definition rule in Washington

2003E.g., Hillis v. Dep’t of Ecology, 131 Wn.2d 373, 397-400 , 932 P.2d 139 (1997) (agency’s policies and procedures regarding which water applications would be given priority, use of a watershed assessment process for purposes of making decisions on applications, and ranking of watersheds for assessments had to be adopted through rule making); Failor’s Pharmacy v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 125 Wn.2d 488, 494-96 , 886 P.2d 147 (1994) (agency changes to rate schedules for Medicaid reimbursement constituted reimbursement methodology that had to be adopted through rule making); Simpson Tacoma Kr

2003E.g., Hillis v. Dep't of Ecology, 131 Wash.2d 373, 397-400 , 932 *614 P.2d 139 (1997) (agency's policies and procedures regarding which water applications would be given priority, use of a watershed assessment process for purposes of making decisions on applications, and ranking of watersheds for assessments had to be adopted through rule-making); Failor's Pharmacy v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 125 Wash.2d 488, 494-96 , 886 P.2d 147 (1994) (agency changes to rate schedules for Medicaid reimbursement constituted reimbursement methodology that had to be adopted through rule-making); Simpson

2023Pulp, 200 Wn.2d at 672. “[W]here the challenge is to a policy applicable to all participants in a program, not its implementation under a single contract or assessment of individual benefits, the action is of general applicability within 30 No. 39494-8-III City of Tacoma v. Dep’t of Ecology the definition of a rule.” Failor’s Pharm., 125 Wn.2d at 495 (citing Simpson, 119 Wn.2d at 648 ).

2003E.g., Hillis v. Dep’t of Ecology, 131 Wn.2d 373, 397-400 , 932 P.2d 139 (1997) (agency’s policies and procedures regarding which water applications would be given priority, use of a watershed assessment process for purposes of making decisions on applications, and ranking of watersheds for assessments had to be adopted through rule making); Failor’s Pharmacy v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 125 Wn.2d 488, 494-96 , 886 P.2d 147 (1994) (agency changes to rate schedules for Medicaid reimbursement constituted reimbursement methodology that had to be adopted through rule making); Simpson Tacoma Kr

2023Pulp, 200 Wn.2d at 672. “[W]here the challenge is to a policy applicable to all participants in a program, not its implementation under a single contract or assessment of individual benefits, the action is of general applicability within 30 No. 39494-8-III City of Tacoma v. Dep’t of Ecology the definition of a rule.” Failor’s Pharm., 125 Wn.2d at 495 (citing Simpson, 119 Wn.2d at 648 ).

2020Failor’s Pharmacy v. Department of Social & Health Services, 125 Wn.2d 488, 493 , 886 P.2d 147 (1994).

2003E.g., Hillis v. Dep’t of Ecology, 131 Wn.2d 373, 397-400 , 932 P.2d 139 (1997) (agency’s policies and procedures regarding which water applications would be given priority, use of a watershed assessment process for purposes of making decisions on applications, and ranking of watersheds for assessments had to be adopted through rule making); Failor’s Pharmacy v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 125 Wn.2d 488, 494-96 , 886 P.2d 147 (1994) (agency changes to rate schedules for Medicaid reimbursement constituted reimbursement methodology that had to be adopted through rule making); Simpson Tacoma Kr

2000Hillis, 131 Wash.2d at 398 , 932 P.2d 139 .

1997State v. Straka, 116 Wn.2d 859, 868 , 810 P.2d 888 (1991).

1997State v. Straka, 116 Wn.2d 859, 868 , 810 P.2d 888 (1991).

2021Smith, 159 Wn.2d at 786-787 .

2021Smith, 159 Wn.2d at 786-787 .

2010Rodriguez, 65 Wash.App. at 417 , 828 P.2d 636 . ¶ 11 Valladares and Rodriguez reinforce the definition of waiver as "`an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known *834 right or privilege.'" State v. Riley, 19 Wash. App. 289, 294 , 576 P.2d 1311 (1978) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)).

2010Rodriguez, 65 Wash.App. at 417 , 828 P.2d 636 . ¶ 11 Valladares and Rodriguez reinforce the definition of waiver as "`an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known *834 right or privilege.'" State v. Riley, 19 Wash. App. 289, 294 , 576 P.2d 1311 (1978) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)).

