direct claim in Maryland

2023Count II—Statutory Claim for a Violation of the Directors’ Standard of Conduct In Plank v. Cherneski, 469 Md. 548 (2020), this Court held that a breach of fiduciary duty may be actionable as an independent cause of action.

2023Count II—Statutory Claim for a Violation of the Directors’ Standard of Conduct In Plank v. Cherneski, 469 Md. 548 (2020), this Court held that a breach of fiduciary duty may be actionable as an independent cause of action.

2023Count I—Statutory Claim for Stockholder Oppression For the same reasons that I have determined that Edward states a statutory claim under Count II for a violation of the directors’ standard of conduct under CA § 2-405.1, I similarly determine that Edward has stated a claim under CA § 3-413(b)(2) that would permit a court to consider equitable remedies short of involuntary dissolution to which a minority stockholder may be entitled upon proof that the “acts of the directors or those in control of the corporation are illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent”—remedies that this Court has sanctioned in

2023Count I—Statutory Claim for Stockholder Oppression For the same reasons that I have determined that Edward states a statutory claim under Count II for a violation of the directors’ standard of conduct under CA § 2-405.1, I similarly determine that Edward has stated a claim under CA § 3-413(b)(2) that would permit a court to consider equitable remedies short of involuntary dissolution to which a minority stockholder may be entitled upon proof that the “acts of the directors or those in control of the corporation are illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent”—remedies that this Court has sanctioned in

2017In George Wasserman & Janice Washerman Goldsten Family LLG v. Kay, 197 Md.App. 586 , 14 A.3d 1193 (2011), the Court of Special Appeals “extended] the rationale in Shenker to the law of partnerships and LLCs,” and therefore required that the plaintiffs show both a direct harm and the breach of a duty owed specifically to the plaintiffs.

2017In George Wasserman & Janice Washerman Goldsten Family LLG v. Kay, 197 Md.App. 586 , 14 A.3d 1193 (2011), the Court of Special Appeals “extended] the rationale in Shenker to the law of partnerships and LLCs,” and therefore required that the plaintiffs show both a direct harm and the breach of a duty owed specifically to the plaintiffs.

2017We decline, however, to adopt the second limiting circumstance. 22 One year after Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91 (Del. 2006), in Gatz v. Ponsoldt, 925 A.2d 1265 (Del. 2007), the Delaware Supreme Court allowed shareholders to bring a direct claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the corporation’s directors and majority shareholders on a share dilution theory even though the newly issued shares were granted to a new shareholder, rather than an already-controlling one.

2017One year after Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91 (Del. 2006), in Gatz v. Ponsoldt, 925 A.2d 1265 (Del, 2007), the Delaware Supreme Court allowed shareholders to bring a direct claim for breach of fiduciary duty against tire corporation’s directors and majority shareholders on a share dilution theory even though the newly issued shares were granted to a new shareholder, rather than an already-controlling one.

2017Morgan Chase & Co. Shareholder Litigation, 906 A.2d 766 (Del. 2006), shareholders brought a direct claim against directors for allegedly inducing them to approve a merger “with a proxy statement that contained materially inaccurate or incomplete disclosures.” Id. at 768 .

2017Morgan Chase & Co. Shareholder Litigation, 906 A.2d 766 (Del. 2006), shareholders brought a direct claim against directors for allegedly inducing them to approve a merger “with a proxy statement that contained materially inaccurate or incomplete disclosures.” Id. at 768 .

2017One year after Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91 (Del. 2006), in Gatz v. Ponsoldt, 925 A.2d 1265 (Del, 2007), the Delaware Supreme Court allowed shareholders to bring a direct claim for breach of fiduciary duty against tire corporation’s directors and majority shareholders on a share dilution theory even though the newly issued shares were granted to a new shareholder, rather than an already-controlling one.

2017Id. at 1281 , But in 2016, the court declined to further extend Gentile's holding to allow a limited partner to bring a direct claim for overpayment when he did not allege voting rights dilution or an increase in the general partner’s control at the expense of the limited partners.

