direct violation in California

2025“A defendant accused of a crime has a constitutional right to a trial by unbiased, impartial jurors.” (People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513 , 601 (Miles).) Juror misconduct occurs when an 55 PEOPLE v. ALVAREZ Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. “overt event is a direct violation of the oaths, duties, and admonitions imposed on actual or prospective jurors, such as when a juror conceals bias on voir dire, consciously receives outside information, discusses the case with nonjurors, or shares improper information with other jurors.” (In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 294 (Hamilton).) “ ‘It is

2025“A defendant accused of a crime has a constitutional right to a trial by unbiased, impartial jurors.” (People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513 , 601 (Miles).) Juror misconduct occurs when an 55 PEOPLE v. ALVAREZ Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. “overt event is a direct violation of the oaths, duties, and admonitions imposed on actual or prospective jurors, such as when a juror conceals bias on voir dire, consciously receives outside information, discusses the case with nonjurors, or shares improper information with other jurors.” (In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 294 (Hamilton).) “ ‘It is

2022I, § 16; [citations].) An impartial jury is one in which no member has been improperly influenced [citations] and every member is ‘ “capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it” ’ [citations].” (People v. Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 293-294 .) Juror misconduct occurs when there is “a direct violation of the oaths, duties, and admonitions imposed on actual or prospective jurors, such as when a juror conceals bias on voir dire, consciously receives outside information, discusses the case with nonjurors, or 55 shares improper information with other jurors.” (People

2021I, § 16; [citations].) An impartial jury is one in which no member has been improperly influenced [citations] and every member is ‘ “capable and 52 willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it” ’ [citations].” (People v. Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 293-294 .) Juror misconduct occurs when there is “a direct violation of the oaths, duties, and admonitions imposed on actual or prospective jurors, such as when a juror conceals bias on voir dire, consciously receives outside information, discusses the case with nonjurors, or shares improper information with other jurors.” (People

2001In People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 914 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705 , 855 P.2d 1277 ], where trial counsel objected to the prosecutor’s remarks, but did not additionally request an admonition that would have cured any harm, the court held: “[T]rial counsel failed to preserve a direct claim of misconduct because, although he objected to the *568 prosecutor’s remarks, he did not also request an admonition that would clearly have cured any harm. [Citations.]” Similarly, in People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1215 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456 , 892 P.2d 1199 ] (Gionis), the court stated: “[A] reviewin

2001In People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 914 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705 , 855 P.2d 1277 ], where trial counsel objected to the prosecutor’s remarks, but did not additionally request an admonition that would have cured any harm, the court held: “[T]rial counsel failed to preserve a direct claim of misconduct because, although he objected to the *568 prosecutor’s remarks, he did not also request an admonition that would clearly have cured any harm. [Citations.]” Similarly, in People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1215 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456 , 892 P.2d 1199 ] (Gionis), the court stated: “[A] reviewin

2022It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his [or her] impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.’ ” (Id. at pp. 580-581, italics omitted.) Under California law, “actual bias supporting an attack on the verdict is similar to actual bias warranting a juror’s disqualification.” (Id. at p. 581.) Thus, actual bias is “ ‘the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the case, or to any of the parties, which will prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.

2022It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his [or her] impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.’ ” (Id. at pp. 580-581, italics omitted.) Under California law, “actual bias supporting an attack on the verdict is similar to actual bias warranting a juror’s disqualification.” (Id. at p. 581.) Thus, actual bias is “ ‘the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the case, or to any of the parties, which will prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.

2022I, § 16; [citations].) An impartial jury is one in which no member has been improperly influenced [citations] and every member is ‘ “capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it” ’ [citations].” (People v. Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 293-294 .) Juror misconduct occurs when there is “a direct violation of the oaths, duties, and admonitions imposed on actual or prospective jurors, such as when a juror conceals bias on voir dire, consciously receives outside information, discusses the case with nonjurors, or 55 shares improper information with other jurors.” (People

2021I, § 16; [citations].) An impartial jury is one in which no member has been improperly influenced [citations] and every member is ‘ “capable and 52 willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it” ’ [citations].” (People v. Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 293-294 .) Juror misconduct occurs when there is “a direct violation of the oaths, duties, and admonitions imposed on actual or prospective jurors, such as when a juror conceals bias on voir dire, consciously receives outside information, discusses the case with nonjurors, or shares improper information with other jurors.” (People

2022(See Quiles v. Parent (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1013 (Quiles); see 13 In Goldstein I, the plaintiff offered a concrete theory of damages.

