Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
11 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jensengreen1 sentence2012See State v. Jensen, 2005-NMCA-113, ¶¶ 12-16 , 138 N.M. 3 254, 118 P.3d 762 (rejecting a similar claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, in 4 light of the fact that trial counsel might have elected not to request a lesser included 5 instruction as a matter of strategy and the lack of the lesser included offense 6 instruction did not rise to the level of prejudice or unjust result). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jensengreen1 sentence2012See State v. Jensen, 2005-NMCA-113, ¶¶ 12-16 , 138 N.M. 3 254, 118 P.3d 762 (rejecting a similar claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, in 4 light of the fact that trial counsel might have elected not to request a lesser included 5 instruction as a matter of strategy and the lack of the lesser included offense 6 instruction did not rise to the level of prejudice or unjust result). | 1 | 1 |
Michele A. Robb, Individually and as a Personal Representative of the Estate of Paul D. Robb v. Norfolk & Western Railway Companygreen1 sentence2008See Robb, 122 F.3d at 361-62 (collecting cases). {13} We believe the Supreme Court correctly defined “excusable neglect,” and thus, we adopt this definition as the standard for relief under Rule 1-060(B)(1). | 1 | 1 |
City of Sunland Park v. Harris News, Inc.green2 sentences2006See City of Sunland Park v. Harris News, Inc., 2005-NMCA-128, ¶ 50 , 138 N.M. 588 , 124 P.3d 566 (noting that this Court does not issue advisory opinions on hypothetical questions), cert. granted, 2005-NMCERT-011 , 138 N.M. 587 , 124 P.3d 565 . 2006See City of Sunland Park v. Harris News, Inc., 2005-NMCA-128, ¶ 50 , 138 N.M. 588 , 124 P.3d 566 (noting that this Court does not issue advisory opinions on hypothetical questions), cert. granted, 2005-NMCERT-011 , 138 N.M. 587 , 124 P.3d 565 . | 1 | 1 |
Specialty Food Systems, Inc. v. Reliance Insurancegreen1 sentence2006Co. of Ill., 45 F.Supp.2d 541, 543-44 (E.D.La.1999) (concluding that a charge of discrimination with the EEOC constituted a claim when the definition of claim included notice from “any administrative agency advising that it is the intention of a person to hold the [i]nsured responsible” for a wrongful employment practice (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), aff'd, 200 F.3d 816 (5th Cir.1999). {18} We emphasize that the policy language resolves the question in this ease, and we express no opinion about whether an EEOC or NMHRD charge of discrimination would constitute a claim where | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sosagreen2 sentences2001See State v. Sosa, 1997-NMSC-032, ¶ 29 , 123 N.M. 564 , 943 P.2d 1017 (rejecting the defendant's argument that failure to include definition of self defense within elements instruction was error). {8} Defendant next argues that the jury instructions were confusing in that they required the jury to find a "double negative," namely that Defendant failed to act without excuse or justification, and did not properly inform the jury of the act for which Defendant was being convicted. 2001See State v. Sosa, 1997-NMSC-032, ¶ 29 , 123 N.M. 564 , 943 P.2d 1017 (rejecting the defendant's argument that failure to include definition of self defense within elements instruction was error). {8} Defendant next argues that the jury instructions were confusing in that they required the jury to find a "double negative," namely that Defendant failed to act without excuse or justification, and did not properly inform the jury of the act for which Defendant was being convicted. | 1 | 1 |
Albuquerque National Bank v. Albuquerque Ranch Estates, Inc.green2 sentences1984The definition of waiver was recently reiterated in Albuquerque National Bank v. Albuquerque Ranch Estates, Inc., 99 N.M. 95, 101 , 654 P.2d 548, 554 (1982) as “[t]he intentional relinquishment of a known right or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of the right, resulting from an express agreement between the parties or which is inferred from circumstances indicating an intention to waive.” Whether an affirmative defense of waiver has been proven is a factual question for the trial judge, the determination of which will not be disturbed if based on substantial evidence 1984The definition of waiver was recently reiterated in Albuquerque National Bank v. Albuquerque Ranch Estates, Inc., 99 N.M. 95, 101 , 654 P.2d 548, 554 (1982) as “[t]he intentional relinquishment of a known right or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of the right, resulting from an express agreement between the parties or which is inferred from circumstances indicating an intention to waive.” Whether an affirmative defense of waiver has been proven is a factual question for the trial judge, the determination of which will not be disturbed if based on substantial evidence | 1 | 1 |