2017But this proved to be a 29 hollow victory—the court dismissed the claim because the “plaintiffs [ ] failed to suggest any form of relief that [could] be granted to them in a direct claim.” Id. at 602 .

2017But this proved to be a hollow victory—the court dismissed the claim because the “plaintiffs [ ] failed to suggest any form of relief that [could] be granted to them in a direct claim.” Id. at 602 , In In re J.P.

2025Several years later, Newton filed a postconviction petition, claiming, among other things, ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to the presence of the alternate juror during deliberations, and a direct claim that “the trial court erred in permitting the alternate to sit in on deliberations.” Id. at 350 .

2025Newton, 455 Md. at 352 n.5.

2024Id. at 574 .

2020Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, [ 475 U.S. 469 ] (1986); De Bleecker v. Montgomery County, 292 Md. 498, 511-12 (1982). [Appellants] are asserting a direct claim against Baltimore County based on their position that Mr. Coit’s constitutional rights “were violated as a direct result of Baltimore County policies and customs which contributed to the deprivation of Mr. Coit’s federal constitutional or statutory rights to life.” Pls.’ Opp. at 19.

2020Id. at 187–88.

2020Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, [ 475 U.S. 469 ] (1986); De Bleecker v. Montgomery County, 292 Md. 498, 511-12 (1982). [Appellants] are asserting a direct claim against Baltimore County based on their position that Mr. Coit’s constitutional rights “were violated as a direct result of Baltimore County policies and customs which contributed to the deprivation of Mr. Coit’s federal constitutional or statutory rights to life.” Pls.’ Opp. at 19.

2017But in Strougo v. Bassini, 282 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2002), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied Maryland law to that question.

2015The Court of Special Appeals reviewed the Circuit Court’s analysis of the fraud allegations with respect to the direct claim and found “no clear error” in the trial court’s finding of oppressive, but not fraudulent, conduct. 217 Md.App. at 124 , 90 A.3d 559 .

2015The Court of Special Appeals reviewed the Circuit Court’s analysis of the fraud allegations with respect to the direct claim and found “no clear error” in the trial court’s finding of oppressive, but not fraudulent, conduct. 217 Md.App. at 124 , 90 A.3d 559 .

2011The majority characterizes John and Kevin’s oppression claim as a direct claim, citing Edenbaum v. Sckwarcz-Osztreicherne, 165 Md.App. 233 , 885 A.2d 365 (2005).

2011The majority characterizes John and Kevin’s oppression claim as a direct claim, citing Edenbaum v. Sckwarcz-Osztreicherne, 165 Md.App. 233 , 885 A.2d 365 (2005).

2011The State argues that the public duty doctrine applies to Ms. Jones’ claim of negligent retention, training and supervision because “the State’s responsibility, through the Sheriff, to train and supervise Deputies is owed to the public, not to individual citizens.” Ms. Jones disagrees, contending that the public duty doctrine applies to a case against a police officer for failure to protect a citizen from injury caused by another citizen, but her claim is a direct claim against the State for *667 failing to properly train, supervise and retain the deputies. 18 Alternatively, Ms. Jones argues t

2011The State argues that the public duty doctrine applies to Ms. Jones’ claim of negligent retention, training and supervision because “the State’s responsibility, through the Sheriff, to train and supervise Deputies is owed to the public, not to individual citizens.” Ms. Jones disagrees, contending that the public duty doctrine applies to a case against a police officer for failure to protect a citizen from injury caused by another citizen, but her claim is a direct claim against the State for *667 failing to properly train, supervise and retain the deputies. 18 Alternatively, Ms. Jones argues t

2011Although the district court lacks the power to issue a declaratory judgment, it certainly would have been within its authority to determine the legal *384 question of the validity of the toxicologist standards. 11 See Howard v. State, 76 Md.App. 447, 450-51 , 545 A.2d 705 (1988) (The district court in a criminal case possessed “fundamental jurisdiction” to decide whether the adoption of an agency regulation violated the Maryland Constitution.) Thus, there was no reason for Vargas-Aguila to seek declaratory relief in the circuit court.

