17 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1929–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Herman v. Division of Special Revenuegreen2 sentences2000Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990); see Herman v. Division of Special Revenue, 193 Conn. 379, 383 , 477 A.2d 119 (1984); Rybinski v. State Employees’ Retirement Commission, 173 Conn. 462, 469-70 , 378 A.2d 547 (1977); see also Trost v. Conservation Commission, 242 Conn. 335, 336, 340 , 698 A.2d 832 (1997) (construing same language of § 8-8 [n] in General Statutes § 22a-43 [c]). 2000Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990); see Herman v. Division of Special Revenue, 193 Conn. 379, 383 , 477 A.2d 119 (1984); Rybinski v. State Employees’ Retirement Commission, 173 Conn. 462, 469-70 , 378 A.2d 547 (1977); see also Trost v. Conservation Commission, 242 Conn. 335, 336, 340 , 698 A.2d 832 (1997) (construing same language of § 8-8 [n] in General Statutes § 22a-43 [c]). | 2 | 2 |
Trost v. Conservation Commissiongreen2 sentences2000Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990); see Herman v. Division of Special Revenue, 193 Conn. 379, 383 , 477 A.2d 119 (1984); Rybinski v. State Employees’ Retirement Commission, 173 Conn. 462, 469-70 , 378 A.2d 547 (1977); see also Trost v. Conservation Commission, 242 Conn. 335, 336, 340 , 698 A.2d 832 (1997) (construing same language of § 8-8 [n] in General Statutes § 22a-43 [c]). 2000Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990); see Herman v. Division of Special Revenue, 193 Conn. 379, 383 , 477 A.2d 119 (1984); Rybinski v. State Employees’ Retirement Commission, 173 Conn. 462, 469-70 , 378 A.2d 547 (1977); see also Trost v. Conservation Commission, 242 Conn. 335, 336, 340 , 698 A.2d 832 (1997) (construing same language of § 8-8 [n] in General Statutes § 22a-43 [c]). | 2 | 2 |
McCoy v. Commissioner of Public Safetygreen2 sentences2023Workers’ Compensation Act’’); see also, e.g., McCoy v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 300 Conn. 144, 156 , 12 A.3d 948 (2011) (‘‘[b]ecause the legislature has not defined motor vehicle violation, but has defined violation, we conclude that it is reasonable to apply the definition of violation to the phrase motor vehicle vio- lation’’). 2023Workers’ Compensation Act’’); see also, e.g., McCoy v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 300 Conn. 144, 156 , 12 A.3d 948 (2011) (‘‘[b]ecause the legislature has not defined motor vehicle violation, but has defined violation, we conclude that it is reasonable to apply the definition of violation to the phrase motor vehicle vio- lation’’). | 1 | 1 |
International Business MacHines Corporation v. Browngreen2 sentences2011See Rainforest Cafe, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue Services, 293 Conn. 363, 373 , 977 A.2d 650 (2009) ("[i]t is axiomatic that this statutory definition is binding on our courts"); see also General Statutes § 1-2z ("[t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes"); International Business Machines Corp. v. Brown, 167 Conn. 123, 134 , 355 A.2d 236 (1974) ("[w]hen legislation contains a specific definition, the courts are bound to accept that definition"). 2011See Rainforest Cafe, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue Services, 293 Conn. 363, 373 , 977 A.2d 650 (2009) ("[i]t is axiomatic that this statutory definition is binding on our courts"); see also General Statutes § 1-2z ("[t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes"); International Business Machines Corp. v. Brown, 167 Conn. 123, 134 , 355 A.2d 236 (1974) ("[w]hen legislation contains a specific definition, the courts are bound to accept that definition"). | 1 | 1 |
Rainforest Cafe, Inc. v. Department of Revenue Servicesgreen2 sentences2011See Rainforest Cafe, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue Services, 293 Conn. 363, 373 , 977 A.2d 650 (2009) ("[i]t is axiomatic that this statutory definition is binding on our courts"); see also General Statutes § 1-2z ("[t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes"); International Business Machines Corp. v. Brown, 167 Conn. 123, 134 , 355 A.2d 236 (1974) ("[w]hen legislation contains a specific definition, the courts are bound to accept that definition"). 2011See Rainforest Cafe, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue Services, 293 Conn. 363, 373 , 977 A.2d 650 (2009) ("[i]t is axiomatic that this statutory definition is binding on our courts"); see also General Statutes § 1-2z ("[t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes"); International Business Machines Corp. v. Brown, 167 Conn. 123, 134 , 355 A.2d 236 (1974) ("[w]hen legislation contains a specific definition, the courts are bound to accept that definition"). | 1 | 1 |
