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26 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1961–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fla. Optometric Ass'n v. DEPT. OF PRO. REG., BD. OF OPTICIANRYgreen2 sentences2015When an agency is called upon to issue a declaratory statement ... which would'require a response of -such a general and consistent nature as to meet the definition of a rule, the agency should either decline to issue the statement or comply with the provisions of Section 120.54 governing rulemaking, 567 So.2d at 937 (emphasis in original). 1995In Florida Optometric Association v. Department of Professional Regulation, 567 So.2d 928, 937 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), we said: When an agency is called upon to issue a declaratory statement in response to a question which is not limited to specific facts and a specific petitioner, and which would require a response of such a general and consistent nature as to meet the definition of a rule, the agency should either decline to issue the statement or comply with the provisions of Section 120.54 governing rulemaking. | 2 | 2 |
Raymond James Financial v. Saldukasgreen2 sentences2005Servs., Inc. v. Saldukas, 896 So.2d 707, 711 (Fla.2005), that Sunbeam has waived its own right to insist upon its agreement with Clear Channel's proposal. 2005Servs., Inc. v. Saldukas, 896 So.2d 707, 711 (Fla.2005), that Sunbeam has waived its own right to insist upon its agreement with Clear Channel’s proposal. | 2 | 2 |
Barber v. Pagegreen2 sentences2024See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (“To suggest that failure to cross-examine [a witness at a preliminary hearing] constitutes a waiver of the right of confrontation at a subsequent trial hardly comports with this Court’s definition of a waiver[.]”). 2008Under the circumstances of this case, the failure in this regard does not comport with the definition of waiver, i.e., "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). *156 Additionally, we conclude that the mere existence of rule 3.190(j) does not provide defendants with a "prior opportunity" for cross-examination, as explained in Crawford . | 1 | 3 |
Coventry First, LLC v. State, Office of Insurance Regulationgreen1 sentence2018Regulation, 38 So. 3d 200, 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (quoting Dep’t of Revenue v. Vanjaria Enters., Inc., 675 So. 2d 252, 255 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)). | 1 | 1 |
Department of Revenue v. Vanjaria Enterprisesgreen1 sentence2018Regulation, 38 So. 3d 200, 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (quoting Dep’t of Revenue v. Vanjaria Enters., Inc., 675 So. 2d 252, 255 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)). | 1 | 1 |
Department of Highway Safety v. Schlutergreen1 sentence2014A "rule” is "each agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy.” § 120.52(16), Fla. Stat.; see also Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Schluter, 705 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (holding that policies governing employee misconduct that applied without exception were unadopt-ed rules); McCarthy v. Dep’t of Ins. and Treasurer, 479 So.2d 135 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (holding that a letter from the fire marshal setting out requirements for obtaining fire inspector certification constituted an una-dopted rule); Dep’t of Admin. v. Harvey, 356 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Basilieregreen1 sentence2008To suggest that failure to cross-examine in such circumstances constitutes a waiver of the right of confrontation at a subsequent trial hardly comports with this Court's definition of a waiver as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Id. at 725 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)); see also State v. Basiliere, 353 So.2d 820, 824 (Fla.1977) (concluding that defendant did not waive *910 his constitutional right of confrontation because, at the time of deposition, the defendant had no idea tha | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State, Dept. of Admin., Etc., Person. v. Harvey
green
2 sentences2014A "rule” is "each agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy.” § 120.52(16), Fla. Stat.; see also Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Schluter, 705 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (holding that policies governing employee misconduct that applied without exception were unadopt-ed rules); McCarthy v. Dep’t of Ins. and Treasurer, 479 So.2d 135 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (holding that a letter from the fire marshal setting out requirements for obtaining fire inspector certification constituted an una-dopted rule); Dep’t of Admin. v. Harvey, 356 1985State, Department of Administration v. Harvey, 356 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Price Wise Buying Group v. Nuzum, 343 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). | 4 | 1980–2014 |
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences2008Under the circumstances of this case, the failure in this regard does not comport with the definition of waiver, i.e., "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). *156 Additionally, we conclude that the mere existence of rule 3.190(j) does not provide defendants with a "prior opportunity" for cross-examination, as explained in Crawford . 2008Under the circumstances of this case, the failure in this regard does not comport with the definition of waiver, i.e., "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). *156 Additionally, we conclude that the mere existence of rule 3.190(j) does not provide defendants with a "prior opportunity" for cross-examination, as explained in Crawford . | 3 | 1977–2008 |
STATE, DEPT. OF ADMINSTRATION v. Stevens
green
2 sentences2014A "rule” is "each agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy.” § 120.52(16), Fla. Stat.; see also Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Schluter, 705 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (holding that policies governing employee misconduct that applied without exception were unadopt-ed rules); McCarthy v. Dep’t of Ins. and Treasurer, 479 So.2d 135 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (holding that a letter from the fire marshal setting out requirements for obtaining fire inspector certification constituted an una-dopted rule); Dep’t of Admin. v. Harvey, 356 1980State, Dept. of Com., Etc. v. Matthews Corp., 358 So.2d 256 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); State, Dept. of Admin., Etc., Person. v. Harvey, 356 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); State, Dept. of Administration v. Stevens, 344 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). | 2 | 1980–2014 |
Price Wise Buying Group v. Nuzum
green
2 sentences1985State, Department of Administration v. Harvey, 356 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Price Wise Buying Group v. Nuzum, 343 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). 1985State, Department of Administration v. Harvey, 356 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Price Wise Buying Group v. Nuzum, 343 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). | 2 | 1985–1985 |
GRABBA-LEAF, LLC v. Department of Business and Professional etc.