2011Although the district court lacks the power to issue a declaratory judgment, it certainly would have been within its authority to determine the legal *384 question of the validity of the toxicologist standards. 11 See Howard v. State, 76 Md.App. 447, 450-51 , 545 A.2d 705 (1988) (The district court in a criminal case possessed “fundamental jurisdiction” to decide whether the adoption of an agency regulation violated the Maryland Constitution.) Thus, there was no reason for Vargas-Aguila to seek declaratory relief in the circuit court.

2010When presented with a particular voir dire question, the trial judge should ask himself or herself, "does this question probe for a condition that would be likely to impair a juror's ability to decide this case on the evidence presented?" If the answer to that question is "yes," the question should be asked. *1170 Had this test been applied in State v. Thomas, 369 Md. 202 , 798 A.2d 566 (2002), the circuit court would have concluded that, in a case in which the defendant has been charged with selling drugs to an undercover officer, it is likely that a prospective juror's attitude about drugs w

2010When presented with a particular voir dire question, the trial judge should ask himself or herself, "does this question probe for a condition that would be likely to impair a juror's ability to decide this case on the evidence presented?" If the answer to that question is "yes," the question should be asked. *1170 Had this test been applied in State v. Thomas, 369 Md. 202 , 798 A.2d 566 (2002), the circuit court would have concluded that, in a case in which the defendant has been charged with selling drugs to an undercover officer, it is likely that a prospective juror's attitude about drugs w

2008In a 5-4 decision, the Court considered the issue raised by the petitioner “even though the defect was not raised in a timely manner” because the appointment of a non-Article III judge was a direct violation of section 292(a), which “ ‘embodies a strong policy concerning the proper administration of judicial business.’” 539 U.S. at 78 , 123 S.Ct. 2130 (quoting Glidden, supra, 370 U.S. at 536 , 82 S.Ct. 1459 ).

2008In a 5-4 decision, the Court considered the issue raised by the petitioner “even though the defect was not raised in a timely manner” because the appointment of a non-Article III judge was a direct violation of section 292(a), which “ ‘embodies a strong policy concerning the proper administration of judicial business.’” 539 U.S. at 78 , 123 S.Ct. 2130 (quoting Glidden, supra, 370 U.S. at 536 , 82 S.Ct. 1459 ).

2008In a 5-4 decision, the Court considered the issue raised by the petitioner “even though the defect was not raised in a timely manner” because the appointment of a non-Article III judge was a direct violation of section 292(a), which “ ‘embodies a strong policy concerning the proper administration of judicial business.’” 539 U.S. at 78 , 123 S.Ct. 2130 (quoting Glidden, supra, 370 U.S. at 536 , 82 S.Ct. 1459 ).

2008In a 5-4 decision, the Court considered the issue raised by the petitioner “even though the defect was not raised in a timely manner” because the appointment of a non-Article III judge was a direct violation of section 292(a), which “ ‘embodies a strong policy concerning the proper administration of judicial business.’” 539 U.S. at 78 , 123 S.Ct. 2130 (quoting Glidden, supra, 370 U.S. at 536 , 82 S.Ct. 1459 ).

2007See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del.1985) (shareholder action requesting rescission of cash-out merger); Lerner, 132 Md.App. at 53 , 750 A.2d 709 (shareholder action seeking rescission of reverse stock split “freezing out” minority shareholders).

2005An excellent example of this suggested procedure can be found in United States v. Napoleone, 349 F.2d 350 (3d Cir.1965), which involved a prosecution for false personation of a federal agent.

2005An excellent example of this suggested procedure can be found in United States v. Napoleone, 349 F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1965), which involved a prosecution for false personation of a federal agent.