Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
32 New York opinions name it 12 courts 1877–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
HD Services, LLC v. New York State Comptrollergreen2 sentences2024Matter of HD Servs., LLC v New York State Comptroller , 51 AD3d 1236, 1237-1238 [3d Dept 2008]). 2024Matter of HD Servs., LLC v New York State Comptroller , 51 AD3d 1236, 1237-1238 [3d Dept 2008]). | 2 | 2 |
Elcor Health Services, Inc. v. Novellogreen2 sentences2024However, "interpretive statements and statements of general policy which in themselves have no legal effect but are merely explanatory" are expressly exempted from the definition of a rule (State Administrative Procedure Act § 102 [2] [b] [iv]; see Matter of Elcor Health Servs., Inc. v Novello , 100 NY2d 273, 279 [2003]). 2003As such, it is an explanatory statement and a technical instruction for meeting the regulatory requirement which has no legal effect standing alone (see Matter of Elcor Health Servs. v Novello, 100 NY2d 273, 279 [2003]; National Assn. of Ind. Insurers v State of New York, 207 AD2d 191 [1994], affd 89 NY2d 950 [1997]; Leichter v Barber, 120 AD2d 776, 777 [1986]). | 2 | 2 |
Matter of Shankar (Trillium Trading, LLC)green1 sentence2026A rule has been further defined as "a fixed, general principle to be applied by an administrative agency without regard to other facts and circumstances relevant to the regulatory scheme of the statute it administers" ( Matter of Suffolk Regional Off-Track Betting Corp. v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd. , 11 NY3d 559, 572 [2008] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Matter of Shankar [Trillium Trading, LLC] , 238 AD3d 1451 , 1453 [3d Dept 2025]). | 1 | 1 |
Mrijaj v. Genting N.Y. LLCgreen2 sentences2026Even if this were not the [*2] case, we would find the claim to be lacking in merit. "[S]pecifically exempted from the definition of a rule under [SAPA] are 'forms and instructions, interpretive statements and statements of general policy which in themselves have no legal effect but are merely explanatory' " ( Matter of North Shore Hematology-Oncology Assoc., P.C. v New York State Dept. of Health , 240 AD3d 42 , 45 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 44 NY3d 904 [2025], quoting State Administrative Procedure Act § 102 [2] [b] [iv]; see Mrijaj v Genting N.Y. LLC , 235 AD3d 558 , 559 [1st Dept 2025], appe 2026Even if this were not the [*2] case, we would find the claim to be lacking in merit. "[S]pecifically exempted from the definition of a rule under [SAPA] are 'forms and instructions, interpretive statements and statements of general policy which in themselves have no legal effect but are merely explanatory' " ( Matter of North Shore Hematology-Oncology Assoc., P.C. v New York State Dept. of Health , 240 AD3d 42, 45 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 44 NY3d 904 [2025], quoting State Administrative Procedure Act § 102 [2] [b] [iv]; see Mrijaj v Genting N.Y. LLC , 235 AD3d 558, 559 [1st Dept 2025], appeal | 1 | 1 |
Suffolk Regional Off-Track Betting Corp. v. New York State Racing & Wagering Boardgreen1 sentence2026A rule has been further defined as "a fixed, general principle to be applied by an administrative agency without regard to other facts and circumstances relevant to the regulatory scheme of the statute it administers" ( Matter of Suffolk Regional Off-Track Betting Corp. v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd. , 11 NY3d 559, 572 [2008] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Matter of Shankar [Trillium Trading, LLC] , 238 AD3d 1451 , 1453 [3d Dept 2025]). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of North Shore Hematology-Oncology Assoc., P.C. v. New York State Dept. of Healthgreen2 sentences2025As we recently reiterated, "the primary difference between a rule or regulation and an interpretive statement or guideline is that the former set standards that substantially alter or, in fact, can determine the result of future agency adjudications while the latter simply provide additional detail and clarification as to how such standards are met by the public and upheld by the agency" ( Matter of North Shore Hematology-Oncology Assoc., P.C. v New York State Dept. of Health , 233 AD3d at 100 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]). 2025As we recently reiterated, "the primary difference between a rule or regulation and an interpretive statement or guideline is that the former set standards that substantially alter or, in fact, can determine the result of future agency adjudications while the latter simply provide additional detail and clarification as to how such standards are met by the public and upheld by the agency" ( Matter of North Shore Hematology-Oncology Assoc., P.C. v New York State Dept. of Health , 233 AD3d at 100 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]). | 1 | 1 |