Schneckloth v. Bustamontegreen2 sentences1986Ed. 1461 (1938), the United States Supreme Court articulated the classic definition of waiver, stating a “waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” An effective waiver presupposes full knowledge of the right or privilege allegedly waived and some act “done designedly or knowingly to relinquish it.” State v. Toste, 178 Conn. 626, 630 , 424 A.2d 293 (1979); see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 238 , 93 S. Ct. 2041 , 36 L. 1986Ed. 1461 (1938), the United States Supreme Court articulated the classic definition of waiver, stating a “waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” An effective waiver presupposes full knowledge of the right or privilege allegedly waived and some act “done designedly or knowingly to relinquish it.” State v. Toste, 178 Conn. 626, 630 , 424 A.2d 293 (1979); see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 238 , 93 S. Ct. 2041 , 36 L. | 1 | 1 |
Brady v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1982Ed. 1461 (1938), the United States Supreme Court articulated a classic definition of waiver in stating that it was ordinarily “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” We have said that “[a] valid waiver of a constitutional right . . . must be knowing and intelligent, accomplished with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” State v. Reed, 174 Conn. 287, 293 , 386 A.2d 243 (1978); see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 , 90 S. Ct. 1463 , 25 L. 1982Ed. 1461 (1938), the United States Supreme Court articulated a classic definition of waiver in stating that it was ordinarily “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” We have said that “[a] valid waiver of a constitutional right . . . must be knowing and intelligent, accomplished with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” State v. Reed, 174 Conn. 287, 293 , 386 A.2d 243 (1978); see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 , 90 S. Ct. 1463 , 25 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rybinski v. State Employees' Retirement Commission
green
2 sentences2001The Appellate Court most recently found that a bearing is "any oral proceeding before a tribunal." Tevolini v. Tevolini 66 Conn. App. 16 , (October 2, 2001), citing Rybinski v. State Employee's Retirement Commission, 173 Conn. 462 , 470 (1977). 2000Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990); see Herman v. Division of Special Revenue, 193 Conn. 379, 383 , 477 A.2d 119 (1984); Rybinski v. State Employees’ Retirement Commission, 173 Conn. 462, 469-70 , 378 A.2d 547 (1977); see also Trost v. Conservation Commission, 242 Conn. 335, 336, 340 , 698 A.2d 832 (1997) (construing same language of § 8-8 [n] in General Statutes § 22a-43 [c]). | 3 | 1999–2001 |
Reyes v. City of Bridgeport
neutral
2 sentences2018Our Supreme Court has stated that [a] hearing can be a proceeding in the nature of a trial with the presentation of evidence, it can be merely for the purpose of presenting arguments, or, of course, it can be a combination of the two." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Reyes v. Bridgeport , 134 Conn. App. 422 , 427-28, 39 A.3d 771 (2012). 2018Our Supreme Court has stated that [a] hearing can be a proceeding in the nature of a trial with the presentation of evidence, it can be merely for the purpose of presenting arguments, or, of course, it can be a combination of the two." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Reyes v. Bridgeport , 134 Conn. App. 422 , 427-28, 39 A.3d 771 (2012). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State Ex Rel. Gregan v. Koczur
green
1 sentence2015Gregan v. Koczur, supra, 287 Conn. 145 , stated that § 22-329a does not contain a definition or standard of neglect, but rather incorporates by reference specific statutes, and concluded that the neglect referred to in § 22-329a includes the failure to provide protection from the weather, as provided in § 53-247. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Dietzel v. Planning Commission
