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5 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1913–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Younggreen1 sentence2013“We do not consider bits and pieces of the instructions in isolation.” Commonwealth v. Young, 461 Mass. 198, 207 (2012). 15 The defendant first claims the judge’s instruction was not specific enough regarding the definition of defense of another and that the judge failed to instruct that the defendant had the right to use deadly force if Frias had the same right under the circumstances. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Dixongreen1 sentence2000We consider the closing argument as a whole, Commonwealth v. Dixon, 425 Mass. 223, 230 (1997), and we “consider the fact that the defendant did not object to the statements at trial as ‘some indication that the tone [and] manner ... of the now challenged aspects of the prosecutor’s argument were not unfairly prejudicial.’ ” Commonwealth v. Lyons, 426 Mass. 466, 471 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 380 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Lyonsgreen1 sentence2000We consider the closing argument as a whole, Commonwealth v. Dixon, 425 Mass. 223, 230 (1997), and we “consider the fact that the defendant did not object to the statements at trial as ‘some indication that the tone [and] manner ... of the now challenged aspects of the prosecutor’s argument were not unfairly prejudicial.’ ” Commonwealth v. Lyons, 426 Mass. 466, 471 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 380 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Mellogreen1 sentence2000We consider the closing argument as a whole, Commonwealth v. Dixon, 425 Mass. 223, 230 (1997), and we “consider the fact that the defendant did not object to the statements at trial as ‘some indication that the tone [and] manner ... of the now challenged aspects of the prosecutor’s argument were not unfairly prejudicial.’ ” Commonwealth v. Lyons, 426 Mass. 466, 471 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 380 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Frye v. United States
red
1 sentence1997The definition of this standard was enunciated in Frye v. United States where it was held that “while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discoveiy, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Hundley v. Martinez
green
1 sentence1968Hundley v. Martinez, 151 W. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Doyle v. Boston & Albany Railroad
green
1 sentence1913Doyle v. Boston & Albany Railroad, 145 Mass. 386 . | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.