2022(See Quiles v. Parent (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1013 (Quiles); see 13 In Goldstein I, the plaintiff offered a concrete theory of damages.

2024(See People v. Quiroz (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 65, 78 .) Defendant nevertheless contends his trial counsel was deficient in failing to object on the ground that defendant’s statements were involuntarily obtained by an agent of the police.

2023(See People v. Quiroz (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 65, 78 .) Implicitly acknowledging this fact, defendant contends his trial counsel provided constitutionally deficient assistance by failing to object on the ground that defendant’s statements in the conversation were involuntarily obtained by an agent of the police.

2023(Ibid.) 5 “‘Direct progeny are those which are a continuation of the stipulated cause or question its finality, such as motions to vacate or reconsider.” (Gridley, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1583 .) The stipulated-to commissioner has jurisdiction over “direct progeny” proceedings because a party who already stipulated to the commissioner has effectively asked for the original proceedings to “be repeated or the result reexamined” before they conclude.

2021As a consequence, she contends, the temporary judge lacked jurisdiction to enter the “non-CLETS” restraining order. “‘“The appointment of a temporary judge to hear a particular ‘cause’ carries with it the power to act until the final determination of that proceeding. [Citation.] . . .”’” (Gridley v. Gridley (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1581 , quoting In re Steven A. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 754, 768 .) In determining whether a temporary judge is authorized to resolve a particular matter, “courts apply the rule that ‘[t]he determination of a cause encompasses subsequent proceedings that are its “d

2013(People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1303 ; In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 294 .) Juror 9 misconduct occurs when there is a direct violation of the oaths, duties, or admonitions imposed on jurors, such as when a juror conceals bias on voir dire, consciously receives outside information about the case, discusses the case with nonjurors, or shares improper information with other jurors.

2013“Because a defendant charged with a crime has a right to the unanimous verdict of 12 impartial jurors [citation], it is settled that a conviction cannot stand if even a single juror has been improperly influenced.” [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1303 .) “[W]here a verdict is attacked for juror taint, the focus is on whether there is any overt event or circumstance, ‘open to [corroboration by] sight, hearing, and the other senses’ [citation], which suggests a likelihood that one or more members of the jury were influenced by improper bias. [¶] When the ove

2025Accordingly, defendant is challenging the validity of his plea and such a challenge requires a certificate of probable cause.” (Accord, People v. Mashburn (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 937, 941 [“a defendant generally may not appeal from a judgment of conviction following a guilty or no contest plea, unless he files with the trial court a statement ‘showing reasonable, constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings’ (§ 1237.5, subd. (a)), and the trial court executes and files ‘a certificate of probable cause for such appeal with the clerk of the court’ (§ 1

2011A “timely notice of appeal, as a general matter, is ‘essential to appellate jurisdiction.’ [Citation.] It largely divests the superior court of jurisdiction and vests it in the Court of Appeal. [Citation.] An untimely notice of appeal is ‘wholly ineffectual: The delay cannot be waived, it cannot be cured by nunc pro tunc order, and the appellate court has no power to give relief, but must dismiss the appeal on motion or on its own motion.’ [Citation.] The purpose of the requirement of a timely notice of appeal is, self-evidently, to further the finality of judgments by causing the [party] to t

2021(In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 675 .) It is not misconduct when it is unrelated to any issue in the case, even when it concerns the jury process.

1999(See, e.g., Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th 561, 578-579 ; In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 647 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 889 P.2d 985 ] (Carpenter); Hitchings, supra, 6 Cal. 4th 97, 118 .) A sitting juror’s involuntary exposure to events outside the trial evidence, even if not “misconduct” in the pejorative sense, may require similar examination for probable prejudice.

