direct violation in Hawaii

2024Chang presided. 2 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER The Griffiths raise three points of error on appeal, contending that the Circuit Court: (1) abused its discretion by failing to properly apply the "totality of the circumstances" approach and the factors identified in Troyer v. Adams, 102 Hawai i 399, 77 P.3d 83 (2003), in determining the settlement between Third-Party Defendants-Appellees Grant Kapono Kanoho (Kanoho) and Marcus & Associates, Inc. (together, MAI Defendants) and Plaintiffs-Appellees Alan Sean Abad and Carolyn Kehaunani Abad (Abads) was made in

2024Chang presided. 2 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER The Griffiths raise three points of error on appeal, contending that the Circuit Court: (1) abused its discretion by failing to properly apply the "totality of the circumstances" approach and the factors identified in Troyer v. Adams, 102 Hawai i 399, 77 P.3d 83 (2003), in determining the settlement between Third-Party Defendants-Appellees Grant Kapono Kanoho (Kanoho) and Marcus & Associates, Inc. (together, MAI Defendants) and Plaintiffs-Appellees Alan Sean Abad and Carolyn Kehaunani Abad (Abads) was made in

2024Chang presided. 2 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER The Griffiths raise three points of error on appeal, contending that the Circuit Court: (1) abused its discretion by failing to properly apply the "totality of the circumstances" approach and the factors identified in Troyer v. Adams, 102 Hawai i 399, 77 P.3d 83 (2003), in determining the settlement between Third-Party Defendants-Appellees Grant Kapono Kanoho (Kanoho) and Marcus & Associates, Inc. (together, MAI Defendants) and Plaintiffs-Appellees Alan Sean Abad and Carolyn Kehaunani Abad (Abads) was made in

2014The court recognized that the ease “involved a discrete determination, rather than a direct challenge to a law or policy.” Id.

2014However, although the “litigation concerned a specific property, ... the result vindicated the dedication of public parks and historic sites across the state.” Id.

2012This is not a direct claim for the Property, and further, because a fair reading of UniDev’s counterclaim establishes that its primary purpose is to obtain money damages, the HUFTA claim is asserted for a purpose which was rejected as a basis for a lis yen-dens in S. Utsunomiya. 75 Haw. at 511-12 , 866 P.2d at 966-67 . 4.

2012This is not a direct claim for the Property, and further, because a fair reading of UniDev’s counterclaim establishes that its primary purpose is to obtain money damages, the HUFTA claim is asserted for a purpose which was rejected as a basis for a lis yen-dens in S. Utsunomiya. 75 Haw. at 511-12 , 866 P.2d at 966-67 . 4.

2000In State v. Staley, 91 Hawai'i 275 , 982 P.2d 904 (1999), a case on all fours with this one, the trial court’s elicitation of a waiver of the right solely from the defendant’s attorney and not directly from the defendant constituted plain error which infringed upon the defendant’s constitutional right to testify.

2000In State v. Staley, 91 Hawai'i 275 , 982 P.2d 904 (1999), a case on all fours with this one, the trial court’s elicitation of a waiver of the right solely from the defendant’s attorney and not directly from the defendant constituted plain error which infringed upon the defendant’s constitutional right to testify.

1996As a general rule, see Weeks, 70 Haw. at 398 , 772 P.2d at 1191 , a court order may not be collaterally attacked unless the jurisdiction of the court to make the order is challenged; mere questions of irregularity may not be collaterally attacked.

1996As a general rule, see Weeks, 70 Haw. at 398 , 772 P.2d at 1191 , a court order may not be collaterally attacked unless the jurisdiction of the court to make the order is challenged; mere questions of irregularity may not be collaterally attacked.

1993However, the statute at issue in the instant case does not contain any suspect categories. 5 Under HRS § 329-1 (Supp. 1992), the fourteen factors to consider in determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia are as follows: (1) Statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning its use; (2) Prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, under any state or federal law relating to any controlled substance; (3) The proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of this chapter; (4) The proximity of the object to controll

1993Texas 1981); Franza v. Carey, 518 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Gasser v. Morgan, 498 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D.

1993However, the statute at issue in the instant case does not contain any suspect categories. 5 Under HRS § 329-1 (Supp. 1992), the fourteen factors to consider in determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia are as follows: (1) Statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning its use; (2) Prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, under any state or federal law relating to any controlled substance; (3) The proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of this chapter; (4) The proximity of the object to controll

1993However, the statute at issue in the instant case does not contain any suspect categories. 5 Under HRS § 329-1 (Supp. 1992), the fourteen factors to consider in determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia are as follows: (1) Statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning its use; (2) Prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, under any state or federal law relating to any controlled substance; (3) The proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of this chapter; (4) The proximity of the object to controll

1993However, the statute at issue in the instant case does not contain any suspect categories. 5 Under HRS § 329-1 (Supp. 1992), the fourteen factors to consider in determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia are as follows: (1) Statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning its use; (2) Prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, under any state or federal law relating to any controlled substance; (3) The proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of this chapter; (4) The proximity of the object to controll

1993Texas 1981); Franza v. Carey, 518 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Gasser v. Morgan, 498 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D.

1960One cannot ordinarily be estopped to assert the direct violation of a decisive prohibition of statute or the unenforceability of a contract contrary to law. * * *” Commissioner of Banks v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 253 Mass. 205 , 148 N.E. 609, 614 . “* * * ‘Not even estoppel can legalize or vitalize that which the law declares unlawful and void.’ ” Georgia Public Service Com’n v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 205 Ga. 863 , 55 S.E. 2d 618, 634 .

1960One cannot ordinarily be estopped to assert the direct violation of a decisive prohibition of statute or the unenforceability of a contract contrary to law. * * *” Commissioner of Banks v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 253 Mass. 205 , 148 N.E. 609, 614 . “* * * ‘Not even estoppel can legalize or vitalize that which the law declares unlawful and void.’ ” Georgia Public Service Com’n v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 205 Ga. 863 , 55 S.E. 2d 618, 634 .

1925In Territory v. Truslow, 27 Haw. 109 , cited by the prosecution in the case at bar in support of the instruction as given, “the only witness involved in the question of credibility was the defendant;” and it was held that “for the court to have instructed the jury upon the credibility of the evidence of the prosecution which the defendant had in terms admitted would have been to stultify itself,” that a general instruction with reference to the interest of witnesses could not have been applicable to any witness other than the defendant and that, therefore, the direct instruction referring to t