green
2 sentences2012We begin by considering the common, generally understood meaning of the term “hearing.” “We consistently have acknowledged the definition of a hearing provided in Black’s Law Dictionary, as [a] proceeding of relative formality . . . generally public, with definite issues of fact or of law to be tried, in which witnesses are heard and evidence presented, and in which parties to a dispute have a right to be heard.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dietzel v. Planning Commission, 60 Conn. App. 153, 160-61 , 758 A.2d 906 (2000), citing Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). 2012We begin by considering the common, generally understood meaning of the term “hearing.” “We consistently have acknowledged the definition of a hearing provided in Black’s Law Dictionary, as [a] proceeding of relative formality . . . generally public, with definite issues of fact or of law to be tried, in which witnesses are heard and evidence presented, and in which parties to a dispute have a right to be heard.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dietzel v. Planning Commission, 60 Conn. App. 153, 160-61 , 758 A.2d 906 (2000), citing Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Kluttz
green
2 sentences2011The plaintiff relies, however, on the 1987 Appellate Court decision in State v. Kluttz, 9 Conn.App. 686 , 521 A.2d 178 (1987). 2011The plaintiff relies, however, on the 1987 Appellate Court decision in State v. Kluttz, 9 Conn.App. 686 , 521 A.2d 178 (1987). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Dornfried v. October Twenty-Four, Inc.
green
1 sentence2002In Dornfried v. October Twenty-Four, Inc ., 230 Conn. 622 (1994), our Supreme Court set forth the definition and standard for the doctrine of municipal estoppel as follows: The law of equitable estoppel as applied to municipalities in the enforcement of zoning laws is well established. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Zoning Commission v. Lescynski
green
2 sentences2002"In Zoning Commission v. Lescynski , 188 Conn. 724 , 731-32 , 453 A.2d 1144 (1982), we held that, in special circumstances, a municipality may be estopped from enforcing its zoning regulations. 2002"In Zoning Commission v. Lescynski , 188 Conn. 724 , 731-32 , 453 A.2d 1144 (1982), we held that, in special circumstances, a municipality may be estopped from enforcing its zoning regulations. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Tevolini v. Tevolini
green
1 sentence2001The Appellate Court most recently found that a bearing is "any oral proceeding before a tribunal." Tevolini v. Tevolini 66 Conn. App. 16 , (October 2, 2001), citing Rybinski v. State Employee's Retirement Commission, 173 Conn. 462 , 470 (1977). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
cluster 501726
green
1 sentence2001Robins Co., Inc ., 839 F.2d 198 , 200 (CA. 4, 1988), the court said: "While the importance of § 362 cannot be overemphasized, its coverage extends only to claims against the debtor that arose prior to the filing of the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (4), as pertinent, defines a claim to be a (A) right to a payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured." The Grady court went on to point out that "Congress intended that the definition of claim in the code be as br | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Paulsen v. Manson
green
2 sentences1995Paulsen v. Manson, 203 Conn. 484, 489 , 525 A.2d 1315 (1987). 1995Paulsen v. Manson, 203 Conn. 484, 489 , 525 A.2d 1315 (1987). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Toste
green
2 sentences1986Ed. 1461 (1938), the United States Supreme Court articulated the classic definition of waiver, stating a “waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” An effective waiver presupposes full knowledge of the right or privilege allegedly waived and some act “done designedly or knowingly to relinquish it.” State v. Toste, 178 Conn. 626, 630 , 424 A.2d 293 (1979); see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 238 , 93 S. Ct. 2041 , 36 L. 1986Ed. 1461 (1938), the United States Supreme Court articulated the classic definition of waiver, stating a “waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” An effective waiver presupposes full knowledge of the right or privilege allegedly waived and some act “done designedly or knowingly to relinquish it.” State v. Toste, 178 Conn. 626, 630 , 424 A.2d 293 (1979); see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 238 , 93 S. Ct. 2041 , 36 L. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Fay v. Noia
