14 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1959–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sparks v. Republic National Life Insurancegreen2 sentences1988Sparks v. Republic National Life Insurance Company, 132 Ariz. 529, 536 , 647 P.2d 1127, 1134 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1070 , 103 S.Ct. 490 , 74 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983). 1988Sparks v. Republic National Life Insurance Company, 132 Ariz. 529, 536 , 647 P.2d 1127, 1134 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1070 , 103 S.Ct. 490 , 74 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983). | 2 | 2 |
Collins on Behalf of Collins v. Tabetgreen1 sentence2021Compare Brittner, 246 Ariz. at 297, ¶ 10 (explaining this court does not “limit immunity only for services related to the judicial process”) with Collins v. Tabet, 806 P.2d 40, 51, ¶ 38 (N.M. 1991) (explaining GALs are not entitled to immunity when they are acting as an attorney representing a private interest and are “not assisting the court in the discharge of its judicial duties”). | 1 | 1 |
Brittner v. Lanzilottagreen1 sentence2021Compare Brittner, 246 Ariz. at 297, ¶ 10 (explaining this court does not “limit immunity only for services related to the judicial process”) with Collins v. Tabet, 806 P.2d 40, 51, ¶ 38 (N.M. 1991) (explaining GALs are not entitled to immunity when they are acting as an attorney representing a private interest and are “not assisting the court in the discharge of its judicial duties”). | 1 | 1 |
Rodriguez v. Schlittenhartgreen2 sentences2010Denial of motion for new trial: jury instructions ¶ 46 The County argues the trial court erred by denying its motion for new trial because the court (1) erroneously instructed the jury on the definition of waiver, and (2) improperly gave the jury an impracticability instruction. 9 We review the jury instructions as a whole to determine whether the given instructions “misled the jury as to the proper rules of law.” Rodriguez v. Schlittenhart, 161 Ariz. 609, 614 , 780 P.2d 442, 447 (App.1989). 2010Denial of motion for new trial: jury instructions ¶ 46 The County argues the trial court erred by denying its motion for new trial because the court (1) erroneously instructed the jury on the definition of waiver, and (2) improperly gave the jury an impracticability instruction. 9 We review the jury instructions as a whole to determine whether the given instructions “misled the jury as to the proper rules of law.” Rodriguez v. Schlittenhart, 161 Ariz. 609, 614 , 780 P.2d 442, 447 (App.1989). | 1 | 1 |
Stulce v. SALT RIVER PROJECT AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENT AND POWER DISTRICTgreen2 sentences2007They note that § 12-821.01(B) provides that its definition of accrual is “[f]or purposes of this section.” Further, the University Officials correctly assert that, in Stulce v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District, 197 Ariz. 87, ¶¶ 10-11 , 3 P.3d 1007, 1010 (App. 1999), Division One of this court stated that courts had applied the common law discovery rule to the statute of limitations in § 12-821 and that the legislature enacted § 12-821.01(B) to insert the discovery rule into the notice of claim statute, thereby keeping the accrual definition for purposes of the notic 2007They note that § 12-821.01(B) provides that its definition of accrual is “[f]or purposes of this section.” Further, the University Officials correctly assert that, in Stulce v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District, 197 Ariz. 87, ¶¶ 10-11 , 3 P.3d 1007, 1010 (App. 1999), Division One of this court stated that courts had applied the common law discovery rule to the statute of limitations in § 12-821 and that the legislature enacted § 12-821.01(B) to insert the discovery rule into the notice of claim statute, thereby keeping the accrual definition for purposes of the notic | 1 | 1 |
First National Bank in Fairfield v. Frescoln Farms, Ltd.green1 sentence2003Bank v. Frescoln Farms, Ltd., 430 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Iowa 1988) (“Solvency must be determined as of the time the alleged fraudulent transfer took place.”) (citation omitted). ¶ 22 The UFTA’s definition of claim is unquestionably broadly worded. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Renforthgreen2 sentences1988It agreed that such a definition of the standard of proof “inappropriately escalated [defendant’s burden] beyond that imposed by the clear and convincing evidence standard as developed in caselaw and incorporated into A.R.S. § 13-502.” State v. Renforth, 155 Ariz. 385, 386 , 746 P.2d 1315, 1316 (Ct.App.1987), rev. granted Nov. 17, 1987. 