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55 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1968–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospitalgreen2 sentences2002Like the parents in Strachan, supra, 109 N.J. at 535 , 538 A. 2d 346 , plaintiff's emotional distress claim "was not the result of witnessing another's injury but rather the result of a breach of duty owed directly to plaintiff[ ]." And, like the brain-dead son in Strachan , plaintiff's father was also deceased, and therefore could suffer no cognizable harm as a result of the City's negligence or willful misconduct. 2002Like the parents in Strachan, supra, 109 N.J. at 535 , 538 A. 2d 346 , plaintiff's emotional distress claim "was not the result of witnessing another's injury but rather the result of a breach of duty owed directly to plaintiff[ ]." And, like the brain-dead son in Strachan , plaintiff's father was also deceased, and therefore could suffer no cognizable harm as a result of the City's negligence or willful misconduct. | 2 | 3 |
Russo v. Nagelgreen2 sentences2024Alternatively, a plaintiff can state a prima facie claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress by satisfying the four elements set forth in Portee. [ 195 N.J. 91, 104 (2008); accord Abousaid v. Mansard Gardens Assocs., LLC, 207 N.J. 67, 76-77 (2011).] Plaintiff contends he is entitled to recover damages based on a direct claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress that follows traditional negligence analysis, which he claims "can be understood as negligent conduct that is the proximate cause of emotional distress in a person to whom the actor owes a legal duty to exercise reas 2021To establish a direct claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must establish "(a) defendant owed a duty of reasonable care to plaintiff; (b) defendant breached that duty; (c) plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and (d) defendant's breach of duty was the proximate cause of the injury." Russo v. Nagel, 358 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
Lawlor v. Cloverleaf Memorial Park, Inc.green2 sentences1993See Lawlor v. Cloverleaf Memorial Park, Inc., 56 N.J. 326, 339-345 [ 266 A.2d 569 ] (1970). 1993See Lawlor v. Cloverleaf Memorial Park, Inc., 56 N.J. 326, 339-345 [ 266 A.2d 569 ] (1970). | 2 | 2 |
Tully v. Mirzgreen2 sentences2025Tully, 457 N.J. 2021Citing Tully v. Mirz, 457 N.J. | 1 | 2 |
Messeka Sheet Metal v. Hoddergreen2 sentences2011Id. at 118 , 845 A. 2d 646 . 2011Id. at 118 , 845 A. 2d 646 . | 1 | 2 |
Carey v. Lovettgreen2 sentences1993Consequently, a direct claim for emotional distress, see generally, Carey v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44, 55-57 , 622 A. 2d 1279 (1993), is cognizable under the LAD claims alleged under Count Four. 1993Consequently, a direct claim for emotional distress, see generally, Carey v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44, 55-57 , 622 A. 2d 1279 (1993), is cognizable under the LAD claims alleged under Count Four. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Osoriogreen1 sentence2026We decline to reassess the standard in Dixon and Dangcil at this time and await a direct challenge by a party. 9 principles, race, color, ancestry, national origin, and sex.” State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508 , 526 n.3 (1986), modified in other part, State v. Osorio, 199 N.J. 486, 502-04 (2009). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Eldersgreen1 sentence2025We defer4 to the trial court’s supported factual findings and conclude it correctly found that plaintiffs suffered a special injury, enabling the direct claim exception to the derivative suit requirement. 4 "Deference is especially appropriate when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility" because of the "trial court's opportunity to hear and see the witnesses who testified on the stand." Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574 , 594-95 (2020) (first quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998); and then citing State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007)). | 1 | 1 |
Muellenberg v. Bikon Corp.green1 sentence2025See Mullenberg v. Bikon Corp., 143 N.J. 168, 181 (1996) (explaining that shareholders of closely held companies owe fiduciary duties to both the company and other shareholders). | 1 | 1 |
Cesare v. Cesaregreen1 sentence2025We defer4 to the trial court’s supported factual findings and conclude it correctly found that plaintiffs suffered a special injury, enabling the direct claim exception to the derivative suit requirement. 4 "Deference is especially appropriate when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility" because of the "trial court's opportunity to hear and see the witnesses who testified on the stand." Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574 , 594-95 (2020) (first quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998); and then citing State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007)). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Browngreen1 sentence2025Super. at 124 .] For a closely-held corporation, courts have discretion to construe a derivative cause of action as a direct claim if doing so "will not (i) unfairly expose the corporation or the defendants to a multiplicity of actions, (ii) materially prejudice the interests of creditors of the corporation, or (iii) interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery among all interested persons." Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, § 7.01(d) (Am. [L.] Inst. (1992)) [hereinafter Principles][;] [s]ee also Brown, 323 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Jablonowska v. Suthergreen1 sentence2024Alternatively, a plaintiff can state a prima facie claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress by satisfying the four elements set forth in Portee. [ 195 N.J. 91, 104 (2008); accord Abousaid v. Mansard Gardens Assocs., LLC, 207 N.J. 67, 76-77 (2011).] Plaintiff contends he is entitled to recover damages based on a direct claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress that follows traditional negligence analysis, which he claims "can be understood as negligent conduct that is the proximate cause of emotional distress in a person to whom the actor owes a legal duty to exercise reas | 1 | 1 |
