direct violation in Pennsylvania

2025As in [Commonwealth v. Williams, 35 A.3d 44, 53 (Pa. Super. 2011)], “Appellant’s request for DNA testing did not constitute a direct exception to the time bar of the PCRA.

2025As in [Commonwealth v. Williams, 35 A.3d 44, 53 (Pa. Super. 2011)], “Appellant’s request for DNA testing did not constitute a direct exception to the time bar of the PCRA.

2017None of those provisions give the court the equitable power to set aside a sale if it is “just and proper.” As our Supreme Court stated in First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Lancaster v. Swift, 321 A.2d 895, 898 (Pa. 1974): The rights of all parties to a tax sale are defined and governed by statute. ‘(W)henever there is a direct rule of law governing the case in all its circumstances, the (equity) court is as much bound by it as would be a court of law. ...’ Where, as here, the parties’ rights are regulated and fixed by a comprehensive scheme of legislation, the maxim ‘equity follows

1992Moreover, as Justice Roberts stated in the case of First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Lancaster v. Swift, 457 Pa. 206 , 321 A.2d 895 (1974): ‘[w]henever there is a direct rule of law governing the case in all its circumstances, the [equity] court is as much bound by it as would be a court of law____’ ...

2021Id. (quoting 35 P.S. § 780-102(b)).

2020In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, a court or other authority should consider, in addition to all other logically relevant factors, statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning its use ... the proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of this act, the proximity of the object to controlled substances, the existence of any residue of controlled substances on the object, direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object[.] 35 P.S. § 780-102; see also Commonwealth v. Coleman, 98

2021Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 593 (Pa. Super. 2007).

2021Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 593 (Pa.Super. 2007).

2019See generally Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 610 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 624 Pa. 688 , 87 A.3d 319 (2014).

2019See generally Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 610 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 624 Pa. 688 , 87 A.3d 319 (2014).

2017Williams, 35 A.3d at 53 (explaining that, “Appellant’s request for DNA testing did not constitute a direct exception to the time bar of the PCRA”), citing Weeks, 831 A.2d at 1196 .

2016Commonwealth v. Weeks, 831 A.2d 1194, 1196 (Pa. Super. 2003).

2023“To sustain a conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia[,] the Commonwealth must establish that items possessed by defendant were used or intended to be used with a controlled substance so as to constitute drug paraphernalia and this burden may be met by Commonwealth through circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Little, 879 A.2d 293, 300 (Pa. Super. 2005).

2009“To sustain a conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia[,] the Commonwealth must establish that items possessed by defendant were used or intended to be used with a controlled substance so as to constitute drug paraphernalia and this burden may be met by Commonwealth through circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Little, 879 A.2d 293, 300 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 586 Pa. 724 , 890 A.2d 1057 (2005). ¶ 8 A review of the record reveals the following.

2014See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Devers, 519 Pa. 88 , 546 A.2d 12, 15-19 (1988) (criticizing Superior Court's requirements for punctilious adherence to technicalities of sentencing that developed from line of cases commencing with Commonwealth v. Valentin, 259 Pa.Super. 496 , 393 A.2d 935 (1978), in which Superior Court affirmed sentence while articulating rule that sentencing judge must make his reasons clear, have accurate information, including presentence report where required, and consider defendant’s character and particular circumstances of offense in arriving at individual sentence, and Comm

2014See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Devers, 519 Pa. 88 , 546 A.2d 12, 15-19 (1988) (criticizing Superior Court's requirements for punctilious adherence to technicalities of sentencing that developed from line of cases commencing with Commonwealth v. Valentin, 259 Pa.Super. 496 , 393 A.2d 935 (1978), in which Superior Court affirmed sentence while articulating rule that sentencing judge must make his reasons clear, have accurate information, including presentence report where required, and consider defendant’s character and particular circumstances of offense in arriving at individual sentence, and Comm

2014See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Devers, 519 Pa. 88 , 546 A.2d 12, 15-19 (1988) (criticizing Superior Court's requirements for punctilious adherence to technicalities of sentencing that developed from line of cases commencing with Commonwealth v. Valentin, 259 Pa.Super. 496 , 393 A.2d 935 (1978), in which Superior Court affirmed sentence while articulating rule that sentencing judge must make his reasons clear, have accurate information, including presentence report where required, and consider defendant’s character and particular circumstances of offense in arriving at individual sentence, and Comm

2014See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Devers, 519 Pa. 88 , 546 A.2d 12, 15-19 (1988) (criticizing Superior Court's requirements for punctilious adherence to technicalities of sentencing that developed from line of cases commencing with Commonwealth v. Valentin, 259 Pa.Super. 496 , 393 A.2d 935 (1978), in which Superior Court affirmed sentence while articulating rule that sentencing judge must make his reasons clear, have accurate information, including presentence report where required, and consider defendant’s character and particular circumstances of offense in arriving at individual sentence, and Comm

