disclosure requirement in Michigan

2015Further, “[t]he statute does not predicate the disclosure requirement upon the prisoner having, in fact, previously filed civil actions or appeals.” Tomzek v Dep’t of Corrections, 258 Mich App 222, 224 ; 672 NW2d 511 (2003).

2015Further, “[t]he statute does not predicate the disclosure requirement upon the prisoner having, in fact, previously filed civil actions or appeals.” Tomzek v Dep’t of Corrections, 258 Mich App 222, 224 ; 672 NW2d 511 (2003).

2022In order to survive the exacting-scrutiny standard, there must be “a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important governmental interest.” Doe v Reed, 561 US 186, 196 ; 130 S Ct 2811 ; 177 L Ed 2d 493 (2010) (quotation 2 marks and citations omitted).

2022In order to survive the exacting-scrutiny standard, there must be “a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important governmental interest.” Doe v Reed, 561 US 186, 196 ; 130 S Ct 2811 ; 177 L Ed 2d 493 (2010) (quotation 2 marks and citations omitted).

2022However, as this Court has recognized, the Legislature also codified exemptions from the disclosure requirement to “shield[] some ‘affairs of government’ from public view.” Herald Co, 475 Mich at 472 .

2022However, as this Court has recognized, the Legislature also codified exemptions from the disclosure requirement to “shield[] some ‘affairs of government’ from public view.” Herald Co, 475 Mich at 472 .

1995Atkins, supra at 174 .

1990The disclosure requirement may be considered satisfied where the "jury [is] made well aware” of such facts "by means of . . . thorough and probing *153 cross-examination by defense counsel.” Atkins, supra, p 174 , emphasis added.

2018That remand resulted in Doe v. Dep't of Corrections , 312 Mich. App. 97 , 878 N.W.2d 293 (2015), in which this Court held that the trial court erred by not granting summary disposition for failure to comply with the disclosure requirement of the PLRA and that plaintiffs could not amend their complaint to cure the defect.

2005Again, because we have determined that there is no private cause of action to enforce the disclosure requirement of the Head Start Act, we need not address whether the state courts are required, under Chevron and Mead, supra, to accord deference to the letters authored by these HHS officials.

2005Rather, § 9839(a) imposes on Head Start agencies a disclosure requirement, and 42 U.S.C. 9836a explicitly provides a remedy for a violation of that requirement: corrective action to be initiated by the secretary. [1] 532 U.S. 275 , 121 S.Ct. 1511 , 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001). [2] 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). [3] Cort, supra at 78 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 . [4] Alexander involved an interpretation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides in § 601 that no person shall, "on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the

2005Rather, § 9839(a) imposes on Head Start agencies a disclosure requirement, and 42 U.S.C. 9836a explicitly provides a remedy for a violation of that requirement: corrective action to be initiated by the secretary. [1] 532 U.S. 275 , 121 S.Ct. 1511 , 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001). [2] 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). [3] Cort, supra at 78 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 . [4] Alexander involved an interpretation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides in § 601 that no person shall, "on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the

2005Rather, § 9839(a) imposes on Head Start agencies a disclosure requirement, and 42 U.S.C. 9836a explicitly provides a remedy for a violation of that requirement: corrective action to be initiated by the secretary. [1] 532 U.S. 275 , 121 S.Ct. 1511 , 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001). [2] 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). [3] Cort, supra at 78 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 . [4] Alexander involved an interpretation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides in § 601 that no person shall, "on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the

2005Rather, § 9839(a) imposes on Head Start agencies a disclosure requirement, and 42 U.S.C. 9836a explicitly provides a remedy for a violation of that requirement: corrective action to be initiated by the secretary. [1] 532 U.S. 275 , 121 S.Ct. 1511 , 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001). [2] 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). [3] Cort, supra at 78 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 . [4] Alexander involved an interpretation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides in § 601 that no person shall, "on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the

1990Also, like the disclosure requirement in Shelton , the childcare organization act "does not provide that the information it requires be kept confidential." Shelton, supra at 486 .

1990Also, like the disclosure requirement in Shelton , the childcare organization act "does not provide that the information it requires be kept confidential.” Shelton, supra at 486 .

1990To raise a First Amendment claim, the effect of a disclosure requirement must at least be to create "a palpable threat of state interference with the internal policies and beliefs of these church related schools.” Id. at 76-77, citing Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America and Canada v Milivojevich, 426 US 696, 713 ; 96 S Ct 2372 ; 49 L Ed 2d 151 (1976).

1990To raise a First Amendment claim, the effect of a disclosure requirement must at least be to create "a palpable threat of state interference with the internal policies and beliefs of these church related schools.” Id. at 76-77, citing Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America and Canada v Milivojevich, 426 US 696, 713 ; 96 S Ct 2372 ; 49 L Ed 2d 151 (1976).

1987That can be done without adverting to whether the witness was, if charged, convicted. [ 415 Mich 612 .] When it is the plea itself which is the consideration, how it can be disclosed without adverting to it is something of a dilemma to the trial bench and bar. 11 The statement, although only dictum given the facts of the case, has been a matter of frequent concern, 12 particularly since it appeared to be an overbroad statement based on distinguishable precedents. 13 In People v Standifer, supra, six members of the Court addressed the issue, again with less than decisive result.

1928In Kennedy v. McLellan, 76 Mich. 598 , it was held by this court (quoting from the syllabus): “Where a plaintiff sees fit to submit his case in the court below without taking, or attempting to take, advantage of the provisions of Act No. 176, Laws of 1885, by impleading a party shown by the disclosure to claim the indebtedness due from the garnishee, or the property in his hands, the appellate court cannot aid him, but must pass upon the judgment as rendered at the circuit.” It is difficult to perceive how the trial judge could have reached any other result than he did, but it is sufficient fo