direct exception in Georgia

2026And Driver held that a detective’s “responses did not violate [a defendant’s] previously invoked right to counsel under Edwards … because [the defendant’s] questions initiated a renewed conversation and evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation.” Driver, 307 Ga. at 650 (quotation marks omitted).11 11 Driver quoted Brown for the proposition that “a police officer’s response to a direct inquiry by the defendant does not constitute ‘interrogation.’” Driver, 307 Ga. at 650 (cleaned up).

2026And Driver held that a detective’s “responses did not violate [a defendant’s] previously invoked right to counsel under Edwards … because [the defendant’s] questions initiated a renewed conversation and evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation.” Driver, 307 Ga. at 650 (quotation marks omitted).11 11 Driver quoted Brown for the proposition that “a police officer’s response to a direct inquiry by the defendant does not constitute ‘interrogation.’” Driver, 307 Ga. at 650 (cleaned up).

2020See Driver, 307 Ga. at 650 (2) (b) (“[A] police officer’s response to a direct inquiry by the defendant does not constitute ‘interrogation.’”) (citation and punctuation omitted)); Brown, 287 Ga. at 477 (2) (where police asked no questions about defendant’s crimes following his invocation of the right to counsel and defendant was voluble throughout his interactions with police, introducing various topics, defendant’s incriminating statements were not the result of improper interrogation). 3.

2020Moreover, “[a] police officer’s response to a direct inquiry by the defendant does not constitute ‘interrogation.’” Brown, 287 Ga. at 477 (citation and punctuation omitted).

2018See Lett , 559 U. S. at 779 (III), 130 S.Ct. 1855 (stating, "we do not deny that the trial judge could have been more thorough," but finding that such additional thoroughness was not constitutionally required).

2018See Lett , 559 U. S. at 779 (III), 130 S.Ct. 1855 (stating, "we do not deny that the trial judge could have been more thorough," but finding that such additional thoroughness was not constitutionally required).

2014See id.

2014See id.

2013“A dealer’s sale of a used car falls within the ambit of the FBPA.” (Citation omitted.) Isbell v. Credit Nation Lending Svc., LLC, 319 Ga. App. 19, 29 (4) ( 735 SE2d 46 ) (2012).

2013“A dealer’s sale of a used car falls within the ambit of the FBPA.” (Citation omitted.) Isbell v. Credit Nation Lending Svc., LLC, 319 Ga. App. 19, 29 (4) ( 735 SE2d 46 ) (2012).

2013See Sinclair, supra at 502 ; Preuss, supra at 437 . (b) Callaway also contends that the trial court erred in finding that Lucinda was not a party to the Evans County action, arguing the evidence shows that although she was not a named party, she was a de facto party to that proceeding.

2013See Sinclair, supra at 502 ; Preuss, supra at 437 . (b) Callaway also contends that the trial court erred in finding that Lucinda was not a party to the Evans County action, arguing the evidence shows that although she was not a named party, she was a de facto party to that proceeding.

2013See Brown, supra (determining that, after the suspect invoked his right to counsel, the detectives’ words and actions that answered or deflected a number of direct questions from the suspect regarding what he would be charged with, when he could go home, whether he would be arrested, when he could use the phone, how the victim was doing, and where he would go next, did not constitute interrogation or its functional equivalent); United States v. Briggs, 273 F3d 737, 740-741 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Apolice officer’s response to a direct inquiry hy the defendant does not constitute ‘interrogation.’ ”)

2010See Walton v. State, 267 Ga. 713, 718 , 482 S.E.2d 330 (1997) ("[A]n accused's response to an officer's answer to a question posed by the accused is not the product of custodial interrogation"); United States v. Briggs, 273 F.3d 737, 740-741 (7th Cir.2001) ("A police officer's response to a direct inquiry by the defendant does not constitute `interrogation.'").

