direct challenge in Indiana

2018McGee appealed. [17] A panel of this court affirmed the trial court's decision to set aside the default judgment and explained that the "failure to answer a direct inquiry from an insurer concerning his client's claim when coupled with the failure to provide the insurer with notice of a pending law suit smack of chicanery and unfair advantage." Id. at 41 .

1996In upholding the trial court’s grant of a Trial Rule 60(B)(3) motion to set aside default judgment, this court noted that the decision of plaintiffs attorney not to answer the direct inquiry showed a lack of good faith and “smackfed] of chicanery and unfair advantage.” Id. at 41 .

1985Goldsmith, supra, is a question we need not address, because we hold that Crose's motion to dismiss was an improper collateral attack on Special Prosecutor Smith's authority. 4 In King v. State (1979) 2d Dist.Ind.App., 397 N.E.2d 1260 , we held that an information signed by the special prosecutor who allegedly lacked requisite authority, was not subject to collateral attack. 5 We there stated that a public officer acting under claim or color of right was a de facto public official whose acts could only be questioned "by a direct challenge against the individual who purports to hold the office.

1985Goldsmith, supra, is a question we need not address, because we hold that Crose's motion to dismiss was an improper collateral attack on Special Prosecutor Smith's authority. 4 In King v. State (1979) 2d Dist.Ind.App., 397 N.E.2d 1260 , we held that an information signed by the special prosecutor who allegedly lacked requisite authority, was not subject to collateral attack. 5 We there stated that a public officer acting under claim or color of right was a de facto public official whose acts could only be questioned "by a direct challenge against the individual who purports to hold the office.

2025Id. [11] Ewing admitted violating this provision when he pled guilty to his charge of Failure to Return to Lawful Detention as a Level 6 felony stemming from his work release violation.

2019Observing that it was not a typical collection matter, the Court clarified: “Although not a direct challenge to a tax collection, this case clearly revolves around an earlier step in the taxation or assessment process.” Id. [13] More recently, in D.A.Y.

2019As in Robinson, this matter is not a direct challenge to a tax collection, but it arose from the “taxation or assessment process.” 99 N.E.3d at 690 .

2019Investments LLC v. Lake County, 106 N.E.3d 500 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), a panel of this Court reviewed a dismissal, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, of a complaint by several plaintiffs, collectively referred to as “Owners,” against defendants collectively referred to as “Lake County Defendants.” The Owners sought to enforce a settlement agreement that allegedly “required the Lake County Defendants to assess their 1,800 parcels at the values agreed to and listed in Exhibit A.” Id. at 505 .

2019Investments LLC v. Lake County, 106 N.E.3d 500 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), a panel of this Court reviewed a dismissal, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, of a complaint by several plaintiffs, collectively referred to as “Owners,” against defendants collectively referred to as “Lake County Defendants.” The Owners sought to enforce a settlement agreement that allegedly “required the Lake County Defendants to assess their 1,800 parcels at the values agreed to and listed in Exhibit A.” Id. at 505 .

2018The Court also stated that "[b]ecause [the plaintiff was] asserting a direct claim addressing a harm in its own name and not a derivative claim of corporate harm in the name of [a limited liability company] under the guise of a direct claim, we do not need to investigate whether the Barth exception is applicable." Id. [38] Based upon the record, including that Alisa has been the majority member of BioConvergence, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to find that Julie's claim regarding excessive payments was frivolous based on the idea that she may have be

2012Id.

2004The Act defines "misappropriation" in relevant part as the "acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means." Id.

2004The Act defines "misappropriation" in relevant part as the "acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means." Id.

2003Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 760 .

1998As discussed in Subsection A, supra, our supreme court noted in Barth II that a trial court may, under certain circumstances, permit a direct claim by the minority shareholder against the corporation which necessarily bypasses the strict requirements set forth in I.C. § 23-1-32-1 et seq.

1996Id.

1994Id. at 514 .

1994Id. at 514 .

1987Prater v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 39 ; Mason v. State (1982), Ind., 440 N.E.2d 457 ; Lewis v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 398 , 375 N.E.2d 1102 .

1987Prater v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 39 ; Mason v. State (1982), Ind., 440 N.E.2d 457 ; Lewis v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 398 , 375 N.E.2d 1102 .

1987Prater v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 39 ; Mason v. State (1982), Ind., 440 N.E.2d 457 ; Lewis v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 398 , 375 N.E.2d 1102 .

1987Prater v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 39 ; Mason v. State (1982), Ind., 440 N.E.2d 457 ; Lewis v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 398 , 375 N.E.2d 1102 .

1985Goldsmith, supra, is a question we need not address, because we hold that Crose's motion to dismiss was an improper collateral attack on Special Prosecutor Smith's authority. 4 In King v. State (1979) 2d Dist.Ind.App., 397 N.E.2d 1260 , we held that an information signed by the special prosecutor who allegedly lacked requisite authority, was not subject to collateral attack. 5 We there stated that a public officer acting under claim or color of right was a de facto public official whose acts could only be questioned "by a direct challenge against the individual who purports to hold the office.

1980The Commissioner misconstrued the facts and his error is one of law which this Court must correct.” 290 A.2d at 383 .