Decker v. Princeton Packet, Inc.green1 sentence2024Super. 254, 269-70 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting Decker v. Princeton Packet, 116 N.J. 418, 429 (1989)). | 1 | 1 |
Abouzaid v. Mansard Gardens Associates, LLCgreen1 sentence2024Alternatively, a plaintiff can state a prima facie claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress by satisfying the four elements set forth in Portee. [ 195 N.J. 91, 104 (2008); accord Abousaid v. Mansard Gardens Assocs., LLC, 207 N.J. 67, 76-77 (2011).] Plaintiff contends he is entitled to recover damages based on a direct claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress that follows traditional negligence analysis, which he claims "can be understood as negligent conduct that is the proximate cause of emotional distress in a person to whom the actor owes a legal duty to exercise reas | 1 | 1 |
Adler's Quality Bakery, Inc. v. Gaseteria, Inc.green1 sentence2022See Adler's Quality Bakery, Inc. v. Gaseteria, Inc., 32 N.J. 55, 80 (1960) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("A person who, without personal fault, has become subject to tort liability for the unauthorized and wrongful conduct of another, is entitled to indemnity from the other for expenditures properly made in the discharge of such liability."). | 1 | 1 |
Diorio v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurancegreen1 sentence2021See State v. 11 Branch, 182 N.J. 338, 349-50 (2005) (reversing a conviction “because a detective’s hearsay testimony led to the ‘inescapable inference’ that the detective received information from an unknown source implicating the defendant in the crime,” and stressing that, “‘[w]hen the logical implication to be drawn from the testimony leads the jury to believe that a non-testifying witness has given the police evidence of the accused’s guilt, the testimony should be disallowed as hearsay’”) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 262, 271 (1973)). | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2021Beyond finding that trial counsel could not be deemed ineffective for not raising a direct challenge to CSAAS testimony, the judge noted it would have not made any difference if she had mounted that challenge in light of the Court's unequivocal conclusion in this case that "the CSAAS expert's improper statements were not clearly capable of producing an unjust result and do not warrant a new trial." J.R., 227 N.J. at 400 ; see G.E.P., 243 N.J. at 370 (declining to reverse G.E.P.'s convictions, 2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693-94 (1984). 6 A-4915-18 notwithstanding pipeline retroact | 1 | 1 |
State v. Frisbygreen1 sentence2021We also recognize “that juries ‘may be inclined to accord special respect to’ police testimony,” Trinidad, 241 N.J. at 446 (quoting State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595 (2002)), and that a testifying police officer may, intentionally or not, lead the jury to believe that the police are in possession of additional damning information that proves that the defendant is guilty but is being kept from the direct hearing of the jury. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Branchgreen1 sentence2021See State v. 11 Branch, 182 N.J. 338, 349-50 (2005) (reversing a conviction “because a detective’s hearsay testimony led to the ‘inescapable inference’ that the detective received information from an unknown source implicating the defendant in the crime,” and stressing that, “‘[w]hen the logical implication to be drawn from the testimony leads the jury to believe that a non-testifying witness has given the police evidence of the accused’s guilt, the testimony should be disallowed as hearsay’”) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 262, 271 (1973)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen1 sentence2020In State v. Smith, 43 N.J. 67, 74 (1964), our Supreme Court explained that a PCR "proceeding may not be used as a substitute for an appeal from the judgment of conviction. | 1 | 1 |
| Rodney D. Hendrick v. H.E. Avent, an Unincorporated Associationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gaines v. Bellinogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Potomac Ins. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs.green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Addoniziogreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Alexander A. Alexandro, Jr.green | 1 | 1 |
| New Jersey Coalition of Health Care Professionals, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of Banking & Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| NJ COLALITION OF HEALTH CARE v. Dobigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pickett v. Lloyd'sgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Buoni v. Browning Ferres Industriesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 391264green | 1 | 1 |
| State, in Interest of Ahgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Holloway v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ilda Aguas v. State of New Jersey (072467)
green
2 sentences2015To prevail on a direct claim alleging defendant's negligence, a plaintiff bears the burden to show a defendant negligently created a discriminatory work environment by "faili[ng] to exercise due care with respect to sexual discrimination in the workplace, that [the defendant's] breach of the duty of care caused the plaintiff's harm, and that [plaintiff] sustained damages." Id. at 512 . 2015Id. at 506 . | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Portee v. Jaffee
green
2 sentences2002Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 101 , 417 A. 2d 521 (1980). [9] The trial court in this case focused on plaintiff's failure to "actually see something" and her inability to establish "some nexus between the actual physical seeing of something or impression." In our view, plaintiff's claim is a direct claim of emotional distress because her allegations do not involve any injury to another. 2002Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 101 , 417 A. 2d 521 (1980). [9] The trial court in this case focused on plaintiff's failure to "actually see something" and her inability to establish "some nexus between the actual physical seeing of something or impression." In our view, plaintiff's claim is a direct claim of emotional distress because her allegations do not involve any injury to another. | 2 | 1980–2002 |
