10 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1965–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. LHgreen2 sentences2016By not applying here the Supreme Court's definition and analysis in Rumblin, the majority opinion prevents the prosecution of all other accomplices, co-conspirators, and masterminds when DNA analysis cracks "dormant or 'cold' cases." See State v. L.H., 206 N.J. 528, 532 (2011) (Long, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 550 (Rivera-Soto, J., concurring)).8 This ruling will significantly limit the ability to use N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) to prosecute cold cases. 2016By not applying here the Supreme Court's definition and analysis in Rumblin, the majority opinion prevents the prosecution of all other accomplices, co-conspirators, and masterminds when DNA analysis cracks "dormant or 'cold' cases." See State v. L.H., 206 N.J. 528, 532 (2011) (Long, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 550 (Rivera-Soto, J., concurring)).8 This ruling will significantly limit the ability to use N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) to prosecute cold cases. | 1 | 1 |
Wick v. Arnoldgreen1 sentence2016See State v. Michaels, 219 N.J. 1, 48 (considering the "real likelihood that . . . dilemmas may arise in cold cases" as a reason not to apply the Confrontation Clause rigidly), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 761 , 190 L. | 1 | 1 |
Arreguin v. Holdergreen1 sentence2016See State v. Michaels, 219 N.J. 1, 48 (considering the "real likelihood that . . . dilemmas may arise in cold cases" as a reason not to apply the Confrontation Clause rigidly), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 761 , 190 L. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Julie L. Michaels (072106)green1 sentence2016See State v. Michaels, 219 N.J. 1, 48 (considering the "real likelihood that . . . dilemmas may arise in cold cases" as a reason not to apply the Confrontation Clause rigidly), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 761 , 190 L. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gardnergreen2 sentences1992Super. 479 [ 174 A. 2d 506 ] (1961), where the Appellate Division correctly said that although the burden is upon a defendant to adduce evidence to support the defense, yet if such evidence appears either in the State's case or upon the defendant's case, the issue must be left to the jury with this instruction: that the burden is upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense is untrue, and hence there must be an acquittal if there is a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant did act in self-defense within the definition of that defense. [ Id. ]. *193 See also State v. Kel 1992Super. 479 [ 174 A. 2d 506 ] (1961), where the Appellate Division correctly said that although the burden is upon a defendant to adduce evidence to support the defense, yet if such evidence appears either in the State's case or upon the defendant's case, the issue must be left to the jury with this instruction: that the burden is upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense is untrue, and hence there must be an acquittal if there is a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant did act in self-defense within the definition of that defense. [ Id. ]. *193 See also State v. Kel | 1 | 1 |
State v. Abbottgreen1 sentence1974The argument advanced is that the jury was not instructed on the burden of proof as directed in State v. Abbott, 36 N.J. 63, 72-73 (1961): * * * if such evidence [of self-defense] appears either in the State's case or upon the defendant's case, the issue must be left to the jury with this instruction: that the burden is upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense is untrue, and hence there must be an acquittal if there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant did act in self-defense within the definition of that defense. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Chiarello
green
2 sentences1992Super. 479 [ 174 A. 2d 506 ] (1961), where the Appellate Division correctly said that although the burden is upon a defendant to adduce evidence to support the defense, yet if such evidence appears either in the State's case or upon the defendant's case, the issue must be left to the jury with this instruction: that the burden is upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense is untrue, and hence there must be an acquittal if there is a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant did act in self-defense within the definition of that defense. [ Id. ]. *193 See also State v. Kel 1992Super. 479 [ 174 A. 2d 506 ] (1961), where the Appellate Division correctly said that although the burden is upon a defendant to adduce evidence to support the defense, yet if such evidence appears either in the State's case or upon the defendant's case, the issue must be left to the jury with this instruction: that the burden is upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense is untrue, and hence there must be an acquittal if there is a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant did act in self-defense within the definition of that defense. [ Id. ]. *193 See also State v. Kel | 2 | 1991–1992 |
Shebar v. Sanyo Business Systems Corp.
green
1 sentence2024Ibid. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Holzman
neutral
2 sentences1992As to pathological intoxication, the Holzman court found no evidence that the defendant met the definition of this defense, which it defined as "a severe intoxication which the actor had no reason to expect which happened because of some underlying organic condition." Id. at 594 , 424 A. 2d 454 . 1992As to pathological intoxication, the Holzman court found no evidence that the defendant met the definition of this defense, which it defined as "a severe intoxication which the actor had no reason to expect which happened because of some underlying organic condition." Id. at 594 , 424 A. 2d 454 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Burks
green
1 sentence1992Once proof appears either in the State's case or defendant's case in support of an allegation of self-defense, the State has the burden of proving that the defense is untrue."); State v. Burks, 208 N.J. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Natividad
green
2 sentences1992"A defendant who passively observes in a state of complete incomprehension the complex wheels of justice grind on before him can hardly be said to have satisfied the classic definition of a waiver as the `voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right.'" State v. Natividad, supra, 111 Ariz. at 194 , 526 P. 2d at 733 . 1992"A defendant who passively observes in a state of complete incomprehension the complex wheels of justice grind on before him can hardly be said to have satisfied the classic definition of a waiver as the `voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right.'" State v. Natividad, supra, 111 Ariz. at 194 , 526 P. 2d at 733 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Kelly
green
2 sentences1992Super. 479 [ 174 A. 2d 506 ] (1961), where the Appellate Division correctly said that although the burden is upon a defendant to adduce evidence to support the defense, yet if such evidence appears either in the State's case or upon the defendant's case, the issue must be left to the jury with this instruction: that the burden is upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense is untrue, and hence there must be an acquittal if there is a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant did act in self-defense within the definition of that defense. [ Id. ]. *193 See also State v. Kel 1992Super. 479 [ 174 A. 2d 506 ] (1961), where the Appellate Division correctly said that although the burden is upon a defendant to adduce evidence to support the defense, yet if such evidence appears either in the State's case or upon the defendant's case, the issue must be left to the jury with this instruction: that the burden is upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense is untrue, and hence there must be an acquittal if there is a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant did act in self-defense within the definition of that defense. [ Id. ]. *193 See also State v. Kel | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Rosa v. Dunkin' Donuts of Passaic
green
1 sentence1991It defines work-related negligence as that "inherent in the performance of the officer's duties." Ante at 76, 583 A. 2d at 1134 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1973The second exigency was described as being “where [the officer] has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual”, regardless of probable cause ( 392 U. S. at 27 , 88 S. Ct. at 1883 ). 1973The second exigency was described as being “where [the officer] has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual”, regardless of probable cause ( 392 U. S. at 27 , 88 S. Ct. at 1883 ). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Capece v. Allstate Ins.
green
1 sentence1965Here, State Farm's policy obligated it: "To pay all damages which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay because of (A) bodily injury sustained by other persons * * * caused by accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use, * * * of the owned automobile." (Emphasis added) The definition clause of the policy provided: "NAMED INSURED means the individual so designated in the declarations and also includes his spouse, if a resident of the same household. *542 INSURED under coverages A, B, C and M, the unqualified word `insured' includes (1) the named insured, and also i | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.