Cooper v. Albuquerque City Commissiongreen2 sentences1979See Rule of Civ.App.Proc. 11 and the definition of waiver in Cooper v. Albuquerque City Commission, 85 N.M. 786 , 518 P.2d 275 (1974). [3] (c) Defendants contend the trial court’s venue decision should be affirmed because the propriety of venue in Santa Fe County for the damage action depends entirely on the selection of the Bank as the conservator and the conservator’s “sole function is to create venue in Santa Fe County.” Defendants assert that “creating” a party solely for purposes of venue is improper under New Mexico law. 1979See Rule of Civ.App.Proc. 11 and the definition of waiver in Cooper v. Albuquerque City Commission, 85 N.M. 786 , 518 P.2d 275 (1974). [3] (c) Defendants contend the trial court’s venue decision should be affirmed because the propriety of venue in Santa Fe County for the damage action depends entirely on the selection of the Bank as the conservator and the conservator’s “sole function is to create venue in Santa Fe County.” Defendants assert that “creating” a party solely for purposes of venue is improper under New Mexico law. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Padilla
green
2 sentences2022In this Court’s notice of proposed disposition, we noted that, generally, “failure to give a definition instruction [cannot] be elevated to a failure to instruct on an essential element[, and] . . . a failure to instruct the jury on a definition or amplification of the elements of a crime is not error.” State v. Padilla, 1977-NMCA-055 , ¶ 5, 90 N.M. 481 , 565 P.2d 352 . 2022In this Court’s notice of proposed disposition, we noted that, generally, “failure to give a definition instruction [cannot] be elevated to a failure to instruct on an essential element[, and] . . . a failure to instruct the jury on a definition or amplification of the elements of a crime is not error.” State v. Padilla, 1977-NMCA-055 , ¶ 5, 90 N.M. 481 , 565 P.2d 352 . | 2 | 1980–2022 |
State v. Cabezuela
green
2 sentences2015Adriana Cabezuela acted intentionally may be inferred from 7 all of the surrounding circumstances, such as Adriana Cabezuela’s 8 actions or failure to act, conduct and statements. 9 (Emphasis added.) See UJI 14-610 (“Child abuse; ‘intentional’; defined.”). 10 {36} Instruction no. 4, the definition instruction for intent, tracks UJI 14-610 and 11 includes the phrase “failure to act.” Cabezuela I, 2011-NMSC-041, ¶18 . 2015(Emphasis added.) See UJI 14-610 (“Child abuse; ‘intentional’; defined.”). {36} Instruction no. 4, the definition instruction for intent, tracks UJI 14-610 and includes the phrase “failure to act.” Cabezuela I, 2011-NMSC-041, ¶18 . | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Herrera
green
2 sentences2012Defense 6 counsel did not request the district court make a ruling; instead, she merely stated she 7 was “not prepared to go forward in this manner” and that she was “providing 8 ineffective assistance of counsel.” Since the issue was not properly preserved, we do 9 not address it on appeal. 10 Defendant Did Not Have Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 11 Lastly, Defendant contends his counsel was ineffective because she failed to 12 request a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of statutory rape for the CSPM 13 charge and because she failed to request a definition instruction for “f 2012Defense 6 counsel did not request the district court make a ruling; instead, she merely stated she 7 was “not prepared to go forward in this manner” and that she was “providing 8 ineffective assistance of counsel.” Since the issue was not properly preserved, we do 9 not address it on appeal. 10 Defendant Did Not Have Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 11 Lastly, Defendant contends his counsel was ineffective because she failed to 12 request a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of statutory rape for the CSPM 13 charge and because she failed to request a definition instruction for “f | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Teaver v. Miller
green
2 sentences1979They rely on language in Teaver v. Miller, 53 N.M. 345 , 208 P.2d 156 (1949), which indicates a party whose residence determines venue must be a necessary party. 1979They rely on language in Teaver v. Miller, 53 N.M. 345 , 208 P.2d 156 (1949), which indicates a party whose residence determines venue must be a necessary party. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
State v. Fuentes
green
2 sentences1977State v. Gunzelman, supra, and State v. Fuentes, 85 N.M. 274 , 511 P.2d 760 (Ct.App.1973) state that instructions in the language of the statute are sufficient. 1977State v. Gunzelman, supra, and State v. Fuentes, 85 N.M. 274 , 511 P.2d 760 (Ct.App.1973) state that instructions in the language of the statute are sufficient. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.