Cubas v. Martinezgreen1 sentence2024Although "there is no clear bright line between a 'rule' or 'regulation' and an interpretative policy" ( Cubas v Martinez , 8 NY3d 611, 621 [2007]), "[t]he primary difference between a rule or regulation and an interpretive statement or guideline is that the former set standards that substantially alter or, in fact, can determine the result of future agency adjudications while the latter simply provide additional detail and clarification as to how such standards are met by the public and upheld by the agency" ( Matter of Plainview-Old Bethpage Congress of Teachers v New York State Health Ins. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Beaumontgreen1 sentence2006However, this issue is unpreserved for appellate review as it was at no time raised before County Court in defendant’s omnibus motion or otherwise, prior to his guilty plea or at sentencing; noting the absence of any reported decision on this legislation, we decline to address it in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.05 [2]; 470.15 [3] [c]; [6] [a]; People v Keebler, 15 AD3d 724, 727 [2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 854 [2005]; People v Beaumont, 299 AD2d 657, 658-659 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 580 [2003]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Keeblergreen1 sentence2006However, this issue is unpreserved for appellate review as it was at no time raised before County Court in defendant’s omnibus motion or otherwise, prior to his guilty plea or at sentencing; noting the absence of any reported decision on this legislation, we decline to address it in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.05 [2]; 470.15 [3] [c]; [6] [a]; People v Keebler, 15 AD3d 724, 727 [2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 854 [2005]; People v Beaumont, 299 AD2d 657, 658-659 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 580 [2003]). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Raquel M.green1 sentence2004Consequently, also put at risk is the requirement that the People bear the burden of establishing the defendant’s guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.” For a discussion of the burden, see Matter of Raquel M. ( 99 NY2d 92, 95-96 [2002]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pattersongreen1 sentence2004The defacto statutory imposition of a guilty plea creates the forfeiture of the benefit of the “presumption of innocence.” For a definition of the presumption and its role in the courts, see People v Patterson ( 78 NY2d 711, 716 [1991]). | 1 | 1 |
Leichter v. Barbergreen1 sentence2003As such, it is an explanatory statement and a technical instruction for meeting the regulatory requirement which has no legal effect standing alone (see Matter of Elcor Health Servs. v Novello, 100 NY2d 273, 279 [2003]; National Assn. of Ind. Insurers v State of New York, 207 AD2d 191 [1994], affd 89 NY2d 950 [1997]; Leichter v Barber, 120 AD2d 776, 777 [1986]). | 1 | 1 |
Beer Garden, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authoritygreen1 sentence1993Auth., supra, at 277), 18 NYCRR 352.5 (d) is invalid to the extent it excludes the additional costs of meals for persons unable to prepare meals at home from the definition of standard of need. | 1 | 1 |
Estin v. Estingreen1 sentence1975Pursuant to various paragraphs of CPLR 3211 (subd [a]), defendant has moved to dismiss the action and plaintiff opposes the motion relying upon the doctrine of "divisible divorce.” A leading text on matrimonial practice sets forth the following definition of the doctrine of "divisible divorce”: "In brief, if a divorce judgment determines incidental rights of marriage along with an adjudication of the marital status, the adjudication of the incidental rights need not be given full faith and credit in other states if the person whose rights were adjudicated was not subjected to the personam powe | 1 | 1 |
Estin v. Estingreen1 sentence1975Pursuant to various paragraphs of CPLR 3211 (subd [a]), defendant has moved to dismiss the action and plaintiff opposes the motion relying upon the doctrine of "divisible divorce.” A leading text on matrimonial practice sets forth the following definition of the doctrine of "divisible divorce”: "In brief, if a divorce judgment determines incidental rights of marriage along with an adjudication of the marital status, the adjudication of the incidental rights need not be given full faith and credit in other states if the person whose rights were adjudicated was not subjected to the personam powe | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Zerbst
red
