10 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cianci v. Nationwide Insurance Co.green2 sentences2001Our Supreme Court agreed that a claimant does not have a direct claim against the insurer of a tortfeasor until that claim has been reduced to judgment against the tortfeasor Medical Malpractice, 703 A.2d at 1101 (citing Cianci v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 659 A.2d 662, 666 (R.I. 1995), and Auclair v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 505 A.2d 431 (R.I. 1986)). 2001Our Supreme Court agreed that a claimant does not have a direct claim against the insurer of a tortfeasor until that claim has been reduced to judgment against the tortfeasor Medical Malpractice, 703 A.2d at 1101 (citing Cianci v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 659 A.2d 662, 666 (R.I. 1995), and Auclair v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 505 A.2d 431 (R.I. 1986)). | 3 | 3 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences1981Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 724 ; cf. State v. Espinosa, 109 R.I. 221, 227 , 283 A.2d 465, 468 (1971) (example of trial judge’s separate instructions on waiver and voluntariness). 1981Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 724 ; cf. State v. Espinosa, 109 R.I. 221, 227 , 283 A.2d 465, 468 (1971) (example of trial judge’s separate instructions on waiver and voluntariness). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Espinosagreen2 sentences1981Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 724 ; cf. State v. Espinosa, 109 R.I. 221, 227 , 283 A.2d 465, 468 (1971) (example of trial judge’s separate instructions on waiver and voluntariness). 1981Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 724 ; cf. State v. Espinosa, 109 R.I. 221, 227 , 283 A.2d 465, 468 (1971) (example of trial judge’s separate instructions on waiver and voluntariness). | 2 | 2 |
Auclair v. Nationwide Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences2001Our Supreme Court agreed that a claimant does not have a direct claim against the insurer of a tortfeasor until that claim has been reduced to judgment against the tortfeasor Medical Malpractice, 703 A.2d at 1101 (citing Cianci v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 659 A.2d 662, 666 (R.I. 1995), and Auclair v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 505 A.2d 431 (R.I. 1986)). 2001Our Supreme Court agreed that a claimant does not have a direct claim against the insurer of a tortfeasor until that claim has been reduced to judgment against the tortfeasor Medical Malpractice, 703 A.2d at 1101 (citing Cianci v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 659 A.2d 662, 666 (R.I. 1995), and Auclair v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 505 A.2d 431 (R.I. 1986)). | 1 | 2 |
In Re Request for Advisory Opinion From the House of Representativesgreen1 sentence2022These amendments ushered in four fundamental changes to the Rhode Island Constitution and, for the first time in [the state’s] history, clearly and explicitly established three separate and distinct departments of government.” In re Request for Advisory Opinion from House of Representatives (Coastal Resources Management Council), 961 A.2d 930, 933 (R.I. 2008). | 1 | 1 |
McKenna v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2022Cf. McKenna, 874 A.2d at 230 (“Although the foregoing holdings [based on standing] are determinative of the - 19 - issues before this Court, we are mindful of the public importance that attaches to such a direct challenge to an official’s title to office [in accordance with the state constitution].”). 1 Repeal of Article 6, Section 10 “In November of 2004, the electorate of the State of Rhode Island approved the so-called separation of powers amendments. 2022Cf. McKenna, 874 A.2d at 230 (“Although the foregoing holdings [based on standing] are determinative of the - 19 - issues before this Court, we are mindful of the public importance that attaches to such a direct challenge to an official’s title to office [in accordance with the state constitution].”). 1 Repeal of Article 6, Section 10 “In November of 2004, the electorate of the State of Rhode Island approved the so-called separation of powers amendments. | 1 | 1 |
Smith Development Corp. v. Bilow Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences2008The city and PRA argued below, and also on appeal, that this Court’s holding in Belliveau Building Corp., 763 A.2d at 629 , eviscerates any tortious interference claim as a matter of law. 5 To prevail on a claim of tortious interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must show “(1) the existence of a contract; (2) the alleged wrongdoer’s knowledge of the contract; (3) his [or her] intentional interference; and (4) damages resulting therefrom.” Smith Development Corp. v. Bilow Enterprises, Inc., 112 R.I. 203, 211 , 308 A.2d 477, 482 (1973). 2008The city and PRA argued below, and also on appeal, that this Court’s holding in Belliveau Building Corp., 763 A.2d at 629 , eviscerates any tortious interference claim as a matter of law. 5 To prevail on a claim of tortious interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must show “(1) the existence of a contract; (2) the alleged wrongdoer’s knowledge of the contract; (3) his [or her] intentional interference; and (4) damages resulting therefrom.” Smith Development Corp. v. Bilow Enterprises, Inc., 112 R.I. 203, 211 , 308 A.2d 477, 482 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
DiQuinzio v. Panciera Lease Co., Inc.green1 sentence1994See id. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n v. Rhode Island Insurers' Insolvency Fund
green
2 sentences2001Our Supreme Court agreed that a claimant does not have a direct claim against the insurer of a tortfeasor until that claim has been reduced to judgment against the tortfeasor Medical Malpractice, 703 A.2d at 1101 (citing Cianci v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 659 A.2d 662, 666 (R.I. 1995), and Auclair v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 505 A.2d 431 (R.I. 1986)). 2001Our Supreme Court agreed that a claimant does not have a direct claim against the insurer of a tortfeasor until that claim has been reduced to judgment against the tortfeasor Medical Malpractice, 703 A.2d at 1101 (citing Cianci v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 659 A.2d 662, 666 (R.I. 1995), and Auclair v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 505 A.2d 431 (R.I. 1986)). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. NAT. ASS'N OF GOV. EMP. L. 79
green
1 sentence1991This was a direct violation of the doctrine enunciated by us in State v. National Association of Government Employees Local No. 79, supra. Moreover, it should be noted that the chief judge has been given by statute the power and the duty to supervise the operations of the District Court. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
National Sav. Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton
green
2 sentences1989However, we also adopted the rule in Bartlett that had been stated earlier in National Savings Life Insurance Co. v. Dutton, 419 So.2d 1357 (Ala.1982): “ ‘An insurer is liable for its refusal to pay a direct claim when there is no lawful basis for the refusal coupled with actual knowledge of that fact. * * * No lawful basis “means that the insurer lacks a legitimate or arguable reason for failing to pay the claim.” * * * When a claim is “fairly debatable,” the insurer is entitled to debate it, whether the debate concerns a matter of fact or law. “ ‘Under those authorities the plaintiff in a “b 1989Or, stated differently, the plaintiff must show that the insurance company had no legal or factual defense to the insurance claim.’ ” (Emphasis added.) 419 So.2d at 1361 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.