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8 Oklahoma opinions name it 2 courts 1924–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oklahoma courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rogers v. Stategreen2 sentences1999The jury is admonished to disregard the definition of the standard.” ¶ 42 These last comments are quite similar to those made in Rogers v. State, 1986 OK CR 104 , 721 P.2d 820, 825-26 (the trial is about “reasonable theory, reasonable doubt.”). 1999The jury is admonished to disregard the definition of the standard.” ¶ 42 These last comments are quite similar to those made in Rogers v. State, 1986 OK CR 104 , 721 P.2d 820, 825-26 (the trial is about “reasonable theory, reasonable doubt.”). | 1 | 1 |
Henson v. Stategreen2 sentences1991In Henson v. State, 97 Okl.Cr. 240 , 261 P.2d 916, 923 (1953), we quoted Corpus Juris and stated that the best evidence rule requires the production of the best evidence of which the nature of the case is susceptible. 1991In Henson v. State, 97 Okl.Cr. 240 , 261 P.2d 916, 923 (1953), we quoted Corpus Juris and stated that the best evidence rule requires the production of the best evidence of which the nature of the case is susceptible. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oklahoma. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Threadgill v. Cross, Secretary of State
green
2 sentences2023"The duty of determining what law shall be enacted and what law shall not be enacted rests neither upon the executive nor the judicial department." Threadgill , 1910 OK 165, ¶ 19 , 109 P. 558, 562 . 2023"The duty of determining what law shall be enacted and what law shall not be enacted rests neither upon the executive nor the judicial department." Threadgill , 1910 OK 165, ¶ 19 , 109 P. 558, 562 . | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences1974The United States Supreme Court stated in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1967): “To suggest that failure to cross-examine in such circumstances constitutes a waiver of the right of confrontation at a subsequent trial hardly comports with this Court’s definition of a waiver as 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S.Ct. 1245, 1246 , 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966).” Admittedly, in Barber the state knew the whereab 1974The United States Supreme Court stated in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1967): “To suggest that failure to cross-examine in such circumstances constitutes a waiver of the right of confrontation at a subsequent trial hardly comports with this Court’s definition of a waiver as 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S.Ct. 1245, 1246 , 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966).” Admittedly, in Barber the state knew the whereab | 2 | 1968–1974 |
Brookhart v. Janis
green
2 sentences1974The United States Supreme Court stated in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1967): “To suggest that failure to cross-examine in such circumstances constitutes a waiver of the right of confrontation at a subsequent trial hardly comports with this Court’s definition of a waiver as 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S.Ct. 1245, 1246 , 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966).” Admittedly, in Barber the state knew the whereab 1974The United States Supreme Court stated in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1967): “To suggest that failure to cross-examine in such circumstances constitutes a waiver of the right of confrontation at a subsequent trial hardly comports with this Court’s definition of a waiver as 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S.Ct. 1245, 1246 , 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966).” Admittedly, in Barber the state knew the whereab | 2 | 1968–1974 |
Barber v. Page
green
2 sentences1974The United States Supreme Court stated in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1967): “To suggest that failure to cross-examine in such circumstances constitutes a waiver of the right of confrontation at a subsequent trial hardly comports with this Court’s definition of a waiver as 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S.Ct. 1245, 1246 , 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966).” Admittedly, in Barber the state knew the whereab 1974The United States Supreme Court stated in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1967): “To suggest that failure to cross-examine in such circumstances constitutes a waiver of the right of confrontation at a subsequent trial hardly comports with this Court’s definition of a waiver as 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S.Ct. 1245, 1246 , 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966).” Admittedly, in Barber the state knew the whereab | 1 | 1974–1974 |
State ex rel. Commissioners of Land Office v. Mobley
neutral
2 sentences1955Com'rs of Land Office v. Mobley, 208 Okl. 342 , 255 P.2d 945, 948 , opinion by Welch, J., as follows: "The doctrine of subrogation is governed and controlled in its operation by principles of equity, rather than by strict legal rules, and one of the conditions of subrogation in all cases, in the absence of specific contract, is that the subrogee discharge the obligation of another for the protection of his own rights." citing 50 Am.Jur., Subrogation, 10, and Johnson v. Gillett, 66 Okl. 308 , 168 P. 1031 . 1955Com'rs of Land Office v. Mobley, 208 Okl. 342 , 255 P.2d 945, 948 , opinion by Welch, J., as follows: "The doctrine of subrogation is governed and controlled in its operation by principles of equity, rather than by strict legal rules, and one of the conditions of subrogation in all cases, in the absence of specific contract, is that the subrogee discharge the obligation of another for the protection of his own rights." citing 50 Am.Jur., Subrogation, 10, and Johnson v. Gillett, 66 Okl. 308 , 168 P. 1031 . | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Johnson v. Gillett
green
2 sentences1955Com'rs of Land Office v. Mobley, 208 Okl. 342 , 255 P.2d 945, 948 , opinion by Welch, J., as follows: "The doctrine of subrogation is governed and controlled in its operation by principles of equity, rather than by strict legal rules, and one of the conditions of subrogation in all cases, in the absence of specific contract, is that the subrogee discharge the obligation of another for the protection of his own rights." citing 50 Am.Jur., Subrogation, 10, and Johnson v. Gillett, 66 Okl. 308 , 168 P. 1031 . 1955Com'rs of Land Office v. Mobley, 208 Okl. 342 , 255 P.2d 945, 948 , opinion by Welch, J., as follows: "The doctrine of subrogation is governed and controlled in its operation by principles of equity, rather than by strict legal rules, and one of the conditions of subrogation in all cases, in the absence of specific contract, is that the subrogee discharge the obligation of another for the protection of his own rights." citing 50 Am.Jur., Subrogation, 10, and Johnson v. Gillett, 66 Okl. 308 , 168 P. 1031 . | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Garver v. Graham
neutral
1 sentence1924App.) 51 P. 812 , the Court of Appeals of Kansas, construing the statute of that state, which is substantially the same as ours, said: “That this applies equally to the defendant’s title, under a cross-petition, we do not think will be questioned.” Therein is quoted with approval the definition of the doctrine of lis pendens by Judge Storey, as follows: “A purchase made of the property actually in litigation, pendente lite, for a, valuable consideration, and without any express or implied notice in point of fact, affects the purchaser in the same manner as if he had such notice, and he will ac | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.