2012See Roth v. Gulf Atlantic Media of Ga., 244 Ga. App. 677, 679 (1) ( 536 SE2d 577 ) (2000) (“When a grant of summary judgment in a prior suit is relied upon to support a plea of res judicata in a subsequent suit, the basis of the prior summary judgment must be examined.

2012See Roth v. Gulf Atlantic Media of Ga., 244 Ga. App. 677, 679 (1) ( 536 SE2d 577 ) (2000) (“When a grant of summary judgment in a prior suit is relied upon to support a plea of res judicata in a subsequent suit, the basis of the prior summary judgment must be examined.

2006Id.; see also Grace Bros., Ltd. v. Farley Indus., 264 Ga. 817, 819 (2) ( 450 SE2d 814 ) (1995).

2006Id.; see also Grace Bros., Ltd. v. Farley Indus., 264 Ga. 817, 819 (2) ( 450 SE2d 814 ) (1995).

1994See Thomas v. Dickson, 250 Ga. 772, 774 , supra. In the case sub judice, defendant’s failure to place the propriety of plaintiffs’ direct claim on the table before the close of evidence leaves an unfocused evidentiary record as to the factors relevant to deciding this issue.

1986Thomas v. Dickson, 250 Ga. 772, 774 ( 301 SE2d 49 ) (1983).

2026As we have made clear, scrupulously honoring a defendant’s rights requires a detective to refrain from “ask[ing] [a defendant who has invoked his Miranda rights] any questions about the case” until after the defendant has reinitiated communication by signaling “a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation.” Pauldo, 309 Ga. at 133, 144 (quotation marks omitted) (noting that a defendant “may not be subjected to further questioning by law enforcement” after invoking his Miranda rights, unless “the suspect initiates the 10 Driver quoted Brown for the proposition

2026See Fortson v. Brown, 302 Ga. App. 89, 90 (1) ( 690 SE2d 239 ) (2010) (explaining that “it is not the function of this Court to cull the record on behalf of a party in search of instances of error,” and the “burden is upon the party alleging error to show it affirmatively in the record” (quotation marks omitted)). 17 We do not authorize the reporting of this opinion because it does not announce a new rule or policy or involve an interpretation of law that is not already precedent.

2026See Fortson v. Brown, 302 Ga. App. 89, 90 (1) ( 690 SE2d 239 ) (2010) (explaining that “it is not the function of this Court to cull the record on behalf of a party in search of instances of error,” and the “burden is upon the party alleging error to show it affirmatively in the record” (quotation marks omitted)). 17 We do not authorize the reporting of this opinion because it does not announce a new rule or policy or involve an interpretation of law that is not already precedent.

2025Greer v. Thompson, 281 Ga. 419 , 421–22 (2006) (cleaned up)7; see 7 There are exceptions to this rule: “(1) an actual or constructive denial 22 also Hall, 286 Ga. at 770 (habeas petitioner’s claim did not fall within narrow range of cases in which a presumption of prejudice could be assumed in context of appellate counsel’s failure to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness); Alexander v. State, 313 Ga. 521 , 530– 32 (2022) (adhering to rule that a claim of structural error, although presumed prejudicial when raised as a direct claim, is not entitled to the same presumption when raised in the co

2024More specifically, the Supreme Court concluded that the appellant’s “conduct-based waiver argument is a direct challenge to the enforceability of the arbitration agreement.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 176 (2) (a).

2022See Bell v. Cohran, 244 Ga. App. 510, 511 ( 536 SE2d 187 ) (2000); see also Voyles v. Voyles, 301 Ga. 44, 47 ( 799 SE2d 160 ) (2017) (explaining that appeal from order denying a motion to set aside was not a direct challenge to the court’s underlying custody ruling and therefore was not directly appealable under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11)).

2022See Bell v. Cohran, 244 Ga. App. 510, 511 ( 536 SE2d 187 ) (2000); see also Voyles v. Voyles, 301 Ga. 44, 47 ( 799 SE2d 160 ) (2017) (explaining that appeal from order denying a motion to set aside was not a direct challenge to the court’s underlying custody ruling and therefore was not directly appealable under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11)).