Giardina v. Bennett
green
2 sentences1993Relying on Giardina v. Bennett, 111 N.J. 412 , 545 A.2d 139 (1988), the Law Division ruled that the parents, plaintiffs JoAnn Carey and Gregory Carey, could assert a direct claim for their emotional distress. 1993Relying on Giardina v. Bennett, 111 N.J. 412 , 545 A.2d 139 (1988), the Law Division ruled that the parents, plaintiffs JoAnn Carey and Gregory Carey, could assert a direct claim for their emotional distress. | 2 | 1993–1995 |
Holloway v. State
green
2 sentences1992Super. at 559 , 571 A. 2d 1324 ] The Supreme Court then said: In concluding that the State's direct claim for reimbursement for its medical expenses by way of subrogation is barred by the statute of limitations, we note that the State has also variously contended that its entitlement to those medical expenses in whole or in part is encompassed by its claims for indemnification and contribution. 1991The Appellate Division, on interlocutory appeal, reversed the trial court’s ruling that dismissed the State’s claim for reimbursement of medical expenses as time-barred and reinstated the claim. 239 N.J.Super. 554, 560-61 , 571 A.2d 1324 (1990). | 2 | 1991–1992 |
State v. Gilmore
green
1 sentence2026We decline to reassess the standard in Dixon and Dangcil at this time and await a direct challenge by a party. 9 principles, race, color, ancestry, national origin, and sex.” State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508 , 526 n.3 (1986), modified in other part, State v. Osorio, 199 N.J. 486, 502-04 (2009). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Bellamy
green
1 sentence2026In other words, the “group must be one that has been historically excluded, on the basis of stereotypical prejudices, from full participation in the significant duties and privileges of American citizenship.” Dangcil, 248 N.J. at 143 (quoting State v. Bellamy, 260 N.J. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Twanda Jones v. Morey’s Pier, Inc. (077502) (Cape May and Statewide)
green
1 sentence2021In Jones, our Court held that the claim period is the same for both a plaintiff's direct claim and a defendant's indemnification/contribution claim. 230 N.J. at 157 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. J.R.
green
1 sentence2021Beyond finding that trial counsel could not be deemed ineffective for not raising a direct challenge to CSAAS testimony, the judge noted it would have not made any difference if she had mounted that challenge in light of the Court's unequivocal conclusion in this case that "the CSAAS expert's improper statements were not clearly capable of producing an unjust result and do not warrant a new trial." J.R., 227 N.J. at 400 ; see G.E.P., 243 N.J. at 370 (declining to reverse G.E.P.'s convictions, 2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693-94 (1984). 6 A-4915-18 notwithstanding pipeline retroact | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp.
green
2 sentences2021In contrast, a direct claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress "can be understood as negligent conduct that is the proximate cause of emotional distress in a person to whom the actor owes a legal duty to exercise reasonable care." Decker, 116 N.J. at 429 . 2021Super. 254, 269 (App. A-1226-19 12 Div. 2003 ) (citing Decker, 116 N.J. at 429 ). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Hendrick v. Avent green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Rewald v. United States green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Johnpoll v. Thornburgh
green
1 sentence2017The collateral attacks brought later are barred by res judicata." Hendrick v. Avent, 891 F.2d 583, 587 (5th Cir.) (rejecting collateral attack of bankruptcy court order for the sale of debtor's stock), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 819 , 111 S. Ct. 64 , 112 L. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Gilbert v. Gladden green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Rac v. Pjs, Jr. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Registrar & Transfer Co. v. DIR. DIV. OF TAX. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Sears Mortgage Corp. v. Rose green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Jablonowska v. Suther green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Srebnik v. State green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Woolery v. United States green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Speckter v. United States green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Coughlin v. Jacobson green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Cruz Const. Co., Inc. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Sheffield v. Ford Motor Co. neutral | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Flores neutral | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Conway green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Savage green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Hedgebeth v. Medford green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Horesh v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Markey v. Skog green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Ryder v. United States green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Lehmann v. Toys 'R' US, Inc. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Foley v. Foley green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Frame v. Kothari green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Speer v. Armstrong green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Amer. Container Corp. v. Hanley Trucking Corp. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| B & L Motor Freight, Inc. v. Heymann neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| B & L Motor Freight, Inc. v. Heymann green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| B & L MOTOR FREIGHT v. Heymann neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Greisman v. Newcomb Hospital green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Fritz v. Anderson green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.