1988It agreed that such a definition of the standard of proof “inappropriately escalated [defendant’s burden] beyond that imposed by the clear and convincing evidence standard as developed in caselaw and incorporated into A.R.S. § 13-502.” State v. Renforth, 155 Ariz. 385, 386 , 746 P.2d 1315, 1316 (Ct.App.1987), rev. granted Nov. 17, 1987. | 1 | 1 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Bogartgreen2 sentences1987The court concluded: Given the clear indication of coverage in the declaration page of the policy, the lack of any exclusion in the exclusion portion of the policy, the non-standard nature of this other insurance clause, its location under ‘policy conditions’ and the necessity to consult the definition clause in order to determine applicability, we cannot say that the trial court erred in concluding that the exclusion relied on by State Farm was ambiguous when the policy is considered as a whole, as it must be____ ****** For similar reasons, we believe it quite clear that the clause in questio 1987The court concluded: Given the clear indication of coverage in the declaration page of the policy, the lack of any exclusion in the exclusion portion of the policy, the non-standard nature of this other insurance clause, its location under ‘policy conditions’ and the necessity to consult the definition clause in order to determine applicability, we cannot say that the trial court erred in concluding that the exclusion relied on by State Farm was ambiguous when the policy is considered as a whole, as it must be____ ****** For similar reasons, we believe it quite clear that the clause in questio | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
County of Mahnomen v. White Earth Band of Chippewa Indians
green
2 sentences1988Sparks v. Republic National Life Insurance Company, 132 Ariz. 529, 536 , 647 P.2d 1127, 1134 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1070 , 103 S.Ct. 490 , 74 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983). 1988Sparks v. Republic National Life Insurance Company, 132 Ariz. 529, 536 , 647 P.2d 1127, 1134 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1070 , 103 S.Ct. 490 , 74 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983). | 2 | 1986–1988 |
Karapinka v. Union Carbide Corp.
green
2 sentences1988Sparks v. Republic National Life Insurance Company, 132 Ariz. 529, 536 , 647 P.2d 1127, 1134 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1070 , 103 S.Ct. 490 , 74 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983). 1988Sparks v. Republic National Life Insurance Company, 132 Ariz. 529, 536 , 647 P.2d 1127, 1134 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1070 , 103 S.Ct. 490 , 74 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983). | 2 | 1986–1988 |
Green Acres Trust v. London
green
1 sentence2004Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586 (1977)) (emphasis added). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Cochise County v. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System
green
2 sentences1994A.R.S. § 41-1030; Cochise County, 170 Ariz. at 445 , 825 P.2d at 970 ; Havasu Heights Ranch & Dev. 1994A.R.S. § 41-1030; Cochise County, 170 Ariz. at 445 , 825 P.2d at 970 ; Havasu Heights Ranch & Dev. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Anderson
green
2 sentences1991Anderson, 96 Ariz. at 131 , 392 P.2d at 790 . 1991Anderson, 96 Ariz. at 131 , 392 P.2d at 790 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
In Re WINSHIP
green
2 sentences1988Quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1075-76 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring), for the proposition that factfinders can seldom if ever “acquire unassailably accurate knowledge” and, at best, “can [only] acquire ... a belief of what probably happened,” the court held that the instruction was incorrect. 1988Quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1075-76 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring), for the proposition that factfinders can seldom if ever “acquire unassailably accurate knowledge” and, at best, “can [only] acquire ... a belief of what probably happened,” the court held that the instruction was incorrect. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Gordinier v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
green
