60 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1918–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
National SEC. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bowengreen2 sentences1997Co. v. Bowen , 417 So.2d 179 (Ala. 1982), as follows: "An insurer is liable for its refusal to pay a direct claim when there is no lawful basis for the refusal coupled with actual knowledge of that fact. 1997This Court created the tort of bad faith failure to pay an insurance claim in Chavers v. National Security Fire Casualty Co. , 405 So.2d 1 , 7 (Ala. 1981), stating: "[A]n actionable tort arises for an insurer's intentional refusal to settle a direct claim where there is either '(1) no lawful basis for the refusal coupled with actual knowledge of that fact or (2) intentional failure to determine whether or not there was any lawful basis for such refusal.' " Later, in National Security Fire Casualty Co. v. Bowen , 417 So.2d 179 , 183 (Ala. 1982), this Court held: "No lawful basis 'means that the | 5 | 19 |
Chavers v. National SEC. Fire & Cas. Co.green2 sentences2013Since Chavers , this Court has referred to this tort in the singular: “[A]n actionable tort arises for an insurer’s intentional refusal to settle a direct claim where there is either ‘(1) no lawful basis for the refusal coupled with actual knowledge of that fact or (2) intentional failure to determine whether or not there was any lawful basis for such refusal.’ ” 405 So.2d at 7 . 2013In Chavers this Court adopted the test proposed in the dissent in Vincent and held that “an actionable tort arises for an insurer’s intentional refusal to settle a direct claim where there is either ‘(1) no lawful basis for the refusal coupled with actual knowledge of that fact or (2) intentional failure to determine whether or not there was any lawful basis for such refusal.’ ” 405 So.2d at 7 . | 4 | 23 |
Michael v. National Security Fire & Casualty Co.green2 sentences1999See Michael v. National Security Fire & Casualty Co., 458 F.Supp. 128 (N.D.Miss.1978). 1990See Michael v. National Security Fire Casualty Co. , 458 F. Supp. 128 (N.D.Miss. 1978). | 4 | 5 |
Leatherwood, Inc. v. Bakergreen2 sentences2012See also Blaylock, 709 So.2d at 1131 . [[Image here]] “Where a purchaser’s direct inquiry would otherwise impose a duty of truthful disclosure, this Court has held that a purchaser’s fraud claim is precluded by language in a sales contract stating that the purchase is ‘as is.’ Leatherwood, Inc. v. Baker, 619 So.2d 1273, 1274 (Ala.1992); Haygood v. Burl Pounders Realty, Inc., 571 So.2d 1086, 1089 (Ala.1990); Massey v. Weeks Realty Co., 511 So.2d 171, 173 (Ala.1987). 2010In Nesbitt v. Frederick, 941 So.2d 950 (Ala.2006), the plaintiffs expressly asked the Court "to overrule a line of Alabama cases holding that `[w]here a purchaser's direct inquiry would otherwise impose a duty of truthful disclosure, this Court has held that a purchaser's fraud claim is precluded by language in a sales contract stating that the purchase is "as is."' Moore, 849 So.2d at 924 (citing Leatherwood v. Baker, 619 So.2d 1273, 1274-75 (Ala.1992); Haygood v. Burl Pounders Realty, Inc., 571 So.2d 1086, 1089 (Ala.1990); and Massey v. Weeks Realty Co., 511 So.2d 171, 173 (Ala. 1987))." 941 | 3 | 7 |
