definition waiver in Maryland

1996Tactical decisions, when made by an authorized competent attorney, as well as legitimate procedural requirements, will normally bind a criminal defendant.” A few years later, in Williams v. State, supra, 292 Md. at 215-216 , 438 A.2d at 1308 , we reaffirmed the interpretation of the Post Conviction Procedure set forth in Curtis , stating: “Curtis held that the definition of waiver in the Post Conviction Procedure Act, Code (1957, 1976 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 645A(c), as an intelligent and knowing failure by the *644 defendant himself to raise an issue, was only applicable to those rights which,

1996Tactical decisions, when made by an authorized competent attorney, as well as legitimate procedural requirements, will normally bind a criminal defendant.” A few years later, in Williams v. State, supra, 292 Md. at 215-216 , 438 A.2d at 1308 , we reaffirmed the interpretation of the Post Conviction Procedure set forth in Curtis , stating: “Curtis held that the definition of waiver in the Post Conviction Procedure Act, Code (1957, 1976 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 645A(c), as an intelligent and knowing failure by the *644 defendant himself to raise an issue, was only applicable to those rights which,

1979The classic definition of waiver was enunciated in Johnson — “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Id. at 464 .

1979The classic definition of waiver was enunciated in Johnson — "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Id. at 464 .

2008"It is clear that a `procedural default' in certain circumstances, even where a defendant may personally have been without knowledge or understanding of the matter, may result in his being precluded from asserting important rights." Curtis, 284 Md. at 147 , 395 A.2d at 472 ; see Hunt v. State, 345 Md. 122, 138 , 691 A.2d 1255, 1263 (1997) ("`[T]he waiver of other rights, which ordinarily do not require such knowing and voluntary action for a waiver to be effective, [is] not governed by the definition of waiver in the Post Conviction Procedure Act.'" (quoting Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 215

2008"It is clear that a `procedural default' in certain circumstances, even where a defendant may personally have been without knowledge or understanding of the matter, may result in his being precluded from asserting important rights." Curtis, 284 Md. at 147 , 395 A.2d at 472 ; see Hunt v. State, 345 Md. 122, 138 , 691 A.2d 1255, 1263 (1997) ("`[T]he waiver of other rights, which ordinarily do not require such knowing and voluntary action for a waiver to be effective, [is] not governed by the definition of waiver in the Post Conviction Procedure Act.'" (quoting Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 215

1968The classic definition of waiver of a federal constitutional right is that contained in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 , i.e., “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” In Manning v. State, 237 Md. 349 , the Maryland Court of Appeals gave explicit recognition to the holding of the Supreme Court in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 516 , viz.: “Presuming waiver [of the right to counsel] from a silent record is impermissible.

1968Cummings v. Warden, 243 Md. 702 ; Ware v. State, 235 Md. 131 ; Montgomery v. Warden, supra. The classic definition of waiver of a federal constitutional right is that contained in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 , i.e., “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” In Manning v. State, supra, the Maryland Court of Appeals gave explicit recognition to the holding of the Supreme Court in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 516 , viz.: “Presuming waiver [of the right to counsel] from a silent record is impermissible.

2008In Schroyer, 323 Md. at 282 , 592 A.2d 1119 , Judge (later Chief Judge) Bell laid out the point of departure for our analysis with a basic definition of the defense of assumption of risk (quoting from Gibson v. Beaver, 245 Md. 418, 421 , 226 A.2d 273 (1967)): When the plaintiff enters voluntarily into a relation or situation involving obvious danger, he may be taken to assume the risk, and to relieve the defendant of responsibility.

2008In Schroyer, 323 Md. at 282 , 592 A.2d 1119 , Judge (later Chief Judge) Bell laid out the point of departure for our analysis with a basic definition of the defense of assumption of risk (quoting from Gibson v. Beaver, 245 Md. 418, 421 , 226 A.2d 273 (1967)): When the plaintiff enters voluntarily into a relation or situation involving obvious danger, he may be taken to assume the risk, and to relieve the defendant of responsibility.

2008In Schroyer, 323 Md. at 282 , 592 A.2d 1119 , Judge (later Chief Judge) Bell laid out the point of departure for our analysis with a basic definition of the defense of assumption of risk (quoting from Gibson v. Beaver, 245 Md. 418, 421 , 226 A.2d 273 (1967)): When the plaintiff enters voluntarily into a relation or situation involving obvious danger, he may be taken to assume the risk, and to relieve the defendant of responsibility.

2008In Schroyer, 323 Md. at 282 , 592 A.2d 1119 , Judge (later Chief Judge) Bell laid out the point of departure for our analysis with a basic definition of the defense of assumption of risk (quoting from Gibson v. Beaver, 245 Md. 418, 421 , 226 A.2d 273 (1967)): When the plaintiff enters voluntarily into a relation or situation involving obvious danger, he may be taken to assume the risk, and to relieve the defendant of responsibility.

2000While the Court of Appeals has never ruled on a challenge to a proposed district's contiguity, it has offered the following definition of the requirement: The contiguity requirement mandates that there be no division between one part of a district's territory and the rest of the district; in other words, contiguous territory is territory touching, adjoining and connected, as distinguished from territory separated by other territory. 299 Md. at 675 .