1997Foster, 91 Wash.2d at 481 , 589 P.2d 789 .

1997Foster, 91 Wn.2d at 481 .

2021“If agency action falls within the APA’s definition of a rule, the agency must engage in rule-making.” Postema v. Pollution Control Hr’g Bd., 142 Wn.2d 68, 96 , 11 P.3 726 (2000).

2021“In relevant part, ‘rule’ means ‘any agency order, directive, or regulation of general applicability . . . which establishes, alters, or revokes any qualification or requirement relating to the enjoyment of benefits or privileges conferred by law.” Id. (quoting former RCW 34.05.010(15) (2000), recodified as RCW 34.05.010(16) (LAWS OF 2011, ch. 336, § 762)).

2021“If agency action falls within the APA’s definition of a rule, the agency must engage in rule-making.” Postema v. Pollution Control Hr’g Bd., 142 Wn.2d 68, 96 , 11 P.3 726 (2000).

2021Panag, 166 Wn.2d at 52 .

2021Although the notice of auction in that case provided that the sale was to be free and clear of all claims, the circuit court reasoned that the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of claim “requires an enforceable obligation of the debtor to pay the claimant.” Folger Adam Sec., Inc., 209 F.3d at 260 .

2021Conversely, “a defense seeks to diminish a claim or to defeat recovery rather than to share in it.” Folger Adam Sec., Inc., 209 F.3d at 260 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 419 (6th ed. 1990)).

2013CP at 373. 4 No. 86853-1 In State v. Stubbs, 170 Wn.2d 117 , 240 P.3d 143 (2010), we reviewed an exceptional sentence imposed for a first degree assault conviction analyzing the same aggravating fact determination by the jury here, i.e., that the injuries inflicted substantially exceeded those necessary to satisfy the elements of the offense.

2013CP at 373. 4 No. 86853-1 In State v. Stubbs, 170 Wn.2d 117 , 240 P.3d 143 (2010), we reviewed an exceptional sentence imposed for a first degree assault conviction analyzing the same aggravating fact determination by the jury here, i.e., that the injuries inflicted substantially exceeded those necessary to satisfy the elements of the offense.

2010Rodriguez, 65 Wash.App. at 417 , 828 P.2d 636 . ¶ 11 Valladares and Rodriguez reinforce the definition of waiver as "`an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known *834 right or privilege.'" State v. Riley, 19 Wash. App. 289, 294 , 576 P.2d 1311 (1978) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)).

2010Rodriguez, 65 Wash.App. at 417 , 828 P.2d 636 . ¶ 11 Valladares and Rodriguez reinforce the definition of waiver as "`an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known *834 right or privilege.'" State v. Riley, 19 Wash. App. 289, 294 , 576 P.2d 1311 (1978) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)).

2010Rodriguez, 65 Wash.App. at 417 , 828 P.2d 636 . ¶ 11 Valladares and Rodriguez reinforce the definition of waiver as "`an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known *834 right or privilege.'" State v. Riley, 19 Wash. App. 289, 294 , 576 P.2d 1311 (1978) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)).

2010Rodriguez, 65 Wash.App. at 417 , 828 P.2d 636 . ¶ 11 Valladares and Rodriguez reinforce the definition of waiver as "`an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known *834 right or privilege.'" State v. Riley, 19 Wash. App. 289, 294 , 576 P.2d 1311 (1978) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)).

2007Hinton, 152 Wash.2d at 859 , 100 P.3d 801 . [6] RCW 9A.36.021(1)(a) currently defines second degree assault when a defendant "[i]ntentionally assaults another and thereby recklessly inflicts substantial bodily harm," which is identical to the definition in the instruction given in this case.

2007Hinton, 152 Wash.2d at 859 , 100 P.3d 801 . [6] RCW 9A.36.021(1)(a) currently defines second degree assault when a defendant "[i]ntentionally assaults another and thereby recklessly inflicts substantial bodily harm," which is identical to the definition in the instruction given in this case.