Haygood v. Burl Pounders Realty, Inc.green2 sentences2012See also Blaylock, 709 So.2d at 1131 . [[Image here]] “Where a purchaser’s direct inquiry would otherwise impose a duty of truthful disclosure, this Court has held that a purchaser’s fraud claim is precluded by language in a sales contract stating that the purchase is ‘as is.’ Leatherwood, Inc. v. Baker, 619 So.2d 1273, 1274 (Ala.1992); Haygood v. Burl Pounders Realty, Inc., 571 So.2d 1086, 1089 (Ala.1990); Massey v. Weeks Realty Co., 511 So.2d 171, 173 (Ala.1987). 2010In Nesbitt v. Frederick, 941 So.2d 950 (Ala.2006), the plaintiffs expressly asked the Court "to overrule a line of Alabama cases holding that `[w]here a purchaser's direct inquiry would otherwise impose a duty of truthful disclosure, this Court has held that a purchaser's fraud claim is precluded by language in a sales contract stating that the purchase is "as is."' Moore, 849 So.2d at 924 (citing Leatherwood v. Baker, 619 So.2d 1273, 1274-75 (Ala.1992); Haygood v. Burl Pounders Realty, Inc., 571 So.2d 1086, 1089 (Ala.1990); and Massey v. Weeks Realty Co., 511 So.2d 171, 173 (Ala. 1987))." 941 | 3 | 6 |
Massey v. Weeks Realty Co., Inc.green2 sentences2012See also Blaylock, 709 So.2d at 1131 . [[Image here]] “Where a purchaser’s direct inquiry would otherwise impose a duty of truthful disclosure, this Court has held that a purchaser’s fraud claim is precluded by language in a sales contract stating that the purchase is ‘as is.’ Leatherwood, Inc. v. Baker, 619 So.2d 1273, 1274 (Ala.1992); Haygood v. Burl Pounders Realty, Inc., 571 So.2d 1086, 1089 (Ala.1990); Massey v. Weeks Realty Co., 511 So.2d 171, 173 (Ala.1987). 2010In Nesbitt v. Frederick, 941 So.2d 950 (Ala.2006), the plaintiffs expressly asked the Court "to overrule a line of Alabama cases holding that `[w]here a purchaser's direct inquiry would otherwise impose a duty of truthful disclosure, this Court has held that a purchaser's fraud claim is precluded by language in a sales contract stating that the purchase is "as is."' Moore, 849 So.2d at 924 (citing Leatherwood v. Baker, 619 So.2d 1273, 1274-75 (Ala.1992); Haygood v. Burl Pounders Realty, Inc., 571 So.2d 1086, 1089 (Ala.1990); and Massey v. Weeks Realty Co., 511 So.2d 171, 173 (Ala. 1987))." 941 | 3 | 5 |
Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Barnesgreen2 sentences1990Co. v. Barnes, 405 So.2d 916, 924 (Ala.1981): "The first tier of the test promulgated by Mr. Justice Embry and adopted by this Court in Chavers establishes that the tort of bad faith refusal to honor a direct claim arises when there exists `no lawful basis for the refusal coupled with actual knowledge of that fact.' `No lawful basis,' as expressed in that opinion, means that the insurer lacks a legitimate or arguable reason for failing to pay the claim. 1990Co. v. Barnes , 405 So.2d 916 , 924 (Ala. 1981): "The first tier of the test promulgated by Mr. Justice Embry and adopted by this Court in Chavers establishes that the tort of bad faith refusal to honor a direct claim arises when there exists 'no lawful basis for the refusal coupled with actual knowledge of that fact.' 'No lawful basis,' as expressed in that opinion, means that the insurer lacks a legitimate or arguable reason for failing to pay the claim. | 2 | 9 |
Vincent v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc.green2 sentences2001Co., 405 So.2d 1 (Ala.1981). "[A]n actionable tort arises for an insurer's intentional refusal to settle a direct claim where there is either `(1) no lawful basis for the refusal coupled with actual knowledge of that fact or (2) intentional failure to determine whether or not there was any lawful basis for such refusal.'" Chavers, 405 So.2d at 7 , quoting Vincent v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 373 So.2d 1054, 1067 (Enbry, J., dissenting). 1990Co. , 405 So.2d 1 (Ala. 1981): "[A]n actionable tort arises for an insurer's intentional refusal to settle a direct claim where there is either '(1) no lawful basis for the refusal coupled with actual knowledge of that fact or (2) intentional failure to determine whether or not there was any lawful basis for such refusal.' " Chavers , 405 So.2d at 7 (quoting Vincent v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama , 373 So.2d 1054 (Ala. 1979)). | 2 | 5 |
