has recognized principle in Mississippi

1986Ellis v. Berry, supra; First National Bank v. Owen, 177 Miss. 339 , 171 So. 4 ; Hickman v. Slough, 187 Miss. 525 , 193 So. 443 ; In Re Estate of Whittington, deceased, 217 Miss. 457 , 64 So.2d 580 .

1986Ellis v. Berry, supra; First National Bank v. Owen, 177 Miss. 339 , 171 So. 4 ; Hickman v. Slough, 187 Miss. 525 , 193 So. 443 ; In Re Estate of Whittington, deceased, 217 Miss. 457 , 64 So.2d 580 .

1986Ellis v. Berry, supra; First National Bank v. Owen, 177 Miss. 339 , 171 So. 4 ; Hickman v. Slough, 187 Miss. 525 , 193 So. 443 ; In Re Estate of Whittington, deceased, 217 Miss. 457 , 64 So.2d 580 .

1986Ellis v. Berry, supra; First National Bank v. Owen, 177 Miss. 339 , 171 So. 4 ; Hickman v. Slough, 187 Miss. 525 , 193 So. 443 ; In Re Estate of Whittington, deceased, 217 Miss. 457 , 64 So.2d 580 .

1986Ellis v. Berry, supra; First National Bank v. Owen, 177 Miss. 339 , 171 So. 4 ; Hickman v. Slough, 187 Miss. 525 , 193 So. 443 ; In Re Estate of Whittington, deceased, 217 Miss. 457 , 64 So.2d 580 .

1986Ellis v. Berry, supra; First National Bank v. Owen, 177 Miss. 339 , 171 So. 4 ; Hickman v. Slough, 187 Miss. 525 , 193 So. 443 ; In Re Estate of Whittington, deceased, 217 Miss. 457 , 64 So.2d 580 .

2004This Court has recognized this principle in King where it stated that Mississippi due process law requires notice or diligent efforts to secure actual notice be given. 579 So.2d at 1253-54 (relying on Caldwell v. Caldwell, 533 So.2d 413 (Miss.1988)).

2002This Court has recognized this principle in King where it stated that Mississippi due process law requires notice or diligent efforts to secure actual notice be given. 579 So.2d at 1253-54 (relying on Caldwell v. Caldwell, 533 So.2d 413 (Miss. 1988)).

1999Luckett v. State, 582 So.2d 428 (Miss.1991) (denial of due process in sentencing merited exception from the three year time limit of § 99-39-5); Smith v. State, 477 So.2d 191 (Miss.1985) (denial of due process in sentencing merited an exception from the rule that questions not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

1998Luckett v. State, 582 So. 2d 428 (Miss. 1991) (denial of due process in sentencing merited exception from the three year time limit of § 99-39-5); Smith v. State, 477 So. 2d 191 (Miss. 1985) (denial of due process in sentencing merited an exception from the rule that questions not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

2019“However, for just as long, this Court has limited this vicarious liability to acts of the employee ‘performed within the scope of the authority conferred.’” Id. (quoting Steamboat General Worth v. Hopkins, 30 Miss. 703, 711 (Miss. 1856).

2019“Since the mid-19th century, this Court has recognized the doctrine of respondeat superior[,] which imputes an employee’s negligence to the employer.” Hearn, 923 So. 2d at 204 .

2014Fortinberry v. Holmes, 89 Miss. 373 , 42 So. 799, 799 (1907).

2010This Court has recognized the rule that “a plaintiffs deraignment must show: ‘title in himself from the govern *1190 ment down, or he must show title by adverse possession ... or he must show title from the defendant, or that both derive their claim from a common source, and that his is the better title from that source.’ ” Crosswhite v. Golmon, 939 So.2d 831 , 834 n. 1 (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (quoting Long v. Stanley, 79 Miss. 298, 300-01 , 30 So. 823 (1901)).

2010This Court has recognized the rule that “a plaintiffs deraignment must show: ‘title in himself from the govern *1190 ment down, or he must show title by adverse possession ... or he must show title from the defendant, or that both derive their claim from a common source, and that his is the better title from that source.’ ” Crosswhite v. Golmon, 939 So.2d 831 , 834 n. 1 (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (quoting Long v. Stanley, 79 Miss. 298, 300-01 , 30 So. 823 (1901)).

1994As to the possibility of the reinstatement question becoming moot, this Court has recognized an exception to the practice which forbids courts from considering moot questions under the doctrine of "capable of repetition yet evading review." See Strong v. Bostick, 420 So.2d 1356 (Miss. 1982); Mississippi High School Activities Ass'n v. Coleman, 631 So.2d 768 (Miss. 1994).

1994As to the possibility of the reinstatement question becoming moot, this Court has recognized an exception to the practice which forbids courts from considering moot questions under the doctrine of "capable of repetition yet evading review." See Strong v. Bostick, 420 So.2d 1356 (Miss. 1982); Mississippi High School Activities Ass'n v. Coleman, 631 So.2d 768 (Miss. 1994).

