has recognized principle in Connecticut

2022Id.

2016Specifically, the Appellate Court concluded in the present case that Mullen v. Horton, 46 Conn.App. 759 , 771, 700 A.2d 1377 (1997), and Davies v. General Tours, Inc., 63 Conn.App. 17 , 31, 774 A.2d 1063 , cert. granted, 256 Conn. 926 , 776 A.2d 1143 (2001) (appeal withdrawn October 18, 2001), must be interpreted as having "held that the facts of those cases did not justify the imposition of vicarious liability" under the doctrine of apparent authority, thereby implying that this court has recognized the doctrine.

2016Specifically, the Appellate Court concluded in the present case that Mullen v. Horton, 46 Conn.App. 759 , 771, 700 A.2d 1377 (1997), and Davies v. General Tours, Inc., 63 Conn.App. 17 , 31, 774 A.2d 1063 , cert. granted, 256 Conn. 926 , 776 A.2d 1143 (2001) (appeal withdrawn October 18, 2001), must be interpreted as having "held that the facts of those cases did not justify the imposition of vicarious liability" under the doctrine of apparent authority, thereby implying that this court has recognized the doctrine.

2016Specifically, the Appellate Court concluded in the present case that Mullen v. Horton, 46 Conn.App. 759 , 771, 700 A.2d 1377 (1997), and Davies v. General Tours, Inc., 63 Conn.App. 17 , 31, 774 A.2d 1063 , cert. granted, 256 Conn. 926 , 776 A.2d 1143 (2001) (appeal withdrawn October 18, 2001), must be interpreted as having "held that the facts of those cases did not justify the imposition of vicarious liability" under the doctrine of apparent authority, thereby implying that this court has recognized the doctrine.

2016Specifically, the Appellate Court concluded in the present case that Mullen v. Horton, 46 Conn.App. 759 , 771, 700 A.2d 1377 (1997), and Davies v. General Tours, Inc., 63 Conn.App. 17 , 31, 774 A.2d 1063 , cert. granted, 256 Conn. 926 , 776 A.2d 1143 (2001) (appeal withdrawn October 18, 2001), must be interpreted as having "held that the facts of those cases did not justify the imposition of vicarious liability" under the doctrine of apparent authority, thereby implying that this court has recognized the doctrine.

2016Specifically, the Appellate Court concluded in the present case that Mullen v. Horton, 46 Conn.App. 759 , 771, 700 A.2d 1377 (1997), and Davies v. General Tours, Inc., 63 Conn.App. 17 , 31, 774 A.2d 1063 , cert. granted, 256 Conn. 926 , 776 A.2d 1143 (2001) (appeal withdrawn October 18, 2001), must be interpreted as having "held that the facts of those cases did not justify the imposition of vicarious liability" under the doctrine of apparent authority, thereby implying that this court has recognized the doctrine.

2016Specifically, the Appellate Court concluded in the present case that Mullen v. Horton, 46 Conn.App. 759 , 771, 700 A.2d 1377 (1997), and Davies v. General Tours, Inc., 63 Conn.App. 17 , 31, 774 A.2d 1063 , cert. granted, 256 Conn. 926 , 776 A.2d 1143 (2001) (appeal withdrawn October 18, 2001), must be interpreted as having "held that the facts of those cases did not justify the imposition of vicarious liability" under the doctrine of apparent authority, thereby implying that this court has recognized the doctrine.

2014This court has recognized an exception to discretion- ary act immunity that allows for liability when ‘‘the circumstances make it apparent to the public officer that his or her failure to act would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm . . . .’’13 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 616 .

2014This identifiable per- son-imminent harm exception has three requirements: ‘‘(1) an imminent harm; (2) an identifiable victim; and (3) a public official to whom it is apparent that his or her conduct is likely to subject that victim to that harm.’’ Id.

2010Indeed, this court has recognized an exception ... for those cases in which the appellant makes a colorable challenge to the jurisdiction of the trial court to open the judgment.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Novak v. Levin, 287 Conn. 71, 77 , 951 A.2d 514 (2008). 7 Following argument before us, we sua sponte ordered the trial court “to further articulate, on or before January 8, 2010, the basis of its April 28, 2008 decision granting the defendants’ March 25, 2008 motion to reopen in light of the provision in ... § 52-212a that ‘the parties may waive the provisions o

2010Indeed, this court has recognized an exception ... for those cases in which the appellant makes a colorable challenge to the jurisdiction of the trial court to open the judgment.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Novak v. Levin, 287 Conn. 71, 77 , 951 A.2d 514 (2008). 7 Following argument before us, we sua sponte ordered the trial court “to further articulate, on or before January 8, 2010, the basis of its April 28, 2008 decision granting the defendants’ March 25, 2008 motion to reopen in light of the provision in ... § 52-212a that ‘the parties may waive the provisions o

2004See, e.g., Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, Inc., supra, 260 Conn. 694 (“[a]t common law, an employer may terminate an at-will employee for any reason unless that reason violates some important public policy”); Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 476-77 , 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (recognizing public policy exception to doctrine of employment at will).