green
1 sentence2026“If an agency statement meets the definition of a rule, but hasn’t been adopted as a rule under chapter 120, then it is considered an unadopted rule.” Id. (citation modified). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
McCarthy v. Dept. of Ins. & Treasurer
green
1 sentence2014A "rule” is "each agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy.” § 120.52(16), Fla. Stat.; see also Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Schluter, 705 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (holding that policies governing employee misconduct that applied without exception were unadopt-ed rules); McCarthy v. Dep’t of Ins. and Treasurer, 479 So.2d 135 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (holding that a letter from the fire marshal setting out requirements for obtaining fire inspector certification constituted an una-dopted rule); Dep’t of Admin. v. Harvey, 356 | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
1 sentence2008Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Capeletti Bros., Inc. v. STATE DEPT. OF TRANSP.
green
1 sentence2007Section 120.52(15)(b) states that the term rule does not include: “Legal memoranda or opinions issued to an agency by the Attorney General or agency legal opinions pri- or to their use in connection with an agency action.” Id. (emphasis added). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Dept. of Transp. v. Blackhawk Quarry Co. of Fla., Inc.
green
1 sentence2003Thus the COA form meets the definition of a rule under chapter 120. 5 See Dep’t of Transp. v. Blackhawk Quarry of Fla., Inc., 528 So.2d 447 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Gaylord
green
1 sentence2002We agree with the district court in Young that the definition provided in the standard jury instruction is erroneous and that the definition should be that "[m]alice means ill will, hatred, spite, an evil intent." Gaylord, 356 So.2d at 314 . [2] We also agree that using the inaccurate definition provided in the standard jury instruction "reduc[ed] the state's burden of proof on an essential element of the offense charged." Young, 753 So.2d at 729 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
United States v. Ross
green
2 sentences2002Probably the most important decision of the United States Supreme Court for guidance in the instant action is United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). 2002Probably the most important decision of the United States Supreme Court for guidance in the instant action is United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Young v. State
green
1 sentence2002We agree with the district court in Young that the definition provided in the standard jury instruction is erroneous and that the definition should be that "[m]alice means ill will, hatred, spite, an evil intent." Gaylord, 356 So.2d at 314 . [2] We also agree that using the inaccurate definition provided in the standard jury instruction "reduc[ed] the state's burden of proof on an essential element of the offense charged." Young, 753 So.2d at 729 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State, Dept. of Ins. v. Keys Title
green
1 sentence2001Keys Title, 741 So.2d at 602 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
McDonald v. Dept. of Banking and Finance
green
1 sentence1989Although the definition of a rule "`obviously could be read literally to encompass virtually any utterance by an agency,'" [2] nevertheless, to do so makes it impossible for an agency to "wisely sharpen its purposes through adjudication before casting rules." Id. at 581 (citing Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 Harv.L.Rev. 921, 927 (1965)). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Thomas v. State
green
1 sentence1989In Thomas v. State, 531 So.2d 708 (Fla. 1988), the court overruled previous decisions that distinguished between common and uncommon devices as burglary tools. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Webster v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist.
green
1 sentence1984Thus, we decline the District's suggestion to reconsider our prior holding in Webster v. South Florida Management District, 367 So.2d 734 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Dept. of Revenue v. US Sugar Corp.
green
1 sentence1981We agree with the hearing officer's conclusion that the statement is one of general applicability that implements, interprets or prescribes law, policy, procedure or practice requirements of the agency and falls squarely within the definition of a rule as defined by § 120.52(14), Florida Statutes (1977). [citations omitted] 388 So.2d at 598 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
STATE, DEPT. OF COM., ETC. v. Matthews Corp.
green
1 sentence1980State, Dept. of Com., Etc. v. Matthews Corp., 358 So.2d 256 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); State, Dept. of Admin., Etc., Person. v. Harvey, 356 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); State, Dept. of Administration v. Stevens, 344 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Brookhart v. Janis
green
2 sentences1977To suggest that failure to cross-examine in such circumstances constitutes a waiver of the right of confrontation at a subsequent trial hardly comports with this Court's definition of a waiver as `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S.Ct. 1245 , 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966)." 1977To suggest that failure to cross-examine in such circumstances constitutes a waiver of the right of confrontation at a subsequent trial hardly comports with this Court's definition of a waiver as `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S.Ct. 1245 , 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966)." | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Hime v. Florida Real Estate Commission
green
1 sentence1974In Hime v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 61 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1952), it was stated that the Legislature of this State has held administrative boards to strict requirements of due process. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Baggett v. Davis
green
1 sentence1961In the majority opinion the case of Baggett v. Davis, 169 So. 372 , supra, is cited in support of the definition of the exception to the rule involved here. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.