9 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1924–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sligh v. First Nat. Bank of Holmes Countygreen1 sentence2013Sligh v. First Nat’l Bank of Holmes County, 735 So.2d 963, 969 (Miss.1999) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390). | 1 | 1 |
First Southwest Corp. v. Lamptongreen1 sentence2004Richardson's sworn statement, in the Settlement Petition, that the Corneses "have been declared wrongful death beneficiaries by separate order of the court" was sufficient to satisfy the definition of waiver, defined as "an act or omission ... fairly evidencing an intention permanently to surrender the right alleged to have been waived." First Southwest Corp., 724 So.2d at 995 (¶ 36). ¶ 78. | 1 | 1 |
Pederson v. Dumouchelgreen2 sentences1982No longer is it proper to limit the definition of the standard of care which a medical doctor or dentist must meet solely to the practice or custom of a particular locality, a similar locality, or a geographic area. 72 Wash.2d at 77-79 , 431 P.2d at 977-78 (emphasis in original). 1982No longer is it proper to limit the definition of the standard of care which a medical doctor or dentist must meet solely to the practice or custom of a particular locality, a similar locality, or a geographic area. 72 Wash.2d at 77-79 , 431 P.2d at 977-78 (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
King v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1982See also King v. Williams, 276 S.C. 478 , 279 S.E.2d 618 (1981); and Shier v. Freedman, 58 Wis.2d 269 , 206 N.W.2d 166 (1973). 1982See also King v. Williams, 276 S.C. 478 , 279 S.E.2d 618 (1981); and Shier v. Freedman, 58 Wis.2d 269 , 206 N.W.2d 166 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. State
green
1 sentence2002In Brown v. State, 731 So.2d 595 (¶ 10) (Miss.1999), the Mississippi Supreme Court used the same definition and test for double jeopardy as used in the United States Supreme Court: "It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Shier v. Freedman
green
2 sentences1982See also King v. Williams, 276 S.C. 478 , 279 S.E.2d 618 (1981); and Shier v. Freedman, 58 Wis.2d 269 , 206 N.W.2d 166 (1973). 1982See also King v. Williams, 276 S.C. 478 , 279 S.E.2d 618 (1981); and Shier v. Freedman, 58 Wis.2d 269 , 206 N.W.2d 166 (1973). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Carter v. Berry
green
2 sentences1977In Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 321 , 136 So.2d 871 , Sugg. of Error, 140 So.2d 843 (1962), this Court stated: The rule against perpetuities is the law limiting the time within which future interests can be created. 1977In Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 321 , 136 So.2d 871 , Sugg. of Error, 140 So.2d 843 (1962), this Court stated: The rule against perpetuities is the law limiting the time within which future interests can be created. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
MAGEE v. Magee's Estate
green
2 sentences1977In Magee v. Magee's Estate, 236 Miss. 572 , 111 So.2d 394 (1959), we held that a testamentary trust was not in violation of the rule against perpetuities and in so holding the following definition of the rule was given: `The rule against perpetuities prohibits the creation of future interests or estates which by possibility may not become vested within a life or lives in being at the time of the testator's death or the effective date of the instrument creating the future interest, and twenty-one years thereafter, . ..' ( 236 Miss. at 591 , 111 So.2d at 402 ). 1977In Magee v. Magee's Estate, 236 Miss. 572 , 111 So.2d 394 (1959), we held that a testamentary trust was not in violation of the rule against perpetuities and in so holding the following definition of the rule was given: `The rule against perpetuities prohibits the creation of future interests or estates which by possibility may not become vested within a life or lives in being at the time of the testator's death or the effective date of the instrument creating the future interest, and twenty-one years thereafter, . ..' ( 236 Miss. at 591 , 111 So.2d at 402 ). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Birmingham v. Conger
green
2 sentences1971In the 1969 case of Birmingham v. Conger et al., 222 So.2d 388 , we said: "In order to establish equitable estoppel a party must show change of position in reliance on the conduct of another and detriment caused thereby." 222 So.2d at 392 . 1971In the 1969 case of Birmingham v. Conger et al., 222 So.2d 388 , we said: "In order to establish equitable estoppel a party must show change of position in reliance on the conduct of another and detriment caused thereby." 222 So.2d at 392 . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Peeples v. Botkin
red
2 sentences1954Peeples v. Boykin, 132 M. 359, 96 So. 177 .” The definition of a rule of property is set out in 54 C. 1954Peeples v. Boykin, 132 M. 359, 96 So. 177 ." The definition of a rule of property is set out in 54 C.J. 1110, Section 8, as follows: "Rule of Property. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Pongetti v. Spraggins
green
2 sentences1953Jur. 989 , Sec. 295, in these words: “The conclusion to be drawn from the cases as *68 to what constitutes the rule of res ipsa loquitur is that proof that the thing which caused the injury to the plaintiff was under the control and management of the defendant, and that the occurrence was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care, affords sufficient evidence, or, as some time stated by the courts, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care.” 1953Jur. 989 , Sec. 295, in these words: “The conclusion to be drawn from the cases as *68 to what constitutes the rule of res ipsa loquitur is that proof that the thing which caused the injury to the plaintiff was under the control and management of the defendant, and that the occurrence was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care, affords sufficient evidence, or, as some time stated by the courts, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care.” | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Dixon v. State
neutral
2 sentences1924In the case of Dixon v. State, 106 Miss. 697 , 64 So. 468 , the defendant was convicted of murder, and, on appeal, assigned as error the failure of the court to give the jury a definition of murder, and in responding to this assignment the court said: “No instruction was asked by either the state or defendant requesting the court to define the crime of murder, and therefore, under section -793 of the Code, it was with out power to so instruct them; consequently it did not err in not so doing, for error cannot be predicated upon the failure of the court to do a thing- which it is expressly forb 1924In the case of Dixon v. State, 106 Miss. 697 , 64 So. 468 , the defendant was convicted of murder, and, on appeal, assigned as error the failure of the court to give the jury a definition of murder, and in responding to this assignment the court said: “No instruction was asked by either the state or defendant requesting the court to define the crime of murder, and therefore, under section -793 of the Code, it was with out power to so instruct them; consequently it did not err in not so doing, for error cannot be predicated upon the failure of the court to do a thing- which it is expressly forb | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.