Ex Parte Progress Rail Services Corp.green2 sentences2015Corp., 869 So.2d 459, 462 (Ala.2003) (holding that a loss-of-consortium claim is "derivative of, and dependent upon the outcome of, the direct claim''). . 2008Corp., 869 So.2d 459, 462 (Ala.2003) (“Even if the claims alleging loss of consortium and loss of services could otherwise be legally cognizable, they are derivative of, and dependent upon the outcome of, the direct claim .... ”). | 2 | 2 |
Roberts v. C & S Sovran Credit Corp.green2 sentences2002However, if the seller, or the seller's agent, is questioned directly about specific defects, or if the seller or the agent has knowledge of specific defects that affected health or safety and the defect is not known to or readily observable by the buyer, the seller or the agent has a duty to disclose and is liable for damages for nondisclosure.' " Roberts v. C & S Sovran Credit Corp., 621 So.2d 1294, 1297 (Ala.1993) (citations omitted). 2002However, if the seller, or the seller's agent, is questioned directly about specific defects, or if the seller or the agent has knowledge of specific defects that affected health or safety and the defect is not known to or hreadily observable by the buyer, the seller or the agent has a duty to disclose and is liable for damages for nondisclosure.' " Roberts v. CS Sovran Credit Corp. , 621 So.2d 1294 , 1297 (Ala. 1993) (citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Moore v. Prudential Residential Servicesgreen2 sentences2012“Where a purchaser’s direct inquiry would otherwise impose a duty of truthful disclosure, ... a purchaser’s fraud claim is precluded by language in a sales contract stating that the purchase is ‘as is.’ ” Moore, 849 So.2d at 924 . 2010P'ship, 849 So.2d 914, 924 (Ala.2002) (explaining that "[w]here a purchaser's direct inquiry would otherwise impose a duty of truthful disclosure, this Court has held that a purchaser's fraud claim is precluded by language in a sales contract stating that the purchase is `as is'"); and Clay Kilgore Constr., Inc. v. Buchalter/Grant, L.L.C., 949 So.2d 893 (Ala.2006). | 1 | 3 |
Keck v. Dryvit Systems, Inc.green1 sentence2015"The AEMLD is a judicially created accommodation of Alabama law to the doctrine of strict liability for damage or injuries caused by allegedly defective products.” Keck v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 830 So.2d 1, 5 (Ala.2002). | 1 | 1 |
Blaylock v. Carygreen1 sentence2012See also Blaylock, 709 So.2d at 1131 . [[Image here]] “Where a purchaser’s direct inquiry would otherwise impose a duty of truthful disclosure, this Court has held that a purchaser’s fraud claim is precluded by language in a sales contract stating that the purchase is ‘as is.’ Leatherwood, Inc. v. Baker, 619 So.2d 1273, 1274 (Ala.1992); Haygood v. Burl Pounders Realty, Inc., 571 So.2d 1086, 1089 (Ala.1990); Massey v. Weeks Realty Co., 511 So.2d 171, 173 (Ala.1987). | 1 | 1 |
Balwin County Electric v. Catrettgreen1 sentence2011Membership Corp. v. Catrett, 942 So.2d 337, 345 (Ala.2006). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte FPgreen1 sentence2005Compare Ex parte F.P., supra. Still, the same definition of abandonment found in the CPA is found in Alabama’s Adoption Code. | 1 | 1 |
Murdock v. STEEL PROCESSING SERVICESgreen1 sentence2003See Murdock v. Steel Processing Servs., Inc. , 581 So.2d 846 (Ala. 1991). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Ford Motor Credit Co.green2 sentences2000See Ex parte Ford Motor Credit Co. 717 So.2d 781 , 787 (Ala. 1997). 2000See Ex parte Ford Motor Credit Co. , 717 So.2d at 787 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co.