2022“Acquiescence occurs if a defendant is aware of the proceedings taking place in his absence but remains silent, so long as he had sufficient information concerning the matters occurring outside his 14 presence for his silence to be fairly construed as consent.” Steen, 312 Ga. at 617 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022“Acquiescence occurs if a defendant is aware of the proceedings taking place in his absence but remains silent, so long as he had sufficient information concerning the matters occurring outside his 14 presence for his silence to be fairly construed as consent.” Steen, 312 Ga. at 617 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted.) See also Champ, 310 Ga. at 841 (2) (c); Burney v. State, 299 Ga. 813, 820 (3) (b) (792 SE2d 354) (2016) (Acquiescence “is a tacit consent to acts or condition” and “implies a knowledge of those things which are acquiesced in.”).

2022“Acquiescence occurs if a defendant is aware of the proceedings taking place in his absence but remains silent, so long as he had sufficient information concerning the matters occurring outside his 14 presence for his silence to be fairly construed as consent.” Steen, 312 Ga. at 617 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted.) See also Champ, 310 Ga. at 841 (2) (c); Burney v. State, 299 Ga. 813, 820 (3) (b) (792 SE2d 354) (2016) (Acquiescence “is a tacit consent to acts or condition” and “implies a knowledge of those things which are acquiesced in.”).

2022“Acquiescence occurs if a defendant is aware of the proceedings taking place in his absence but remains silent, so long as he had sufficient information concerning the matters occurring outside his 14 presence for his silence to be fairly construed as consent.” Steen, 312 Ga. at 617 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted.) See also Champ, 310 Ga. at 841 (2) (c); Burney v. State, 299 Ga. 813, 820 (3) (b) (792 SE2d 354) (2016) (Acquiescence “is a tacit consent to acts or condition” and “implies a knowledge of those things which are acquiesced in.”).

2022“Acquiescence occurs if a defendant is aware of the proceedings taking place in his absence but remains silent, so long as he had sufficient information concerning the matters occurring outside his 14 presence for his silence to be fairly construed as consent.” Steen, 312 Ga. at 617 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted.) See also Champ, 310 Ga. at 841 (2) (c); Burney v. State, 299 Ga. 813, 820 (3) (b) (792 SE2d 354) (2016) (Acquiescence “is a tacit consent to acts or condition” and “implies a knowledge of those things which are acquiesced in.”).

2022See Bell v. Cohran, 244 Ga. App. 510, 511 ( 536 SE2d 187 ) (2000); see also Voyles v. Voyles, 301 Ga. 44, 47 ( 799 SE2d 160 ) (2017) (explaining that appeal from order denying a motion to set aside was not a direct challenge to the court’s underlying custody ruling and therefore was not directly appealable under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11)).

2022See Bell v. Cohran, 244 Ga. App. 510, 511 ( 536 SE2d 187 ) (2000); see also Voyles v. Voyles, 301 Ga. 44, 47 ( 799 SE2d 160 ) (2017) (explaining that appeal from order denying a motion to set aside was not a direct challenge to the court’s underlying custody ruling and therefore was not directly appealable under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11)).

2022The Plaintiffs do not, however, directly “state they are challenging [BCBS’s] premiums.”7 Therefore, the filed-rate doctrine does not bar the Plaintiffs’ claims as a direct challenge to the rates approved by the Commissioner.8 Next we examine whether the Plaintiffs’ Complaint contained a facially-neutral challenge that would indirectly require the trial court’s award of damages to change the rate approved by the Commissioner.9 Although the filed-rate doctrine bars causes of action that “would, effectively, change the rate paid by the customer-plaintiff to one below the filed rate paid by other