2 sentences1968The classic definition of waiver as stated in Johnson v. Zerbst ( 304 U. S. 458, 464 ) is “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege ”. 1968As stated in Fay v. Noia ( 372 U. S. 391, 439 ): “ The classic definition of waiver enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 , 464 — ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege ’ furnishes the controlling standard.” The contrived atmosphere of calm created by the conversation and activities of the detective and B’s father created in this young man’s mind an attitude of casual indifference toward the vital legal choices to be made. | 2 | 1968–1968 |
People v. . Corbalis
green
2 sentences1924People v. Corbalis, 178 N. Y. 516 ; People v. Albow, 140 id. 130. 1924People v. Corbalis, 178 N. Y. 516 ; People v. Albow, 140 id. 130. | 2 | 1924–1924 |
Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy
green
1 sentence2011The more widely accepted American common law at that time, in contrast, utilized a broader definition of the rule against perpetuities: “No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest” (Buffalo Seminary, 86 AD2d at 441 n 4 [internal quotation marks omitted]). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
People v. Keebler
green
1 sentence2006However, this issue is unpreserved for appellate review as it was at no time raised before County Court in defendant’s omnibus motion or otherwise, prior to his guilty plea or at sentencing; noting the absence of any reported decision on this legislation, we decline to address it in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.05 [2]; 470.15 [3] [c]; [6] [a]; People v Keebler, 15 AD3d 724, 727 [2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 854 [2005]; People v Beaumont, 299 AD2d 657, 658-659 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 580 [2003]). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Garfield Slope Housing Corp. v. Public Service Mutual Insurance
green
1 sentence2004Co. , 973 F Supp 326 [ED NY 1997]), the policy at issue here specifically defines claim as "a demand or suit for money tendered to the insured for loss or injunctive relief." Regardless of how HRH chose to characterize Fox's March 19, 2001 letter, "injunctive relief" is, by definition, a judicial remedy; thus, a letter to another party, even one containing strongly worded cease and desist language and a threat of litigation, cannot constitute a demand for "injunctive relief," as that term would ordinarily be understood ( see United States Fid. & Guar. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
National Ass'n of Independent Insurers v. State
green
1 sentence2003As such, it is an explanatory statement and a technical instruction for meeting the regulatory requirement which has no legal effect standing alone (see Matter of Elcor Health Servs. v Novello, 100 NY2d 273, 279 [2003]; National Assn. of Ind. Insurers v State of New York, 207 AD2d 191 [1994], affd 89 NY2d 950 [1997]; Leichter v Barber, 120 AD2d 776, 777 [1986]). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
National Ass'n of Independent Insurers v. State
green
1 sentence2003As such, it is an explanatory statement and a technical instruction for meeting the regulatory requirement which has no legal effect standing alone (see Matter of Elcor Health Servs. v Novello, 100 NY2d 273, 279 [2003]; National Assn. of Ind. Insurers v State of New York, 207 AD2d 191 [1994], affd 89 NY2d 950 [1997]; Leichter v Barber, 120 AD2d 776, 777 [1986]). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Butner v. United States
green
1 sentence2001Resolution of the issue depends upon the nature of defendant’s right or interest in marital property and, therefore, involves a question of State law (see, Butner v United States, 440 US 48, 54-55 ). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Santangelo v. State of NY
yellow
2 sentences2000The statute was enacted in response to this Court’s decision in Santangelo v State of New York ( 71 NY2d 393, 397 ), which denied recovery to police officers who were injured while attempting to subdue an escaped mental patient. 2000The statute was enacted in response to this Court's decision in Santangelo v State of New York ( 71 NY2d 393, 397 ), which denied recovery to police officers who were injured while attempting to subdue an escaped mental patient. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Lemon v. Kurtzman
red
1 sentence1992The Judge concluded that, in addition to being without precedent in New York law and on other grounds, the causes of action constitutionally could not be sustained because they would require the definition of a standard of care for the cleric, and that the defining of such a standard would, in his view, necessarily run afoul of the prohibition against excessive entanglement in religion inherent in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution under Lemon v Kurtzman ( 403 US 602 ). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Flayhart