2014See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Devers, 519 Pa. 88 , 546 A.2d 12, 15-19 (1988) (criticizing Superior Court's requirements for punctilious adherence to technicalities of sentencing that developed from line of cases commencing with Commonwealth v. Valentin, 259 Pa.Super. 496 , 393 A.2d 935 (1978), in which Superior Court affirmed sentence while articulating rule that sentencing judge must make his reasons clear, have accurate information, including presentence report where required, and consider defendant’s character and particular circumstances of offense in arriving at individual sentence, and Comm

2014See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Devers, 519 Pa. 88 , 546 A.2d 12, 15-19 (1988) (criticizing Superior Court's requirements for punctilious adherence to technicalities of sentencing that developed from line of cases commencing with Commonwealth v. Valentin, 259 Pa.Super. 496 , 393 A.2d 935 (1978), in which Superior Court affirmed sentence while articulating rule that sentencing judge must make his reasons clear, have accurate information, including presentence report where required, and consider defendant’s character and particular circumstances of offense in arriving at individual sentence, and Comm

2017Claimant’s conduct here was not inadvertent, “but [wa]s more akin to disobedience of a direct instruction.” Id. at 464 .

2016We distinguished Morysville from Heitczman , noting that the claimant's backing-up of his truck without performing a "walk around" was not inadvertent or negligent behavior, "but is more akin to disobedience of a direct instruction." Heitczman, 638 A.2d at 464 .

2022To permit subrogation in this case would be a direct violation of the well-recognized rule of law that, in the absence of a clear and unequivocal understanding to the contrary, an insurer is not entitled to subrogation from its named insured. [J-68-2021] - 8 Employers of Wausau, 476 F.Supp. at 143 (emphasis supplied).

2020See; Keystone Paper Converters, 562 F. Supp. at 1048 ; Employers of Wausau, 476 F. Supp. at 142 . 13 IV.

2021See generally Commonwealth v. Kates, 305 A.2d 701 (Pa. 1973) (holding that it is permissible for courts to conduct revocation hearings for direct violations, known as a Daisy Kates hearing, prior to trial on the underlying charges).

2017Both of these matters were transferred to [Judge Bronson] under the First Judicial District’s Focused Deterrence Program.1 [Judge Bronson] held a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Kates, 305 A.2d 701 (Pa. 1973) [(hereinafter, “Daisy Kates hearing”),] on December 17, 2014[,] and found [Appellant] in direct violation of his probation in the above cases.2 On March 9, 2015, [Judge Bronson] terminated [Appellant’s] parole in his burglary case, revoked [Appellant’s] probations, and resentenced [Appellant] to an aggregate term of three to six years[’] incarceration plus four years[’] reporting prob

2021Id.

2015In other words, “[a] petitioner [] does not meet the requirements of [section] 9543.1(a)(2) if the technology existed at the time of his trial, the verdict was rendered after January 1, 1995, and the court never refused funds for the testing.” Commonwealth v. Perry, 959 A.2d 932, 939 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation, quotation marks and brackets omitted).

1981A court of equity, in dealing with legal rights, adopts and follows the rules of law in all cases to which those rules are applicable; and whenever there is a direct rule of law governing the case in all its circumstances, the court is as much bound by it as would be a court of law, if the controversy was there pending— Albright v. Albright, 228 Pa. 552, 560 , 77 A. 896, 898-99 (1910). .

1981A court of equity, in dealing with legal rights, adopts and follows the rules of law in all cases to which those rules are applicable; and whenever there is a direct rule of law governing the case in all its circumstances, the court is as much bound by it as would be a court of law, if the controversy was there pending— Albright v. Albright, 228 Pa. 552, 560 , 77 A. 896, 898-99 (1910). .

2024See Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (Pa. 2005) (recognizing that we must consider and analyze an ineffective assistance claim as a “distinct legal ground” for PCRA review).

2023Group on Behalf of Chen v. Kamara, 155 A.3d 1108 , 1113-14, 1115 (Pa. Super. 2017) (Kamara I) (concluding that the insurer’s action, which was initiated “on behalf” of the employee, was not an improper direct claim for subrogation, - 12 - J-E02005-22 and the insurer could properly verify the complaint upon information and belief).

2023Group on Behalf of Chen v. Kamara, 155 A.3d 1108, 1113-14, 1115 (Pa. Super. 2017) (Kamara I) (concluding that the insurer’s action, which was initiated “on behalf” of the employee, was not an improper direct claim for subrogation, - 12 - J-E02005-22 and the insurer could properly verify the complaint upon information and belief).

2022See Wilson, 227 A.3d at 932-33 .