2003E.g., Hillis v. Dep't of Ecology, 131 Wash.2d 373, 397-400 , 932 *614 P.2d 139 (1997) (agency's policies and procedures regarding which water applications would be given priority, use of a watershed assessment process for purposes of making decisions on applications, and ranking of watersheds for assessments had to be adopted through rule-making); Failor's Pharmacy v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 125 Wash.2d 488, 494-96 , 886 P.2d 147 (1994) (agency changes to rate schedules for Medicaid reimbursement constituted reimbursement methodology that had to be adopted through rule-making); Simpson

1989Savidge, Inc., supra, in quoting the definition of presumption as defined in Heidelbach v. Campbell, 95 Wash. 661, 668 , 164 P. 247 (1917): A presumption is an inference, affirmative or disaffirmative, of the truth of a proposition of fact which is drawn by a process of reasoning from some one or more matters of known fact.

1989Savidge, Inc., supra, in quoting the definition of presumption as defined in Heidelbach v. Campbell, 95 Wash. 661, 668 , 164 P. 247 (1917): A presumption is an inference, affirmative or disaffirmative, of the truth of a proposition of fact which is drawn by a process of reasoning from some one or more matters of known fact.

1982In Sellen we quoted the definition of the rule found in State v. Thompson, 38 Wn.2d 774, 777 , 232 P.2d 87 (1951): [G]eneral terms appearing in a statute in connection with precise, specific terms, shall be accorded meaning and effect only to the extent that the general terms suggest items or things similar to those designated by the precise or specific terms.

1982In Sellen we quoted the definition of the rule found in State v. Thompson, 38 Wn.2d 774, 777 , 232 P.2d 87 (1951): [G]eneral terms appearing in a statute in connection with precise, specific terms, shall be accorded meaning and effect only to the extent that the general terms suggest items or things similar to those designated by the precise or specific terms.

1981State v. Hite, 3 Wn.

1962This court adhered to that definition in interpreting the present statute in Miller v. Treat, 57 Wn. (2d) 524, 358 P. (2d) 143 (1960). [2] The trial court included this definition in instruction No. 11, but preceded it by the sentence to which appellant excepted, reading: "The term `gross negligence' as applied to this case means an utter disregard in the operation of a motor vehicle by the host driver for the safety of a guest passenger." The effect of the quoted sentence was to inject an additional and entirely different criterion by which the jury was to measure the host's duty to his guest

1951In Averbuch v. Averbuch, 80 Wash. 257 , 141 Pac. 701 , we approved the following definition of the doctrine of condonation: “Condonation is forgiveness -with an implied condition that the injury shall not be repeated, and on breach of this condition the right to a remedy for former injuries revives (Greenleaf, Evidence, 14th ed., §53).” (p. 259) Whether the words, acts, or course of conduct of the parties in a particular case constitute condonation is a question of fact.

1951In Averbuch v. Averbuch, 80 Wash. 257 , 141 Pac. 701 , we approved the following definition of the doctrine of condonation: “Condonation is forgiveness -with an implied condition that the injury shall not be repeated, and on breach of this condition the right to a remedy for former injuries revives (Greenleaf, Evidence, 14th ed., §53).” (p. 259) Whether the words, acts, or course of conduct of the parties in a particular case constitute condonation is a question of fact.

1915People v. Yund, supra; State v. Kennedy, 154 Mo. 268 , 55 S. W. 293 ; State v. Stewart, 52 Wash. 61 , 100 Pac. 153 ; 2 Thompson, Trials (2d ed.), § 2341.

1915People v. Yund, supra; State v. Kennedy, 154 Mo. 268 , 55 S. W. 293 ; State v. Stewart, 52 Wash. 61 , 100 Pac. 153 ; 2 Thompson, Trials (2d ed.), § 2341.

1915People v. Yund, supra; State v. Kennedy, 154 Mo. 268 , 55 S. W. 293 ; State v. Stewart, 52 Wash. 61 , 100 Pac. 153 ; 2 Thompson, Trials (2d ed.), § 2341.

1915People v. Yund, supra; State v. Kennedy, 154 Mo. 268 , 55 S. W. 293 ; State v. Stewart, 52 Wash. 61 , 100 Pac. 153 ; 2 Thompson, Trials (2d ed.), § 2341.