green
2 sentences1992This Court stated those 'prongs' in Jones v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Co. , 507 So.2d 396 , 899 (Ala. 1986): " '[A]n actionable tort arises for an insurer's intentional refusal to settle a direct claim where there is either "(1) no lawful basis for the refusal coupled with actual knowledge of that fact or (2) intentional failure to determine whether or not there was any lawful basis for such refusal." ' "The plaintiff in a bad faith action has a heavy burden, National Savings Life Ins. 1991This Court stated those 'prongs' in Jones v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Co. , 507 So.2d 396 , 899 (Ala. 1986): " '[A]n actionable tort arises for an insurer's intentional refusal to settle a direct claim where there is either "(1) no lawful basis for the refusal coupled with actual knowledge of that fact or (2) intentional failure to determine whether or not there was any lawful basis for such refusal." ' "The plaintiff in a bad faith action has a heavy burden, National Savings Life Ins. | 3 | 1989–1992 |
National Sav. Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton
green
2 sentences1992Co. v. Dutton , 419 So.2d 1357 (Ala. 1982), and the elements of bad faith refusal to pay are: *Page 1321 " '(a) An insurance contract between the parties and a breach thereof by the defendant; " '(b) An intentional refusal to pay the insured's claim; " '(c) The absence of any reasonably legitimate or arguable reason for that refusal (the absence of a debatable reason); " '(d) The insurer's actual knowledge of the absence of any legitimate or arguable reason; " '(e) If the intentional failure to determine the existence of a lawful basis is relied upon, the plaintiff must prove the insurer's int 1991Co. v. Dutton , 419 So.2d 1357 (Ala. 1982), and the elements of bad faith refusal to pay are: " '(a) An insurance contract between the parties and a breach thereof by the defendant; " '(b) An intentional refusal to pay the insured's claim; " '(c) The absence of any reasonably legitimate or arguable reason for that refusal (the absence of a debatable reason); " '(d) The insurer's actual knowledge of the absence of any legitimate or arguable reason; " '(e) If the intentional failure to determine the existence of a lawful basis is relied upon, the plaintiff must prove the insurer's intentional fa | 3 | 1989–1992 |
Clawson v. Hts. Chiropractic Physicians, L.L.C.
green
2 sentences2025That motion was also granted. 38 SC-2025-0368 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a vicarious-liability claim against a physician's employer is barred "when a direct claim against the physician is time-barred." 170 Ohio St. 3d at 460 , 214 N.E. 3d at 548 . 2025That motion was also granted. 38 SC-2025-0368 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a vicarious-liability claim against a physician's employer is barred "when a direct claim against the physician is time-barred." 170 Ohio St. 3d at 460 , 214 N.E. 3d at 548 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Childs v. MISSISSIPPI VAL. TITLE INS. CO.
green
1 sentence2013The tort of bad faith is based upon the fact that “ ‘[ejvery contract contains an implied in law covenant of good faith and fair dealing’ ” and the “ ‘[bjreach of [that] covenant provides the injured party with a tort action for “bad faith” notwithstanding that the acts complained of may also constitute a breach of contract.’” Id. at 4 (quoting Childs, 359 So.2d at 1152 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Hodurski
green
1 sentence2013However, because I believe that “[o]ur duty is to enunciate the law on the record facts” even though “none of the parties declaimed the applicable law,” Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So.2d at 960 , and because I believe that enunciating the law on the factual record of this case would require overruling Handley , I respectfully dissent. . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Nesbitt v. Frederick
green
2 sentences2010In Nesbitt v. Frederick, 941 So.2d 950 (Ala.2006), the plaintiffs expressly asked the Court "to overrule a line of Alabama cases holding that `[w]here a purchaser's direct inquiry would otherwise impose a duty of truthful disclosure, this Court has held that a purchaser's fraud claim is precluded by language in a sales contract stating that the purchase is "as is."' Moore, 849 So.2d at 924 (citing Leatherwood v. Baker, 619 So.2d 1273, 1274-75 (Ala.1992); Haygood v. Burl Pounders Realty, Inc., 571 So.2d 1086, 1089 (Ala.1990); and Massey v. Weeks Realty Co., 511 So.2d 171, 173 (Ala. 1987))." 941 2010In Nesbitt v. Frederick, 941 So.2d 950 (Ala.2006), the plaintiffs expressly asked the Court "to overrule a line of Alabama cases holding that `[w]here a purchaser's direct inquiry would otherwise impose a duty of truthful disclosure, this Court has held that a purchaser's fraud claim is precluded by language in a sales contract stating that the purchase is "as is."' Moore, 849 So.2d at 924 (citing Leatherwood v. Baker, 619 So.2d 1273, 1274-75 (Ala.1992); Haygood v. Burl Pounders Realty, Inc., 571 So.2d 1086, 1089 (Ala.1990); and Massey v. Weeks Realty Co., 511 So.2d 171, 173 (Ala. 1987))." 941 | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Clay Kilgore Constr. v. buchalter/grant
green