1 sentence1987The court concluded: Given the clear indication of coverage in the declaration page of the policy, the lack of any exclusion in the exclusion portion of the policy, the non-standard nature of this other insurance clause, its location under ‘policy conditions’ and the necessity to consult the definition clause in order to determine applicability, we cannot say that the trial court erred in concluding that the exclusion relied on by State Farm was ambiguous when the policy is considered as a whole, as it must be____ ****** For similar reasons, we believe it quite clear that the clause in questio | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Arizona Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. O'Malley Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences1985In Homes and Son Construction Co., Inc. v. Bolo Corporation, 22 Ariz.App. 303 , 526 P.2d 1258 (1974), the court, citing Arizona Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. O’Malley Lumber Co., 14 Ariz.App. 486 , 484 P.2d 639 (1971), stated: “We start with the definition that a claim is liquidated ‘if the evidence furnishes data which, if believed, makes it possible to compute the amount with exactness, without reliance upon opinion or discretion.’ ” 22 Ariz.App. at 306, 526 P.2d 1261 . 1985In Homes and Son Construction Co., Inc. v. Bolo Corporation, 22 Ariz.App. 303 , 526 P.2d 1258 (1974), the court, citing Arizona Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. O’Malley Lumber Co., 14 Ariz.App. 486 , 484 P.2d 639 (1971), stated: “We start with the definition that a claim is liquidated ‘if the evidence furnishes data which, if believed, makes it possible to compute the amount with exactness, without reliance upon opinion or discretion.’ ” 22 Ariz.App. at 306, 526 P.2d 1261 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Homes & Son Construction Co., Inc. v. Bolo Corp.
green
2 sentences1985In Homes and Son Construction Co., Inc. v. Bolo Corporation, 22 Ariz.App. 303 , 526 P.2d 1258 (1974), the court, citing Arizona Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. O’Malley Lumber Co., 14 Ariz.App. 486 , 484 P.2d 639 (1971), stated: “We start with the definition that a claim is liquidated ‘if the evidence furnishes data which, if believed, makes it possible to compute the amount with exactness, without reliance upon opinion or discretion.’ ” 22 Ariz.App. at 306, 526 P.2d 1261 . 1985In Homes and Son Construction Co., Inc. v. Bolo Corporation, 22 Ariz.App. 303 , 526 P.2d 1258 (1974), the court, citing Arizona Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. O’Malley Lumber Co., 14 Ariz.App. 486 , 484 P.2d 639 (1971), stated: “We start with the definition that a claim is liquidated ‘if the evidence furnishes data which, if believed, makes it possible to compute the amount with exactness, without reliance upon opinion or discretion.’ ” 22 Ariz.App. at 306, 526 P.2d 1261 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences1974A defendant who passively observes in a state of complete incomprehension the complex wheels of justice grind on before him can hardly be said to have satisfied the classic definition of a waiver as “the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right.” City of Tucson v. Koerber, 82 Ariz. 347 , 313 P.2d 411 (1957); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1937). 1974A defendant who passively observes in a state of complete incomprehension the complex wheels of justice grind on before him can hardly be said to have satisfied the classic definition of a waiver as “the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right.” City of Tucson v. Koerber, 82 Ariz. 347 , 313 P.2d 411 (1957); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1937). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
City of Tucson v. Koerber
green
2 sentences1974A defendant who passively observes in a state of complete incomprehension the complex wheels of justice grind on before him can hardly be said to have satisfied the classic definition of a waiver as “the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right.” City of Tucson v. Koerber, 82 Ariz. 347 , 313 P.2d 411 (1957); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1937). 1974A defendant who passively observes in a state of complete incomprehension the complex wheels of justice grind on before him can hardly be said to have satisfied the classic definition of a waiver as “the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right.” City of Tucson v. Koerber, 82 Ariz. 347 , 313 P.2d 411 (1957); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1937). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
United States v. 62 Cases, More or Less, Containing Six Jars of Jam, Etc
green
1 sentence1959The court then quoted with approval from United States v. 62 Cases, etc., 10 Cir., 183 F.2d 1014, 1018 , in which it was said: "If it is sold under a name of a food for which a definition and standard has been prescribed, if it looks and tastes like such a food, if it is bought, sold and ordered as such a food, and if it is served to customers as such a food, then it purports to be, and is represented to be, such a food.” We believe this quotation constitutes a fair test of the question of fraud in such cases. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.