2022The Plaintiffs do not, however, directly “state they are challenging [BCBS’s] premiums.”7 Therefore, the filed-rate doctrine does not bar the Plaintiffs’ claims as a direct challenge to the rates approved by the Commissioner.8 Next we examine whether the Plaintiffs’ Complaint contained a facially-neutral challenge that would indirectly require the trial court’s award of damages to change the rate approved by the Commissioner.9 Although the filed-rate doctrine bars causes of action that “would, effectively, change the rate paid by the customer-plaintiff to one below the filed rate paid by other

2022Assn. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 108 F3d 658 , 668 (IV) (6th Cir. 1997) (same); Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F2d 680, 688-89 (II) (B) (1) (b) (9th Cir. 1993) (same); Stone v. Williams, 970 F2d 1043, 1048 (I) (A) (2d Cir. 1992) (“Because a declaratory judgment action is a procedural device used to vindicate substantive rights, it is time-barred only if relief on a direct claim would also be barred.”); Clulow v. State of Oklahoma, 700 F2d 1291, 1302 (IV) (B) (10th Cir. 1983) (same), overruled on other grounds, Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F2d 640 (10th Cir.

2022Assn. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 108 F3d 658, 668 (IV) (6th Cir. 1997) (same); Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F2d 680, 688-89 (II) (B) (1) (b) (9th Cir. 1993) (same); Stone v. Williams, 970 F2d 1043, 1048 (I) (A) (2d Cir. 1992) (“Because a declaratory judgment action is a procedural device used to vindicate substantive rights, it is time-barred only if relief on a direct claim would also be barred.” ); Clulow v. State of Oklahoma, 700 F2d 1291, 1302 (IV) (B) (10th Cir. 1983) (same), overruled on 11 other grounds, Garcia v. Williams, 731 F2d 640 (10th

2021Thus, absent a valid waiver, violation of the right to be present triggers reversal and remand for a new trial whenever the issue is properly raised on direct appeal.” (footnotes omitted)); Ward, 288 Ga. at 646-647 (“This Court has consistently ruled that the ‘denial of the right to be present guaranteed by the Georgia Constitution is not subject to harmless error review on direct appeal.’” (quoting Smith)); Howard, 307 Ga. at 21 (“’If not waived by the defendant, a direct violation of the right to be present is presumed prejudicial and requires a new trial.’” (citation omitted)).

2021Thus, absent a valid waiver, violation of the right to be present triggers reversal and remand for a new trial whenever the issue is properly raised on direct appeal.” (footnotes omitted)); 32 when, as in this case, the defendant rather obviously could not establish any actual prejudice.11 We should at least be confident that Ward, 288 Ga. at 646-647 (“This Court has consistently ruled that the ‘denial of the right to be present guaranteed by the Georgia Constitution is not subject to harmless error review on direct appeal.’” (quoting Smith, 284 Ga. at 609 )); Howard, 307 Ga. at 21 (“‘If not w

2021Thus, absent a valid waiver, violation of the right to be present triggers reversal and remand for a new trial whenever the issue is properly raised on direct appeal.” (footnotes omitted)); Ward, 288 Ga. at 646-647 (“This Court has consistently ruled that the ‘denial of the right to be present guaranteed by the Georgia Constitution is not subject to harmless error review on direct appeal.’” (quoting Smith)); Howard, 307 Ga. at 21 (“’If not waived by the defendant, a direct violation of the right to be present is presumed prejudicial and requires a new trial.’” (citation omitted)).

2021Thus, absent a valid waiver, violation of the right to be present triggers reversal and remand for a new trial whenever the issue is properly raised on direct appeal.” (footnotes omitted)); 32 when, as in this case, the defendant rather obviously could not establish any actual prejudice.11 We should at least be confident that Ward, 288 Ga. at 646-647 (“This Court has consistently ruled that the ‘denial of the right to be present guaranteed by the Georgia Constitution is not subject to harmless error review on direct appeal.’” (quoting Smith, 284 Ga. at 609 )); Howard, 307 Ga. at 21 (“‘If not w

2020Thus, “[a]n accused’s response to an officer’s answer to a question posed by the accused is not the product of custodial interrogation.” Gray, 304 Ga. at 805 (citation and punctuation omitted).