2 sentences2010P'ship, 849 So.2d 914, 924 (Ala.2002) (explaining that "[w]here a purchaser's direct inquiry would otherwise impose a duty of truthful disclosure, this Court has held that a purchaser's fraud claim is precluded by language in a sales contract stating that the purchase is `as is'"); and Clay Kilgore Constr., Inc. v. Buchalter/Grant, L.L.C., 949 So.2d 893 (Ala.2006). 2010P’ship, 849 So.2d 914, 924 (Ala.2002) (explaining that “[w]here a purchaser’s direct inquiry would otherwise impose a duty of truthful disclosure, this Court has held that a purchaser’s fraud claim is precluded by language in a sales contract stating that the purchase is ‘as is’ ”); and Clay Kilgore Constr., Inc. v. Buchalter/Grant, L.L.C., 949 So.2d 893 (Ala.2006). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Lee v. United Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n
green
1 sentence2008Further, as was the case in Ex parte Farmers Exchange Bank, supra, and Lee v. United Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 466 So.2d 131 (Ala.1985), we find no fiduciary or confidential relationship or any other special circumstances to exist between Regions Bank or Barnett and the Swanns that might have given rise to a duty to disclose. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Dodd v. Burleson
green
2 sentences2007The main opinion in Dodd I pretermitted review of four issues that had not been preserved at the trial level (the validity of a visitation order apparently rendered on July 16, 2004; the allowance of the grandparents' amended complaint; the taxation of the guardian ad litem's fee to the father; and the award of an attorney fee to the grandparents), and opined that the father's direct challenge to § 30-3-4.1 , as applied to him, was foreclosed because he had failed to serve the Attorney General with a copy of his answer. 932 So.2d at 918 . 2007The main opinion in Dodd I pretermitted review of four issues that had not been preserved at the trial level (the validity of a visitation order apparently rendered on July 16, 2004; the allowance of the grandparents' amended complaint; the taxation of the guardian ad litem's fee to the father; and the award of an attorney fee to the grandparents), and opined that the father's direct challenge to § 30-3-4.1, as applied to him, was foreclosed because he had failed to serve the Attorney General with a copy of his answer. 932 So.2d at 918 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Terry v. Phillips 66 Co., Inc.
neutral
1 sentence2006"As a reminder to the bench and bar of the analytical underpinnings involved in this analysis, we note that a master-servant relationship is a subgroup of principal-agent relationships; a master is a subspecies of principal and a servant is a subspecies of agent." Terry v. Phillips 66 Co., 591 So.2d 33 , 36 n. 1 (Ala.1991). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Weekley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence2004The Browns also asserted a direct claim, titled "Complaint for Declaratory Judgment," against State Farm as Gant's liability insurer seeking a declaration that, based on this Court's decision in Tate v. Allstate Insurance Co. , supra, the policy should be "interpreted so as to provide $50,000 coverage for Judy Brown's claims and an additional $50,000 coverage for Michael Brown's claims." On February 16, 2001, State Farm filed its answer to the Browns' declaratory-judgment complaint, asserting, among other things, the affirmative defenses that the Browns' claim against State Farm was a prohibit | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Ivey v. Frankle
neutral
1 sentence1993Leatherwood, Inc., d/b/a Coldwell Banker First Ozark Realty v. Baker , 619 So.2d 1273 (1992); Ivey v. Frankle , 619 So.2d 1277 (Ala. 1993). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama v. Granger
green
1 sentence1989It is the second prong of the holding in Chavers that is at issue in this case. 1 In Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama v. Granger , 461 So.2d 1320 (Ala. 1984), this Court held: "It follows from [the language in Chavers ] that the [insured] in a bad faith case may prove his case either by showing that the insurer refused to pay the claim, knowing there was no legitimate reason to refuse payment, or by showing that the insurer intentionally failed to investigate the claim to determine whether there was a legitimate reason for refusing payment. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Old Southern Life Insurance Company v. Woodall green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Lavoie v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., Inc. green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Rex Insurance Company v. Baldwin green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Calvert Fire Insurance Company v. Green green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Casey v. Bryce green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Ex parte Harris neutral | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Moulton v. Reid green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Day v. Andrews green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Frederic v. Wilkins green | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| McAllister v. State green | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| Todd v. Ward neutral | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.