citizens' Pipe Line Co. v. Twin City Pipe Line Co.
neutral
2 sentences1944El Dorado v. Coats, 175 Ark. 289 , 299 S. W. 355 ; Citizens Pipe Line Co. v. Twin City Pipe Line Co., 178 Ark. 309 , 10 S. W. 2d 493 . 1944El Dorado v. Coats, 175 Ark. 289 , 299 S. W. 355 ; Citizens Pipe Line Co. v. Twin City Pipe Line Co., 178 Ark. 309 , 10 S. W. 2d 493 . | 1 | 1944–1944 |
El Dorado v. Coats
neutral
2 sentences1944El Dorado v. Coats, 175 Ark. 289 , 299 S. W. 355 ; Citizens Pipe Line Co. v. Twin City Pipe Line Co., 178 Ark. 309 , 10 S. W. 2d 493 . 1944El Dorado v. Coats, 175 Ark. 289 , 299 S. W. 355 ; Citizens Pipe Line Co. v. Twin City Pipe Line Co., 178 Ark. 309 , 10 S. W. 2d 493 . | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Cotton v. White
green
1 sentence1930Sibly v. England, 90 Ark. 420 , 119 S. W. 820 ; and Cotton v. White, 131 Ark. 275 , 199 S. W. 116 . | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Sibly v. England
neutral
2 sentences1930Sibly v. England, 90 Ark. 420 , 119 S. W. 820 ; and Cotton v. White, 131 Ark. 275 , 199 S. W. 116 . 1930Sibly v. England, 90 Ark. 420 , 119 S. W. 820 ; and Cotton v. White, 131 Ark. 275 , 199 S. W. 116 . | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Nixon v. Allen
green
2 sentences1929Nixon v. Allen, 150 Ark. 244 , 234 S. W. 45 , and cases cited. 1929Nixon v. Allen, 150 Ark. 244 , 234 S. W. 45 , and cases cited. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Burns v. Yocum
neutral
2 sentences1929Burns v. Yocum, 81 Ark. 127 , 98 S. W. 956 . 1929Burns v. Yocum, 81 Ark. 127 , 98 S. W. 956 . | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Jones v. Lewis
neutral
1 sentence1924Jones v. Lewis, 89 Ark. 368 . | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.