red
2 sentences1984Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 , 83 S. Ct. 822 , 9 L. 1984Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 , 83 S. Ct. 822 , 9 L. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences1982Ed. 2d 747 (1970). “ ‘[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights and . . . ‘do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’ ” (Citations omitted.) Johnson v. Zerbst, supra. In addition, a waiver of a fundamental constitutional right is not to be presumed from a silent record. 1982Ed. 2d 747 (1970). "`[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights and ... `do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.'" (Citations omitted.) Johnson v. Zerbst, supra. In addition, a waiver of a fundamental constitutional right is not to be presumed from a silent record. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Reed
green
2 sentences1982Ed. 1461 (1938), the United States Supreme Court articulated a classic definition of waiver in stating that it was ordinarily “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” We have said that “[a] valid waiver of a constitutional right . . . must be knowing and intelligent, accomplished with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” State v. Reed, 174 Conn. 287, 293 , 386 A.2d 243 (1978); see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 , 90 S. Ct. 1463 , 25 L. 1982Ed. 1461 (1938), the United States Supreme Court articulated a classic definition of waiver in stating that it was ordinarily “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” We have said that “[a] valid waiver of a constitutional right . . . must be knowing and intelligent, accomplished with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” State v. Reed, 174 Conn. 287, 293 , 386 A.2d 243 (1978); see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 , 90 S. Ct. 1463 , 25 L. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Sherwood v. City of Bridgeport
green
2 sentences1971Sherwood v. Bridgeport, 123 Conn. 348, 353 , 195 A. 744 . 1971Sherwood v. Bridgeport, 123 Conn. 348, 353 , 195 A. 744 . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Durham v. United States
green
1 sentence1968Some ten years ago, an attempt was made to induce this court to adopt a definition or test of insanity which at that time had recently been promulgated by the United States Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in the case of Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
State v. Marx
green
2 sentences1929State v. McGuire, *308 84 Conn. 470, 485 , 80 Atl. 761 ; State v. Marx, 78 Conn. 18, 23 , 60 Atl. 690 ; State v. Williams, 90 Conn. 126, 129 , 96 Atl. 370 ; Malice Aforethought, Justice Curtis, 19 Yale Law Journal, 639, 644. 1929State v. McGuire, *308 84 Conn. 470, 485 , 80 Atl. 761 ; State v. Marx, 78 Conn. 18, 23 , 60 Atl. 690 ; State v. Williams, 90 Conn. 126, 129 , 96 Atl. 370 ; Malice Aforethought, Justice Curtis, 19 Yale Law Journal, 639, 644. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
State v. McGuire
green
2 sentences1929State v. McGuire, *308 84 Conn. 470, 485 , 80 Atl. 761 ; State v. Marx, 78 Conn. 18, 23 , 60 Atl. 690 ; State v. Williams, 90 Conn. 126, 129 , 96 Atl. 370 ; Malice Aforethought, Justice Curtis, 19 Yale Law Journal, 639, 644. 1929State v. McGuire, *308 84 Conn. 470, 485 , 80 Atl. 761 ; State v. Marx, 78 Conn. 18, 23 , 60 Atl. 690 ; State v. Williams, 90 Conn. 126, 129 , 96 Atl. 370 ; Malice Aforethought, Justice Curtis, 19 Yale Law Journal, 639, 644. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
State v. Williams
neutral
2 sentences1929State v. McGuire, *308 84 Conn. 470, 485 , 80 Atl. 761 ; State v. Marx, 78 Conn. 18, 23 , 60 Atl. 690 ; State v. Williams, 90 Conn. 126, 129 , 96 Atl. 370 ; Malice Aforethought, Justice Curtis, 19 Yale Law Journal, 639, 644. 1929State v. McGuire, *308 84 Conn. 470, 485 , 80 Atl. 761 ; State v. Marx, 78 Conn. 18, 23 , 60 Atl. 690 ; State v. Williams, 90 Conn. 126, 129 , 96 Atl. 370 ; Malice Aforethought, Justice Curtis, 19 Yale Law Journal, 639, 644. | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.