direct challenge in Florida

2020Absent a direct challenge, we must treat the delegation provision as valid and allow the arbitrator to determine the issue of arbitrability.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Angels Senior Living at Connerton Ct., LLC v. Gundry, 210 So. 3d 257, 258 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017))); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Beverly, 183 So. 3d 1099, 1101 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“The question whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration, i.e., the ‘question of arbitrability,’ is ‘an issue for judicial determination [u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.’” (alteration in origina

2018“Absent a direct challenge, we must treat the delegation provision as valid and allow the arbitrator to determine the issue of arbitrability.” Newman for Founding Partners Stable Value Fund, LP v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 231 So. 3d 464 , 467 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (quoting Angels Senior Living at Connerton Ct., LLC v. Gundry, 210 So. 3d 257, 258 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)); see also Allied Prof’ls Ins.

2017Absent a direct challenge, we must treat the delegation provision as valid and allow the arbitrator to determine the issue of arbitrability.” Parnell v. CashCall, Inc., 804 F.3d 1142, 1148 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 72, 130 S.Ct. 2772 ).

2017Absent a direct challenge, we must treat the delegation provision as valid and allow the arbitrator to determine the issue of 2 arbitrability.” Angels Senior Living at Connerton Ct., LLC v. Gundry, 210 So. 3d 257, 258 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (quoting Parnell v. CashCall, Inc., 804 F.3d 1142, 1148 (11th Cir. 2015)).

2017Absent a direct challenge, we must treat the delegation provision as valid and allow the arbitrator to determine the issue of arbitrability.” Parnell v. CashCall, Inc., 804 F.3d 1142, 1148 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 72, 130 S.Ct. 2772 ).

2017Absent a direct challenge, we must treat the delegation provision as valid and allow the arbitrator to determine the issue of arbitrability.” Parnell v. CashCall, Inc., 804 F.3d 1142, 1148 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 72, 130 S.Ct. 2772 ).

2012Oct. 20, 2010) (under Delaware law, common law claims of negligent misrepresentation and fraud were direct claims which could be brought by limited partners); Stephenson v. Citco Group, Ltd., 700 F.Supp.2d 599, 608-12 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (negligent misrepresentation is a direct claim, and noting that the same set of facts may result in both direct and derivative claims).

2010Oct.20, 2010) (under Delaware law, common law claims of negligent misrepresentation and fraud were direct claims which could be brought by limited partners); Stephenson v. Citco Group, Ltd., 700 F.Supp.2d 599, 608-12 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (negligent misrepresentation is a direct claim, and noting that the same set of facts may result in both direct and derivative claims).

2008See Lazzara v. Molins, 504 So.2d 13 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (holding that where complaint did not support direct claim against property because recovery would, at most, provide money damages, lis pendens should have been discharged); see also Lake Placid Holding Co. v. Paparone, 414 So.2d 564, 566 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (“A complaint which will not support a claim against the specific property at issue cannot provide a basis for tying it up by a filing of notice of lis pendens.”).

1987Lake Placid Holding Co. v. Paparone, 414 So.2d 564 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).

2000Florida Bar v. Ward, 599 So.2d 650, 652 (Fla.1992) (emphasis removed) (quoting Florida Bar v. Dancu, 490 So.2d 40, 41-42 (Fla.1986) (citation omitted)).

1992The direct violation of this trust by stealing client's money, compounded by lying about it, mandates a punishment commensurate with such abuse. 490 So.2d 40 , 41-42 (Fla. 1986) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

2025See Mazda Motor Corp. v. Quinn, 524 So. 2d 1021, 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (distinguishing prior supreme court decision because it “did not involve a direct challenge to an overbroad discovery order” (emphasis supplied)); Am.

2023P’ship v. Citigroup Inc., 980 F. Supp. 2d 510, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Even if Citigroup was also injured, plaintiffs’ injuries are not depend[e]nt on Citigroup’s injury merely because the same misconduct might have harmed Citigroup.”); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1212 (Del. 1996) (“Courts have long recognized that the same set of facts can give rise both to a direct claim and a derivative claim.”), cited with approval by Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1038 .

2023P’ship v. Citigroup Inc., 980 F. Supp. 2d 510, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Even if Citigroup was also injured, plaintiffs’ injuries are not depend[e]nt on Citigroup’s injury merely because the same misconduct might have harmed Citigroup.”); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1212 (Del. 1996) (“Courts have long recognized that the same set of facts can give rise both to a direct claim and a derivative claim.”), cited with approval by Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1038 .