2004See, e.g., Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, Inc., supra, 260 Conn. 694 (“[a]t common law, an employer may terminate an at-will employee for any reason unless that reason violates some important public policy”); Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 476-77 , 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (recognizing public policy exception to doctrine of employment at will).

2001"This court has recognized the principle that a subdivision of the state, 10 acting within its delegated governmental capacity, is not impliedly bound by the ordinary statute of limitations." State v. Goldfarb , 160 Conn. 320 , 326 , 278 A.2d 818 (1971); see also Dept. of Transportation v. Canevari , 37 Conn. Sup. 899 , 442 A.2d 1358 (1982) (Appellate Session) (affirming granting of motion to strike special defense of § 52-584 statute of limitations on the ground that a subdivision of the state is not bound by ordinary statute of limitations); Dept. of Transportation v. Castaldo , Superior Cou

2001"This court has recognized the principle that a subdivision of the state, 10 acting within its delegated governmental capacity, is not impliedly bound by the ordinary statute of limitations." State v. Goldfarb , 160 Conn. 320 , 326 , 278 A.2d 818 (1971); see also Dept. of Transportation v. Canevari , 37 Conn. Sup. 899 , 442 A.2d 1358 (1982) (Appellate Session) (affirming granting of motion to strike special defense of § 52-584 statute of limitations on the ground that a subdivision of the state is not bound by ordinary statute of limitations); Dept. of Transportation v. Castaldo , Superior Cou

1980Berger v. Shanahan, 142 Conn. 726, 731-32 , 118 A.2d 311 (1955); King Motors v. Delfino, 136 Conn. 496, 498 , 72 A.2d 233 (1950); cf. General Statutes § 42a-2-718 (1); and Restatement (Second), Contracts § 370 (Tent.

1980Berger v. Shanahan, 142 Conn. 726, 731-32 , 118 A.2d 311 (1955); King Motors v. Delfino, 136 Conn. 496, 498 , 72 A.2d 233 (1950); cf. General Statutes § 42a-2-718 (1); and Restatement (Second), Contracts § 370 (Tent.

1980Berger v. Shanahan, 142 Conn. 726, 731-32 , 118 A.2d 311 (1955); King Motors v. Delfino, 136 Conn. 496, 498 , 72 A.2d 233 (1950); cf. General Statutes § 42a-2-718 (1); and Restatement (Second), Contracts § 370 (Tent.

1980Berger v. Shanahan, 142 Conn. 726, 731-32 , 118 A.2d 311 (1955); King Motors v. Delfino, 136 Conn. 496, 498 , 72 A.2d 233 (1950); cf. General Statutes § 42a-2-718 (1); and Restatement (Second), Contracts § 370 (Tent.

1976Though this court has recognized the principle that the actions of a public officer acting officially are entitled to a presumption of accuracy; Batch Pontiac-Buick, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 165 Conn. 559, 568 , 345 A.2d 520 ; State v. Lenihan, 151 Conn. 552, 555 , 200 A.2d 476 ; nowhere have we gone so far as to condone a presumption that a machine is accurate.

1976Though this court has recognized the principle that the actions of a public officer acting officially are entitled to a presumption of accuracy; Batch Pontiac-Buick, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 165 Conn. 559, 568 , 345 A.2d 520 ; State v. Lenihan, 151 Conn. 552, 555 , 200 A.2d 476 ; nowhere have we gone so far as to condone a presumption that a machine is accurate.

1976Though this court has recognized the principle that the actions of a public officer acting officially are entitled to a presumption of accuracy; Batch Pontiac-Buick, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 165 Conn. 559, 568 , 345 A.2d 520 ; State v. Lenihan, 151 Conn. 552, 555 , 200 A.2d 476 ; nowhere have we gone so far as to condone a presumption that a machine is accurate.

1976Though this court has recognized the principle that the actions of a public officer acting officially are entitled to a presumption of accuracy; Batch Pontiac-Buick, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 165 Conn. 559, 568 , 345 A.2d 520 ; State v. Lenihan, 151 Conn. 552, 555 , 200 A.2d 476 ; nowhere have we gone so far as to condone a presumption that a machine is accurate.

1971New Haven v. Torrington, 132 Conn. 194, 204 , 43 A.2d 455 ; Bridgeport v. Schwarz Bros.

1971New Haven v. Torrington, 132 Conn. 194, 204 , 43 A.2d 455 ; Bridgeport v. Schwarz Bros.

1905In the case of Hoyt v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 60 Conn. 385, 390 , the plaintiff recovered $150 as the amount of the reduction of the pecuniary value of his lot caused by the destruction of an ornamental shade tree.

1905Among the cases in which this court has recognized the rule above stated, as laid down in Tomlinson v. Derby, 43 Conn. 562, are Taylor v. Monroe, ibid. 36, 46; Seymour v. Ives, 46 id. 109, 113; Brzezinski v. Tierney, 60 id. 55, 61; Crug v. Gorham, 74 id. 541, 544; Ling v. Malcom, 77 id. 517, 527.