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14 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wallar v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Second, Teter claims that the State either lost or destroyed the blood evidence depicted in the photos before his counsel had the opportunity to test the blood for DNA. “[B]efore an alleged disclosure violation can be cognizable in a Rule 24.035 proceeding, it must both attain constitutional significance (i.e., meet the requirements of Brady[ 4]) and be of such a nature that it could not have been raised before the Rule 24.035 motion.” Wallar v. State, 403 S.W.3d 698, 707 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (emphasis added). 2017Wallar v. State, 403 S.W.3d 698, 707 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Camerongreen1 sentence2010“Therefore, the review of the propriety of the trial court’s action includes consideration of whether the State was unfairly surprised by [the alibi witness’s] testimony and the harm, if any, it would have suffered by virtue of that surprise.” Id. 12 Although the State claims it would have been unfairly prejudiced at trial as a result of the late endorsement of the witnesses, “[t]he mere fact of late endorsement does not in itself show prejudice.” State v. Cameron, 604 S.W.2d 653, 657-659 (Mo.App. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Moore v. Brewstergreen1 sentence2004See Brewster, 116 S.W.3d at 639 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mansfieldgreen2 sentences2002The same principles of analysis and discretion apply where the defendant has violated the disclosure rule. "[R]efusal to allow testimony in a criminal case is a `drastic remedy.'" State v. Anderson, 18 S.W.3d 11, 16 (Mo.App.2000) (citing State v. Mansfield, 637 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Mo. banc 1982)). 2002The same principles of analysis and discretion apply where the defendant has violated the disclosure rule. “[Rjefusal to allow testimony in a criminal case is a ‘drastic remedy.’ ” State v. Anderson, 18 S.W.3d 11, 16 (Mo.App.2000) (citing State v. Mansfield, 637 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Mo. banc 1982)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Andersongreen2 sentences2002The same principles of analysis and discretion apply where the defendant has violated the disclosure rule. "[R]efusal to allow testimony in a criminal case is a `drastic remedy.'" State v. Anderson, 18 S.W.3d 11, 16 (Mo.App.2000) (citing State v. Mansfield, 637 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Mo. banc 1982)). 2002The same principles of analysis and discretion apply where the defendant has violated the disclosure rule. “[Rjefusal to allow testimony in a criminal case is a ‘drastic remedy.’ ” State v. Anderson, 18 S.W.3d 11, 16 (Mo.App.2000) (citing State v. Mansfield, 637 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Mo. banc 1982)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Paynegreen1 sentence1995State v. Payne, 660 S.W.2d 24, 25 [3] (Mo.App.1983). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Curtisgreen1 sentence1984(That case merely holds that where Oregon had no provision for reciprocal discovery, the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment forebade enforcement of an alibi preclusion rule against petitioner.) Note also State v. Curtis, 544 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Mo. banc 1976), holding that where the defendant has given notice-of-mental disease or defect defense, the state, under Wardius, must disclose the names and addresses of witnesses of rebuttal witness to that defense (as well as an alibi defense). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Corleygreen1 sentence1983State v. Corley, 639 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Mo.App.1982). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Royalgreen1 sentence1983State v. Royal, 610 S.W.2d 946, 951 (Mo. banc 1981). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hubblegreen1 sentence1975State v. Hubble, 494 S.W.2d 358, 361 (Mo.App.1973). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Corozzo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
green
1 sentence2018In particular, we found that, "[a]ll they allege is that the format of Wal-Mart's Disclosure Form did not comply with the FCRA's disclosure requirement because Wal-Mart's Disclosure Form included extraneous information." Id. at 575-76 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Simonton
green
2 sentences2010“This is addressed in light of the purpose of the disclosure rule which was violated.” Id. 2010“Therefore, the review of the propriety of the trial court’s action includes consideration of whether the State was unfairly surprised by [the alibi witness’s] testimony and the harm, if any, it would have suffered by virtue of that surprise.” Id. 12 Although the State claims it would have been unfairly prejudiced at trial as a result of the late endorsement of the witnesses, “[t]he mere fact of late endorsement does not in itself show prejudice.” State v. Cameron, 604 S.W.2d 653, 657-659 (Mo.App. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Roviaro v. United States
green
2 sentences1998Roviaro v. U.S., 353 U.S. 53, 62 , 77 S.Ct. 623, 628-29 , 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). 1998Roviaro v. U.S., 353 U.S. 53, 62 , 77 S.Ct. 623, 628-29 , 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Wardius v. Oregon
green
2 sentences1984Had there been a specific disclosure of that defense, then the case might be in a different posture, as requiring a reciprocal disclosure of the statement under Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 , 93 S.Ct. 2208 , 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973). 1984Had there been a specific disclosure of that defense, then the case might be in a different posture, as requiring a reciprocal disclosure of the statement under Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 , 93 S.Ct. 2208 , 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
State v. Ellis
green
2 sentences1979In State v. Ellis, 567 S.W.2d 454 (Mo.App.1978) wherein a similar theory was interposed, this court said “determination of compliance with the disclosure rule cannot be based upon a party’s subjective intent.” ( 567 S.W.2d 454, 456 ) Furthermore, as appellant declined the opportunity to make an offer of proof regarding the testimony of the proposed character witness, we are unable, as was the trial court, to appraise the degree of prejudice which could have potentially inured to the State. 1979In State v. Ellis, 567 S.W.2d 454 (Mo.App.1978) wherein a similar theory was interposed, this court said “determination of compliance with the disclosure rule cannot be based upon a party’s subjective intent.” ( 567 S.W.2d 454, 456 ) Furthermore, as appellant declined the opportunity to make an offer of proof regarding the testimony of the proposed character witness, we are unable, as was the trial court, to appraise the degree of prejudice which could have potentially inured to the State. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Buckley v. Valeo
green
2 sentences1976The court recognized a possible constitutional problem with compelled disclosure, and stated that to uphold such a disclosure requirement, there must be a "`substantial relation' between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed." 96 S.Ct. at 656 . 1976The court recognized a possible constitutional problem with compelled disclosure, and stated that to uphold such a disclosure requirement, there must be a “‘substantial relation’ between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed.” 96 S.Ct. at 656 . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.