1992In Investors Property v. Watkins, Pitts, Hill & Assocs., 511 So.2d 1379, 1383 (Miss. 1987), we recently observed: We have found several cases apparently maintaining the proposition that, when the plaintiff accepted money paid, he may still appeal, where the object of the appeal is simply to have a judgment modified by increasing his demand, as where sufficient damages had not been allowed, or where proper interest had not been allowed. (emphasis in original) (quoting Adams, 47 So. at 410 ).

1986This Court has recognized this principle in Levi Et al v. Mississippi State Bar, 436 So.2d 781 (Miss. 1983) by stating that the purpose of bar disciplinary proceedings are not to punish the lawyer but to vindicate in the eyes of the public the overall reputation of the bar.

1981Ellis v. Berry, supra; First National Bank v. Owen, 177 Miss. 339 , 171 So. 4 ; Hickman v. Slough, 187 Miss. 525 , 193 So. 443 ; In re Estate of Whittington, deceased, 217 Miss. 457 , 64 So.2d 580 . ( 233 Miss. at 644-645 , 103 So.2d at 430 ) An action to enforce an oral agreement to devise the lake-house property here would be unenforceable.

1981Ellis v. Berry, supra; First National Bank v. Owen, 177 Miss. 339 , 171 So. 4 ; Hickman v. Slough, 187 Miss. 525 , 193 So. 443 ; In re Estate of Whittington, deceased, 217 Miss. 457 , 64 So.2d 580 . ( 233 Miss. at 644-645 , 103 So.2d at 430 ) An action to enforce an oral agreement to devise the lake-house property here would be unenforceable.

1968Strickland v. Humble Oil & Refining Company, 194 Miss. 194 , 11 So.2d 820 (1943).

1968Strickland v. Humble Oil & Refining Company, 194 Miss. 194 , 11 So.2d 820 (1943).

1962Company v. McNeil, 205 Miss. 807 , 39 So. 2d 490 ; Boyd v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 211 Miss. 409 , 52 So. 2d 21 , this Court has recognized the rule that, under ordinary conditions, the presence of a railroad train or car upon a crossing is adequate notice to a traveler approaching the crossing and the railroad employees need not give additional notice or warning of the danger; and that, in the absence of unusual circumstances, it is not ordinarily negligence to stop a train on a crossing without providing lights to warn users of the highway.

1962Company v. McNeil, 205 Miss. 807 , 39 So. 2d 490 ; Boyd v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 211 Miss. 409 , 52 So. 2d 21 , this Court has recognized the rule that, under ordinary conditions, the presence of a railroad train or car upon a crossing is adequate notice to a traveler approaching the crossing and the railroad employees need not give additional notice or warning of the danger; and that, in the absence of unusual circumstances, it is not ordinarily negligence to stop a train on a crossing without providing lights to warn users of the highway.

1962Company v. McNeil, 205 Miss. 807 , 39 So. 2d 490 ; Boyd v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 211 Miss. 409 , 52 So. 2d 21 , this Court has recognized the rule that, under ordinary conditions, the presence of a railroad train or car upon a crossing is adequate notice to a traveler approaching the crossing and the railroad employees need not give additional notice or warning of the danger; and that, in the absence of unusual circumstances, it is not ordinarily negligence to stop a train on a crossing without providing lights to warn users of the highway.

1962Company v. McNeil, 205 Miss. 807 , 39 So. 2d 490 ; Boyd v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 211 Miss. 409 , 52 So. 2d 21 , this Court has recognized the rule that, under ordinary conditions, the presence of a railroad train or car upon a crossing is adequate notice to a traveler approaching the crossing and the railroad employees need not give additional notice or warning of the danger; and that, in the absence of unusual circumstances, it is not ordinarily negligence to stop a train on a crossing without providing lights to warn users of the highway.

1953In the ease of Shell Petroleum Corporation, et al. v. Kennedy, 167 Miss. 305 , 141 So. 335 , the oil company’s city manager at Meridian was driving with his wife in a company-owned automobile to another town to see about a loan for a prospective purchaser of a gasoline service station, which, if procured, might have resulted in the purchase by the borrower of the gasoline service station and the sale of gasoline and other petroleum products by the oil company to the borrower.

1953In the ease of Shell Petroleum Corporation, et al. v. Kennedy, 167 Miss. 305 , 141 So. 335 , the oil company’s city manager at Meridian was driving with his wife in a company-owned automobile to another town to see about a loan for a prospective purchaser of a gasoline service station, which, if procured, might have resulted in the purchase by the borrower of the gasoline service station and the sale of gasoline and other petroleum products by the oil company to the borrower.

1912A stay.of proceédings on a judgment, or an execution, will discharge the surety.” ‘In the case of Harris v. West, 25 Miss. 156 , Yerger, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said: “This court has recognized the doctrine repeatedly that if a creditor, without the consent of the surety, enters into a contract with the principal, upon a sufficient consideration, to give him an extension of time for a definite period, or enters into any contract with the principhl, which in its consequences may have the effect of giving such an extension of time, the surety is released from his engagement.