2020Absent a direct challenge, we must treat the delegation provision as valid and allow the arbitrator to determine the issue of arbitrability.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Angels Senior Living at Connerton Ct., LLC v. Gundry, 210 So. 3d 257, 258 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017))); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Beverly, 183 So. 3d 1099, 1101 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“The question whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration, i.e., the ‘question of arbitrability,’ is ‘an issue for judicial determination [u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.’” (alteration in origina

2020Absent a direct challenge, we must treat the delegation provision as valid and allow the arbitrator to determine the issue of arbitrability.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Angels Senior Living at Connerton Ct., LLC v. Gundry, 210 So. 3d 257, 258 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017))); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Beverly, 183 So. 3d 1099, 1101 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“The question whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration, i.e., the ‘question of arbitrability,’ is ‘an issue for judicial determination [u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.’” (alteration in origina

2017An officer’s request for clarification of a spontaneous statement generally does not constitute interrogation.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Briggs, 273 F.3d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A police officer’s response to a direct inquiry by the defendant does not constitute ‘interrogation.’ ”); People v. Gonzales, 987 P.2d 239, 242-43 (Colo. 1999) (“A response explicitly permitting a defendant to make an inculpatory statement does not rise to the level of police interrogation.”); State v. Cryan, 363 N.J.Super. 442 , 833 A.2d 640, 647-48 (N.J.

2017An officer’s request for clarification of a spontaneous statement generally does not constitute interrogation.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Briggs, 273 F.3d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A police officer’s response to a direct inquiry by the defendant does not constitute ‘interrogation.’ ”); People v. Gonzales, 987 P.2d 239, 242-43 (Colo. 1999) (“A response explicitly permitting a defendant to make an inculpatory statement does not rise to the level of police interrogation.”); State v. Cryan, 363 N.J.Super. 442 , 833 A.2d 640, 647-48 (N.J.

2017An officer’s request for clarification of a spontaneous statement generally does not constitute interrogation.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Briggs, 273 F.3d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A police officer’s response to a direct inquiry by the defendant does not constitute ‘interrogation.’ ”); People v. Gonzales, 987 P.2d 239, 242-43 (Colo. 1999) (“A response explicitly permitting a defendant to make an inculpatory statement does not rise to the level of police interrogation.”); State v. Cryan, 363 N.J.Super. 442 , 833 A.2d 640, 647-48 (N.J.

2017An officer’s request for clarification of a spontaneous statement generally does not constitute interrogation.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Briggs, 273 F.3d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A police officer’s response to a direct inquiry by the defendant does not constitute ‘interrogation.’ ”); People v. Gonzales, 987 P.2d 239, 242-43 (Colo. 1999) (“A response explicitly permitting a defendant to make an inculpatory statement does not rise to the level of police interrogation.”); State v. Cryan, 363 N.J.Super. 442 , 833 A.2d 640, 647-48 (N.J.

2014Health & Wellness, L.L.C.. v. Work, 282 Ga.App. 619 , 689 S.E.2d 570 , 575-76 (2006) (“While shareholders may also bring direct actions for injuries done to them in their individual capacities by corporate fiduciaries, in order to pursue such a direct claim the shareholder must allege more than a wrong done to the corporation, either a separate and distinct injury from that suffered by other shareholders or a wrong involving a contract right existing independently of any right of the corporation.”); Loewen v. Galligan, 130 Or.App. 222 , 882 P.2d 104, 119 (1994) (“A special injury is establishe

2014Health & Wellness, L.L.C.. v. Work, 282 Ga.App. 619 , 689 S.E.2d 570 , 575-76 (2006) (“While shareholders may also bring direct actions for injuries done to them in their individual capacities by corporate fiduciaries, in order to pursue such a direct claim the shareholder must allege more than a wrong done to the corporation, either a separate and distinct injury from that suffered by other shareholders or a wrong involving a contract right existing independently of any right of the corporation.”); Loewen v. Galligan, 130 Or.App. 222 , 882 P.2d 104, 119 (1994) (“A special injury is establishe

2012See Lundy v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 34 F.3d 1173, 1183 (3d Cir.1994) (“Where there is a basis for the plaintiff to assert liability against the party or parties named in a complaint and there is no reason for another party to believe that the plaintiff did anything other than make a deliberate choice between potential defendants, courts have consistently held that the third requirement of Rule 15(c)(3) [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governing relation back of amendments] is not met.”); State ex rel.

2008See Lazzara v. Molins, 504 So.2d 13 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (holding that where complaint did not support direct claim against property because recovery would, at most, provide money damages, lis pendens should have been discharged); see also Lake Placid Holding Co. v. Paparone, 414 So.2d 564, 566 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (“A complaint which will not support a claim against the specific property at issue cannot provide a basis for tying it up by a filing of notice of lis pendens.”).

2000Florida Bar v. Ward, 599 So.2d 650, 652 (Fla.1992) (emphasis removed) (quoting Florida Bar v. Dancu, 490 So.2d 40, 41-42 (Fla.1986) (citation omitted)).

1999See Wolfe v. American Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 539 So.2d 606 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Jones v. H.F.

1999See In re Weinstein, 518 So.2d 1370 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)(counsel's failure to stand when making objections after being *615 ordered to so was a willful disobedience of a court order representing an affront to the court's authority).