2000The Court drew that definition from two New York cases, which make clear that "the requirement of contiguity is not necessarily violated because part of a district is divided by water." Schneider v. Rockefeller , 31 N.Y.2d 420 , 430 , 293 N.E.2d 67 (1972).

2000The Court drew that definition from two New York cases, which make clear that "the requirement of contiguity is not necessarily violated because part of a district is divided by water." Schneider v. Rockefeller , 31 N.Y.2d 420 , 430 , 293 N.E.2d 67 (1972).

1991Significantly, in Farmers & Mechanics Bank v. Walser, 316 Md 366, 387, 558 A.2d 1208 (1989), the Court of Appeals held that a defendant in an interpleader action, who alleged that the stakeholder was independently liable to him, could not defeat the action simply by forsaking any claim to the fund deposited with the court.

1979Graves v. United States, 150 U. S. at 121 .

1979App. 343, 349, 234 A. 2d 472 (1967), the adoption of subsection (c) was “for the procedural purpose of creating a rebuttable presumption that such a waiver has in fact occurred where the alleged error has not been timely asserted.” In Bristow v. State, supra, 242 Md. at 289-290 , decided shortly after the Post Conviction Procedure Act was *149 amended, this Court, although pointing out that subsection (c) reflected the definition of waiver set forth in Fay v. Noia, explicitly acknowledged that the “intelligent and knowing” standard of subsection (c) is not always applicable.

1971Judge (later Chief Judge) Prescott, for the Court, in Fitzpatrick v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 220 Md. 534, 540-41 , 155 A. 2d 702 (1959) set forth a definition of the rule against perpetuities as follows: “It has frequently been said that no full, complete and comprehensive definition has ever been given of the Rule.

1971Judge (later Chief Judge) Prescott, for the Court, in Fitzpatrick v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 220 Md. 534, 540-41 , 155 A. 2d 702 (1959) set forth a definition of the rule against perpetuities as follows: “It has frequently been said that no full, complete and comprehensive definition has ever been given of the Rule.

1968Cummings v. Warden, 243 Md. 702 ; Ware v. State, 235 Md. 131 ; Montgomery v. Warden, supra. The classic definition of waiver of a federal constitutional right is that contained in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 , i.e., “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” In Manning v. State, supra, the Maryland Court of Appeals gave explicit recognition to the holding of the Supreme Court in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 516 , viz.: “Presuming waiver [of the right to counsel] from a silent record is impermissible.

1968The classic definition of waiver of a federal constitutional right is that contained in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 , i.e., “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” In Manning v. State, 237 Md. 349 , the Maryland Court of Appeals gave explicit recognition to the holding of the Supreme Court in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 516 , viz.: “Presuming waiver [of the right to counsel] from a silent record is impermissible.

1968Cummings v. Warden, 243 Md. 702 ; Ware v. State, 235 Md. 131 ; Montgomery v. Warden, supra. The classic definition of waiver of a federal constitutional right is that contained in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 , i.e., “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” In Manning v. State, supra, the Maryland Court of Appeals gave explicit recognition to the holding of the Supreme Court in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 516 , viz.: “Presuming waiver [of the right to counsel] from a silent record is impermissible.

1943As stated by this court in Benson v. Borden, 174 Md. 202, 219 , 198 A. 419 , 427 : “In this country ‘waiver’ and ‘estoppel’ are often used synonymously * * *, particularly in insurance law * * *, although the terms have separate and distinct functions, and the same set of *491 facts may establish one but not the other.” In that case the court quotes with approval the definition of waiver as given in Crosswell v. Connecticut Indemnity Ass’n, 51 S. C. 469, 29 S. E. 236 , 239: “(Waiver is) the relinquishing, giving up, or surrendering of some known legal right, (and) may be found to exist if one

1943As stated by this court in Benson v. Borden, 174 Md. 202, 219 , 198 A. 419 , 427 : “In this country ‘waiver’ and ‘estoppel’ are often used synonymously * * *, particularly in insurance law * * *, although the terms have separate and distinct functions, and the same set of *491 facts may establish one but not the other.” In that case the court quotes with approval the definition of waiver as given in Crosswell v. Connecticut Indemnity Ass’n, 51 S. C. 469, 29 S. E. 236 , 239: “(Waiver is) the relinquishing, giving up, or surrendering of some known legal right, (and) may be found to exist if one

1943As stated by this court in Benson v. Borden, 174 Md. 202, 219 , 198 A. 419 , 427 : “In this country ‘waiver’ and ‘estoppel’ are often used synonymously * * *, particularly in insurance law * * *, although the terms have separate and distinct functions, and the same set of *491 facts may establish one but not the other.” In that case the court quotes with approval the definition of waiver as given in Crosswell v. Connecticut Indemnity Ass’n, 51 S. C. 469, 29 S. E. 236 , 239: “(Waiver is) the relinquishing, giving up, or surrendering of some known legal right, (and) may be found to exist if one