green
1 sentence1992A. Accessorial Liability Under section 20.00 of the Penal Law, a defendant is accessorially liable for a criminal offense committed by another when he "solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or intentionally aids” another to engage in the offense, and when the defendant does so "with the mental culpability required for the commission” of the offense (Penal Law § 20.00; People v Flayhart, 72 NY2d 737, 741 ). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Platinum Record Co., Inc. v. Lucasfilm, Ltd.
green
1 sentence1991(See, Platinum Record Co. v Lucasfilm, Ltd., 566 F Supp 226, 227 .) The majority disagrees with the reasoning of the IAS court that since broadcasting is "the act of transmitting sounds or images by radio or television” (Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 138 [1979 ed]), that substitution of this definition in the clause of paragraph 1 above leads to the conclusion reached by IAS that: "[t]his language * * * includes transmitting sound or images contained in a videocassette or videodisc via a VCR and a television set. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.
green
1 sentence1988It is for the court to determine whether the doctrine is triggered by issues presented in a lawsuit and, if so, to refer such issues for the agency’s resolution (see, Nader v Allegheny Airlines, 426 US 290, 303-304 ; Capital Tel. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Hadden v. Consolidated Edison Co.
green
1 sentence1983The court referred in its decision to the classic definition of waiver found in Hadden v Consolidated Edison Co. ( 45 NY2d 466 ) and New York Jurisprudence (vol 21, Estoppel, Ratification, and Waiver, § 93, p 131). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Lynn v. Lynn
green
1 sentence1975Pursuant to various paragraphs of CPLR 3211 (subd [a]), defendant has moved to dismiss the action and plaintiff opposes the motion relying upon the doctrine of "divisible divorce.” A leading text on matrimonial practice sets forth the following definition of the doctrine of "divisible divorce”: "In brief, if a divorce judgment determines incidental rights of marriage along with an adjudication of the marital status, the adjudication of the incidental rights need not be given full faith and credit in other states if the person whose rights were adjudicated was not subjected to the personam powe | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Branyan v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Goepp v. American Overseas Airlines, Inc. green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Goepp v. American Overseas Airlines, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Goepp v. AM. OVERSEAS AIRLINES, INC. neutral | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Fay v. Noia red | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| United States v. Standard Oil Co. neutral | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| United States v. Standard Oil Company of California green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Matter of City of New York (Braddock Ave.) neutral | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| In Re the Estate of West green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Quaker Oats Co. v. Federal Security Administrator green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Federal Security Administrator v. Quaker Oats Co. green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| 62 Cases of Jam v. United States green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Libby, McNeill & Libby v. United States green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| United States v. 306 Cases Containing Sandford Tomato Catsup With Preservative neutral | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| People v. Lefkoff neutral | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| People v. Sterling Amherst Farms Dairy, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| South Buffalo Railway Co. v. Ahern green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Riddle v. . MacFadden green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Wade v. . Kalbfleisch green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Claim of Ahern v. South Buffalo Railway Co. green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Chicago & North Western Railway Co. v. Bolle green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| Merkley v. Cline neutral | 1 | 1912–1912 |
| Turk v. . Ridge green | 1 | 1877–1877 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.