2014“Far more is required to constitute ‘the functional equivalent of questioning’ than merely advising a person he is under arrest for a specific offense. [Citations.]” (People v. Celestine (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1374 .) “A police officer’s response to a direct inquiry by the defendant does not constitute ‘interrogation….’ [Citation.]” (United States v. Briggs (7th Cir. 2001) 273 F.3d 737, 740 .) An officer’s “mere description of the evidence and of potential charges against a suspect, in direct response to the suspect’s importuning, hardly can be classified as interrogatory. [Citations.]” (U

2014“Far more is required to constitute ‘the functional equivalent of questioning’ than merely advising a person he is under arrest for a specific offense. [Citations.]” (People v. Celestine (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1374 .) “A police officer’s response to a direct inquiry by the defendant does not constitute ‘interrogation….’ [Citation.]” (United States v. Briggs (7th Cir. 2001) 273 F.3d 737, 740 .) An officer’s “mere description of the evidence and of potential charges against a suspect, in direct response to the suspect’s importuning, hardly can be classified as interrogatory. [Citations.]” (U

2014The assertion of the privilege as a defense is thus a direct challenge to liability." (Block v. Sacramento Clinical Labs, Inc. (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 386, 389 .) "The privilege created by . . . section 47, though part of the statutory law dealing with defamation, has evolved through case law application into a rather broad protective device which attaches to various classes of persons and applies to types of publications and in types of actions not traditionally identified with the field of defamation." (Rosenthal v. Irell & Manella (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 121, 125 .) 17 "[S]ection 2924 deems the

1986Co., supra, 30 Cal. App.3d at p. 823 , italics omitted; Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen (1983) 146 Cal. App.3d 200, 232 [ 194 Cal. Rptr. 180 ]; Block v. Sacramento Clinical Labs, Inc., supra, 131 Cal. App.3d at p. 394 .) When a publication meets the requirements set out above, the privilege is absolute and unaffected by the presence of malice. ( Costa v. Superior Court, supra, 157 Cal. App.3d at p. 677 ; Izzi v. Rellas (1980) 104 Cal. App.3d 254, 265 [ 163 Cal. Rptr. 639 ]; Tiedemann v. Superior Court (1978) 83 Cal. App.3d 918, 924 [ 148 Cal. Rptr. 242 ].) (3) "The privilege created by Civi

2014The assertion of the privilege as a defense is thus a direct challenge to liability." (Block v. Sacramento Clinical Labs, Inc. (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 386, 389 .) "The privilege created by . . . section 47, though part of the statutory law dealing with defamation, has evolved through case law application into a rather broad protective device which attaches to various classes of persons and applies to types of publications and in types of actions not traditionally identified with the field of defamation." (Rosenthal v. Irell & Manella (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 121, 125 .) 17 "[S]ection 2924 deems the

1986The assertion of the privilege as a defense is thus a direct challenge to liability.” (Block v. Sacramento Clinical Labs, Inc. (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 386, 389 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 438 ].) The “purpose of section 47 is to afford litigants freedom of access to the courts to secure and defend their rights without fear of being harassed by actions for defamation [citations], and to promote the unfettered administration of justice even though as an incidental result it may in some instances provide an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer [citations].” (Bradley v. Hartford Acc. & Indem.

2014It observed, “[t]he court in American Computer focused on the absence of the employer’s attempt to coerce the employee to engage in criminal conduct and the absence of a direct violation of a statute protecting the employee’s rights. [Citation.]” (Collier, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 1126 .) However, as Collier observed, the year after American Computer was decided, the California Supreme Court in Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 91 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 130 , 801 R2d 373] (Rojo) “rejected a similar argument in the context of a wrongful discharge action based on sex discrimination.” (Collier, sup

2014It observed, “[t]he court in American Computer focused on the absence of the employer’s attempt to coerce the employee to engage in criminal conduct and the absence of a direct violation of a statute protecting the employee’s rights. [Citation.]” (Collier, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 1126 .) However, as Collier observed, the year after American Computer was decided, the California Supreme Court in Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 91 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 130 , 801 R2d 373] (Rojo) “rejected a similar argument in the context of a wrongful discharge action based on sex discrimination.” (Collier, sup

2001(E.g., People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 316 , 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 956 P.2d 374 ( Bolin) ; People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 909 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705 , 855 P.2d 1277 ( Montiel. )) However, defendant urges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object, and that the dismissal of Nadyne T. violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. [8] To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show counsel's performance fell below a standard of reasonable competence, and that prejudice resulted.

2001(E.g., People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 316 , 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 956 P.2d 374 ( Bolin) ; People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 909 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705 , 855 P.2d 1277 ( Montiel. )) However, defendant urges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object, and that the dismissal of Nadyne T. violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. [8] To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show counsel's performance fell below a standard of reasonable competence, and that prejudice resulted.